# THE GREAT WAR

SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME FROM THE ARMISTICE TO RATIFICATION OF THE PEACE TREATY

CONTRACTOR SALES CONTRACTOR CONTR

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#### SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME

to the

## GREAT WAR HISTORY

FROM THE ARMISTICE NOVEMBER 11, 1918 TO THE RATIFICATION OF THE PEACE TREATY

together with a series of New World Maps in Colors

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Compiled by
LOUIS E. ORCUTT

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#### FOREWORD.

7ITH the signing of the Armistice there appeared, as if by magic, a large number of histories of the World War. Through all the long weary months of conflict authors had been patiently compiling and publishers had been waiting for the opportunity to market the books. Some were modest one-volume stories of this conflict into which nearly all the nations had been Others were ambitious sets of several volumes, but all ended with the fighting.

It has always been true that the history of war comprises two principal elements, the fighting and the making of the peace. Often the victor in the battle has been the loser in the council. In this armistice which was the signal for the avalanche of histories, lay possibilities innumerable. Initiated on a statement of principles more unselfish than the world had yet known, the perfection of the peace depended upon the ability of statesmen to hold their course toward the ideal through all the devious ways of self-interest and national self-consciousness. Would a real and enduring peace come from the council table or would another armed truce ensue? The world hoped for the best and expected something less. But all of these books were marketed before the first meeting of the Peace Conference was called in session.

For this reason all the books issued at the end of the fighting are incomplete as histories of the war. In selling our own book on the Great War we recognized this fact and promised this supplementary volume, to be issued when Peace was at last declared. We expected that this would be within six months; but events have lagged. The task of the Peace Conference more than covered the six months and then the ratification and proclamation of the peace dragged on. We have been forced, most unwillingly, to close the volume with the mere fact of final declaration of peace under the treaty, a declaration that leaves the United States still technically at war. We have waited and hoped for final affirmative action by the American Senate; but we must go to press with these pages with the treaty still waiting upon the inevitable compromise.

No matter what history of the war you may have purchased, this book will serve to complete it. We have not aimed at exhaustive treatment; but have endeavored to give the connected story of events, with sufficient detail to convey a correct understanding of the work and results of the Peace Conference. It has also been possible to

incorporate facts about the fighting and official statements, not available to anyone at the time most of these histories were issued. We have reprinted the official reports of General Pershing, Sir Douglas Haig, and General Allenby and have quoted liberally from the official story of the American Army's part in the war by Colonel Ayres issued by the United States War Department. There is also much material about all our various units especially about the Air Service, which has come to light bit by bit during these months of peace making.

This book, with almost any well compiled book ending at the armistice, will give you a fairly complete record of the greatest war in the history of mankind and a reasonably good idea of the peace, regarded in many quarters as the greatest event since Calvary. We have carefully checked the facts, dates and names. Credit is given for all quotations. We put the book in your hands, confident that you will feel well repaid for the time spent in reading it; and that you will find it valuable for reference, fair in its statements and unprejudiced in its facts.

L. E. O.

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#### THE MAKING OF PEACE

#### CHAPTER I

#### THE ARMISTICE TERMS ENFORCED

PEACE came so quickly, once the dissolution of the German armed force began, that the world was scarcely ready to believe that the days of terror were really ended. Received with ardent rejoicing everywhere, the news of the signing of the armistice became the signal for a new aligning of forces, in order that the peace which should follow the cessation of fighting might be such a peace as each people desired. In Italy a great campaign was launched to develop a public sentiment, which would back the Italian delegates in a demand for the ultimate maximum of Italia Irredenta. In France and England the Governments encouraged the people to feel that Germany would be forced to repair all the damage, she had caused, and to make reparation, franc for franc. Lloyd George called for elections to Parliament, on December 14, and carried the polling by promising to make Germany pay every last farthing and to try the Kaiser. "Hang the Kaiser" was a popular campaign cry.

Germany was at first too disorganized to do more than attempt to find herself; but beginning with a plea from German women for food, the German people were soon well started on a campaign of self-commiseration, part rumor, part newspaper talk, part addresses by political leaders, all of which tended to present to the Allies a picture of a broken and bankrupt Germany whom they should succor

rather than condemn.

The Allies, however, made their own investigations of Germany's helplessness and, though they found her unable to repay the terrible debt she had caused civilization to incur to stop her wild excursion after power, they found also evident ability to pay heavy indemnities, industry untouched by war, commercial interests ready for a new battle for world commerce, a Germany quite efficient in spite of four years and four months of warfare, blockade and comparative hunger.

America, being the only great nation concerned in the peacemaking, which had no ambition either for territory or increased influence, was looked to by all as the arbiter of peace, and depended upon by some to get for them what they feared they would not be

able to get alone.

With the announcement of peace America returned at once to all-wheat bread and the restrictions of war-time were progressively withdrawn. The War Department began mustering out troops in camps at home on November 16, and the mustering out was continued at the rate of 30,000 a day while plans were rapidly perfected for the bringing home of the men in France at the rate of 200,000 to 300,000 a month.

#### ALLIES MARCH INTO GERMANY

On November 17, 1918, the Allied troops began the march into Germany on the heels of the retreating Germans. The American Army moved through French Lorraine, Luxemburg and a corner of Belgium toward Coblenz on the Rhine. Everywhere, until German soil was reached, the Allied soldiers were received as liberators and Allied flags sprang to view from hiding places innumerable. On November 16, before the march began, Marshal Foch addressed the following message to the Allied armies:

"Officers, Non-commissioned Officers and Soldiers of the Allied Armies: After having resolutely stopped the enemy, you have for months fought him with faith and indefatigable energy, without respite. You have won the greatest battle in history and saved the most sacred cause—the liberty of the world.

"Be proud. You have adorned your flags with immortal glory. Posterity preserves for you its recognition."

The retreating German armies still plundered, driving cattle before them, setting fires, and paying, if at all, in worthless German scrip, but Marshal Foch sent a peremptory message to the German Armistice Commission and the pillaging was largely stopped. As the two great armies moved toward the Rhine, the German rearguards were frequently almost in touch with the Allied advance guards. The Allies advanced with full ammunition supply, airplanes and observation balloons overhead, artillery in line, and ready for action, every military precaution taken, but there were no untoward incidents. Frequently the advance guards would find a great German artillery park with a small guard and German officers waiting for an Allied officer to sign a receipt for the surrendered property. Guns, airplanes, equipment, railway material, cars and engines were given up according to the terms of the armistice, except that the German engines and cars were in part withheld, first on the plea that to give them up meant starvation for Germany, later on the pretext that they were being repaired. Some attempts were made also to surrender guns and airplanes not in usable condition. All such were refused; but because of German attempts at evasion the terms were made more strict on the renewal of the armistice. The German withdrawal was complete by December 11 and the Allied armies were everywhere at the Rhine while the three Bridgeheads were occupied and the neutral zone established. About this time the first elements

of the German army began to reach Berlin. They were received as conquering heroes and welcomed as an unbeaten army, undefeated in the field.

#### THE GREAT NAVAL SURRENDER

Ten days after the signing of the armistice the world saw a spectacle new to history in the surrender to the Allied squadrons of the great and boasted German High Seas fleet. According to the terms of the armistice, Germany's best fighting ships, ten battle ships, five battle cruisers, six light cruisers and fifty destroyers, steamed out of Wilhelmshaven and were met off the Firth of Forth by over four hundred ships of the Allied Navies. The Allied fleets, under Admiral Sir David Beatty, steamed out in two lines six miles apart, every gun loaded, crews at battle stations, ready for treachery and half hoping

the Germans would start something.

The German ships, guns rendered useless and carrying only skeleton crews, piloted by an old English battleship, steamed in single file between the two rows of Allied ships. No signals were flown, no salutes were rendered but, as the Germans passed in, the Allied ships wheeled and formed on either side an armed escort. Thus, in three lines, victors and vanquished entered the Firth and came to anchor. Later, after the bulk of the crews had been sent home, the German ships, with crews only sufficient to keep the ships in order, were interned at the Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands, where, on June 21, just as the delegates of Germany were about to sign the peace treaty surrendering the ships, the crews opened the sea cocks and scuttled most of them before the British guard ships could send men aboard to prevent the damage. Some of the ships were beached by the British, others settled in shallow water, salvage operations were commenced at once. Some of the ships were raised and restored, but on December 27th an inter-Allied naval commission advised that the remaining units of the submerged fleet should be blown up rather than raised and arrangements were made for the dynamiting of the ships to clear the channel.

There had been a considerable difference of opinion over the ultimate disposition of the ships. Because of differences in construction rendering their adaptation to any other navy difficult and more expensive than the possible usefulness of the ships warranted, and because the hulls and machinery, even if stripped of armor and guns, would not be economical commercial vessels, the British and American naval experts had recommended that the ships should be sunk. The French and Italians, whose navies had suffered unrepaired losses in the war, were anxious to restore their naval strength by the addition of some of the enemy vessels. The question of a satisfactory division of the ships was worse than vexed and those advocating sinking, were rather grateful than otherwise at the denoue-

ment provided by the treachery of the German crews.

In addition to the bigger ships Germany surrendered all her submarines, numbering 150. These were surrendered outright and each Allied Government added a few to its naval forces, the American share being used as exhibits to help the Victory Loan.

#### AMERICA'S FLEET COMES HOME.

With the German fleet surrendered, there was no further need of America's naval strength abroad, so the major portion of the squadrons which had been operating with the British navy and had been convoying transports through the submarine zone was given homeward bound orders and steamed away from scenes of conflict, where through long weary months it had fought an insidious and unseen enemy and had fought him to defeat. The arrival at New York was originally timed for December 23 and a great Christmas review was arranged, but bad weather delayed the great fleet and the battleships did not reach New York harbor until the afternoon of Christmas day. The destroyer squadrons were forced to take the route via the Azores and arrived a couple of days later. On December 26 the great dreadnaughts moved up the Hudson. Secretary Daniels, with a notable company, including Mrs. George Dewey, reviewed the fleet from the deck of the President's yacht, Mayflower, anchored near the Statue of Liberty. The review marked the birthday of America's great Admiral as well as the homecoming of her greatest fleet. The Arizona led the line of ships in review, being piloted by the gunboat Gloucester, towing a great sausage balloon. As the Arizona came abreast of the Mayflower she fired the salute to the Secretary and the Mayflower's little guns barked back the acknowledgment of the salute. The echoes of the guns awoke every whistle and bell in the harbor and as the ships slipped majestically up the Hudson, people packed on every dock and roof and ship along the water front cheered and signalled their greeting with flag and handkerchief and hat. Snow squalls and a wind, that kept the smoke swirling about the ships, masked and then revealed the great fighters whose presence in the North Sea kept the German's boasted fleet bottled up, until the armistice drew it out in surrender. In the afternoon, 6,000 bluejackets from the fleet, with Rear Admiral Rodman at their head, marched down Broadway and Fifth Avenue, while the people, undaunted by snow and gales packed the curbs and gave them a glad welcome home.

#### CHAPTER II

#### ORGANIZING THE PEACE CONFERENCE

HE ink of the armistice signatures was scarcely dry before the plans for the peace conference were under the necessary to decide which nations should be represented, then to provide the basis of representation. The question of the representation of this country came up at once and it became known that both Lloyd George and Clemenceau desired the presence of President Wilson. Since he was the author of the Fourteen Points upon which the peace was to be based, his presence was considered essential to a proper functioning of the Conference. The suggestion that he might go brought a storm of discussion in the Press. There was no precedent to follow, no president had ever left American soil during his term, Roosevelt in his trip to Panama had traveled on a warship, technically American soil, there was no statute to permit him to go and none to prevent. Mr. Wilson, with his customary decision, set rumors and speculation at rest by announcing, on November 18, that he would go to France after the opening of the regular session of Congress in December and that he would head America's peace delegation, the other members being Major General Tasker H. Bliss, Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, Colonel Edward M. House and Henry White, former Ambassador to France.

President Wilson addressed the Congress on December 2. After outlining the pressing domestic problems which the Congress must consider, he told the representatives of the nation regarding his decision to go to France that "the conclusion that it was my paramount duty to go has been forced upon me by considerations which I hope will seem as conclusive to you as they have seemed to me." Continuing, he said:

"The Allied governments have accepted the basis of peace which I outlined to the Congress on the Sth of January last. . . . as the Central Empires also have and very reasonably desire my personal counsel in their interpretation and application. . . . The Peace settlements which are now to be agreed upon are of transcendent importance, both to us and to the rest of the world, and I know of no business or interest which should take precedence of them." He declared that he had sought to express in words the ideals for which our brave men had fought and died and that, "It is now my duty to play my full part in making good what they offered their life blood to obtain. I can think of no call to service which would trans-

cend this.... I can have no private thought or purpose of my own in performing such an errand. I go to give the best that is in me to the common settlements which I must now assist in arriving at in conference with the other working heads of the associated governments.... I shall hope to return with the happy assurance that it has been possible to translate into action the great ideals for which America has striven."

The President sailed for Brest, France, on the transport George Washington, on December 4, 1918, Secretary Lansing and Henry White accompanied the President to France, the other members of the American Peace Delegation were already on the other side.

#### PRESIDENT WILSON ABROAD.

Paris, on December 14, gave Mr. Wilson, as the representative of America, a welcome that left no word needed to express her appreciation of America's help in the war. M. Poincaré, in his formal welcome, addressing Mr. Wilson, said: "Mr. President, Paris and France awaited you with impatience, they were eager to acclaim in you the illustrious democrat whose words and deeds were inspired by exalted thought . . . The eminent statesman who had found a way to express the highest political and moral truths in formulas which bear the stamp of immortality."

The ride of the Presidents of the two republics through the Champs Elysees was a continuous ovation. President Wilson spent the next month in preliminary work looking toward the organization of the Peace Conference and in trips to Italy and England where the popular receptions vied with that in France and where he met the heads of the States and the leaders in the governments. He was hailed everywhere as the Apostle of Peace, the one man who approached the intricate problems of international adjustment with no ambitions to satisfy and with a mind unclouded by self-interest.

Naturally each people expected Mr. Wilson to support its own cause, Italy especially looking to him to secure for her all that had been promised her on her entrance into the war and some additional widening of her boundaries which could be defended on the basis of self-determination. The enemy countries, although not permitted to entertain Mr. Wilson, placed in him their last hope for terms of peace dictated by exact justice and untainted by the hatred they realized they had created. Mr. Wilson postponed his visit to the battlefields and to Belgium until after the completion of the peace treaty, being reported to have said that he did not want to see the evidences of German ruthlessness for fear he would hate the former foe too much.

#### THE PEACE CONFERENCE CONVENED.

The Peace Conference opened at the Quai d'Orsey, the French Foreign Office, on January 18, 1919, at 3 P. M., or to be exact 3 minutes past 3 P. M. The day was the anniversary of the proclamation

at Versailles in 1871 of the German Empire. Delegates were present from each nation which had been at war with Germany. President Poincairé of France called the session to order.

In opening the conference M. Poincaré expressed the pleasure of France in the choice of her capital—"the city which for more than four years the enemy made his principal military objective"-as the seat of the labors of the conference. He outlined feelingly the sufferings and sacrifices of France in the common cause and declared that Germany's guilt was clearly shown. He then took up, one by one, the causes which led the various Allies into the contest with Prussian militarism, showing that the delegates gathered in Paris for the conference represented the free peoples of the world. He gave full credit to America, both for her high purpose and her contribution to the final victory, and for "the lofty moral and political truth of which President Wilson has nobly made himself the interpreter." He declared that the delegates were met to administer justice and that "Justice banishes the dream of conquest and imperialism." He included the creation of the League of Nations among the accomplishments to be expected of the Conference, and said, in closing, "You are assembled in order to repair the evil that has been done and to prevent a recurrence of it. You hold in your hands the future of the world."

In accordance with plans previously made, President Wilson at once arose to propose Premier Clemenceau as permanent Chairman of the Conference. He declared that he did this as a tribute to the French Republic and also as a tribute to the man. The President expressed his delight in being able to honor France in the person of so distinguished a servant and he paid an eloquent tribute to the leadership and brotherhood of Premier Clemenceau who, he said, "Feels as we feel—as I have no doubt everybody in this room feels—that we are trusted to do a great thing, to do it in the highest spirit of friendship and accommodation, and to do it as promptly as possible in order that the hearts of men may have fear lifted from them, and that they may return to those purposes of life which bring them happiness and contentment and prosperity."

Premier Clemenceau, in accepting the chair, declared himself deeply touched by the expressions of friendship on the part of the speakers. He said that President Wilson had spoken truly in saying that the delegates represented all the civilized nations of the world and continued, "I wish to repeat here that success is not possible unless we remain firmly united. We have come together as friends, we must leave this hall as friends. That, gentlemen, is the first thought that comes to me. All else must be subordinated to the necessity for a closer and closer union among the nations who have taken part in this great war, and to the necessity of remaining friends. For the League of Nations is here. It is yourself."

In closing he said, "The program of this conference has been laid down by President Wilson. It is no longer the peace of a more or less vast territory, no longer the peace of continents; it is the peace of nations that is to be made. The program is sufficient in itself. There is no superfluous word. Let us try to act swiftly and well."

Premier Clemenceau then announced that the League of Nations would be placed at the head of the "order of the day" at the next full session of the Conference and the sitting adjourned at 4:30 P. M.

The Conference met again on January 25 and appointed a commission to draw up a plan. Commissions were also appointed to decide questions of responsibility, reparations, boundaries, labor, economic relations and the creation of new states.

#### THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

In the session of January 25 President Wilson laid the subject of the League of Nations before the Conference in an address, the salient portions of which are as follows:

"We have assembled for two purposes, to make the present settlements ... and also to secure the peace of the world... The League of Nations seems to me to be necessary for both of these purposes. There are many complicated questions ... if I may judge by my own study of some of these questions they are not susceptible for confident judgments at present. It is therefore necessary that we should set up some machinery by which the work of this Conference should be rendered complete...

"We are assembled under very peculiar conditions of world opinion... It will not suffice to satisfy governmental circles anywhere. It is necessary that we should satisfy the opinion of mankind... I do not need to draw for you the picture of how the burden (of war) has been thrown back from the front upon the older men, upon the women, upon the children, upon the homes of the civilized world... We are bidden by these people to make a peace which will make them secure... to see to it that this strain does not come upon them again...

"It is a solemn obligation on our part, therefore, to make permanent arrangements that justice shall be rendered and peace maintained. This is the central object of our meeting. Settlements may be temporary, but the action of the nations in the interest of peace and justice must be permanent."

"The ardor of the United States for the society of nations," he said, "is not an ardor springing out of fear or apprehension, but an ardor springing out of the ideals which have come in the consciousness of this war. In coming into this war the United States never for a moment thought that she was intervening in the politics of Europe . . . Asia . . . or any part of the world. Her thought was that all the world had now become conscious that there was a single cause of justice and liberty for men of every kind and place. . . . Therefore, it seems to me that we must . . make this League of Nations a vital thing . . . always functioning in watchful attendance upon the interests of the nations . . . And if we do not make it vital. . . . We shall disappoint the expectations of the peoples. That is what their thought centers upon. . . .

"Gentlemen, the select classes of mankind are no longer the governors of mankind. The fortunes of mankind are now in the hands of the plain people. . . . Satisfy them . . . and you have established peace. Fail to satisfy them, and no arrangement that you can make will either set up or

steady the peace of the world."

Mr. Wilson said that the American delegation "would not dare abate a single item of the program which constitutes our instructions," and that they would not dare to compromise upon the principle, "That we are the masters of no peoples, but are here to see that every people in the world shall choose its own masters and govern its own destinies. . . We are here to see, in short, that the very foundations of this war are swept away. Those oundations were the private choice of a small coterie of civil rulers and military staffs . . . the aggression of great powers upon the small . . . the holding together of empires of unwilling subjects by the duress of arms . . . the power of small bodies of men to wield their will and use mankind as pawns in a game. And nothing less than the emancipation of the world from these things will accomplish peace. . . .

In closing the President expressed his pleasure in the knowledge that the delegates of America did not stand alone upon this question but that there were "champions of this cause upon every hand"... "and the very pulse

of the world seems to beat to the fullest in this enterprise."

The Conference adopted the preliminary draft of the league in the following resolutions:

"The Conference, having considered the proposals for the creation of a

League of Nations, resolved that:

"It is essential to the maintenance of the world settlement which the associated nations are now met to establish that a League of Nations be established to promote international obligations and to provide safeguards against war.

"This league should be created as an integral part of the general treaty of peace and should be open to every civilized nation which can be relied

upon to promote its objects

"The members of the league should periodically meet in international conference and should have a permanent organization and secretaries to carry on the business of the league in the intervals between the conferences.

"The Conference therefore appoints a committee, representative of the associated governments, to work out the details of the constitution and the

functions of the league."

The plan for the committee provided for two representatives from each of the five great powers and five others to be chosen from among the delegates of the other nations represented in the Conference.

THE FOURTEEN POINTS ESSENTIAL TO PEACE AS SET FORTH BY MR. WILSON ON JANUARY 8, 1918.

I—Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II—Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III—The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its

maintenance.

IV—Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will reduce to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V—Free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the population concerned must have equal weight with the equitable

claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.

VI—The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy, and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good-will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII—Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever im-

paired.

VIII—All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

IX-A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected


along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.


X-The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded

the freest opportunity of autonomous development.


XI—Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.

XII—The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities






© Underwood & Underwood THE C-1, LARGEST DIRIGIBLE BALLOON IN AMERICA.



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
NEW YORK WELCOMES THE RETURN OF THE 27TH DIVISION

The wounded boys in autos leading the parade on Fifth Avenue.





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PREMIER LLOYD GEORGE.



C Underwood & Underwood TANK IN ACTION WITH THE 27TH DIVISION





O Underwood & Underwood THE BIG FOUR IN THE WAR AND PEACE Premier Lloyd George Premier Orlando Premier Clemenceau President Wilson

which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII—An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial in-

tegrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV—A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike.

#### CHAPTER III

#### SECRET TREATIES THREATEN AGREEMENT

N January 26 the first elements of disagreement appeared in The seeds of future discord were found in the Conference. two secret treaties. One, between Italy on the one hand, and France and England on the other, guaranteed to Italy the Dalmatian coast and Islands to a degree not warranted by the principles of nationality and self-determination which underlay the basis of Italy, however, backed by a carefully worked-up public opinion was insistent on the full keeping of the pledge and asked, as well, basing her plea on the principle of self-determination, the City of Fiume, an Italian city surrounded by Serbs and Croats and claimed as a necessary seaport by the new Kingdom of the Serbs-Croats and Slovenes. France and Great Britain were not in full sympathy with Italy but felt bound by their pledges. Wilson and the American delegation here appeared in the role of mediators and umpires which they had to play frequently throughout the conference, with what success a later history than this must declare.

The second secret treaty concerned Japan on the one hand and Italy, England and France, also Russia on the other, and guaranteed to Japan the transfer of the rights of Germany in Kiao Chau and Shantung and the Caroline and Marshall Islands in the Pacific, German held Islands south of the Equator going to New Zealand, which was to have German Samoa, and to Australia, which was to have the rest. Japan was not willing to accept modification of this agreement to the extent of taking the relation of mandatory for these colonies from the League. She wanted the letter of the bond. The United States was not exactly pleased to see Japan installed on the trade routes between the Philippines and Hawaii. China was insistent that the German rights in Shantung, having been wrung from China by force of arms, could only be righted if cancelled. She held the transfer to Japan to be but the prolongation of an injury and the perpetuation of a grievous wrong. In this China had the full sympathy of America. President Wilson was reported to have asked, as these two secret documents were dragged into the light of day, if there were any more.

#### GERMAN COLONIES NOT TO BE RETURNED.

The session of the conference, January 26, at which these two treaties came to light was marked by one decision, that Germany's colonies could not be returned and that the Turk should never again rule a person of an alien race. The plan adopted was summarized by a correspondent of the Associated Press at Paris as follows:

"The Allied and associated powers are agreed that the German colonies shall not be returned to Germany, owing, primarily, to mismanagement, cruelty, and the use of these colonies as submarine bases.

"The conquered regions of Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine, and

Arabia are to be detached from the Turkish Empire.

"The administration or tutelage of these regions would be intrusted to the more advanced nations, who would act as mandatories in behalf of the League of Nations.

"The mandatories would report at stated intervals to the League of Nations concerning the manner in which a colony was being administered."

#### WHAT THE NATIONS WANTED!

The desires of the various nations at the Peace Table were also summarized by another correspondent as follows:

FRANCE.—France wants, first of all, Alsace-Lorraine unconditionally and the right to discuss and ultimately to fix the French frontiers in their relation to the Rhine. France desires also to annex the basin of the Sarre River.

France will insist that so far as the left bank of the Rhine farther to the north is concerned, the Conference shall forbid military works of any kind

The French bill for reparation is not yet complete, but it has been announced in the Chamber of Deputies that it will be about 66,000,000,000 francs.

The French Government does not ask for a protectorate in Syria in the ordinary sense, . . . but France, on account of her traditional interests in that country, feels that she should be called upon to exercise some sort of guardianship or guidance until Syria is fully able to govern herself.

GREAT BRITAIN.—Great Britain's delegation believes that a Society of Nations is desirable and obtainable, and that it must be established by the present Peace Conference. She advances no Continental demands other than that a permanent and just peace be concluded, and that under the principle of self-determination there shall be international freedom of transit.

Great Britain proposes to take mandatory power over the German islands south of the equator for Australia and over German Southwest Africa for the Union of South Africa. She also expects to have the mandate over German East Africa, some parts of Arabia, and Mesopotamia.

ITALY.—Italy asks for the Trentino as far as the Brenner Pass, including the whole of Southern Tyrol, Trieste, Istria, Fiume, Zara, Sebenico, the larger part of the Dalmatian Islands, and the neutralizing of the others, Avlona and its hinterland; a protectorate over Albania; possession of the islands in the Ægean which were taken from Turkey in the Tripolitan war, and the province of Adalia if France and England take territory in Asia Minor.

RUMANIA.—Rumania desires to retain possession of that portion of Russian Bessarabia...now in her possession. Rumania also desires Southern Dobrudja.

To the westward Rumania wants to annex the Hapsburg provinces of Bukowina and Transylvania and a considerable part of the rich agricultural district of the Banat of Temesvar. It is here that the Rumanian aspirations conflict with those of Serbia which affirms that . . . she should have a large portion of the Banat as well as other sections of former Austria-Hungary adjoining old Serbia to the north to round out the proposed Jugoslav State.

SERBIA.—Serbia's claims to take from the Hapsburg monarchy the Provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina are unopposed. The plans for the incorporation in Jugoslavia of the Hapsburg province of Croatia, except as to the coastal region of Fiume, are also considered as subject to the internal decision of the Southern Slavs.

Jugoslav and Italian aims are in sharp conflict in the settlement of the Adriatic coast problem, involving the future of Flume and the Croatian seaboard.... The union of Montenegro and Serbia is both supported and opposed in Montenegro.

BULGARIA.—Bulgaria has not abandoned hope of adding extensive territories and even hopes to receive extensions in Southern Macedonia along the Ægean coast and in Thrace.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The new state of Czechoslovakia is carving out its territories almost entirely at the expense of the old Austria-Hungary. The old kingdoms of Bohemia, Moravia, and the Slovak regions of Northern Hungary have already been incorporated into the proposed state, but there are certain conflicts with the Poles, Ruthenians, Rumanians, and Germans, as well as with the Austrians and the Magyars, because the Czechs assert that parts of German Saxony and German Silesia belong ethnographically to the new state. The new state desires expansion southward over a frontage on the Danube and over a corridor to the Adriatic.

GRDECE.—Greece wishes Northern Epirus and Thrace, with the exception of Constantinople and the shores of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. . . . Greece asks for the vilayet of Smyrna, in Asia Minor, and the former Turkish islands in the Eastern Mediterranean.

POLAND.—The Poles, with an inadequate army, are endeavoring to establish possession of disputed regions on three sides of Russian Poland and Galicia, which constitutes the nucleus of the new Polish state. The Poles desire Eastern Galicia to include Lemberg, which is in the Ukraine, and the disputed Province of Cholm, in Little Russia.

To the northeast the Poles desire to have Vilna recognized as Polish... The Poles are contending against the Germans, not only for German Silesia and Posen and West Prussia as provinces populated chiefly by Poles, but also for the City of Danzig, so as to provide Poland with access to the sea.

BELGIUM.—Belgium asks that her reparation for damages wrought by Germany shall be the first lien upon German assets to the extent of at least 15,000,000,000 francs, or up to a much larger sum if Germany does not return the machinery and the materials taken from Belgium.

Belgium, which has reasserted her independence and thus emerges from her old state of neutrality, desires from Holland the left bank of the Scheldt and the peninsula of Maastricht, which protrudes into Belgian Limburg.

JAPAN.—Japan enters the Peace Conference, as Baron Makino, the senior delegate, has said, "with no territorial ambitions in China," while as for Tsing Tao, "she will hand it back to China under the terms of the notes exchanged between China and Japan in May, 1915. This is interpreted by Japan as permitting her to retain certain former German concessions on the Shautung Peninsula.

Japan desires to retain the Pacific islands north of the equator which formerly belonged to Germany.

CHINA.-The Chinese delegates ask to be guaranteed from foreign imperialism or aggression and desire the gradual abolition of "consular rights" and to be allowed to impose higher duties on importations. The Chinese also ask for the return of Kiao-Chau.

SWITZERLAND.—Switzerland is said to be willing to join a League of Nations if no policing of adjoining states were involved.

Switzerland desires an outlet to the sea by the Rhine, which she wishes to have declared a neutral stream.

SCANDINAVIA.—Denmark wishes to annex that part of northern

Schleswig inhabited predominantly by Danes.

Norway has certain aspirations to Spitzbergen, but is not pressing them.

A strong Socialist movement in Sweden favors the union with Sweden of the Aland Islands, which are regarded by the Swedes as the naval key to Stockholm. Swedish interests in this connection are in conflict with those of Finland.

AMERICA.—Desires nothing for herself, only justice, and conditions throughout the world favorable to an ordered and prosperous peace.

#### LABOR'S NEW CHARTEP.

The work of the Peace Conference developed largely upon the various commissions. On February 8, the American Labor delegation laid before The Commission on Labor Legislation of the Conference concrete proposals as follows:

"A league of the free peoples of the world in a common covenant for genuine and practical co-operation to secure justice, and therefore peace, in the relations between nations.

"The entrance of any free nation into the league of free peoples should

be inherent.

"No reprisals based upon purely vindictive purposes, or deliberate desire

to injure, but to right wrong.

"Recognition of the rights of small nations and of the principle. No people must be forced under a sovereignty under which it does not wish to

"That in law and in practice the principle shall be recognized that the labor of a human being is not a commodity or an article of commerce.

"Involuntary servitude shall not exist except in punishment for crime.

"Trial by jury should be established.

"The right of free association, free assemblage, free speech and the press shall not be denied or abridged.

"That the seamen of the merchant marine shall be guaranteed the right

of leaving their vessels when the same are in a safe harbor.

"No article or commodity shall be shipped or delivered in international commerce in the production of which children under the age of sixteen years have been employed or permitted to work. (Similar prohibitions are proposed against the product of prison labor and merchandise produced in the home.)

#### THE LEAGUE COVENANT.

On February 14 President Wilson read to the Conference the completed draft of the proposed Constitution or Covenant of the League of Nations. The reading occupied an hour. While the draft as read was largely the work of Mr. Wilson, the various paragraphs

represented the most earnest thought and were the result of long hours of discussion by the representatives of all the nations in the Conference Commission to which the subject had been referred. Several preliminary drafts were presented, one each by America, France and Britain and some by individuals. All were considered and the draft, as presented, represented the common judgment of the Commission. Immediately after the presentation and adoption of the draft the President started for home, via Brest and Boston, to be present at the closing of Congress, to lay the League of Nations covenant before the American people and to return to finish the task of drafting the treaty to be presented to Germany.

#### CHAPTER IV

#### AMERICA DEBATES THE TREATY.

PRESIDENT WILSON landed at Boston just before noon on February 24, 1919. In the afternoon he made an address at Mechanics Hall, after which he took a train for Washington. In his address he gave an insight into the peace situation, which made clear some of the difficulties he had met and some of the considerations the American delegation had been forced to take into account. We quote a few paragraphs from the address as follows:

"I have not come," he said, "to report the proceedings or the results of the proceedings of the Peace Conference; that would be premature. I can say that... while there are some divergencies of object, there is nevertheless a common spirit and a common realization of the necessity of setting

up new standards of right in the world. . . .

"What we are doing is to hear the whole case; hear it from the mouths of the men most interested; hear it from those who are officially commissioned to state it; hear the rival claims, hear the claims that affect new nationalities, that affect new areas of the world, that affect new commercial and economic connections that have been established by the great world war through which we have gone. I have seen earnestness, I have seen tears come to the eyes of men who plead for downtrodden people whom they were privileged to speak for; but they were not the tears of anguish, they were the tears of ardent hope. . . .

"And in the midst of it all every interest seeks out first of all, when it reaches Paris, the representatives of the United States. Why? Because, and I think I am stating the most wonderful fact in history—because there is no nation in Europe that suspects the motives of the United States... Was there ever any fact that so bound the nation that had won that esteem forever to deserve it?... Any man who resists the present tides that run in the world will find himself thrown upon a shore so high and barren that it will seem as if he had been separated from his human kind forever...

"All the peoples of Europe are buoyed up and confident in the spirit of hope, because they believe that we are at the eve of a new age in the world when nations will understand one another, when nations will support one

another, in every just cause.

"If America were at this juncture to fail the world, what would come of it? I do not mean any disrespect to any other great people when I say that America is the hope of the world; and if she does not justify that hope the results are unthinkable.

"When I think of the homes upon which dull despair would settle were this great hope disappointed, I should wish for my part never to have had America play any part whatever in this attempt to emancipate the world. . . .

"And so, my fellow citizens, I have come back to report progress, and I do not believe that the progress is going to stop short of the goal. The nations of the world have set their heads now to do a great thing, and they are not going to slacken their purpose. And when I speak of the nations of the world I do not speak of the governments of the world. I speak of the peoples who constitute the nations of the world. They are in the saddle, and they are going to see to it that if their present governments do not do their will, some other governments shall."

#### CRITICISMS OF THE COVENANT.

The proposed draft of the League of Nations Covenant had been published in America the day the President sailed from France. When he landed in Boston debate was waxing hot both in Congress and in the press, Senator Borah, Republican, and Senator Reed, Democrat, were both bitter opponents of the whole League of Nations scheme; Senator Hitchcock, Democrat, upheld it; Senator Lodge, Republican, upheld the principle but severely criticised the draft presented. The draft was criticised principally for four things, for surrending a part of the sovereignty of the United States and thereby limiting our freedom of individual action, for failing to recognize our Monroe Dostrine, for making possible to Britain and her Colonies preponderant representation on the governing council and assembly, for attempting to make eternal all boundaries existing on the ratification of the treaty. The criticism was met by calling attention to the fact that we relinquished no more of our sovereignty than did other members of the League, by pointing out that England would need to secure a majority of the votes of all the smaller nations to elect a colonial member to the Executive Council of the League, by pointing out also that the territorial guarantee was against external aggression and would not prevent changes in boundaries by revolution from within, and by the assurance that a clause could easily be inserted in the covenant providing recognition for the Monroe Doctrine.

#### ARMISTICE RENEWED FOR THE LAST TIME.

After two thirty-day renewals the armistice with Germany was renewed for an indeterminate term on February 17. The German Government signed the new terms with reluctance as they foreshadowed the final peace terms in reducing Germany's army to a maximum of 250,000 men, provided for the ultimate complete surrender of the German fleet interned at the Scapa Flow, and provided tentatively for the cession to Poland of Posen and parts of Silesia.

#### PRESIDENT CONFERS WITH SENATORS.

On Wednesday, February 26, 1919, President Wilson held an informal conference with the members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The Senators asked questions and the President answered. was reported to have said that while the League idea involved some surrender of sovereignty, all the nations concerned should be willing to make the surrender for the good of the world. He held that the provision for unanimous decisions by the Council of the League precluded any invasion of American rights or any limiting of American armaments to the advantage of any other member of the League, saying that America would have the same right to decide the size of the British Navy that Britain would to decide the size of ours and that no action concerning us could be taken without our agreement. He explained the workings of the League plan in the settlement of international disputes, and pointed out that a call by the executive Council, for military action, would be a last resort and would be advisory only. The decision for war or peace would still rest with the Congress where the Constitution places it. He thought also that the League was just an application of the principle of the Monroe Doctrine to the whole world but that there would be no difficulty in getting the Doctrine recognized in a revised draft of the covenant. He was reported to have declared that the war would have been fought in vain if the League plan should fail.

While the conference cleared the atmosphere and satisfied a large section of the press it did not silence criticism. The Article (No. 10) which bound the United States, along with the rest of the members, to guarantee the territory of another nation against external aggression was the target for most of the adverse comment, although the composition of the governing bodies of the League also drew considerable fire. Former President Taft took to the stump to defend the League and Senators Lodge and Knox and Former Justice Charles E. Hughes and Former Senator and Secretary of State Elihu Root proclaimed the necessity of material changes in the text if it was to be adopted by the American Senate and ratified. Thirty-six Republican Senators and Senators-elect who would have seats in the Senate of the Sixty-Sixth Congress, a number sufficient to prevent ratification, signed a Round Robin declaring their conviction that to be ratified, the covenant must be amended. Former President Taft. Former Justice Hughes and Mr. Root put in writing the amendments they thought necessary or desirable and their drafts were forwarded to the American delegation in Paris. The result was a modification of certain paragraphs, the insertion of a paragraph recognizing the Monroe Doctrine, but no material change in the general nature of the covenant or in the principal element, Article 10.

#### PRESIDENT DECLARES COVENANT HOPE OF THE WORLD.

Following the adjournment of Congress on March 3rd the President started at once on the return trip to France to help complete the work of the Peace Conference; but between his arrival at Ho-

boken and the sailing of his ship he went to the Metropolitan Opera House in New York City and made an address in which he laid the whole case before the country. The address did not convince the opponents of the League, but it heartened those favorable to it and put the whole question out in the open where it could be appraised by the citizens and a judgment reached. The President's address was preceded by a scholarly discussion of the League plan by Mr. Taft, who pleaded for the League, not because it was perfect, but because it offered the only hope for mankind to escape from the play of those political forces which had always brought war and prevented peace. The salient points of the President's address were expressed as follows:

"I do not know when I have been more impressed than by the conferences of the commission set up by the Conference of Peace to draw up a covenant for the League of Nations. The representatives of fourteen nations sat around that board—not young men, not men inexperienced in the affairs of their own countries, not men inexperienced in the politics of the world; and the inspiring influence of every meeting was the concurrence of purpose on the part of all those men to come to an agreement and an effective working agreement with regard to this League of the civilized world.

"There was the conviction that this thing ought to be done, and there was also the conviction that not a man there would venture to go home and

say that he had not tried to do it.

"Mr. Taft has set the picture for you of what a failure of this great purpose would mean. We have been hearing for all these weary months that this agony of war has lasted of the sinister purpose of the Central Empires, and we have made maps of the course that they meant their conquests to take. Where did the lines of that map lie, of that central line that we used to call from Bremen to Bagdad? . . . They lay then through a united empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, whose integrity Germany was bound to respect; . . . the Turkish Empire, whose interests she professed to make her own. . . . And now what has happened? The Austro-Hungarian Empire has gone to pieces and the Turkish Empire has disappeared, and the nations that effected that great result—for it was a result of liberation—are now responsible as the trustees of the assets of those great nations. You not only would have weak nations lying in this path, but you would have nations in which that old poisonous seed of intrigue could be planted with the certainty that the crop would be abundant; and one of the things that the League of Nations is intended to watch is the course of intrigue. Intrigue cannot stand publicity, and if the League of Nations were nothing but a great debating society it would kill intrigue. . . .

The liberated peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and of the Turkish Empire call out to us for this thing. It has not arisen in the council of statesmen. Europe is a bit sick at heart at this very moment, because it sees that statesmen have had no vision, and that the only vision has been the vision of the people. Those who suffer see. My friends, I wish you would reflect upon this proposition: The vision as to what is necessary for great reforms has seldom come from the top in the nations of the world. It has come from the need and the aspiration and the self-assertion of great bodies

of men who meant to be free.

Now the heart of the world is awake, and the heart of the world must be satisfied. Do not let yourself suppose for a moment that the uneasiness in the populations of Europe is due entirely to economic causes or economic motives; something very much deeper underlies it all than that. They see

that their governments have never been able to defend them against intrigue or aggression, and that there is no force of foresight or of prudence in any modern Cabinet to stop war. And therefore they say, "There must be some fundamental cause for this," and the fundamental cause they are beginning to perceive to be that nations have stood singly or in little jealous groups against each other, fostering prejudice, increasing the danger of war rather than concerting measures to prevent it; and that if there is right in the world, if there is justice in the world, there is no reason why nations should be divided in the support of justice.

They are therefore saying if you really believe that there is a right, if you really believe that wars ought to be stopped, stop thinking about the rival interests of nations, and think about men and women and children throughout the world. Nations are not made to afford distinction to their rulers by way of success in the maneuvers of politics; nations are meant, if they are meant for anything, to make the men and women and children in them secure and happy and prosperous, and no nation has the right to set up its special interests against the interests and benefits of mankind, least of all

this great nation which we love.

I have tried once and again, my fellow citizens, to say to little circles of friends or to larger bodies what seems to be the real hope of the peoples of Europe, and I tell you frankly I have not been able to do so because when the thought tries to crowd itself into speech the profound emotion of the thing is too much, speech will not carry. I have felt the tragedy of the hope

of those suffering peoples.

It is a tragedy because it is a hope which cannot be realized in its perfection, and yet I have felt besides its tragedy, its compulsion—its compulsion upon every living man to exercise every influence that he has to the utmost to see that as little as possible of that hope is disappointed, because if men cannot now, after this agony of bloody sweat, come to their self-possession and see how to regulate the affairs of the world, we will sink back into a period of struggle in which there will be no hope, and, therefore, no mercy. There can be no mercy where there is no hope, for why should you spare another if you yourself expect to perish? Why should you be pitiful if you can get no pity? Why should you be just if, upon every hand, you are put upon?

The President said that those gentlemen who were skeptical of the possibility of forming the League of Nations would find when the treaty comes back "the covenant not only in it, but so many threads of the treaty tied to the covenant that you cannot dissect the covenant from the treaty without destroying the whole vital structure. The structure of peace will not be vital without the League of Nations and no man is going to bring back a cadaver

with him "

The President told how Europe had thought us selfish and had expected little real help from us, but how what we really did amazed them and convinced them that "this nation is the friend of mankind as it said it was."

The sweet revenge, therefore, is this, that we believed in righteousness, and now we are ready to make the supreme sacrifice for it, the supreme sacrifice of throwing in our fortunes with the fortunes of men everywhere.

What are we to say, then, as to the future? I think, my fellow citizens, that we can look forward to it with great confidence. I have heard cheering news since I came to this side of the water about the progress that is being made in Paris toward the discussion and clarification of a great many difficult matters, and I believe that settlements will begin to be made rather rapidly from this time on at those conferences. But what I believe, what I know as well as believe, is this: That the men engaged in those conferences are gathering heart as they go, not losing it; that they are finding community of purpose and community of ideal to an extent that perhaps they did not expect; and that amidst all the interplay of influence there is a forward movement

which is running toward the right. Men have at last perceived that the only permanent thing in the world is the right, and that a wrong settlement is bound to be a temporary settlement . . . and the spirits of men will rebel against it, and the spirits of men are now in the saddle. The day will come when men in America will look back with swelling hearts and rising pride that they should have been privileged to make the sacrifice which it was necessary to make in order to combine their might and their moral power with the cause of justice for men of every kind everywhere.

God give us the strength and vision to do it wisely! God give us the privilege of knowing that we did it without counting the cost and because we

were true Americans, lovers of liberty and of the right!

## CHAPTER V

#### FINAL WORK ON THE TREATY.

HE PRESIDENT reached France for the second time on March 13 and plunged at once into the work of perfecting the treaty to be presented to Germany. During the succeeding weeks rumor made peace imminent one day and postponed it the next. Two things served to halt the final decision. France demanded more territorial security and money reparation than Mr. Wilson and the other Allied representatives thought it wise to accord to her. Italy insisted on Fiume and the Dalmatian coast.

#### DANZIG.

The question of Danzig would not stay settled. Poland wanted it to be Polish. The city itself was German and wanted to remain so. Poland needed a free harbor and Germany was willing to grant Poland access to Danzig but unwilling to cede purely German territory in order to give Poland a Polish thoroughfare to salt water. This was finally settled by granting Poland a corridor through Germany to Danzig but by making Danzig a free city under the protection of the League of Nations.

## SHANTUNG.

Japan also proved a snag. She intended to have her agreement with the Allies carried out, literally and completely. She smilingly insisted that once master of the German concessions she would hasten to keep her pledge made before she attacked Shantung and the promise in her treaty of 1915 with China and return to China full sovereignty in Shantung and equal rights in the administration of the mines and railways. Japan called attention to the fact that she had never broken a pledge and she would not take one step backward from her position. She intimated that she might refuse to join the League of Nations, if she were denied Kiao Chau. There were also rumors of a rapprochement between Japan and Germany, through the medium of Bolshevist Russia, for a German-Jap community of interest, which would practically control Russian, Siberian

and Chinese trade and political conditions. The Chinese delegates insisted that Germany got her rights in Shantung by military aggression, that she had only a thief's right of possession and that China, as an Ally, was entitled to receive back her full political and commercial sovereignty without question, directly, and not through an intermediary to whom should accrue some of the rights and a portion of the sovereignty.

President Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Orlando, of Italy, wrestled with this question through days and weeks, conferences followed conferences and finally they compromised with Japan by giving in completely, Japan merely repeating the assurances previously given. Japan, on her part, fought hard to have included in the League of Nations covenant a clause providing for equality of treatment of the nationals of all members by each government without regard to race or color. Japan met as solid opposition to this as she presented to changes in the Shantung program and it was suggested that the final Shantung decision was in part an attempt to soothe Japan's feelings and to help her maintain her dignity at home.

## LEAGUE COVENANT REVISED.

The Revised League of Nations covenant was made public on April 12. The revised draft included a paragraph recognizing directly the validity of the Monroe Doctrine, which it referred to as a "regional understanding for securing the maintenance of peace." Since no European nation had ever before admitted the force of the Monroe Doctrine, although several of them had recognized the power behind it, this clause represented distinct progress in international relations. It did not, however, completely satisfy the critics in this country. The failure to limit the guarantees in Article 10 also brought a revival of adverse criticism, and there were still those in Congress, and out, who held that the covenant threatened our control of our war making and held a danger of outside interference in such purely domestic questions as immigration, race relations and the tariff. A further revision was published on April 29.

### FIUME HALTS PEACE.

After a fortnight of apparently rapid progress toward decision the peace-making was halted again on April 26 by the refusal of the Conference to give Fiume to Italy and a refusal by Italy's delegation to make peace on any other basis. Premier Orlando and Foreign Minister Sonnino returned to Rome, where they were received by thronging crowds which demanded Fiume. There was even a suggestion that Italy might withdraw from the Conference at Paris and make a separate peace with Germany. The crowds, which had hailed Wilson almost as the God of Peace in January, now hurled epithets

toward Paris as hateful as their previous acclaim had been complimentary. On April 23 just before the Italian delegation had started home, Mr. Wilson made public in Paris a note which laid bare the whole Italian controversy. The note was as follows:

# PRESIDENT WILSON'S STATEMENT REGARDING ITALY.

In view of the capital importance of the questions affected, and in order to throw all possible light upon what is involved in their settlement, I hope that the following statements will contribute to the final formation of opinion and to a satisfactory solution:

When Italy entered the war she entered upon the basis of a definite private understanding with Great Britain and France, now known as the Pact of London. Since that time the whole face of circumstances has been Many other powers, great and small, have entered the struggle

with no knowledge of that private understanding.

The Austro-Hungarian Empire, then the enemy of Europe, and at whose expense the Pact of London was to be kept in the event of victory, has gone to pieces and no longer exists. Not only that, but the several parts of that empire, it is agreed now by Italy and all her associates, are to be erected into independent States and associated in a League of Nations, not with those who were recently our enemies, but with Italy herself and the powers that stood with Italy in the great war for liberty.

We are to establish their liberty as well as our own. They are to be among the smaller States whose interests are henceforth to be safeguarded as

scrupulously as the interests of the most powerful States.

The war was ended, moreover, by proposing to Germany an armistice and peace which should be founded on certain clearly defined principles which set up a new order of right and justice. Upon those principles the peace with Germany has been conceived, not only, but formulated. Upon those principles it will be executed.

We cannot ask the great body of powers to propose and effect peace with Austria, and establish a new basis of independence and right in the States which originally constituted the Austro-Hungarian Empire and in the States of the Balkan group on principles of another kind. We must apply the same principles to the settlement of Europe in those quarters that we have applied in the peace with Germany. It was upon the explicit avowal of these principles that the initiative for peace was taken. It is upon them

that the whole structure of peace must rest.

If those principles are to be adhered to, Fiume must serve as the outlet of the commerce, not of Italy, but of the land to the north and northeast of that port, Hungary, Bohemia, Rumania, and the States of the new Jugoslav group. To assign Fiume to Italy would be to create the feeling that we have deliberately put the port upon which all those countries chiefly depend for their access to the Mediterranean in the hands of a power of which it did not form an integral part and whose sovereignty, if set up there, must inevitably seem foreign, not domestic or identified with the commercial and industrial life of the regions which the port must serve. It is for that reason, no doubt, that Fiume was not included in the Pact of London, but there definitely assigned to the Croatians.

And the reasons why the line of the Pact of London swept about many of the islands of the eastern coast of the Adriatic and around the portion of the Dalmatian coast which lies most open to that sea was not only that here and there on those islands, and here and there on that coast, there are bodies of people of Italian blood and connection, but also, and no doubt chiefly, because it was felt that it was necessary for Italy to have a foothold amidst the channels of the Eastern Adriatic in order that she might make her own

But Austria-Hungary no longer exists. It is proposed that the fortifications which the Austrian Government constructed there shall be razed and permanently destroyed.

It is part also of the new plan of European order which centers in the League of Nations that the new states erected there shall accept a limitation of armaments which puts aggression out of the question. There can be no fear of the unfair treatment of groups of Italian people there, because adequate guarantees will be given, under international sanction, of the equal and equitable treatment of all racial or national minorities.

In brief, every question associated with this settlement wears a new aspect—a new aspect given it by the very victory for right for which Italy has made the supreme sacrifice of blood and treasure. Italy along with the four other great Powers, has become one of the chief trustees of the new

order which she has played so honorable a part in establishing.

And on the north and northeast her natural frontiers are completely restored, along the whole sweep of the Alps from northwest to southeast to the very end of the Istrian Peninsula, including all the great watershed within which Trieste and Pola lie, and all the fair regions whose face nature has turned toward the great peninsula upon which the historic life of the Latin people has been worked out through centuries of famous story ever since Rome was first set upon her seven hills.

Her ancient unity is restored. Her lines are extended to the great walls which are her natural defense. It is within her choice to be surrounded by friends; to exhibit to the newly liberated peoples across the Adriatic that noblest quality of greatness, magnanimity, friendly generosity, the preference

of justice over interest.

The nations associated with her, the nations that know nothing of the Pact of London or of any other special understanding that lies at the beginning of this great struggle, and who have made their supreme sacrifice also in the interest, not of national advantage or defense, but of the settled peace of the world, are now united with her older associates in urging her to assume a leadership which cannot be mistaken in the new order of Europe.

America is Italy's friend. Her people are drawn, millions strong, from Italy's own fair countrysides. She is linked in blood, as well as in affection, with the Italian people. Such ties can never be broken. And America was privileged, by the generous commission of her associates in the war, to initiate the peace we are about to consummate—to initiate it upon terms which


she had herself formulated and in which I was her spokesman.

The compulsion is upon her to square every decision she takes a part in with those principles. She can do nothing else. She trusts Italy, and in her trust believes that Italy will ask nothing of her that cannot be made unmistakably consistent with those sacred obligations.

The interests are not now in question, but the rights of peoples, of states new and old, of liberated peoples and peoples whose rulers have never accounted them worthy of a right; above all, the right of the world to peace and to such settlements of interest as shall make peace secure.


These, and these only, are the principles for which America has fought. These, and these only, are the principles upon which she can consent to make peace. Only upon these principles, she hopes and believes, will the people of Italy ask her to make peace.

Italy was in ferment but, when the storm had cleared away, Orlando was no longer premier and Senor Nitti, a partisan of moderate demands, headed a new delegation. The Peace Conference proceeded with the completion of the German treaty, in spite of the threat of Italian disaffection.



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
PREMIER GEORGES CLEMENCEAU



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GIANT HUN GUN WHICH BOMBARDED THE CATHEDRAL AT AMIENS

AND CAPTURED BY THE AUSTRALIAN TROOPS




© Underwood & Underwood 1,972 GOLD STAR BANNER OF THE 27TH DIVISION




GENERAL JOFFRE,
Marshal of France.

Commander of the French Armics who stopped the Germans at the Marne in 1914.



© Central News Photo Service DIFFERENT TYPES OF U. S. ARMY AERIAL BOMBS.



© Central News Photo Service
SURRENDERED GERMAN SUBMARINES

## CHAPTER VI.

## THE PEACE CONGRESS.

HE first parties of the German Peace delegation reached Paris on April 25 and were escorted to quarters at Versailles, in the Hotel des Reservoirs. The rest of the delegates and subordinates followed until the delegation, 280 persons in all, was complete on May 5. The peace treaty was then ready for delivery to the en-

emy delegates and was being printed.

On May 1, Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, head of the German Delegation, and M. Jules Cambon, former French ambassador to Berlin, met at the Hotel Trianon to exchange credentials. In 1871 Louis Thiers and the French delegates had walked from the Hotel des Reservoirs, across the park, to the Hotel Trianon to receive, at the hands of Bismarck, the most humiliating terms ever imposed by a victor upon a vanquished nation. It had been planned to let the Germans re-enact the scene as far as the externals went, the Allies were not disposed to humiliate or bully them, although it was understood that the victors would impose the peace terms on the defeated enemy. But a sudden shower forced a change of plan and the Germans rode in autos. The ceremony of exchange was brief, but dignified and impressive, Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau being so overcome by his feelings that he could make no remarks beyond the most formal acknowledgments.

#### GERMAN DELEGATES RECEIVE TERMS OF PEACE.

T 3 o'clock P. M., on May 7, 1919, the Peace Congress assembled and the German delegates received the terms of peace.

In the great hall of the Trianon Palace at Versailles, on May 7, the anniversary of the sinking of the Lusitania, the first meeting of the Peace Congress was convened. The meeting was scheduled to begin at 3 o'clock. When all of the Allied delegates were in their chairs—Premier Clemenceau at the head of the horseshoe table, President Wilson at his right with Premier Lloyd George at his left and the various delegations ranged around the two sides of the horseshoe—Germany's delegates were announced. The Ger-

mans were seated at a table in the open end of the horseshoe, facing Premier Clemenceau. There was no pomp or ceremony, no gold lace, only democratic simplicity and an air of serious purpose, which grew tense as the hours passed. Premier Clemenceau declared the session open as soon as the Germans had taken their places. The Premier's speech was short but to the point. He declared that this was not the time nor place for superfluous words; that the Germans had before them the plenipotentiaries of all the Powers united to fight together in the war that had been so cruelly imposed upon them, and that the time had come to settle the account. He said: "You asked for peace. We are ready to give you peace. We shall present to you now a book which contains our conditions. You will have every facility to examine these conditions and the time necessary for it. Everything will be done with the courtesy that is the privilege of civilized nations." He further said: "This second treaty of Versailles has cost us too much not to take on our side all necessary precautions and guarantees that the peace shall be a lasting one." He told them that no oral discussion of the terms would take place, but that the German delegation could submit observations in writing and these would be quickly considered. He gave them a maximum period of fifteen days in which to ask questions or make suggestions.

As Premier Clemenceau finished, the Secretary General of the Peace Conference delivered a copy of the treaty to Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau. The head of the German delegation did not rise to make his reply. This apparent lack of courtesy was explained as possibly due to his recent illness; his secretary stated that while the Count could control his voice, he was not sure of his legs. The incident caused some comment and was looked upon in some quarters as a piece of German arrogance. Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau spoke in German. He said "that the German delegates were under no illusions as to the extent of their defeat or their lack of power." startled the delegates by declaring: "It is demanded from us that we shall confess ourselves to be the only ones guilty of the war. Such a confession in my mouth would be a lie." He asserted that the German people were not alone guilty; the world war was the crisis of the illness in Europe, which resulted from the policy of Imperialism among the European states. "Wrong has been done to Belgium," he added, "and we are willing to repair it; but in the manner of making war," he continued, "Germany is not the only guilty one."

Proceeding, he caused considerable stir among the Allied delegates by stating that "crimes in war may not be excusable, but they are committed in the struggle for victory and in the defense of national existence. Passions are aroused which make the consciences of people blunt, but the hundreds of thousands of non-combatants who have perished since November 11, 1918, by reason of the blockade, were killed with cold deliberation after our adversaries had conquered and

victory had been assured to them. Think of that when you speak of

guilt and punishment!"

The American newspaper representatives reported that at this challenge Premiers Clemenceau and Lloyd George and President Wilson engaged in animated conversation, but apparently decided against any interruption that might change the order of procedure, so no reply was made. The German spokesman was permitted to proceed. He declared that while the Germans stood before their adversaries alone, they were yet not without protection, since President Wilson's declaration had pledged the Allies to renounce a peace of violence and to make a peace of justice. . . . You will find us ready to examine upon this basis the preliminary peace which you have proposed to us," he said, "with a firm intention of rebuilding in co-operation with you that which has been destroyed and repairing any wrong that may have been committed—principally the wrong to Belgium—and to show to mankind new aims of political and social progress."

He declared it would then be the chief task to re-establish the devastated vigor of mankind and to reconstruct the territories of Belgium and of northern France which had been occupied by Germany and which were devastated by the war. In this connection he pleaded that the work should not be done by the German prisoners of war, as prisoners. The League of Nations he pronounced the most sublime thought in the history of mankind, and pleaded for the throwing open of the gates of the League to all who are of good-will. Closing, he said "the German people in their hearts are ready to take upon themselves their heavy burdens, if the basis of peace which has been established is not any more shaken." He pledged the German delegates to examine the document handed to them with good-will and in the hope that the final result of their interview might be sub-

scribed to by all.

## GERMANY STIRRED BY TERMS.

Germany did not like the peace terms dictated by the Allies. They were pronounced insulting and vindictive; they were degrading and impossible. So the Ebert Government proclaimed a week of mourning and declared the terms "a peace of violence," while it, promised to answer with a proposal of "a peace of right on the basis of a lasting peace of the nations." Ebert also declared that the terms implied the slavery of German labor to Allied capitalism, that the peace proposed was unbearable and contrary to President Wilson's fourteen points.

Correspondents reported the German people as stupefied at the peace terms, while the German press was almost a unit in its violent opposition to acceptance. On the other hand, clear thinkers like Maximilian Harden saw only harsh, inflexible justice in the terms,

reminding the nation of its own demands at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. The Spartacides urged the Government to sign, because the people wanted peace at any cost, and the general opinion in Allied quarters was that the treaty would be signed ultimately because it must be. The Germans knew quite well what would happen otherwise.

Meanwhile the Germans at Versailles sent a half dozen delegates back home on May 10 with copies of the treaty. Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau on May 10 submitted to Premier Clemenceau a note declaring that the treaty contained demands which could be borne by no people, many of them incapable of accomplishment, and that "the basis of the peace of right agreed upon between the belligerents has been abandoned." He was told in reply that the terms had been prepared with constant thought of the principles on which the armistice was based, and that the Allied representatives could "admit of no discussion of their right to insist on the terms substantially as drafted."

Later, the Germans asked attention to the fact that they were asked to sign the draft of the League of Nations, but that Germany was not mentioned among the nations to be asked to join. They inquired if such an invitation was intended, and were advised that on re-examination of the plan, they would find provision for the admission of new members.

## GERMANY SEEKS MODIFICATION OF TERMS.

Responsible persons in Germany rushed into print with voluminous statements regarding the impossibility of the proposed peace President Ebert called them a product of "revengeful hysteria" and declared the peace could not be signed. Herr Erzberger was quoted as saying that "By the treaty Germany is garroted, bound hand and foot, gagged and blinded. We will have less freedom than Egypt under it." Count von Brockderff-Rantzau declared that the economic clauses would force a large part of the 15,000,000 people in Germany dependent on Germany's industrial system to emigrate or starve. It was freely predicted that the Scheideman cabinet could not survive the signing of the terms and as freely asserted that they must be signed. Germany recognized the necessity of signing as an alternative to military occupation which would have been infinitely worse, but she took her medicine with bad grace. man delegation submitted a series of notes to the Supreme Council. one proposed an entirely new draft of the League of Nations covenant, another protested against the economic clauses and another against the proposed French ocupation of the Sarre Valley. The Germans offered to guarantee to France as much coal as she could hope to mine in the valley, if the territory were not alienated from Germany. The Allies replied that the terms must stand practically as

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presented, although they were willing to consider minor modifications which might appear feasible and just.

The German cabinet on May 20 made an official announcement to the effect that "Germany declines to sign the peace terms laid before it because they spell the economic destruction, political dishonor and moral degradation of the entire German nation, not only for the present, but also for still unborn generations." The statement declared that the German people asked no more than a peace in accord with the fourteen points not a single trace of which they found in the terms proposed. On May 21 the German delegation asked for further time in which to consider the terms and make reply and the time was extended to May 29.

Meantime while German politicians played for advantage and declared the peace impossible crowds were marching through the streets of Berlin and other German cities carrying banners which demanded, "Sign the Peace Terms," and "We Want Bread, Not Bullets."

## COUNCIL REPLIES TO GERMAN PROTESTS.

In reply to Germany's complaint regarding the onerous burden of the economic terms the Supreme Council replied that "While the terms imposed heavy burdens on Germany, the war Germany had launched had put burdens on the rest of Europe and there was no reason why Germany should escape. That in spite of the apparently onerous terms, Germany was not being held to full reparation, and that there was ample opportunity under the terms for German economic growth and commercial prosperity. In spite of the general cry of protest raised by the political leaders in Germany, there were thoughtful men in responsible positions who recognized the justice of the terms and the reasons for their severity. Herr Edward Bernstein, leader of the Social Democratic Party, was quoted as saying that the peace terms were not dictated entirely by hatred and passion, "It appears more likely," he said, "that distrust of our policy inspired them." Maximilian Harden also told Germany fearlessly that she was reaping the whirlwind harvest of the wind she had sown. Also the great conservative banking and commercial interests of Germany, anxious to end unrest and get back to work favored signing any terms that would end the blockade and open to German industry the world markets closed to it for nearly five years.

### GERMAN REPLY TO TREATY.

The German reply was finally handed to the Allies on May 29, that the answer declared that the terms of peace ignored the fact that Germany had replaced an imperialistic and irresponsible government by a strictly democratic one and that "it will be difficult

to say what different conditions could have been imposed upon an imperialistic government. The answer declared that Germany was entitled to a peace of right and was handed a peace of violence. The German delegation was also unwilling to agree to the surrender of the Kaiser and other war offenders or to agree to territorial changes without consultation with the population and the cessions of upper Silesia and portions of East and West Prussia to Poland were vigorously resisted. The Germans suggested that Danzig be made a free port and the Vistula River neutralized. Germany also resisted the loss of her colonies and suggested that she be admitted to the League of Nations and made the official mandatory for her former colonies. The Germans offered to pay indemnity to a total amount of \$25,000,000,000 but presented a counterclaim for damages from the Allied blockade of \$3,000,000,000. Germany also offered to disarm all her battle ships in return for the return of some of her commercial ships and agreed to reduce her army to the number dictated by necessity.

# AUSTRIAN DELEGATION ARRIVES.

While the Germans were discussing the Peace Terms the Austrian delegation arrived, reaching Paris on May 14 being quartered at St. Germain. No communication was permitted between the Germans and Austrian delegates.

# AUSTRIAN DELEGATES RECEIVE TERMS.

On June 2, the Austrian delegation received the terms of peace, except the final boundary and financial sections. The presentation of the terms lacked much of the austerity which was evident in the meeting with the Germans. The Austrian Premier, Dr. Renner, was also happier in his manner than was Brockdorff-Rantzau. He freely admitted that Austria must accept her share of the burden of war, expressed his hatred of the horrible crimes of 1914, committed by the former Austrian government, and declared that Austria was completely in the hands of the Allied Commissioners of whom he asked only such a peace as would insure Austria's national, political and economic existence.

The terms presented to Austria reduced her to a state of from six to seven million people in a territory of five to six thousand square miles. Austria was required to recognize the independence of Hungary, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene state and to guarantee the rights of racial minorities within her borders.

The Austrian foreign minister, after examining the terms declared that they meant the starvation of Austria, reducing the country to four million mountaineers and two million city dwellers and placing outside the boundaries of the new state all the mineral, manufacturing and agricultural wealth and industry of the old Austria.

## CHAPTER VII.

## ALLIES STAND FIRM-GERMANS YIELD-TREATY SIGNED

HE Allied reply to the German answer to the peace terms, was delivered on June 10th and gave Germany until June 23rd to sign. The Germans were told that the Allied troops would move into Germany if the treaty were not signed and the Allied plan for a military cordon about Germany, inside the boundaries of friendly neutrals, was allowed to leak out. Some concessions were made and Germany was assured that the Allies had kept the fourteen points constantly in mind and that the peace offered her was one of right and justice. The Germans were told in effect that they had failed to understand the position in which Germany stood before the public opinion of the world which considered her an international criminal.

With delivery of the Allied reply the main portion of the German peace delegation, headed by Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, resigned and returned to Germany. On June 22 the German National Assembly, after three days of stormy discussion voted 237 to 138 to sign the treaty. The Scheideman cabinet had already resigned when it became apparent that its play for modification of the terms had not succeeded. With the decision taken, the Allies willingly gave the German Government time to establish a new cabinet and to find delegates willing to sign the treaty.

#### THE GERMAN ACCEPTANCE.

Following the refusal by the Council of Three of the Allied Peace Conference to consider any variation in terms, or any extension in time, Dr. Haniel von Haimhausen sent the following note to M. Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference:

"It appears to the government of the German Republic, in consternation at the last communication of the Allied and Associated Governments, that these governments have decided to wrest from Germany by force, acceptance of the peace conditions, even those, which, without presenting any material significance, aim at divesting the German people of their honor.

"No act of violence can touch the honor of the German people. The German people, after frightful suffering in these last years, have no means

of defending themselves by external action.

"Yielding to superior force, and without renouncing in the meantime its own view of the unheard-of injustice of the peace conditions, the government of the German Republic declares that it is ready to accept and sign the peace conditions imposed."

By this note Germany officially accepted the terms of the victorious allies, acknowledging her own guilt and accepting the condemnation of the world of her attack upon its liberties.

The Germans had sought not only to gain time but to gain concessions, especially along the line of the colonies, the acknowledgment of war guilt and the surrender of the Kaiser and other German military chiefs. It was only when it appeared impossible to secure any modification that the majority in the Weimar Assembly voted solemnly and sullenly to sign the Treaty.

Dr. Haniel von Haimhausen was at once instructed to sign the Treaty, but while the Allies were deciding whether or not to accept his signature, since his credentials were not those of a plenipotentiary, von Haimhausen announced that he would not sign, and sent his resignation to Berlin. It was reported that his wife had wired him that if he signed the treaty he need not come home. In a conference with Minister of Defense, Noske, regarding the possibility of resistance to the terms of the Treaty, Field Marshal von Hindenburg was reported to have said that Germany would be able to conquer Poland, but could not offer effective resistance in the west.

The new Premier of Germany and President Ebert returned to Berlin on June 25, having a discussion during the whole night of their journey, over the appointment of a plenipotentiary. Premier Bauer on his arrival in Berlin said, "It is not easy to find the right man because the Entente has made certain difficult limits to our choice, but we hope to find a man by to-morrow who will be willing to sacrifice his own feelings for the sake of the fatherland."

President Ebert, Premier Bauer and all of the members of the new German Government, on June 25, issued a proclamation to the German people announcing the conclusion of peace and saying, "As far as it is possible to carry it out, the Treaty must be carried out." The proclamation promised to intercede in the behalf of those territories threatened with separation from the Empire and exhorted the people to realize the need of work and faithfulness to duty for the redemption of the country.

The new German delegation to the conference including Foreign Secretary Muller, Colonial Secretary Bell, secretaries and expert advisors left Berlin secretly on Thursday night, June 26, fearing an attempt on their lives. They reached Versailles on Friday evening.

On June 28, the fifth anniversary of the murder at Serajevo which furnished the pretext for the war, in the Famous Hall of Mirrors, where the German Empire was proclaimed in December, 1870,

by the grandfather of the imperial refugee in Holland, and where later the French were forced to submit to humiliating terms, the German delegates signed the Treaty of Peace.

The delegates were seated on a dais about a yellow covered table, in the form of a hollow rectangle at one side of the great hall. The German delegates sat at one end next to the delegates of Japan. About 1,000 persons were admitted to the hall as spectators.

### THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY.

Premier Clemenceau called the session to order at 3:10 P. M., French time, 10:10 A. M., New York time, Mr. Clemenceau, announcing that an agreement had been reached and assuring the German delegates that the document to be signed was identical with the copies in their possession, said, "The signatures will be given now and they amount to a solemn undertaking faithfully and loyally to execute the conditions embodied by this Treaty of Peace." He then invited the German delegates to sign the Treaty.

The German delegates were followed by the delegates of America. The British delegates then signed, they being followed in order by the delegates of the British Dominions, the French, the Japanese, the Italians, and then the representatives of the smaller powers.

The representatives of China withheld their signatures and did not attend the signing. They had offered to sign provided they were permitted to make reservations regarding the Shantung settlement. The Supreme Council did not wish to permit reservations, but was willing to have the delegates make a declaration after signing. This the Chinese delegates felt would misrepresent the public opinion of China and would also be against their own "sense of right and justice." The delegates issued a statement in which they submitted "their case to the impartial judgment of the world."

The session of the Peace Congress ended at 3:45.

It had been planned that the Allied delegates should file out of the hall on to the terraces of Versailles, and witness the playing of the elaborate fountains, but the crowd changed the plan. As soon as President Wilson, Premier Clemenceau and Premier Lloyd George descended to the terrace, the thousands of people massed behind the guards broke through and surrounded the three statesmen, struggling, cheering, shouting "vive" for each, and fighting with one another for a chance to shake the hand of one of the makers of the peace. Governed largely by the will of the crowds, the three leaders made their way along the terrace, responding to the acclaim with bows and ready handshakes, smiling and quite as happy as the people who had revised the official plans.

#### NEW SUPREME COUNCIL.

President Wilson sailed for home on June 29, Premier Lloyd George also returned to England, and Premier Clemenceau, feeling that national concerns must claim his whole attention, withdrew from active participation in the peace-making after the signing of the German treaty. The Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, which still had before it the Austrian, Bulgarian and Turkish settlements was reconstituted with Secretary Lansing, later Under-Secretary Frank Polk, substituted for President Wilson. Stephen Pichon substituted for Premier Clemenceau.

Arthur J. Balfour substituted for Lloyd George and Baron Ma-

kino for Japan added to make it a Council of Five.

At the same time that the main treaty with Germany was signed, there was also signed a general treaty with Poland, recognizing Poland as a sovereign nation and recognizing Polish sovereignty over the territories to be added to her domain by the German and Austrian treaties and later agreements. The treaty also bound Poland to assure absolute equality before the law of all races, languages and creeds.

There was also signed on June 28 a treaty between France and England and another between France and the United States pledging England and America to give France immediate military aid in case of armed aggression by Germany. This treaty was considered a temporary expedient to protect France until the League of Nations became operative.

# PEACE WITH GERMANY'S ALLIES.

With the German treaty signed the full time of the Peace Conference was given to the completion of the treaties with Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey and to the devlopment of such a state of stability in Hungary that there should be a government with which to make peace.

### AUSTRIA.

The Austrian delegation, on July 20, received the paragraphs of the proposed treaty necessary to complete the agreement. The articles provided for the reduction of the Austrian army to 30,000 officers and men, for the inclusion of the former Hungarian province of Oldenburg in Austria; for the cession to Czecho-Slovakia of a bridgehead on the Danube and for the division of Austria's pre-war debt between the nations formed from former Austro-Hungarian territory and those receiving additions from this territory. Austria was also required to return to Italy certain historical and art objects and to pay reparation to Italy, part of the payment to be in live stock to re-

place that driven off from the occupied area, and to repair the invaded areas.

Dr. Renner, the Austrian Premier, protested vigorously against the "unheard of severity" of the terms of peace offered to Austria and expressed a determination not to sign engagements he knew could not be executed.

The Austrian treaty reduced Austria from a population of 29,-200,000 to one of 6,500,000. This 22 per cent. of the former population was however charged with 60% of the pre-war debt and 70% of the war debt. The boundary with Czecho-Slovakia followed the historical boundaries of the Kingdom of Bomenia, the boundary with Jugo-Slavia followed the linguistic line, the German speaking people being left in Austria, the boundary with Italy followed the line of strategic defense required by Italy to check possible invasion. These lines left some 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 Germans under Italian and Czecho-Slovak rule.

The Austrian Cabinet voted, on September 6, to sign the treaty, the Assembly followed on September 8 and the treaty was signed on September 10, in the Stone Age Hall of the historic Chateau of St. Germain at Paris. Dr. Renner signed for Austria. Frank L. Polk signed for America. The Chinese delegates, by signing the Austrian Treaty secured membership for China in the League of Nations. The Rumanian and Jugo-slav delegates refused to sign, Rumania objecting to the pledge for the protection of racial minorities; Serbia because a new ministry was being formed. The new government in Jugo-Slavia decided, on September 27, to sign the treaty. Elections were necessary in Rumania before her signature could be obtained and these were held in November. The matter of Fiume was left unsettled in the Austrian Treaty except as far as Austria was concerned, the territory being definitely left outside her boundaries.

## BULGARIA.

Bulgaria received the proposed Treaty of Peace on September 19. The terms offered to Bulgaria provide for the cession of small areas to Serbia to rectify the Serbian frontier; for the cession of western Thrace to the Allied and Associated Powers, Bulgaria being bound to accept any disposition ultimately made of the territory but being assured of an economic outlet to the Aegean Sea; for the reduction of the Bulgarian Army to 20,000 men; for the surrender of all warships, submarines and air forces; for the payment of indemnity to the amount of 2,225,000,000 francs (about \$445,000,000); for the protection of minorities of race, language, nationality and religion and for the return within six months to Greece, Serbia and Roumania of livestock (73,126 animals), records, archives and articles of historical and artistic value, taken from these countries during

the war. Bulgaria is also required to recognize the abrogation of the Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest treaties and to return any money paid to her in conformity with these treaties.

#### FIUME.

The Fiume matter was complicated on September 13th, 1919, by the seizure of Fiume by Italian irregular forces under Colonel The Italian 6th Army Corps, ordered to Gabriele D'Annunzio. intercept the D'Annunzio forces, refused to obey orders and many of them joined the small force with which the Italian poet-patriot started for the "liberation" of the city. Correspondents reported the following dramatic meeting between D'Annunzio and General Pettaluga in command of the Italian regulars. Pettaluga remonstrating with D'Annunzio declared, "Thus you will ruin Italy."

D'Annunzio replied, "Rather will you ruin Italy if you oppose

Fiume's destiny and suffer the infamous policy."

"What, then, do you wish?" said the General.

"A free entry into Fiume."

"I must obey orders.

"I understand you would fire upon your brethren? Fire first upon me." cried the poet, baring his breast.

To which the General replied, "I am happy to meet you brave soldier and grand poet. With you I cry, 'Viva Fiume."

At this all forces cried, "Viva Pettaluga" and the march to

Fiume continued, unhindered.

D'Annunzio was received in Fiume with rejoicing and enthusiastic demonstrations. The President of the National Council, an Italian organization, declared that Fiume "is now annexed to Italy and is under Italian rule."

The liberators soon had 26,000 troops in Fiume and organized the city for defense. The small Allied garrisons remained in their barracks over night and left Fiume the next day, boarding warships in the harbor. The Allied ships at first declared a blockade of the city which was completed by the Italian loyal troops. This blockade was ended in a few days. Although all Italy hailed D'Annunzio's coupe. Premier Nitti, facing a turbulent session of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, denounced the poet as a traitor and declared that Italy's future could lie only with her Allies and that any other course was suicide. Foreign Minister Tittoni supported the Premier, who asked the Allies to oust the adventurer, since such action was difficult for Italy. The matter was, however, left to Italy. D'Annunzio breathed defiance to the world, announced that he would attack if he were not attacked, held the heroic pose for day after day, but after the first excitement, the world ignored him. It was a most difficult situation for the hero.

After some weeks of inaction and indecision, D'Annunzio left Fiume in the hands of a trusted Lieutenant and, with assistance from the Italian navy, seized the Port of Zara in Dalmatia. He threatened also to seize Sebenico and Spalato; but, when it became evident that he might meet both Allied and Jugo-Slav armed resistance, he contented himself with the conquests already made and finally returned to Fiume. Late in December, 1919, it was reported that Premier Nitti and D'Annunzio, after a visit of the latter to Rome, had reached an agreement under which Italian regular troops were to replace the poet's irregulars as the garrison of Fiume. Senor Nitti then returned to Paris to complete the negotiations with England, France and America as to the final settlement of the Adriatic question. It was reported that Italy and Jugoslavia had reached an agreement in which it was expected that the other Allies would concur.

#### TURKEY.

The settlement with Turkey proved the most difficult of all. The delegation which Turkey sent to Paris was advised to go home, being told that the terms of peace would be submitted to Turkey when they were agreed upon. Greece wanted to govern, either as sovereign or under a mandate, all of European Turkey and those portions of Asia Minor and the Aegean Islands where Greeks predominate. France, with troops in Smyrna desired the mandate over Syria, was willing to grant a mandate to Greece for Asia Minor, but did not approve of the proposed Grecian mandate for Constantinople. Italy had her eyes on Adalia and its hinterland, but cared little for the ambitions of Greece. Great Britain wanted mandates for Mesopotamia, Palestine and the Caucasus, but was shy of Armenia and Constantinople, in fact she was reported to be inclined to favor leaving the Turk his European capital, this being a move to avoid offense to the Moslems under the British flag. All plans contemplated the neutralizing of the straits. The only solution which appeared likely to secure an agreement contemplated an American mandate for Constantinople and eastern Thrace, to include Armenia and the small territory on the eastern shores of the Bosphorus which is unquestionably Turkish. Armenia, guarded by two divisions of British troops, was reported in danger of instant annihilation by the Turks if this protection were withdrawn. America, however, although friendly to both Armenians and Turks in the past was not attracted by the prospect of these mandates. A mixed military, economic and missionary committee was despatched under General Harbord to investigate and report. This commission did not agree, a minority favored the acceptance of a mandate, the majority favored only temporary help to set Armenia on her feet. The Republic of Armenia was reported to have an army of 40,000 men which might be

ncreased to 75,000. Memel Pasha, the Turkish commander in Asia Vinor was said to have 200,000 well drilled men. Armenia with its nore than 125,000 sq. miles was reported as numbering, in spite of leportations and the sufferings of four years, 3,000,000 Christians and 1,300,000 Moslems. It was suggested that America might give he little republic financial assistance, might assign officers to drill her army, and might undertake the temporary administration of the sountry.

It was suggested that no treaty might be signed with Turkey, but hat the Allied and Associated Powers might decide on the future of various portions of Turkey and notify the Government of what is left of Turkey of their decision. This matter was also dragging as this

volume went to press.

# CHAPTER VIII

### RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY.

ITH the Peace Treaty signed the world felt that peace was near. It hoped that a speedy ratification would set men back at their normal tasks, and restore the life of the nations to the channels in which it ran in 1914, before the fateful day in August which called to arms the freemen of the world. But prompt ratification was not to be, between legal procedures, required by constitutions, and differences of opinion, which needed to be accommodated, the day of ratification was daily left for some tomorrow until the hearts of the people began to grow faint. The commerce of the nations, too, began to chafe at the artificial obstacles of war which could only be

fully demolished by peace ratified and proclaimed.

Germany was the first of the signatory powers to ratify the Peace Treaty. After a stormy session in which the futility of further resistance was made plain, the German National Assembly at Weimar, on July 9, voted, by a large majority, to accept the peace imposed by the might of the world's conscience. The English Parliament ratified the Treaty of Peace on July 21. King George completed the ratification on October 10. Belgium ratified on August 25. French Chamber of Deputies passed the ratification bill on October 2, after several sessions in which the French delegates to the Peace Conference were accused of yielding too much to President Wilson and of letting Germany off too easy. The French Senate concurred in the ratification on October 10. The King of Italy ratified the Treaty by royal proclamation on October 7. This was held to make possible the putting of the treaty into effect although there was some question regarding the necessity of concurrence in the Italian ratification on the part of the Parliament. The Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, however, postponed the exchange of ratifications, which would have put the Treaty in force between Germany and the Allied nations ratifying, in the hope that the American Senate, by ratifying, would make possible the organization with American representation of the various commissions provided for by the treaty. President Wilson had asked and had failed to gain the consent of the

Senate to the making of these appointments in advance of ratification. Guatemala ratified the Treaty on October 3 and Canada, after a spirited discussion of Article X, ratified on September 12.

# THE PRESIDENT PRESENTS THE TREATY TO THE SENATE.

President Wilson brought the treaty home with him from France and laid it before the Senate on July 10. In the form in which it was presented to the Senate it was a book twenty inches long, fourteen inches wide and six inches thick. In presenting the treaty to the Senate the President, after sketching some of the difficulties created by the "cross currents of politics and of interest," said that America's great role had been that of the disinterested champion of right and that "it was our duty to do everything that it was within our power to do to make the triumph of freedom and of right a lasting triumph in the assurance that men might everywhere live without fear." He said also that "out of the execution of these great enterprises of liberty there had sprung opportunities to attempt what statesmen had never found the way to do before-to safeguard the rights of racial, national and religious minorities, to regulate military establishments, to free the economic life of nations, to clear the channels of commerce of unfair obstructions and to secure for labor the protection of definite international pledges."

While statesmen might see difficulties in the way of the League of Nations the people, the President felt assured, "could see none and would brook no denial; the united power of free nations must put a stop to aggression and the world must be given peace!" The President assured the Senate that the statesmen who had prepared the Covenant of the League saw it "as the main object of the peace, the only thing that could complete it or make it worth while. They saw it as the hope of the world, and that hope they do not dare to disappoint." He admitted that the Treaty, as drawn, represented compromises but declared that none of them "cut to the heart of the principle."

Mr. Wilson declared that America had reached her majority as a world power that our participation in the world war had "established our position among the nations and nothing but our own mistaken action can alter it." In closing he said "the stage is set, the destiny disclosed. It has come about by no plan of our conceiving, but by the hand of God who led us into this way. We cannot turn back! We can only go forward, with lifted eyes and freshened spirit to follow the vision. America shall in truth show the way. The light streams upon the path ahead and nowhere else."

#### THE DISCUSSION OF THE TREATY.

In the United States ratification was delayed by opposition to the League of Nations covenant in the form in which it was finally adopted by the Peace Conference. The recognition of the Monroe Doctrine was not considered broad enough by some critics. were also various minor points which gave rise to critical comment. But the principal attacks on the covenant were levied against the Executive organization of the League some senators fearing that by accepting membership in the League America would surrender her sovereignty to a degree not warranted by the advantages of membership. There was fear that an adverse decision by the Council of the League might place us in opposition to the world on some question, such as immigration, the tariff, racial equality, or some other internal question which had an influence on the rights or policies of our fellow members of the League. There was fear also that Article X, requiring us to go to war, or at least laying upon us the moral obligation to go to war, upon the advice of the Council, would not only violate our Constitution but would involve us in numberless muddles throughout the world in which we had no vital interest, making us a sort of international policeman without our direct consent. There was violent opposition also to the Shantung settlement in the treaty itself. This settlement, coupled with article ten convinced many opponents of the treaty that ratification meant the giving to Japan of rights stolen from China by Germany, plus concessions wrested by Japan on her own account, and the guaranteeing of these territories and rights to Japan against Chinese and any other aggression. opposition to these portions of the treaty divided into three groups, those demanding that ratification follow direct amendment of the treaty, those who demanded reservations having the force of amendments and those favoring explanatory reservations which, while not amendatory, would state clearly the understanding of these provisions in view of which the American ratification was given. President Wilson and a large portion of the Democratic membership of the Senate favored ratification without amendment or reservation, the President fearing that any such action would throw the treaty back into the whirlpool of international self-interest from which it had been snatched in Paris and would encourage every other signatory to cumber the instrument with reservations perhaps to the extent of practically nullifying the months of work at Paris which had produced the treaty.

# MR. TAFT SUGGESTS RESERVATIONS.

The arguments for reservations finally crystalized in two statements, one issued by former President Taft, a stanch supporter of the League covenant as a whole, and the other by former Justice

Hughes. Both lists covered about the same ground and each was issued as a measure of the common ground upon which a compromise might be reached between those favoring more drastic amendment and those favoring none at all. The suggested reservations by Mr. Taft were as follows

"1. That upon two years' notice the United States could cease to be a member of the League without having the League pass upon whether she had fulfilled all her obligations under the covenant.

"2. That self-governed colonies and dominions could not be represented on the League Council at the same time with the mother government or be included in any of those clauses where the parties to the dispute are excluded from its settlement.

"3. That the functioning of the Council under Article X shall be advisory only and that each member shall be left free to determine questions of war in its own way the decision of the United States

resting with Congress.

"4. That differences between the nations regarding immigration, the tariff, and other domestic questions shall not be left to the League for settlement.

"5. That the Monroe Doctrine is to be reserved for administra-

tion by the United States.

"6. That the United States reserves the right to withdraw unconditionally at the end of ten years, or at least to terminate then her obligations under Article X."

#### SHANTUNG AWARD FRIENDLESS.

No attempt was made anywhere to defend the Japanese award, it being recognized that Shantung was a pawn which was sacrificed to keep Japan in the game. The opposition was so strong, however, that President Wilson brought diplomatic pressure to bear on Japan to secure an explicit, official statement of her intentions which would permit the Senate to accept the treaty provision in full confidence that the proposed recession of sovereignty in Shantung to China would be accomplished. The Japanese answer was given by Baron Uchida but was not fully satisfactory, Japan apparently basing the perfection of her promise on China's acceptance of the treaty and upon further "negotiations" with China. In view of what happened to China in the negotiations of 1915 and 1918 the word "negotiations" was taken with some apprehension by the American friends of China.

#### BOTH SIDES GO TO THE COUNTRY.

On September 3, President Wilson began a trip planned to last a month and to take him to the principal cities of the north, middle west, west and south. On this trip he made clear his position regarding the treaty and cleared up many doubtful points, although

he did not silence the opposition. Senators Johnson, of California, and Borah, of Idaho, followed the President's itinerary with speeches in opposition. Both the advocate and the opponents of the treaty spoke to enthusiastic houses and it did not appear that the speechmaking had really made a very great difference in the attitude of the country at large. The President was unable, because of a nervous breakdown to complete his trip. His speech scheduled for Wichita, Kans., on September 26, was cancelled and the rest of the dates were omitted. He was hurried back to the White House, where he was put under a strict regimen of unbroken rest and gradually gained in strength.

## THE TREATY REPORTED TO THE SENATE.

The Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate agreed on its report on the treaty, on September 4, and the report was presented to the Senate on September 10. The Committee recommended four

reservations and thirty-eight direct amendments.

The reservations were included in a resolution of ratification which specified that the ratification was not to take effect until the reservations had been accepted by at least three of the four principal allied and associated powers, i.e., Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. The reservations declared in substance that,

The United States reserves the unconditional right to withdraw

from the League of Nations.

The United States would not consider itself bound under Article X to take any military or economic action or to accept any mandate

except by action of the Congress of the United States.

The United States expressly declares that all domestic questions are reserved for its own decision and are not submitted to the council or the assembly of the League of Nations. Immigration, coastwise traffic, the tariff and commerce are mentioned as questions reserved from the League's authority.

The United States reserves to itself the interpretation of the Monroe Doetrine which is declared wholly outside the jurisdiction of the

League of Nations.

The United States refuses its assent to the Shantung section of

the treaty.

Among the amendments there were four principal changes recommended in the structure of the treaty, thirty-five of the amendments covering similar changes in various paragraphs concerning commissions to be created.

The amendments may be summarized as follows:

An amendment, by Senator Johnson of California, providing that the United States should have equal voting power with Great Britain and her colonies or six votes in the League Assembly.

Amendments by Senator Fall of New Mexico excluding the United States from participation in various commissions created under the treaty and restricting the authority of the American member of the Reparations Commission to matters in which the United States was interested.

An amendment offered by Senator Lodge to change the text of the treaty so as to return Shantung to China instead of to cede it to Japan.

An amendment by Senator Moses of New Hampshire to prevent any nation from taking part in the consideration or settlement of controversies in which it is interested.

### THE AMENDMENTS FAIL

As the treaty came before the Senate it found three groups ready to receive it. One group of irreconcilable opponents was ready to vote for anything that would defeat the treaty. Another group was equally determined to prevent the change of a line or a letter. A third group apparently holding the balance of power was not willing to take any action which would threaten the life of the treaty but felt that some reservations should be made to protect American rights and to make clear the intentions of the United States in ratifying. Debate began promptly on the amendments and they were defeated one by one. The amendments proposed by Senator Fall to prevent American participation in League commissions failed on October 2, by a vote of 30 to 58. The Shantung Amendment was beaten 55 to 35. The Johnson amendment was also beaten, on October 27, 40 to 38, and the Moses amendment also failed.

With the amendments killed the way was open to a vote on the reservations. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, on October 22 revised the reservations partly by increasing the number by dividing the four first reported and also by adding a refusal to assent to the articles of the treaty assigning Shantung to Japan, and reserving to the United States full liberty of action, a provision requiring the assent of Congress to any regulations of the Reparations Commission regarding commerce between Germany and the United States, a provision reserving to Congress the right to determine the amount the United States shall contribute to the support of the League, a provision reserving to Congress the right to decide on the armaments maintained by the United States, and another reserving the right of Congress to permit economic relations between citizens of the United States and the nationals of a nation outlawed by the League for breach of covenant. The reservation of Article X was strengthened and made to declare that "The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country . . . or to employ the military or

naval forces of the United States for any purpose unless . . . the Congress, which under the Constitution has sole power to declare war . . . shall, by act or joint resolution, so provide." President Wilson had declared, when a reservation thus worded, was first broached,

that it was a "dagger thrust at the heart of the treaty."

After several days of debate, the Senate adopted on November 13, 1919, 46 to 33 the proposed "knife thrust" reservation on Article X. A move for cloture to limit debate was made by Senator Lodge, following a similar attempt by Senator Hitchcock. On November 15, working under the cloture rule, the Senate adopted ten more of the proposed reservations, the ones declaring that the United States would accept no mandate except by vote of Congress; that it has served to itself the right to decide what constituted a domestic question; that no question regarding the Monroe Doctrine would be arbitrated, this doctrine being held to be entirely outside the jurisdiction of the League of Nations; that assent to the Shantung settlement was withheld; that the United States reserved to itself the right to control its appointees to various commissions, the right to decide its own share of the expense of the League, the right to judge for itself as to necessary armaments and the right to control commerce between its nationals and those of a state breaking its covenant with the League. On November 18, reservations were adopted making American participation in international labor congresses dependent on Congressional action and declaring that the United States would not be bound by any action of the League Council or Assembly in which any member of the League and its self-governing dominions or colonies shall have cast more than one vote. All other proposed reservations were voted down, fourteen in all being adopted.

It was hoped by the Senators known as "middle ground" Republicans that a sufficient number of Democratic Senators would support the ratification resolution, to provide the votes necessary to adoption. But a letter from President Wilson to Senator Hitchcock, on Nov. 19, declared the Lodge resolution a nullification instead of a ratification and expressed the hope that it would be defeated "in order that the

way might be open to a real ratification."

Senator Lodge's resolution for ratification with reservations was on November 19 lost, 39 to 55, 35 Republicans and 4 Democrats voting for it and 13 Republicans and 42 Democrats against it. A vote to reconsider was adopted and it was defeated again 41 to 50. A resolution to ratify without reservation or amendment was lost by 38 to 53, one Republican and 37 Democrats voting for and 46 Republicans and 7 Democrats against it. The Senate, following the votes on the treaty, adjourned sine die with the treaty unratified.

In the days immediately following adjournment the possibility of agreement on the treaty seemed faint. Senator Lodge, the Republican leader, declared that the ratification resolution represented the

limit of compromise from his standpoint. The Republican position was outlined by the Senator in a statement issued November 21, as follows:

The case is very simple. After four months of careful consideration and discussion, the reservations were presented to the Senate. They were purely American in their character, designed solely to Americanize the treaty and make it safe for the United States.

Under the President's orders the followers of the Administration in the Senate voted down those reservations. It was also shown by a vote that there was a decisive majority against the treaty without the reservations.

Those reservations as presented to the Senate will stand. There is no room for further compromise between Americanism and the super-government presented by the League. All I ask now is that we may have the opportunity to lay those reservations before the American people. To that great and final tribunal alone would I appeal.

I wish to carry those reservations into the campaign. I wish the American people to read and study them. They are not like the covenant of the

League. They are simple.

I do not see that there is one of them to which any American can object. I want the people to see them, understand them, and think of them in every household, on every farm, in every farm, in every shop and factory throughout the land. Then let them decide.

The President refused to make any move toward a compromise, being reported to have adopted a policy of "hands off." There was talk of the treaty becoming an issue in the Presidential campaign of 1920.

The French and British peoples took the American situation philosophically, the French press indicating a willingness to concur in most of the reservations, in fact, some Frenchmen wanted to do some amending themselves, while British statesmen declared it unthinkable that America should reject the peace made under the leadership of her own President and expressed doubt of the success of the League without America. German opinion was divided as to the meaning of America's rejection of the treaty. In some quarters it was taken as an indication that America might yet assist Germany to secure easier terms, and this feeling was reflected in the German refusal to

sign the protocal presented on the exchange of ratifications.

The Supreme Council arranged for the exchange of ratifications with Germany on December 1; but presented to Germany a protocol to be signed first. The protocol contained provisions for the fulfillment of the armistice conditions and required Germany to deliver to the Allies, in reparation for the Scapa Flow sinkings. about 400,000 tons of floating docks, cranes and other naval and maritime equipment. Germany declared this demand to be an attempt by England to cripple German commerce and prevent the reconstitution of Germany's commercial fleet and declared also that she could not release this quantity of material without seriously hampering her commerce. Several notes were exchanged, there was talk of an ultimatum backed by armed force, the German delegates at Paris twice made

ready to go home, and finally, late in December, 1919, an Allied commission was created to inspect German ports and decide upon the possibility of German compliance with the demand. Meanwhile ratifications were not exchanged and the treaty was not in force.

The Supreme Council, on November 21, decided to give Poland a mandate for twenty-five years over Eastern Galicia, subject to final determination by the League of Nations. It was also decided to grant to Norway political sovereignty over the Spitzbergen Archipelago.

The Bulgarian treaty was signed at Neuilly, just outside of Paris, on Nov. 27. Frank L. Polk signed the treaty for America. Serbia and Rumania were not permitted to sign because they had not yet signed the Austrian treaty. M. Stambuliwski, leader of the peasant party, who told King Ferdinand he was signing the death warrant of the nation when the King accepted the German alliance, signed the treaty for Bulgaria. The Greek representatives, since under the treaty Greece gained the major part of Thrace, declared that Greece realized in the treaty the hopes of 1200 years. Rumania signed the Austrian treaty on December 9, declaring at the same time her intention of complying with the demands of the Supreme Council regarding evacuation of Hungarian territory. On December 9, Hungary had been invited to send delegates to Paris to receive the terms of peace for Hungary, the first delegates appointed were being held in internment by Rumania.

The American Peace Delegation left Paris for home on December 9. American Ambassador Wallace took Mr. Polk's place on the Supreme Council.

After the opening of the regular session of Congress on December 1, 1919, it became increasingly evident with every day, that a compromise of some sort on the treaty would be reached. Democrats and Republicans were alike unwilling to let the controversy extend into the campaign of 1920.

The Republican National Committee met in Washington on December 10. While the committee took no action on the treaty, it was said that the members had urged prompt ratification on business and economic grounds. On December 14, the President again refused to offer concessions or to suggest a compromise.

Efforts at compromise became daily more numerous. On December 16, Senator Underwood, Democrat, and possible successor to Senator Hitchcock as Democratic Senate leader, suggested the advisability of mild reservations. A conference of Democrats and Republicans was suggested. Senator Knox prepared a resolution to effect peace if ratification failed, his resolution providing for a declaration of a State of Peace whenever Germany should acquiese in assuring to America all the advantages accruing under the Versailles Treaty.

On December 26, the "middle ground" ground Republicans, "mild reservationists," prepared to demand that Senator Lodge meet Senator Hitchcock and show some progress toward compromise, otherwise they were prepared to proceed without his leadership. This action brought Senator Johnson, of California, leader of the irreconcilable opponents of the treaty, back to Washington from a stumping tour. Senator Johnson was reported as ready to filibuster, if necessary, to defeat the treaty. At a meeting of the Democratic National Committee in Washington on January 8, President Wilson, by a note, expressed again his opposition to any reservations other than those merely interpretive, while Wm. J. Bryan urged his party to accept a compromise with the majority Senators and thus secure early ratification. A bipartisan committee was formed to work out an acceptable compromise. The work proceeded slowly, appeared at times halted, but never quite hopeless. All the indications, as this chapter was closed, pointed to a ratification of some sort before Easter.

# TREATY PUT IN FORCE.

As a result of the re-checking of German holdings of marine equipment by the special Allied commission the Allies agreed to accept 275,000 tons instead of the 400,000 tons originally demanded and the Germans agreed to sign the Protocol and to the put the Treaty in force.

The ceremony of the exchange of ratifications took place in the Clock Hall of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 4 P. M., January 10, 1920. The Proces Verbal by which peace was declared was signed by the representatives of Germany, France, Japan, Italy, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, Panama, Peru, Poland, Siam, Czechoslovakia and Uruguay. The United States was not represented.

With peace formally declared the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference speedily closed up its affairs on January 20, 1920, leaving a council of Ambassadors to clear up any remaining business. The Council ended its labors with the Fiume and Adriatic settlement still unconcluded, although Italy's final proposition was before the Jugo-Slav Government for its acceptance. This provided for relinquishment by Italy of most of the Dalmatian coast in return for the internationalization of Fiume under protection of the League of Nations.

The first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations was called by President Wilson to convene at Paris at 10:30 A. M. on Friday, January 16. Leon Bourgeois of France was named as President of the Council and the organization was perfected. The Saare Valley Commission was named and an adjournment taken to meet in London when it was hoped that the United States might be represented.

## CHAPTER IX.

# NATIONS BORN OF SELF-DETERMINATION.

ITH the break-up of the Central Empires, there sprang into existence a group of nations, subject peoples of Austria, Germany and Russia, declaring their independence and rising to assert those national aspirations which no tyranny could obliterate.

In Russia there was formed the Republic of Finland, the North Russian and Siberian Republics, Republics in Esthonia, Courland, Livonia, and Lettland, a Ukrainian Republic, and a Caucasus Republic, while Poland, uniting former Russian and Austrian Poland, disputed the territory of the Ruthenians with the Ukraine. In Germany, a socialist republic arose from the ashes of the fallen Empire, controlling all of former Imperial Germany except parts of Posen and Silesia which Poland attempted to seize. In Austro-Hungary a Republic was proclaimed in Hungary, another in Austria. The Crown land of Bukowina fell under Rumanian influence and Rumania extended her influence over Transylvania and a part of the Banat of Temesvar. Here she came into conflict with the Kingdom of the Serbs-Croats and Slovenes which united the Former Serbia, the former Austrian southern provinces and Montenegro. Montenegro was not a wholly willing partner to this union, the former King maintaining his government at its seat in France and refusing to recognize the action of the legislature as legal. This kingdom of Serbs etc. was generally referred to as Jugoslavia. Bohemia also established herself as the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia, combining with the old Bohemia the slavic districts of northern Austria and western Hungary. promptly took possession of the Istrian territory marked for occupation by the terms of the armistice, bringing her to the gates of Fiume.

In Turkey independent republican governments were established in Syria and in Armenia, and the Arabian kingdom of the Hedjaz gained full power with the final defeat of the Turks. An attempt at self-determination in Egypt was fostered by Bolshevik elements and was considered premature and sternly repressed by the British, who were compelled to debark Australian troops on their way home, to complete the work of pacification. In Ireland, however, England treated quite passively an attempt of the Sinn Fein Irish Republic to function in the counties where it held majorities. The Irish question grew to larger proportions under the principle of self-determina-

tion.

When, however, the Sinn Fein movement included in self-determination the murder of British soldiers and constables, Britain abandoned her passive attitude and moved to eliminate Sinn Feinism from Ireland. All the Sinn Fein headquarters in the island were raided, papers and leaders were seized and it was announced that the British Government was resolved to "treat the entire Irish republican movement as seditious and illegal under the Treason Felony Act."

On December, 1919, Premier Lloyd George introduced in the British Parliament a bill providing for Home Rule in Ireland, the bill giving Ulster and Catholic Ireland separate Parliaments but permitting the two autonomous governments thus created to unite into one union if they so desired without further imperial legisla-

tion.

#### GERMANY.

The German Socialist Republic appeared at first in danger of becoming a Bolshevist Communistic State, but the more sober elements prevailed and Herr Ebert, the first people's chancellor, succeeded in creating a cabinet which eventually controlled events. Two Red leaders, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. finding it impossible to gain control through the various councils, kept Berlin and the provinces in a turmoil for many weeks, the initial attempt to seize power being staged on January 6, 1919. Berlin saw machine gun fighting in her streets, saw her buildings bombarded and set on fire, saw her civilians shot down by the fire of the opposing sides and got a nice little taste of real German war. She didn't like it and rallied at last to the support of Herr Ebert and his minister of war, Herr Noske, a socialist who dared to use the weapons of imperialism against the creators of disorder. Gradually Noske's loyal troops gained control throughout Germany. Spartacides, as the Reds called themselves after Sparatcus, were restricted to constantly narrowing limits in Berlin and finally, as a climax to the wave of red madness Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, nominally under arrest, were murdered, or their murder was permitted, on January 15, by their guards. The now leaderless Reds still rioted, but with little purpose, and Germany was enabled to pursue her way toward rehabilitation with no other handicaps than a series of semi-revolutionary strikes which persisted until the Peace Treaty was signed and in which Hamburg, Dusseldorf, Bremen and some other cities were temporarily, at various times, under control of radical organizations. During this period of turbulence the other German States, all of which had been proclaimed Republics, showed tendencies toward a complete breaking up of Germany, this being especially noticeable in the south German states, Bavaria, Wurtemburg and Saxony, but the Ebert Government was able to unify Germany sufficiently to call elections for a National Assembly to be held

January 19. Berlin was under martial law but the elections were held and resulted in the return of a large majority of conservative socialists. The new German Assembly was convened at Weimar, because of the unrest in Berlin, and immediately set about to plan for a new Germany. Herr Ebert was elected the first President of the German Republic; Philip Scheideman became chancellor.

On February 21, 1919, Kurt Eisner, socialist premier of Bavaria, was assassinated by a former army officer. A Soldiers' and Workmen's Council was at once organized and Bavaria was declared to be a Soviet Republic. Lenine sent messages of encouragement, and a Red army was raised for defence. The German National forces, however, were used to dispose of Bavarian Sovietism and it practically ended on April 13, although Munich was not retaken until May 3.

The Scheideman cabinet held office through the trying days of peace uncertainty, opposed the Allied terms and resigned when the Assembly voted to sign the treaty. A new cabinet was organized by Herr Adolph Bauer with Dr. Herman Muller as foreign secretary, Herr Noske remaining as Minister of Defense. Herr Muller headed the delegation which signed the Treaty of Peace.

Following the signing of the Treaty the German Assembly gave its entire attention to the completion of the Constitution of the new Germany. As finally promulgated it declares Germany an Imperial Republic. The form of Government follows rather closely that of the United States, but with a cabinet under a chancellor similar to that of the old regime. There is to be a Reichstag elected by the people by universal free and equal suffrage and an upper house Reichsrat, made up of representatives of the German states, each state having one vote for every million inhabitants, but no state may have more than two-fifths of the votes, thus limiting the representation of Prussia, so that she may not dominate the Republican Empire as she did the former Empire of the Hohenzollerns. The universally recognized principles of the laws of nations are accepted as binding elements of German law. Freedom of speech and of the press are guaranteed, as is the right of association. Provision is made for religious instruction in the schools, for the protection of youth from exploitation, for just economic laws, for the protection of the family and for life tenure subject to certain exceptions for public servants. is a provision for referendum votes of the people on laws passed by the Reichstag, especially on bills rejected by the Reichsrat. A provision of the constitution providing for union of Austria with the German Republic was in conflict with the Peace Treaty and brought from the Allied Supreme Council an immediate demand for its elimination.

#### AUSTRIA.

Austria organized a Republic of German Austria during the early days of the dismemberment of the old Empire. This Republic stood through the troublous weeks and lived to be recognized by the Allies after the signing of the Treaty of Peace with Austria. The Allies, however, refused to deal with "German" Austria, denominating the former enemy merely as "Austria" in all documents. Various rumors of Austrian dallying upon the verge of Bolshevism proved false, but recurred whenever events looked inauspicious. It was said that the tendency toward Bolshevism was checked by a wholesome fear of starvation, as the Allied food commission notified the Austrian people that food shipments would cease if a Bolshevist regime were instituted.

#### HUNGARY.

With the end of war came the murder of Count Tisza and the collapse of monarchy in Hungary. Count Michael Karolyi organized a Republic which held power until late in March, when, under threat of Allied occupation, if armistice terms were not promptly complied with, declaring that this prevented the provisioning of Hungary, Karolyi turned the government over to one Bela Kun, a disciple of Lenine who promptly organized a Soviet Communist Regime. He declared socialized all large estates, mines, big industries, banks and transport lines, contracted an armed alliance with Russia, organized a powerful Red army and became a sword in the side of the Peace Conference which was only eliminated in August, 1919, when Rumanian, Serbian and Bohemian troops defeated Kun's Red armies and Rumanian troops approached Budapest rather too closely for Kun's comfort. He and his cabinet fled to Austria. Kun got through. His premier was caught and executed. The Allies were not much better off, however, for Archduke Joseph, a Hapsburg noble, installed himself in Budapest on August 6, and proceeded to organize a government. He stepped down after receiving a two-hour ultimatum from the Allies. Meantime the Rumanians occupied the Hungarian capital and helped themselves to food stuffs and railway material. They claimed that the railway material had been stolen from them by the Hungarians during the Austrian occupation of Rumania. The Peace Conference notified the Rumanian Government that it would have to pay for all requisitioned material, and ordered the withdrawal of all Rumanian forces from Hungary. The notice was not complied with until several times repeated and then, on November 15, the Rumanians withdrew only to the River Theiss. With Archduke Joseph out of the way a representative cabinet was organized under Premier Friedrich, with which it was expected that the Allies would be able to negotiate a treaty of peace.

#### RUSSIA.

In Russia the Esthonian and Lettish Republics were kept alive by the never-ending threat of Bolshevism. They gave their undivided attention to the organization of armed resistance. The presence among them of several thousand German soldiers who alternately fought and fraternized with the Bolsheviki made the situation more difficult still. In company with Poland and with the support of British and American warships these little Republics kept up a ceaseless struggle to free Russia from Red terror and on Sept. 1, 1919, their armies were within striking distance of Petrograd, had been since early summer, and were reported about to begin an advance to rescue the former Russian capital before winter set in. Finland, after a German attempt had failed to make it a kingdom, reorganized as a Republic, with a provisional government and joined in the fight on Bolshevism. The Finnish armies were near Petrograd on the north on Sept. 1 ready to co-operate with the Allied Naval forces and the Esthonian and Lettish armies in the attempt to make Petrograd once more a civilized city. Because of failure of Finnish co-operation and of a German-Russian attack on Riga the Lettish-Esthonian attack on Petrograd fell just short of success, General Yudenitch holding reserve positions with difficulty. At the time the armistice was signed in November, 1918, the Bolshevists controlled practically all of Russia and the opposition was disorganized. The Siberian Republican government, the strongest of the anti-Bolshevist governments, became a military dictatorship under Admiral Kolchak. The Admiral organized a representative cabinet and declared that he would use his power only to free Russia and would convene a Constituent Assembly as soon as the Reds were defeated and Russia reconquered. The capital was at Omsk, Siberia.

Gradually other Russian forces recognized the authority of Kolchak and by early spring the campaigns against the Bolsheviki were The Siberians attacked and advanced almost to the Volga. The Cossacks under General Denikine advanced from the Don country and the North Russian Government and Allied forces advanced south of Archangel. Success was complete on every front, but toward the middle of the summer the Siberians ran short of arms and munitions, Red propaganda took effect and the handicapped Siberian armies, facing a well organized Red offensive, were driven back to the Urals, while the North Russian Government suffered reverses and fell back on Archangel. Denikine continued to advance, having adequate supplies of munitions, guns, and tanks, supplied by the British, but with the near collapse of the Siberians, Denikine faced a difficult situation and was driven back slightly, although he captured and held Odessa and the Crimea. On September 1 the Poles reported an advance, with the support of tanks, showing that supplies had reached them and American supplies in large quantities were nearing Kolchak's forces. At

one time, in the early summer, the Allies were reported about to recognize Kolchak as head of the de facto Russian government, then his reverses began and recognition was withheld. United States Minister to Japan, Morris, sent to Omsk to investigate, reported that the reverses had been largely due to discouragement, due to the failure to secure recognition, and strongly recommended immediate recognition and adequate support for Kolchak, whom he felt certain would thus be enabled to rescue Russia from the terror of nearly two years' standing. As the winter of 1919-1920 closed in the Bolsheviki were resuming the offensive on all fronts, were holding Petrograd, were defeating the forces of General Denikine, and had destroyed the forces of Admiral Kolchak.

#### JUGOSLAVIA.

The Kingdom of the Serbs-Croats and Slovenes showed great cohesive strength from the beginning. King Peter of Serbia abdicated in favor of his son, Alexander, who carried on the government with a cabinet representative of the various nationalities and parties. The Kingdom was able to organize an army which successfully resisted the Austrians and Hungarians in border disputes, held Bulgaria in check, and dared to threaten Rumania in the dispute over the Banat of Temesvar. In fact the Jugoslav nation appeared almost strong enough to replace Austria as a standing danger to Italy; and Italy based her claim to the complete carrying out of the Treaty of London, in part, on the Jugoslav military showing. At one time it appeared possible that Italy and her newly created neighbor might come to blows before the Peace Treaty could be completed. The only weak spot in this new kingdom was in Montenegro, the peasants in the mountains remaining loyal to King Nicholas.

#### SYRIA AND ARMENIA.

The Syrian Republic and the Armenian Republic existed solely because of the protection of Allied troops. French and Greek troops guarded Syria and British troops, Armenia. Pressure was brought to bear on the United States to take the mandatory over Constantinople and Thrace and over Armenia. At one time it was reported that the British troops in the Caucasus were to be withdrawn and that the Turks were ready to complete the extermination of the Armenians as soon as protection was lacking. The Armenians greatly desired the United States as their permanent guardian. The matter was not finally settled when this was written. (See Chapter 8.)

#### BOHEMIA.

The Czecho-Slovak Republic was being organized as fighting ended, being proclaimed on October 28. The organization was soon

completed. Prof. T. G. Masaryk was elected President, an efficient army was organized and Czecho-Slovakia stood as a bulwark against Bolshevism and did a great deal toward the expulsion of the Reds from Hungary, although at one time the Red army succeeded in driving back the Bohemian troops. There was a report of disaffection on the part of Slovak troops. Bohemia and Poland were unable to agree as to the division of the Teschen district and hostilities were only prevented by an Allied ultimatum.

#### ALBANIA.

Albania is not a product of self-determination except as she is continuing a many-centuries-long fight to exercise that principle. During all the days of Turkish dominance in the Balkans, Albania fought the conqueror and was unconquered. The German and Austrian armies which overran Montenegro and Serbia in 1915 included Albania in their sweep, all but one small corner near Avlona, which the Italians occupied and which was made a base for the advance that ultimately drove out the Teuton invaders. To the Albanians it was merely a change of invaders and they sought before the Peace Conference action to recognize their demands and secure the withdrawal of the Italian forces. The Albanians asked for the restoration of a free Albania incorporating the territory now allotted to Albania and the territory adjoining, in which Albanians predominate, in Montenegro, Serbia and Greece, allotted to these countries by the Conference of London in 1913. In this total territory they claim an Albanian population of 2,500,000. While anxious to stand alone there were evidences that Albania, if she must choose a mandatory, would choose the United States. Greece wanted to add Albania to her own territory, and Italy was reported to demand the mandate as a part of her plan to assure to her command of the Adriatic. The future of Albania had not been determined when this volume was sent to press.

### POLAND.

The right of Poland to independence was recognized by the Allies early in the war and the Polish legion organized in America, fought valiantly with the French forces on the German western front. The moving spirit in the work for a new Poland was Ignace Jan Paderewski who added statesmanship to his fame as a musician organizing relief first then armies, finally a nation, the Republic of Poland. Poland declared her independence on November 9th, 1918, as Austria yielded to defeat and to disruption. Mr. Paderewski became the first premier of the provisional Polish Government, which was born to battle and which was still fighting as this was written. At first Poland had to fight the Russian Reds, then she

became involved with the Ukrainian forces over the control of Austrian Galicia. Lemberg, so often in the dispatches early in the war, was alternately won and lost over several months' fighting, remaining finally in Polish hands. Poland also had to fight German troops in attempting to occupy certain portions of old Poland in Posen and Silesia, territory held by Prussia before 1914, but Polish in population and sympathy. There was also trouble over Teschen with Czecho-Slovakia. The Peace Conference was forced to call a halt to fighting here, and Germany was not only compelled to stop hostilities but to transport across her territory with their equipment, the 40,000 Polish legionaries in France. With these men added to her volunteer forces Poland was able to hold her lines on the east, to drive back the Ukrainians and to drive back the Russian Reds beyond Vilna, the Polish armies in October, 1919, joining hands with the armies of General Denikine northwest of Kiev. The Ukrainian troops were then temporarily friendly to Denikine.

When the Polish Republic was fully organized Mr. Paderewski remained as Premier, he represented Poland at the Peace Conference and in the negotiations with Czecho-Slovakia. He was reported to have said that he would never play again but that he gladly gave his

music for his country.

#### THE UKRAINE.

When the Russian Revolution overthrew the Czar the Ukraine, which had long been agitating the question of independence, set up a separate socialist republic, withdrawing Ukrainian soldiers from Kerensky's armies. When the Reds supplanted Kerensky they also sought to control the soviets in the Ukraine but not with much After Brest-Litovsk the Germans sent troops into the Ukraine to "protect" the new government. The protection consisted in the requisitioning of the crops and manufactures of the Ukraine for Germany and the people found themselves under a more severe tyranny than that of the Czar. The result was the murder of the German overlord and a revolt of the peasants who refused to till their fields or sow new crops. Germany was soon too busy in France to retain adequate forces so far from home as the Ukraine. Following her withdrawal the government at Kiev began a series of kaleidoscopic changes from Red to White. One month the Ukraine would be Bolshevist and the next month fighting Bolshevism. Kiev changed hands frequently. As this was written Kiev had been taken by the Russian Volunteer forces of General Denikine and the Ukrainian General Petlura a little less Red than formerly was co-operating with Denikine. The Ukraine fought with Poland for Ruthenian districts in Austrian Galicia, threatened Roumania over Bessarabia, resisted the Red invasion, when she did not invite it, and in general has been a good example of self-determination under difficulties. Some of

Russia's richest land and most prosperous manufacturing industries are in the Ukraine and when a settled and ordered peace comes Ukrainia may either remain as a new star in the firmament of the nations or may become one of the states of a united Russia.

### FINLAND, ESTHONIA, LITHUANIA.

Finland declared its independence and established a Republic during the Kerensky regime in Russia. When Lenine and Trotsky overturned Kerensky they also organized Red armies in Finland. The Finnish Republican leaders, however, organized White Guards who eventually drove the Reds over the border. The Finnish Republic came under German influence through a German military expedition sent ostensibly to help Finland. An attempt was made to set up a Kingdom of Finland with a German prince on the throne; but the proposed throne promised to be so shaky that no prince cared to risk its uncertain tenure. The Republic was re-established as the German hand weakened and Finland stood as a bulwark against the Bolsheviki, co-operating with every effort to conquer the Russian Reds. Finland and Sweden came into diplomatic conflict over the Aland Islands, possession of which gives strategic control of the upper Baltic. The decision was left to the Supreme Council.

Along the Southern shore of the Gulf of Finland and the adjoining Baltic coast two republics sprang up after the withdrawal of the German troops. These were the Republics of Esthonia and Lithuania. The Esthonians successfully fought off the Bolshevists and finally made peace with them early in 1920. The Lithuanians kept on fighting, their lines joining the lines of the Poles, forming the frontier of Europe against Bolshevism. The Lithuanians at one time were fighting both the Reds and German troops of General von der Goltz, who refused to leave Lithuania as required by the armistice terms and the orders of the Supreme Council. Riga was almost taken by the Germans: but they were ultimately completely whipped and glad to go home, the Lithuanians then turning their armies against the Russian Reds. Lithuanian troops fought beside the Poles only because of the common danger. Lithuania refused to make an alliance with Poland, there being some ancient antagonism which indicates that Poland will not find a warm friend in her Baltic near neighbor.

### CHAPTER X

### AMERICA'S PART IN THE WAR

NE of the most illuminating recitals of America's part in the World War is "The War With Germany," a Statistical Summary, by Colonel Leonard P. Ayres, Chief of the Statistics Branch of the General Staff, United States Army. The book was prepared at the direction of Secretary of War Baker, and was issued by the War Department. By permission we quote liberally from the work of Colonel Ayres in the following pages:

# FIGURES OF AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR

Total armed forces, including Army, Navy, Marine	
Corps, etc.	4,800,000
Total men in the Army	4,000,000
Men who went overseas	2,086,000
Men who fought in France	1,390,000
Greatest number sent in one month	306,000
Greatest number returning in one month	333,000
Tons of supplies shipped from America to France	7,500,000
Total registered in draft	24,234,021
Total draft inductions	2,810,296
Total draft inductions month	400,000
Greatest number inducted in one month	80,468
Graduates of Line Officers' Training Schools	
Cost of war to April 30, 1919	\$41,000,000,000
Cost of Army to April 30, 1919	\$13,930,000,000
Battles fought by American troops	13
Months of American participation in the war	19
Days of battle	200
Days of duration of Meuse-Argonne battle	47
Americans in Meuse-Argonne battle	<b>1,2</b> 00,000
American casualties in Meuse-Argonne battle	120,000
American battle deaths in war	50,000
American wounded in war	236,000
American deaths from disease	56,991
Total deaths in the Army	112,422
(Total desing in mo Timb	


#### THE MEN WHO SERVED

About 4,000,000 men served in the Army of the United States during the war (April 6, 1917 to Nov. 11, 1918). The total number of men serving in the armed forces of the country, including the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the other services, amounted to 4,800,000. It was almost true that among each 100 American citizens 5 took up arms in defense of the country.

During the Civil War 2,400,000 men served in the northern armies or in the Navy. In that struggle 10 in each 100 inhabitants of the Northern States served as soldiers or sailors. It would be interesting and instructive to make comparisons between the numbers in the American armies during the present war and those of France. Great Britain, Italy, and Germany, but unfortunately this is most difficult to do fairly and truly. The reason for the difficulty lies in the diverse military policies of the nations.

It was the policy of France, for example, to mobilize and put into uniform most of the able-bodied men in the population who were not beyond middle age, and then assign these soldiers to the work that had to be done, whether it was directly military in nature or not.

In the United States it was the policy to take into the Army only those men who were physically fit to fight and assign them, save in exceptional cases, only to work directly related to the ordinary duties . . . There is, however, one comparison which may of a soldier. fairly be made. This is the comparison between the American Expeditionary Forces and the British Expeditionary Forces.




British and American Expeditionary Forces on the Western Front countries devoted their major efforts to building up and maintaining their armies in France. The results are set forth in the diagram, which shows the strength of the two forces at different dates.

The British sent to France many more men in their first year in the war than we did in our first year. On the other hand, it took England three years to reach a strength of 2,000,000 men in France and the United States accomplished it in one-half of that time. . . .

The British had to use men from the beginning to fill gaps caused by casualties, while the American forces were for many months built up in strength by all the new arrivals.

It was not until the German drive was under way in March, 1918, that the allies called upon America for the supreme effort that carried a million and a half soldiers to France in six months.

When war was declared there were only 200,000 in the Army. Two-thirds of these were Regulars and one-third National Guardsmen who had been called to Federal service for duty along the Mexican border. When the war ended this force had been increased to 20 times its size and 4,000,000 men had served.



Sources of the Army


The Diagram herewith shows the three sources from which the Army came.

More than half a million came in through the Regular Army. Almost 400,000 more, or nearly 10 per cent. entered through the National Guard. More than three-quarters of all came in through the selective service or National Army enlistments.

It is a noteworthy evidence of the enthusiastic support given by the country to the war program that, despite previous hostility to the principle of universal liability for military service, a few months after the selective service law was passed, the standing of the drafted soldier was fully as honorable in the estimation of his companions and of the country in general as was that of the man who enlisted voluntarily. Moreover, the record of desertions from the Army shows that the total was smaller than in previous wars and a smaller percentage occurred among drafted men than among those who volunteered. The selective service law was passed on May 19, 1917. . . . Under this act, 24,234,021 men were registered and slightly more than 2,800,000 were inducted into the military service. At the outbreak of the war, the total male population of the country was about

54,000,000. During the war some 26,000,000 of them, or nearly half of all, were either registered under the selective-service act or were serving in the Army or Navy without being registered.

During the War with Germany we raised twice as many men as we raised during the Civil War, and at one-twentieth of the cost.



Soldiers furnished by each State

Analysis of the records of physical examinations shows that the country boys made better records than those from the cities; the

white registrants better than the colored; and native-born better records than those of alien birth. These differences are so considerable that 100,000 country boys would furnish for the military service 4,790 more soldiers than would an equal number of city boys, while 100,000 native-born would yield 3,500 more soldiers than would a like number of foreign-born.

About 200,000 commissioned officers were required for the Army. Of this number, less than 9,000 were in the Federal service at the beginning of the war. Of these, 5,791 were Regulars and 3,199 were

officers of the National Guard in the Federal service.

The figures show that of every six officers one had had previous military training in the Regular Army, the National Guard, or the ranks. Three received the training for their commissions in the officers' training camps. The other two went from civilian life into the Army with little or no military training.

The average American soldier who went to France received six months of training in this country before he sailed. After he landed overseas he had two months of training before entering the battle line in a quiet sector where he remained one month before going into an active sector and taking part in hard fighting.

The Infantry soldier was trained in the division, which was our typical combat unit. In the American Army it was composed of

about 1,000 officers and 27,000 men.

Before the signing of the armistice there were trained and sent everseas 42 American divisions. The training of 12 more was well advanced, and there were 4 others that were being organized. The plans on which the Army was acting called for 80 divisions overseas before July, 1919, and 100 divisions by the end of that year.

Place of organization of divisions and sources by States

Regulars:  1st		
1st		
2nd	France	Regulars.
3rd	France	Regulars.
4th	Greene, N. C	Regulars.
	Greene, N. C	Regulars.
5th	Logan, Tex	Regulars.
otn	McClenan, Ala	negulars.
0+h	MacArthur, Tex	Pagulara
9+h	Sheridan Ala	Regulars
10th	Fremont, Calif Sheridan, Ala Funston, Kans	Regulars.
12th	Devens, Mass	Regulars.
13th	Devens, Mass Lewis, Wash Custer, Mich Logan, Tex Kearny, Calif	Regulars.
14th	Custer, Mich	Regulars.
15th	Logan, Tex	Regulars.
16th	Kearny, Calif	Regulars.
18th	Travis, Tex	Regulars.
19tH	Travis, Tex Dodge, Iowa Sevier, S. C	Rapulara
National Guard: 1		
26th	Devens, Mass	New England.
27th	Wadsworth, S. C.	New York.
28th	Wadsworth, S. C Hancock, Ga	Pennsylvania.
29th	McClellan, Ala	New Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, Mary-
		l land. District of Columbia.
30th	Sevier, S. C	Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina,
	~	District of Columbia.
	Wheeler, Ga	Georgia, Alabama, Florida.
32nd	MacArthur, Tex	Michigan, Wisconsin.
33rd]	Logan, Tex Cody, N. Mex Doniphan, Okla	Illinois. Nahraska Towa South Dakota Minnasota
34th	Doninhan Okla	Nebraska, Iowa, South Dakota, Minnesota. Missouri, Kansas.
35th	Bowie, Tex	Texas, Oklahoma.
37th	Sheridan Ohio Shelby, Miss Beauregard, La	Ohio.
38th	Shelby, Miss	Indiana, Kentucky, West Virginia.
39th	Beauregard, La	Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana California, Colorado, Utah, Arizona, New
40th	Kearny, Calif	California, Colorado, Utah, Arizona, New
41st	Fremont, Calif	Mexico. Washington, Oregon, Montana, Idaho,
		Wyoming.
42nd	Mills, N. Y	Various States.
National Army:	Design Moss	Now England Now Varia
77+h	Unton N V	New York City
78+b	Dix N. J.	Western New York, New Jersey, Delaware,
79th	Devens, Mass Upton, N. Y Dix N. J Meade, Md	New England, New York. New York City. Western New York, New Jersey, Delaware. Northeastern Pennsylvania, Maryland, Dis-
		trict of Columbia.
1		l vania
		North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida,
9923	Gordon Ga	Georgia Alahama Tennessee.
8274	Sherman Ohio	Ohio Western Pennsylvania.
84†h	Z'cha'y 'l'aylor, Ky.	Kentucky, Indiana, Southern Illinois.
85th	Custer Mich	Michigan, Eastern Wisconsin.
86th	Grant, Ill	Chicago, Northern Illinois.
87th	Pike, Ark	Forto Rico. Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee. Ohio, Western Pennsylvania. Kentucky, Indiana, Southern Illinois. Michigan, Eastern Wisconsin. Chicago, Northern Illinois. Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Southern Alabama.
88th	Dodge, Iowa	North Dakota, Minnesota, Iowa, Western Illinois.
89th	Funston, Kan	Kansas, Missouri, South Dakota, Nehraska,
90th	Travis. Tex	Kansas, Missouri, South Dakota, Nebraska. Texas, Oklahoma.
31St	Dewis, wash	Alaska, Washington, Oregon, Camonia,
92nd	Funston, Kans	Idaho, Nebraska, Montana, Wyoming, Colored, various States. Colored, various States.

All the divisions shown in the table reached France except the 12 Regular Army divisions numbered from 9 to 20. The divisions being organized at the time of the signing of the armistice were numbered 95, 96, 97, and 100.

To carry forward the training program, shelter was constructed in a few months for 1,800,000 men. For the National Guard and National Army divisions, 16 camps and 16 cantonments were built. National Guard units being organized rapidly during the summer of 1917 were put under canvas in camps throughout the South. The cantonments were largely in the North for the National Army called in the fall of 1917.

One National Guard division, the Rainbow (42nd) required no training field, for it was assembled directly at Camp Mills for early transportation to France. Two National Army divisions, the Ninetysecond (colored) and the Ninety-third (colored), were trained in separate units at various camps. The headquarters of the Ninetysecond were at Camp Funston and those of the Ninety-third at Camp Stuart. The remaining 16 National Guard and 16 National Army divisions began their training in the camps and cantonments in the summer and fall of 1917. The total camp and cantonment capacity was nearly a million and a half. There were schools for training men for special services, such as the Artillery, Aviation, Engineer Corps, Chemical Warfare, Tank Corps, Quartermaster Corps. There were also large embarkation camps at New York and Newport News.

In the American Army there is one officer for each 20 men. This means that 200,000 officers were required for the army of 4,000,000 men. But when war was declared there were only 6,000 officers in the Regular Army. The National Guard divisions were fortunately able to furnish most of their own officers. After this source of supply had been exhausted, however, it was still necessary to secure


some 180,000 officers elsewhere.

The officers' training camp was the instrumentality that really solved the problem of securing the commissioned personnel of the American Army. Three months of intensive training put the prospective officers through all the tasks required of the enlisted man and the duties of the platoon and company commander.

#### LENGTH OF TRAINING

Of the 42 American divisions which reached France, 36 were organized in the summer and early autumn of 1917. The other 6 were organized as divisions by January, 1918, but had been in training as separate units months before that time.

The average division had been organized eight months before sailing for France and its period of training was further lengthened by a two months' interim between the time the division landed in France



Time from organization of divisions to entering line

and the time it entered the line. The diagram on the preceding page shows these periods for each of the 42 divisions.

In June with the German drives in full swing, the Allies called on us to continue the extraordinary transportation of troops begun in April. The early movement had been met by filling up the divisions that sailed with the best trained men wherever they could be found.


Seven months may be taken as the average training figure for the first million men, five months for the second million, an average of six months before reaching France.

In the last months of the war, the induction of men was carried forward at top speed and every device was used for hastening training. The result fully justified the effort. Into the great Meuse-Argonne offensive we were able to throw a force of 1,200,000 men while we had many thousands of troops engaged in other parts of the line. Our training-camp officers stood up to the test; our men, with their intensive drilling in open-order fighting, which has characterized American training, routed the best of the German divisions from the Argonne Forest and the valley of the Meuse.

### CHAPTER XI

### TRANSPORTING 10,000 MEN A DAY, OVERSEAS

ITHIN a few weeks of our entrance into the war we began, at the earnest request of our co-belligerents, to ship troops overseas. The facts as to the transportation of troops to France and back to the United States are presented in the diagram.



Men Sailing Each Month to France and Home

Early in 1918 negotiations were entered into with the British Government by which three of its big liners and four of its smaller troop ships were definitely assigned to the service of the Army. The results of this are shown in the increased troop movement for March. Before the 1st of July 1,000,000 men had been embarked.


The record for July exceeded all previous monthly totals, the number of troops carried being more than 306,000. Before the end of October the second million men had sailed from our shores.

No such troop movement as that of the last summer had ever been contemplated, and no movement of any such number of persons by water for such a distance and such a time had ever previously occurred. The record has been excelled only by the achievement in bringing the same men back to the shores of the United States.

The necessity for creating a great transport fleet came just at the time when the world was experiencing its most acute shortage of ton-


nage. The start was made by chartering a few American merchant steamers and by the 1st of July there were in service seven troop ships and six cargo ships.

The diagram below shows how there was developed from these small beginnings a great transport fleet which aggregated by the end of 1918 three and one-quarter million dead-weight tons of shipping.



The Trans-Atlantic Fleet in Thousands of Deadweight Tons

During these same months another great American transport fleet was created with an almost equally striking rapidity. This was our cross-Channel fleet, which carried cargo and men from England to France. Beginning with 7,000 tons in October, 1917, this fleet consisted of more than a third of a million tons by the end of 1918. About one-fourth of the vessels were Swedish or Norwegian, while the rest were American. This service utilized large numbers of small wood and steel vessels built by the Emergency Fleet Corporation at the yards of the Great Lakes and along the coast.



Troops sailing from American ports and landing in France and England

In building up our trans-Atlantic and Channel fleets every possible source of tonnage had to vessels, which came into service during the fall of 1917. The taking over of Dutch steamers in the spring of 1918 and the chartering of Scandinavian and Japanese tonnage accounted for the great in-The first great increment was the seized German be called on for every ship that could be secured. reases in the cargo fleet.

The most ample credit must be given to the Emergency Fleet Corporation, which turned over nearly a million tons of new ships, and to the Shipping Control Committee, which stripped bare of all suitable vessels our import and export trades and turned over for Army use nearly a million and The Army vessels also came from 12 other nations well scattered over the globe. a half tons of ships.

# EMBARKATION AND DEBARKATION

Most of the troops who sailed for France left from New York. Half of them landed in England and the other half landed in France. Most of those who landed in England went directly to Liverpool and most of those who landed in France went to Brest. While these statements are valid generalizations, they fall short in showing what happened in detail. The principal facts of the eastward troop movement are shown in the map on the preceding page.

Troops left America from 10 ports, as shown in the little table in the left of the map. In this table the several ports of Hoboken, New York, and Brooklyn have all been included in one, and the same thing is true of the different ports at Hampton Roads, which have

been shown under the heading of Norfolk.

The ports of arrival are given in the tables on the right of the

map.

Credit for the troop movement must be shared with the Allies and with the British in particular, since approximately half of the troops were carried in their ships.



Deadweight Tons of American Army Shipping Secured from Different Countries

Among every hundred men who went over, 49 went in British ships, 45 in American ships, 3 in those of Italy, 2 in French, and 1

in Russian shipping under English control.

The first shipment of cargo to support the forces abroad was made in June, 1917, and amounted to 16,000 tons. After the first two months the shipments grew rapidly and steadily until they were in excess of 800,000 tons in the last months of the war. Less than 5 per cent of the cargo carried was transported in allied bottoms. The cargo carried for the American Army consisted of thousands of different articles of the most varied sort. Nearly one-half of all consisted of quartermaster material, largely composed of food and clothing. The next largest elements were engineering and ordnance sup-

plies. All together, from our entrance into the war through April, 1919, the Army shipped from this side of the Atlantic nearly seven

and a half million tons of cargo.

Included in the cargo shipment were 1,791 consolidation locomotives of the 100-ton type. Of these, 650 were shipped set up on their own wheels, so that they could be unloaded on the tracks in France and run off in a few hours under their own steam. Shipment of setup locomotives of this size had never been made before. The Army also shipped 26,994 standard-gauge freight cars, and at the termination of hostilities was preparing to ship flat cars set up and ready to run. Motor trucks to the number of 47,018 went forward, and when fighting ceased were being shipped at the rate of 10,000 a month. Rails and fittings aggregated 423,000 tons. In addition to the tons of cargo mentioned above the Army shipped 68,694 horses and mules. Aside from the cargo shipped across the Atlantic, General Pershing imported large amounts from European sources, the chief item being coal from England.

During the whole period of active hostilities the Army lost at sea only 200,000 deadweight tons of transports. Of this total 142,000 tons were sunk by torpedoes. No American troop transport was lost on its eastward voyage. For this splendid record the Navy, which armed, manned, and convoyed the troop transports, deserves the high-


est commendation.

As soon as the armistice was signed preparations were made for returning the troops to the United States in the shortest possible time. After the signing of the armistice the British needed their ships for the return of their own colonial troops, to Canada, Australia, and South Africa. By means of converted cargo ships, by the assignment of German liners, and also by the great aid rendered by the Navy, which put at the Army's disposal cruisers and battleships, the Army was brought back home even more rapidly than it was taken to France.

# FOOD, CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT.

The reasons for the enormous figures of Army purchases are not far to seek. In the first place, men who went to camp received complete equipment of new articles, whereas ordinary production in peace time goes mainly to replace articles that have been worn out. In the second place, the supplies required for an army increase in proportion to the distance that separates the army from its home base. In the third place, the consumption in action is three or four times the peace rate. The rule generally followed for clothing was that there should be for each man at the front a three months' reserve in France, another two or three months' reserve in the United States, and a third three months' supply continuously in transit. Wool coats, for example, last about three months in active service.

Hence for every coat on a man's back at the front there had to be a coat in reserve in France, a coat in transit, and a coat in reserve in



Total American Production of Four Articles Compared With Army Purchases

the United States. Two million men overseas required something like

8.000,000 coats, and required them immediately.

The same thing was true for other supplies and munitions. For munitions difficult to manufacture, such as artillery and ammunition, the problem presented by this necessity for reserves and large amounts in transit, in addition to the actual equipment of troops, was almost insuperable.

A list of the total deliveries during the war of some of the common articles of clothing shows the size of the task. They are given in

the table below:

The cost of the articles listed was more than \$1,000,000,000.

	Total		Total
Articles	delivered.	Articles	delivered.
Wool stockingspairs	131,800,000 B	lankets	
Undershirts			21,700,000
Underdrawers	83,600,000 W	Vool coats	13,900,000
Shoespairs	30,700.000 O	vercoats	8,300,000
Flannel shirts	26,500,000		


To secure these and other articles in sufficient quantity it was found necessary in many cases for the Army to take control of all stages of the manufacturing process, from assembling the raw ma-



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GENERAL FERDINAND FOCH

Marshal of France, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.



THE 14-INCH U. S. NAVAL RAILWAY BATTERY IN FRANCE THAT POUNDED THE KAISER'S ARMIES.




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KING GEORGE V. AND ALLIED CHIEFS ON U. S. S. NEW YORK


Receiving the surrender of the Kaiser's Navy at Rosyth, England, Admiral Rodman

shaking hands with the King.



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
GENERAL PEYTON C. MARCH, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.



England's Premier, Lloyd George, inspecting German Cannon.

terial to inspecting the finished product. For many months preceding the armistice the War Department was owner of all the wool in the country. From September, 1918, to June, 1919, if the troop movement had continued, Army needs were estimated at 246,000,000 pounds of clean wool, while the amount allotted to civilian needs was only 15,000,000 pounds.

In one way or another the Army at war drew upon almost every one of the 344 industries recognized by the United States Census. In some cases readjustments of machinery for a slightly modified product were necessary. In many an improved product was demanded. In practically all an enormous production was required. In the cases of some articles all the difficulties of quantity production were combined with the problems of making something not before manufactured. Typical instances are the 5,400,000 gas masks and the 2,728,000 steel helmets produced before the end of November, 1918.



Seaports, Storage Points, and Supply Lines of the American Army in France.

For those supplies there were to a certain degree articles of commercial manufacture, the problem of distribution was fully as difficult as procurement. For production, machinery already in existence could be utilized; for distribution, a new organization was necessary. It was called the Services of Supply, the S. O. S., and had its head-quarters at Tours. It was an army behind the Army. On the day the armistice was signed, there were reporting to the commanding

general of the Services of Supply, 386,000 soldiers besides 31,000 German prisoners, and thousands of civilian laborers furnished by the Allies. At the same time there were in the zone of the armies 160,000 noncombatant troops, the majority of whom were keeping in operation the lines of distribution of supplies to the troops at the front. The proportion of noncombatants in the American Army never fell below 28 per cent. In the British Army it often ran higher. Even when there was the greatest pressure for men at the front, the work back of the lines took roughly one man out of every three.

Distributing supplies to the American forces in France was in the first place a problem of ports, second a problem of railroads, third a problem of motor and horse-drawn transportation, and fourth a problem of storage. It was not necessary to build new ports, but American engineers added 83 new berths, together with warehouses and dock equipment. France already had a railway net denser per square mile than that of the United States, but it was desirable to increase the carrying capacity by nearly 1,000 miles of new trackage, and by switching facilities at crucial points, by new repair shops and round-

houses, and by new rolling stock.

These things were done by the Engineers. The problems were not wholly solved. There were never enough docks to prevent some loss of time by vessels waiting to dock, but the capacity for handling American cargo was tripled from 10,000 tons per day in the spring of 1918 to 30,000 tons by November 11. There were never wholly adequate railway facilities, but with the help of locomotives and freight cars shipped from this side freight was carried inland about as fast as it was landed. The map shows the principal ports at which the Army fleet docked with the headquarters of the Services of Supply at Tours and with the Toul-Verdun sector, where the American armies operated.

Railroads carried American supplies from the ports in France to intermediate or advance depots. Spurs led up to the front. Then came the narrow-gauge railroad, with rails about 2 feet apart, much narrower than the usual narrow-gauge road in this country. American engineers built 538 miles of these roads, for which 406 narrow-gauge locomotives and 2,385 narrow-gauge cars were shipped from

this country, in addition to the standard-gauge equipment.

Beyond the range of the narrow-gauge railway came the motor truck. Trucks were used on a larger scale in this war than was ever before thought possible. The American Infantry division on the march with the trucks, wagons, and ambulances of its supply, ammunition, and sanitary trains stretches for a distance of 30 miles along the road. The 650 trucks which the tables of organization of the division provide are a large factor in this train. As the forces moved forward on the offensive away from their railway bases, more and more trucks were demanded.

The army overseas never had all the trucks it needed during the period of hostilities. The difficulty was almost entirely a shortage of ships. The number of trucks sent overseas prior to the armistice was 40,000 and of these 33,000 had been received in France. The trucks ranged in size from three-quarters of a ton to 5 tons.

Beyond the range of the motor truck the horse and wagon were the means of supply distribution. In general, it may be said that the Army overseas never had enough means of transportation. It may also be said that they produced remarkable results with the

supply they had.

## 47,000 TELEGRAMS A DAY.

In order to operate the transportation of supplies in France, a new system of communication had to be set up. At the time of the signing of the armistice the Signal Corps was operating 282 telephone exchanges, 133 complete telegraph stations with 14,956 telephone lines, reaching 8,959 stations. More than 100,000 miles of wire had been strung. The peak load of operation reached was 47,555 telegrams a day, averaging 60 words each.

To build factories and storage warehouses for supplies, as well as housing for troops, 200,000 workmen in the United States were kept continuously occupied for the period of the war. The types of construction included cement piers and warehouses, equipment for proving grounds, plants for making powder and explosives, repair shops, power plants, roads, and housing for troops. Building was required

in every State of the Union.

Housing constructed had a capacity of 1,800,000 men, or more

than the entire population of Philadelphia.

The total expenditures in this enterprise to November 11, 1918, were, in round numbers, \$800,000,000, or about twice the cost of the Panama Canal. The outstanding feature of the accomplishment was its rapidity. It was this speed that made it possible to get the draft army under training before the winter of 1917 set in and made it available just in time for the critical action of the summer of 1918.

#### CONSTRUCTION IN THE A. E. F.

The conduct of the war in France necessitated a construction program comparable in magnitude and number of projects with that in the United States. All construction work in France was performed by the Corps of Engineers under the Services of Supply. Up to the signing of the armistice construction projects had been undertaken by the Corps of Engineers to the number of 831. The A. E. F. left its trail in the shape of more or less permanent improvements over the greater part of France.

The real test of the efficiency of the supply service comes when an

army engages in battle. Food and clothing are most essential.

At no time was there a shortage of food in the expeditionary forces. Soldiers sometimes went hungry in this as in all other wars, but the condition was local and temporary. The stocks of food on hand in depots in France were always adequate.

In the matter of clothing also, the supply services rose to the

emergency of combat.

The records of the Quartermaster show that during the six months of hard fighting, from June to November, the enlisted man in the A. E. F. received on the average: Slicker and overcoat, every 5 months; blanket, flannel shirt, and breeches, every 2 months; coat, every 79 days; shoes and puttees, every 51 days; drawers and undershirt, every 34 days; woolen socks, every 23 days.

### CHAPTER XII

#### RIFLES AND GUNS.

N THE outbreak of hostilities there were on hand nearly 600,000 Springfield rifles of the model of 1903. This arm is probably the best Infantry rifle in use in any army, and the number on hand was sufficient for the initial equipment of an army of about 1,000,000 men. What no one foresaw was that we should be called upon to equip an army of nearly 4,000,000 men in addition to furnishing rifles for the use of the Navy.

The available Springfields were used to equip the Regular Army and National Guard divisions that were first organized. We also had some 200,000 Krag-Jörgensen rifles that were in sufficiently good con-

dition to be used for training purposes.

It was soon found, that manufacturing difficulties would make it impossible to increase the output of Springfields to much beyond

1,000 per day, which was clearly insufficient.

Fortunately, there were in this country several plants which were just completing large orders for the Enfield rifle for the British Government. A new rifle—the model 1917—was accordingly designed so that the plants equipped for Enfield production could be rapidly converted to its manufacture, but it was chambered to use the same ammunition as is used in the Springfield and in American-made guns.

Beginning with slightly less than 600,000 Springfields the total at the end of the war was nearly 900,000. The Enfields came into production in August, 1917. The output totaled at the end of the war, in November, 1918, nearly 2,300,000. The test of battle use has upheld the high reputation of the Springfield, and has demonstrated that the American Enfield is also a weapon of superior quality. The American troops were armed with rifles that were superior in accuracy and rapidity of fire to those used by either their enemies or the Allies.

#### MACHINE GUNS

In 1912 Congress sanctioned the allowance of the War Department of four machine guns per regiment. In 1919, as a result of the experience of the war, the new Army plans provided for an equipment of 336 machine guns per regiment.

In the annual report of the Secretary of War for 1916, attention was called to the efforts then being made to place our Army on a satisfactory footing with respect to machine guns.

In accordance with these recommendations of a Board of Inquiry, which tested all types, 4,000 Vickers machine guns were ordered in December, 1916. By the end of the next year 2,031 of them had been delivered. In further accord with the recommendations of the board, careful tests were held in May, 1917, of various types of heavy machine guns, and also of light machine guns, which have come to be known as automatic rifles.

The Vickers gun justified the good opinion previously formed of it, but it was clear that it could not be put on a quantity-production. Fortunately, a new gun well adapted to quantity production was presented for trial. This gun, the heavy Browning, performed satisfactorily in all respects and was adopted as the standard heavy machine gun. The light Browning was easily in the lead as an automatic rifle, weighing only 15 pounds. The Lewis gun, too heavy for satisfactory use as an automatic rifle and not capable of the long-sustained fire necessary in a heavy gun, was very well suited, with slight modification, for use as a so-called flexible gun on aircraft. In addition to the flexible type, airplanes require also a synchronized gun; that is, a gun whose time of firing is so adjusted that the shots pass between the propeller blades. After many trials and adjustments, the Marlin gun, a development of the old Colt, was adapted to this purpose.

Production of all the types mentioned was pressed and the advantage of preparedness illustrated. The placing of the order for 4,000 Vickers in 1916 enabled 12 of our early divisions to receive that weapon as their heavy machine gun. The completion of the first light Brownings came in February, 1918, and the first heavy Brownings

followed in April.

The earliest needs of our troops in France were met by French Hotchkiss machine guns and Chauchat automatic rifles. After July 1, divisions embarking were equipped with light and heavy Brown-

ings. Both Browning guns met with immediate success.

Although the light and the heavy Browning guns were brought into production in February and April of 1918, they were not used in battle until September. This was not because of any shortage of supply in the later summer months but because of a deliberate and most significant judgment on the part of General Pershing.

What he feared was that if the first of the guns to reach the expeditionary forces were used in battle there would always be some chance that one might be captured by the Germans. If this should happen it was possible that the advantage of the possession of large numbers of greatly improved types of machine guns and automatic rifles would be partly lost to the American forces.

For these reasons the Brownings were not used in combat until they were used in large numbers in the Meuse-Argonne battle.

The total number of machine guns of American manufacture produced to the end of 1918 was 226,557. In addition there were secured from the French and British 5,300 heavy machine guns, and 34,000 French Chauchat automatic rifles.

#### RIFLES AND MACHINE GUNS USED IN FRANCE.

When troops embarked for France they carried with them their rifles, and sometimes their machine guns and automatic rifles; about 1,775,000 rifles, 29,000 light Brownings, and 27,000 heavy Brownings, and 1,500,000,000 rounds of rifle and machine-gun ammunition were shipped to France from this country before November 1. Before the end of the war American production of rifle ammunition amounted to approximately 3,500,000,000 rounds, of which 1,500,000,000 were shipped overseas. In addition, 100,000,000 rounds were secured from the French and British.

The diagram on page 86 answers in graphic form the question "To what degree did the different elements of our troop program and our small-arms program move forward in company front?"

The line for automatic rifles shows an adequate supply for all troops only in the last two months of the war. That for machine guns shows inadequate supplies up to July and then so enormous a production as to be sufficient before the end of the war for an army of nearly 8,000,000 men. The rapid rise of the lines representing the men that could have been equipped with machine guns and automatic rifles in the later months is due to the havy production of Brownings. It would have resulted, if the fighting had been prolonged, in a greatly increased volume of fire on the part of the American troops.


At this point it is appropriate to comment on the fact that there are many articles of munitions in which American production reached great amounts by the fall of 1918 but which were not used in large quantities at the front because the armistice was signed before big supplies of them reached France. It seems fair to question whether prudent foresight could not have avoided some of this expense.

Perhaps the best answer to the question is to be found in the record of a conference on October 4, 1918, between Marshal Foch and the American Secretary of War.

In that conference the allied commander-in-chief made final arrangements with the American Secretary as to the shipment of American troops and munitions in great numbers during the fall and winter preparatory for the campaign of 1919.

This was one day before the first German peace note and 38 days

before the end of the war.



Small Arms Available Each Month

#### ARTILLERY.

It was true of light artillery as it was of rifles, that the United States had, when war was declared, a supply on hand sufficient to equip the Army of 500,000 men that proponents of preparedness had agreed might have to take the field in the event of a large emergency. There were 900 pieces of field artillery then available. The gun on hand in largest quantities was the 3-inch fieldpiece, of which we had 544, a sufficient number to equip 11 divisions. But the initial plans called for the formation of 42 divisions, which would require 2,100 3-inch fieldpieces and a stream of guns in transit which would increase their initial requirements to about 3,200.

To meet the situation the decision was made in June. 1917, to allot our own guns to training purposes and to equip our forces in France with artillery conforming to the French and British standard cali-

bers.

The plans then formulated further provided that, with our initial requirements taken care of in this way, we should at once prepare to manufacture in our own plants artillery of these same calibers for the equipment of later divisions. With no serious exceptions, the guns from British and French sources were secured as needed, but our own plants were slower in producing complete units ready for use than had been hoped and planned.

In our factories the 3-inch guns of improved model which had been ordered in September, 1916, were changed in caliber to use standard French ammunition, and became known as 75 mm. guns, The British 18-pounder then being produced in this country was similarly redesigned. Work was immediately begun also on the plans for the French 75 mm. gun so as to make it possible to

produce it in American factories.


In the case of other calibers of artillery, the same means in general were taken to secure a supply. It was necessary, of course, in all this work not to interfere with American production for the Allies. By the production of a single component, after the armistice was signed hundreds of units were completed. Up to the end of April, 1919, the number of complete artillery units produced in American

plants was more than 3,000.

In the magnitude of the quantities involved the Artillery ammunition program was the biggest of all. Copper, steel, high explosives, and smokeless powder were all required by the hundreds of millions of pounds. As no firms were prepared to manufacture complete rounds, it was necessary for the Ordnance Department to make contracts for each component and to assume the burden of directing the distribution of these components between manufacturers. shrapnel it was possible to use the design substantially as had previously been used in this country, but the high explosive and gas shell proved more troublesome. The ammunition actually used against the

enemy at the front was nearly all of French manufacture, but the approaching supply from America made possible a more free use of the French and British reserves. Our monthly production of artillery ammunition rose to over 2,000,000 complete rounds in August and over 3,000,000 rounds in October.

One mode of measuring our accomplishments in the way of artillery production is to compare what we succeeded in producing in our own plants in the first 20 months after the declaration of war with what Great Britain produced in the first 20 months after her entry into the war. This comparison is made in the diagram.



British and American Production of Artillery and Ammunition in the First
Twenty Months of War

#### SMOKELESS POWDER AND HIGH EXPLOSIVES.

One of the striking contributions of the United States to the cause of the Allies was the enormous quantity of smokeless powder and high explosives produced. From April 1, 1917, to November 11, 1918, the production of smokeless powder in the United States was 632,000,000 pounds, which was almost exactly equal to the combined production of France and Great Britain. About half the British supply in 1917 was drawn from this country, and in 1918 over a third of the French supply was American made.

The American production of high explosives—T.N.T., ammonium nitrate, picric acid, and others—was not established, when we declared war, on so large a scale as that of smokeless powder. It was necessary, therefore, to erect new plants. Our established rate of production of high explosives at the close of the war, 43,888,000

pounds in three months, was over 40 per cent. larger than Great

Britain's, and nearly double that of France.

At the time we entered the war we had had practically no experience in manufacturing toxic gases, and no existing facilities which could be readily converted to such use. At the signing of the armistice, we were equipped to produce gas at a more rapid rate than France, England, or Germany. The Government found it necessary to build its own chemical plants and to finance certain private firms. The majority of these producing plants, together with plants for filling shells with gas, were built on a tract of land in the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., which came to be known as the Edgewood Arsenal. The increase in production was rapid and steady during 1918 and, before the armistice, more than 10,000 tons had been manufactured.

### TRACTORS AND TANKS.

An innovation in this war, development of which in the future promises to be even more important, was the increased use of motor transportation. Applied to the artillery, this meant the use of caterpillar tractors to haul big guns. New 5-ton and 10-ton types were perfected in this country, put into production, and 1,100 shipped overseas before November 1. About 300 larger tractors were also shipped and 350 more secured from the French and British.

The tank was an even more important application of the caterpillar tractor to war uses. Up to the time of the armistice 64 6-ton tanks had been produced in this country, and the total completed to March 31, 1919, was 778. The burden of active service in France

was borne by 227 of these tanks received from the French.

The efforts of this country in the case of heavy 30-ton tanks were concentrated on a co-operative plan, by which this country was to furnish Liberty motors and the rest of the driving mechanism, and the British the armor plate for 1,500 tanks for the 1919 campaign. For immediate use in France, this country received 64 heavy tanks from the British.

The most important single fact about our artillery in France is that we always had a sufficient supply of light artillery for the combat divisions that were ready for front-line service. This does not mean that when the divisions went into the battle line they always had their artillery with them, for in a number of cases they did not. Under the pressure of battle needs in the summer and fall of 1918, American divisions were put into line a number of times supported by French and British artillery or without artillery.

When the armistice came in November the American forces not only had a sufficient number of 75's for the 29 combat divisions, but

in addition enough more for 12 other divisions.

A careful study of the battle records of all the divisions shows that in every 100 days that our combat divisions were in line they were supported by their own artillery for 75 days, by British artillery for 5 days, by French for 1½ days, and were without artillery for 18½ days out of the 100. Of these 18½ days, however, 18 days were in quiet sectors and only one-half of one day in active sectors. There are only three records of American divisions being in an active sector without artillery support.

The most significant facts about our artillery in France are presented in summary in the table below, which takes into account only light and heavy field artillery and does not include either the small 37-mm, guns or the trench mortars.

#### American Artillery in France-Summary

Total pieces of artillery received to Nov. 11	3,499
Number of American manufacture	
American-made pieces used in battle	130
Artillery on firing line	2,251
Rounds of artillery ammunition expended	8,116,000
Rounds of ammunition of American manufacture expended	
Rounds of American-made ammunition expended in battle	8,400

#### CHAPTER XIII.

#### AIRPLANES, MOTORS, AND BALLOONS.

HEN war was declared in Apil, 1917, the United States had two aviation fields and 55 serviceable airplanes. The National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, which had been conducting a scientific study of the problems of flight, advised that 51 of these airplanes were obsolete and the other 4 obsolescent.

Immediately following the declaration of war, the Allied Governments, particularly the French, urged the necessity of sending 4,500 American aviators to France during the first year, if superiority in

the air were to be insured.

There were three primary requisites for bringing into existence an elementary aviation service. These were training planes, aviators, and service planes. All of them had to be created.

#### TRAINING.

For the task of training, as well as that of securing the necessary planes and motors, there existed in our Army no adequate organization of qualified personnel. Before the war our air service had been small, struggling and unpopular. Aviation was restricted to unmarried officers under 30 years of age, and offered no assured future as a reward for success.

Training divides itself into three stages—elementary, advanced and final. Elementary training, given to all candidates alike, includes physical training, hygiene, various military subjects, the study of the structure and mechanism of airplanes and engines, signaling, observation, ground gunnery, and elementary flying.

Advanced training consisted in the specialized work necessary to qualify the student as a well-prepared, all-around pilot or observer.

Final training, given in Europe, was a short, intensive specialization on the particular machine, or problem to which the pilot or ob-

server was finally assigned.

At the date of the armistice there were 34 fields of operation, with 1,063 instructors; 8,602 men had been graduated from elementary training, and 4,028 from advanced training. There were then actually in training 6,528 men, of whom 59 per cent were in elementary, and 41 per cent. in advanced training schools.

There had been sent to the expeditionary forces more than 5,000 pilots and observers of whom, at the date of armistice, 2,226 were still in training, and 1,238 were on flying duty at the front.

The total personnel of our Air Service, including flying and non-flying officers, students, and enlisted men, increased from about 1,200


at the outbreak of the war to nearly 200,000 at the close.

Deliveries of primary training planes were begun in June, 1917. To the date of the armistice over 5,300 had been produced, including 1,600 of a type which was abandoned on account of unsatisfactory engines.

Advanced training planes reached quantity production early in 1918; up to the armistice about 2,500 were delivered. Approximately

the same number were purchased overseas.

Quantity production of training engines was reached in 1917, and by the end of November, 1918, a total of nearly 18,000 training engines and more than 9,500 training planes had been delivered. Experience had shown that it was necessary to supply two engines per plane. Of the engines, all but 1,346 were built in the United States; and of the 9,500 elementary training planes, more than 8,000 were of American manufacture.



Production of Service Planes to the End of Each Month

As soon as war was declared it became possible for American officers and engineers to learn the secrets of the great improvements that had been developed during the war in the design of airplanes used in battle service. A commission was immediately sent abroad to select types of foreign service planes for production in the United States. The best allied authorities urged the concentration of American production on the more stable observation and bombing machines, leaving the production of pursuit planes to the European factories, which were in closer contact with the front. The imperative need for quick large-scale production, led to the selection of four types for this experiment: The De Havilland—4 (British) observation and daybombing machine, the Handley-Page (British) night bomber, the Caproni (Italian) night bomber, and the Bristol (British) two-seater fighter. This selection was approved by the French and British authorities.

The redesigned De Havilland—4, proved to be a good, all-around plane of rather poor visibility, with a tank design which increased the danger in case of a crash, but with these defects more than compensated by unusually good maneuver ability, and great speed. The De Havillands were acknowledged to be the fastest observation and bombing planes on the western front. At the time of the armistice and 667 to the zone of advance. The Handley-Page was redesigned this plane was being produced at a rate of over 1,100 per month. A total of 3,227 had been completed, 1,885 had been shipped to France, to take two high-powered Americans motors, passed its tests, and on the date of the armistice, parts for 100 had been shipped abroad for assembly.

Delay in the receipt of plans for the Caproni greatly retarded the redesign of this machine. The Bristol fighter was a failure. The changes necessary to accommodate the American engine so increased

the total weight as to render the machine unsafe.

The diagram opposite shows the production of service planes from American and foreign sources. The total at the end of November, 1918, was nearly 7,900, of which nearly 4,100 were of American manufacture and remaining 3,800 were of foreign manufacture.

The rapid development of the heavier types of airplane, together with the pressing need for large scale production, made necessary the development of a high-powered motor adaptable to American methods of standardized quantity production. This need was met in the Liberty 12-cylinder motor which was America's chief contribution to aviation. The total production of Liberty engines to the date of the armistice was 13,574. Of this production 4,435 were shipped overseas to the expeditionary forces and 1,025 were delivered to the British, French, and Italian air services.

Other types of service engines were under development when hos-

tilities ceased

Up to the end of November, 1918, the total number of service engines secured was 22,104. Of this number 16,325, or 73 per cent., were from American sources.

The American and allied airplane programs called for quantities of raw materials, which threatened to exhaust the supply of spruce

and fir, lubricating oils, linen, dopes, and mahogany.

In order to meet the spruce and fir shortage labor battalions were organized and placed in the forests of the west coast, loyal organizations of civilian labor were fostered, new kiln processes were developed which seasoned the lumber rapidly, without loss of strength and resiliency. Approximately 174,000,000 feet of spruce and fir were delivered, of which more than two-thirds went to the Allies.

The castor oil situation was met by planting a large acreage of castor beans and by the development of a mineral oil substitute.

A fabric of long fiber cotton was developed which proved superior to linen.

The standard "dope" to cover the wings of planes, making them air and water tight, was limited in supply and highly inflammable. A substitute dope, far less inflammable and of more plentiful basic materials, was produced.

Mahogany for propellers was partially replaced by walnut, oak,

cherry, and ash.

Intensive research brought some notable results in the production of accessories of which several deserve especial mention. These are:

The oxygen mask, equipped with telephone connections which enabled the flyer to endure the rarified air at any altitude without losing speaking contact with his companions.

The military parachute, which was developed to unprecedented safety. During the entire war there was not an American casualty due to parachute failure.


The electric-heated clothing for aviators on high altitude work.

Quantity production of long-focus, light-filtration cameras by which good photographs could be taken through haze from altitudes of 3 miles or more.


The wireless telephone, by which the aviator is enabled to converse

easily with other planes and with ground stations.

In no field did American manufacturing capacity achieve a greater relative success than in balloon manufacture. Before the armistice we had produced 642 observation balloons and had received 20 from the French. Forty-three of our balloons had been destroyed and 45 given to the French and British. This left us with 574 balloons at the end of the war. On the same date the Belgian Army had 6, the British 43, the French 72, and the Germans 170 on the western front.




© Underwood & Underwood
FIELD MARSHALL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG,
Commander of the British Forces.



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
ARRIVAL OF GEN. FOCH IN COMPIEGNE WOOD

To meet the German delegates to sign the Armistice, Nov. 11, 1918.



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GENERAL DIAZ, Commander of the Italian Armies.



AT THE SURRENDER OF THE GERMAN FLEET
Admiral Sir David Beatty, Admiral Rodman, King George V., Prince of Wales,
Admiral Wm. S. Sims.


#### FORTY-FIVE SQUADRONS AT THE FRONT.

The American pilots of the Lafayette Escadrille were transferred from the French to the American service December 26, 1917, flying as civilians until formally commissioned in late January, 1918. They were then attached to the French Fourth Army, operating over Rheims.

Two full squadrons were attached to the British Royal Air Force in March and June respectively, of 1918, remaining with the British throughout the war, and participated in the following engagements: The Picardy drive, Ypres, Noyon-Montdidier, Viellers, Bray-Rosieres-Roye, Arras, Bapaume, Canal du Nord, and Cambrai.

The strictly American aviation operations started in the middle of March, 1918, with the patrolling of the front from Villeneuve-les-Vertus by an American pursuit squadron using planes of the Frenchbuilt Nieuport-28 types. Their complete success was followed by an immediate increase of the aerial forces at the front, with enlargement of their duties and field of action. By the middle of May squadrons of all types—pursuit, observation, and bombing—as well as balloon companies were in operation over a wide front. These squadrons were equipped with the best available types of British and Frenchbuilt service planes.

The rapid increase in American air forces is shown in the diagram below. The height of the columns shows the number of squadrons in



American Air Squadrons in Action Each Month

action each month. The squadrons were of four types: Observation squadrons, whose business it is to make observations, take photographs, and direct artillery fire; pursuit squadrons, using light fighting planes to protect the observation planes at their work, to drive the enemy from the air, or to "strafe" marching columns by machine-gun fire; the day bombers, whose work was the dropping of bombs on railways or roads; and the night bombers, carrying heavier bomb loads for the destruction of strategic enemy works.

The most rapid growth occurred after July, when American De Havilland planes were becoming available in quantity for observation and day bombing service, and by November the number of squadrons

increased to 45, with a total of 740 planes in action.

Of 2,698 planes sent to the zone of advance, 667, or one-quarter, were of American make and the proportion was rapidly increasing at

the time of the signing of the armistice.

The planes sent to the zone of advance are approximately twothirds of the service planes received by the A. E. F., the other third being in back areas. Of the 2,698 planes dispatched to the zone of advance only 1,162 remained at the time of the signing of the armistice.

## CHATEAU-THIERRY-JULY.

On the Chateau-Thierry-Soissons front the Germans had at the start a pronounced superiority in the air. The American Air Service succeeded, however, in establishing the lines of contact with enemy airmen from 3 to 10 miles within the enemy's lines, photographed the entire front and the terrain deep behind the lines, and played an important part in putting German air forces on the defensive. The German concentration for the attack of July 15 was reported in detail and the location of the German reserves established, while the secrecy of the allied mobilization for the counterattack was maintained and the Germans surprised. The American force employed consisted of four pursuit squadrons, three observation squadrons and two balloon companies.

#### ST. MIHIEL-SEPTEMBER.

In capturing the St. Mihiel salient the American first army was aided and protected by the largest concentration of air force ever made, of which approximately one-third were American and the other two-thirds were French, British, and Italian squadrons operating under American command. The German back areas were kept under bombardment day and night; their reserves and ammunition dumps were located for the American long-range artillery; propaganda designed to disaffect enemy personnel was dropped; record was made by photograph of every movement of the enemy's lines and reserves, such

information being frequently delivered to headquarters in finished photographs within half an hour of its occurrence; and fast pursuit planes armed with machine guns flew low over the German lines, firing directly into his infantry.

The American air force employed consisted of 12 pursuit squadrons, 12 observation squadrons, 3 bombing squadrons, and 15 balloon companies. This large force performed an amount of flying approximately three times as great as was done during the Chateau-Thierry operations.

# AIRPLANES 755 357 BALLOONS 71 Enemy by American by enemy American by enemy

Airplanes and Balloons Brought Down in Action

#### MEUSE-ARGONNE-SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER.

Because the Meuse-Argonne engagement covered a wider front and a more extended period of time, against an enemy who had improved his distribution of air force along the entire southern section of the front, no such heavy instantaneous concentration of planes as was made at St. Mihiel was possible. In this operation, moreover, less assistance was rendered by French and British flyers. The American force used during the engagement was considerably larger than at St. Mihiel

During the six weeks' struggle, the losses were heavy, but replacements were brought forward so rapidly that at the last stage of the action the available American strength was greater than at the start. American air activities continued during the Argonne fighting on the same scale as during the St. Mihiel offensive.

#### STRENGTH AT ARMISTICE.

At the signing of the armistice, there were on the front 20 pursuit squadrons, 18 observation squadrons, and 7 squadrons of bombers; with 1,238 flying officers and 740 service planes. There were also 23 balloon companies.

#### THE TEST OF BATTLE.

American aviators brought down in the course of their few months of active service 755 enemy planes. Our losses in combat were 357 planes. This is illustrated in the diagram, Page 97. The record of our balloon companies shows a somewhat less favorable comparison between our own and enemy losses, the figures being 43 American and 71 German balloons destroyed.

#### CHAPTER XIV.

#### TWO HUNDRED DAYS OF BATTLE


WO out of every three American soldiers who reached France took part in battle. The number who reached France was 2,084,000, and of these 1,390,000 saw active service in the front line.

American combat forces were organized into divisions, which, as has been noted, consisted of some 28,000 officers and men. These divisions were the largest on the western front, since the British division numbered about 15,000 and those of the French and Germans about 12,000 each. There were sent overseas 42 American divisions and several hundred thousand supplementary artillery and service of supply troops. The diagram below shows the numerical designations of the American divisions that were in France each month.

Of the 42 divisions that reached France 29 took part in active combat service. The battle record of the United States Army in this war is largely the history of these 29 combat divisions. Seven of them were regular Army divisions, 11 were organized from the National Guard, and 11 were made up of National Army troops.

American combat divisions were in battle for 200 days, from the 25th of April, 1918, when the first Regular Division after long training in quiet sectors, entered an active sector on the Picardy front, until the signing of the armistice. During these 200 days they were engaged in 13 major operations, of which 11 were joint enterprises with the French, British, and Italians, and 2 were distinctively American.

At the time of their greatest activity in the second week of October all 29 American divisions were in action. They then held 101 miles of front, or 23 per cent of the entire allied battle line. From the middle of August until the end of the war they held, during the greater part of the time, a front longer than that held by the British. Their strength tipped the balance of man-power in favor of the Allies, so that from the middle of June, 1918, to the end of the war the allied forces were superior in number to those of the enemy.




Numerical designations of American Divisions in France Each Month They captured 63,000 prisoners, 1,378 pieces of artillery, 708 trench mortars, and 9,650 machine guns.

The maps and diagrams in this chapter show in more detail the part American troops played in the allied endeavor, something of the scale and character of their operations, and several comparative records of the 29 combat divisions.

#### TIPPING THE BALANCE OF POWER.

The place American troops took in the allied undertaking is illustrated in the diagram below, which shows in kilometers the length of front line held by the armies of each nation on the allied side during the year 1918. In January American troops were holding 10 kilometers, or 6¼ miles, of front in quiet sectors. The high point was reached in October, with 29 divisions in line, extending over a front of 162 kilometers, or 101 miles, nearly one-quarter of the entire western front.




Kilometers of Front Line Held by Armies of Each Nation

The length of front shown as occupied by the French includes the lines held by the Italian Second Army Corps. On November 11, 1918, the Italians held 14 kilometers, or  $2\frac{1}{3}$  per cent, of the western front.

Another measure of American participation is the effect caused by the rapid arrivals of American troops on the rifle strength of the allied armies. One of the best indexes of effective man power is the number of riflemen ready for front-line service. For example, there are 12,250 rifles in an American division.

The diagram below shows the rifle strength of the allied and German armies on the western front from April 1 to November 1, 1918.

The dotted line shows the German rifle strength at the beginning of each month and the solid line the allied strength. On the 1st of April the Germans had an actual superiority of 324,000 riflemen on the western front. The two lines crossed during June. From that



Rifle Strength of Allied and German Armies on the Western Front

time on allied strength was always in the ascendency, due entirely to the Americans. By November 1 the allied rifle strength had a superiority over the German of more than 600,000 rifles.

American troops saw service on practically every stretch of the western front from British lines in Belgium to inactive sectors in the Vosges. On October 21, 1917, Americans entered the line in the quiet Toul sector.

It is difficult to cut up the year and 22 days which intervened into well-defined battles, for in a sense the entire war on the western front was a single battle. It is possible, however, to distinguish certain major operations or phases of the greater struggle. Thirteen such operations have been recognized in which American units were engaged, of which 12 took place on the western front and 1 in Italy. These battles are named and the number of Americans engaged is shown in the table below:

Thirteen Major Operations in Which Americans Participated
Operation


opolativa	Approximate number of Americans engaged.
West front—Campaign of 1917:	
Cambrai, Nov. 20 to Dec. 4	
West front—Campaign of 1918:	
German offensive, Mar. 21 to July 18-	
Somme, Mar. 21 to Apr. 6	2,200
Lys, Apr. 9 to 27	500
Aisne May 27 to June 5	27,500
Novon-Montdidier, June 9 to 15	27,500
Champagne-Marne, July 15 to 18	85,000
Allied offensives, July 18 to Nov. 11—	
Aisne-Marne, July 18 to Aug. 6	270,000
Somme, Aug. 8 to Nov. 11	54,000
Oise-Aisne, Aug. 18 to Nov. 11	85,000
Ypres-Lys, Aug. 19 to Nov. 11	108,000
Three-ries true- to an area	

St. Mihiel, Sept. 12 to 16	550,000
Meuse-Argonne, Sept. 20 to Nov. 11	1,200,000
Italian front—Campaign of 1918:	
Vittorio-Veneto, Oct. 24 to Nov. 4	1,200

In the Cambrai battle at the end of the campaign of 1917, scattering medical and engineering detachments served with the British, but sustained no serious casualties.

#### GERMAN OFFENSIVES.

The campaign of 1918 opened with the Germans in possession of the offensive. In a series of five drives of unprecedented violence the imperial Great General Staff sought to break the allied line



The Five Great German Offensives of 1918

and end the war. These five drives took place in five successive months, beginning in March. Each drive was so timed as to take advantage of the light of the moon for that month. The map, on this page, shows the ground won by the Germans in each of the offensives. The arrows indicate the points at which American troops went into

the battle, and the small numbers are the numerical designations of the American divisions taking part.

The first drive opened on March 21, on a 50-mile front across the old battle field of the Somme. In 17 days of fighting the Germans advanced their lines beyond Noyon and Montdidier and were within 12 miles of the important railroad center of Amiens with its great stores of British supplies. In this battle, also known as the Picardy offensive, approximately 2,200 American troops were engaged.

The attack upon Amiens had been but partially checked when the enemy struck again to the north in the Armentieres sector and advanced for 17 miles up the valley of the Lys. A small number of Americans, serving with the British, participated in the Lys defensive.

For their next attack (May 27) the Germans selected the French front along the Chemin des Dames north of the Aisne. The line from Rheims to a little east of Noyon was forced back. Soissons fell, and on May 31 the enemy had reached the Marne Valley, down which he was advancing in the direction of Paris. At this critical moment our Second Division, together with elements of the Third and Twenty-eighth Divisions were thrown into the line. By blocking the German advance at Chateau-Thierry, they rendered great assistance in stopping perhaps the most dangerous of the German drives. The Second Division not only halted the enemy on its front but also recaptured from him the strong tactical positions of Bouresches. Belleau Wood, and Vaux.


The enemy had by his offensives established two salients threatening Paris. He now sought to convert them into one by a fourth terrific blow delivered on a front of 22 miles between Montdidier and Noyon. The reinforced French Army resisted firmly and the attack was halted after an initial advance of about 6 miles. Throughout this operation (June 9-15) the extreme left line of the salient was defended by our First Division. Even before the drive began the division had demonstrated the fighting qualities of our troops by capturing and holding the town of Cantigny (May 28).

There followed a month of comparative quiet, during which the enemy reassembled his forces for his fifth onslaught. On July 15 he attacked simultaneously on both sides of Rheims, the eastern corner of the salient he had created in the Aisne drive. To the east of the city he gained little. On the west he crossed the Marne, but made slight progress. His path was everywhere blocked. In this battle 85,000 American troops were engaged—the Forty-second division to the extreme east in Champagne, and the Third and Twenty-eighth to the west, near Chateau-Thierry.

#### ALLIED OFFENSIVE.

HE turning point of the war had come. The great German offensives had been stopped, and a series of allied offensives began, destined to roll back the German armies beyond the French frontier. In this continuous allied offensive there may be distinguished six major operations in which the American forces took part.

These six operations are shown on the map on this page, in which the solid arrows indicate points where American divisions entered the line, and the broken arrows the distances over which they drove forward. In four of the six operations the American troops engaged were acting in support of allied divisions and under the command of the generals of the Allies.



American Participation in the Allied Offensives of 1918

The moment chosen by Marshal Foch for launching the first counteroffensive was July 18. The place chosen was the uncovered west flank of the German salient from the Aisne to the Marne. The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Twenty-sixth, Twenty-eighth, Thirty-second, and Forty-second American Divisions, together with selected French troops, were employed. When the operation was completed (August 6) the salient had been flattened out.

Two days later the British struck at the Somme salient, initiating an offensive which, with occasional breathing spells, lasted to the date of the armistice. From August 8 to 20 elements of the Thirty-third Division, which had been brigaded for training with the Australians, were in the line and took part in the capture of Chipilly Ridge. Later the Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth Divisions, who served throughout with the British were brought over from the Ypres sector and used in company with Australian troops to break the Hindenburg line at the tunnel of the St. Quentin Canal (Sept. 20-Oct. 20).

In the meantime simultaneous assaults were in progress at other points on the front. On August 18 Gen. Mangin began the Oise-Aisne phase of the great allied offensive. Starting from the Soissons-Rheims line, along which they had come to rest August 6, the French armies advanced by successive stages to the Aisne, to Laon, and on November 11 were close to the frontier. In the first stages of this advance they were assisted by the Twenty-eighth, Thirty-second, and Seventy-seventh American Divisions, but by September 15 all of these were withdrawn for the coming Meuse-Argonne offensive of the

American Army.

The day after the opening of the Oise-Aisne offensive the British launched the first of a series of attacks in the Ypres sector which continued with some interruptions to the time of the armistice and may be termed the "Ypres-Lys offensive." Four American divisions at different times participated in this operation. The Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth were engaged in the recapture of Mount Kemmel August 31 to September 2. The Thirty-seventh and Ninety-first were withdrawn from the Meuse-Argonne battle and dispatched to Belgium, where they took part in the last stages of the Ypres-Lys offensive (Oct. 31 to Nov. 11).

With the organization of the American First Army on August 10, under the personal command of General Pershing, the history of the American Expeditionary Forces entered upon a new stage. The St. Mihiel (Sept. 12-16) and Meuse-Argonne (Sept. 26-Nov. 11) offensives were major operations planned and executed by American generals and American troops. The ground won in each is shown by

the shaded areas in the map.


In addition to the 12 operations above mentioned, American troops participated in the Battle of Vittorio-Veneto (Oct. 24 to Nov. 4), which ended in the rout of the Austrian Army.

## THE BATTLE OF ST. MIHIEL.

The first distinctly American offensive was the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient carried through from September 12 to September 15, largely by American troops and wholly under the orders of the American commander-in-chief. The positions of the various American divisions at the beginning of the offensive and on each succeeding

day are shown on the map on this page. The arrows indicate the advance of each division. In the attack the American troops were aided by French colonial troops, who held the portion of the front line shown in dashes on the left of this map. The Americans were also aided by French and British air squadrons.

The attack began at 5 a.m., after four hours of artillery preparation of great severity, and met with immediate success. Before noon about half the distance between the bases of the salient had been



The Battle of St. Mihiel

covered and the next morning troops of the First and Twenty-sixth Divisions met at Vigneulles, cutting off the salient within 24 hours from the beginning of the movement.

Two comparisons between this operation and the Battle of Gettysburg emphasize the magnitude of the action. About 550,000 Americans were engaged at St. Mihiel; the Union forces at Gettysburg numbered approximately 100,000. St. Mihiel set a record for concentration of artillery fire by a four-hour artillery preparation, consuming more than 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition. In three days at Gettysburg Union artillery fired 33,000 rounds.


The St. Mihiel offensive cost only about 7,000 casualties, less than one-third the Union losses at Gettysburg. There were captured 16,000 prisoners and 443 guns. A dangerous enemy salient was reduced, and American commanders and troops demonstrated their ability to plan and execute a big American operation.

## THE BATTLE OF THE MEUSE-ARGONNE.

The object of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, said General Pershing in his report of November 20, 1918, "was to draw the best German divisions to our front and to consume them." Every available American division was thrown against the enemy. Every available German

division was thrown in to meet them. At the end of 47 days of continuous battle our divisions had consumed the German divisions.

The goal of the American attack was the Sedan-Meziéres railroad, the main line of supply for the German forces on the major part of the western front. If this line were cut, a retirement on the whole front would be forced. When the engagement was evidently impending the commander of the German Fifth Army sent word to his



The Battle of the Meuse-Argonne

forces, calling on them for unyielding resistance and pointing out that defeat in this engagement might mean disaster for the fatherland.

The map shows the progress of the American action, giving the lines held by divisions on different days. On the first day, the 26th of September, and the next day or two after that, the lines were considerably advanced. Then the resistance became more stubborn. Each side threw in more and more of its man-power until there were no more reserves. Many German divisions went into action twice, and not a few three times, until, through losses, they were far under strength. All through the month of October the attrition went on. Foot by foot American troops pushed back the best of the German divisions. On November 1 the last stage of the offensive began. The enemy power began to break. American troops forced their way to the east bank of the Meuse. Toward the north they made even more rapid progress, and in seven days reached the outskirts of Sedan and cut the Sedan-Meziéres railroad, making the German line untenable.

In the meantime (Oct. 2 to 28) our Second and Thirty-sixth Divisions had been sent west to assist the French who were advancing in Champagne beside our drive in the Argonne. The liaison detachment between the two armies was for a time furnished by the Ninety-second Division.


In some ways the Meuse-Argonne offers an interesting resemblance to the Battle of the Wilderness, fought from May 5 to 12, 1864, in the Civil War. The Meuse-Argonne lasted six times as long as the Battle of the Wilderness. Twelve times as many American troops were engaged as were on the Union side. They used in the action ten times as many guns and fired about one hundred times as many rounds of artillery ammunition. The actual weight of the ammunition fired was greater than that used by the Union forces during the entire Civil War. Casualties were perhaps four times as heavy as among the Northern troops in the Battle of the Wilderness.

The Battle of the Meuse-Argonne was beyond compare the greatest ever fought by American troops, and there have been few, if any, greater battles in the history of the world. Some of the more important statistics of the engagement are presented in the table below:


American Data for the Meuse-Argonne Battle	
Days of Battle	47
American Troops Engaged	1.200,000
Guns employed in attack	2,417
Rounds of artillery ammunition fired	
Rounds of artifery animulation fred	840
Airplanes used	
Tons of explosives dropped by planes on enemy lines	
Tanks used	
Miles of penetration of enemy line, maximum	34
Square kilometers of territory taken	1,550
Villages and towns liberated	
Prisoners captured	16,059
	1.00
Artillery pieces captured	2,864
Machine guns captured	´
Trench mortars captured	400.000
American casualties	120,000

#### RECORD OF TWENTY-NINE DIVISIONS.

Twenty-nine combat divisions achieved the successes and bore the losses of active operations. The story of their achievements can not



Days Spent by Each Division in Quiet and Active Sectors



Kilometers Advanced Against the Enemy by Each Division

be told within the limits of the account. There are, however, certain fundamental records which give us a picture of the accomplishments of these divisions.

The length of service of each division in quiet and in active sectors of the line is shown in the diagram. The diagram pictures the accomplishments of different divisions by showing the number of kilo metres each advanced against the enemy, and in graphic form the percentage of the total kilometres advanced which was carried through by each division. The length of the advance depends in each case on the length of service of the division, the duty assigned to it (whether offensive or defensive), the nature of the terrain to be covered, the strength and effectiveness of opposing enemy forces, artillery support, etc. Hence, conclusions as to the relative efficiency of divisions can not be drawn from these figures alone.

The Seventy-seventh National Army Division, composed largely of troops from New York City, made the greatest advance—a total of 71½ kilometers, or nearly 45 miles. If the advances by all divisions are turned into miles the total advance is 485 miles, and the average gain for each division 17 miles.

Divi-	1260	
sion	Captured	Per cent,
2nd	12,026	19.07
lst	6,489	10.26
89th	5,061	8.02
33rd	3,967	6,32
30th	3,848	6.10
26th	3,148	4.99
4th	2,756	\$ 20 4.3?
91st	2,412	3.82
27th	2,357	3.74
5th	2,356	3.74
3rd	2,240	3.55
29th	2,187	3.47
32nd	2,153	3.41
90th	1,876	2.97
80th	1,813	2.87
37th	1,495	2.37
42nd	1,317	2.09
79th	1,077	1.71
28th	921	1.45
82nd	845	1.34
35th	781	1.24
77th	750	1.19
36th	549	.87
78th	432	.68
82st	101	.16
7th	69	1.11
92n4		.06
6th	12	1.02
88th	3	•00
Total	63,079	

German Prisoners Captured by Each Division

The figures for number of prisoners taken are from the official records of the different divisions. The total number of Americans taken prisoner by Germans was 4,434.

The price paid for these achievements was 286,000 battle casualties; a heavy price when counted in terms of the individuals who gave their lives or suffered from wounds; a small price when compared with the enormous price paid by the nations at whose sides we fought.

The figures given were corrected to March 1 at the office of the adjutant general of the expeditionary forces. Battle deaths include both killed in action and died of wounds. Under wounded are included many slightly injured, and there is probably some duplication between wounded and died of wounds.

Under "other units" are grouped the casualties of several different kinds of units. These are the following:

The troops not in divisions were largely artillery, headquarters,

train, and other special services.

The Ninety-third Division is worthy of special comment. It was always incomplete as a division. It was without its artillery and some other units, and was brigaded with the French from the time of its arrival in France in the spring of 1918 until the signing of the armistice. Its service in the line was fully as long as that of many of the so-called combat divisions. This is indicated by a comparison of its casualties (2,583) with those in the other divisions. The division was made up of colored soldiers from National Guard units of various States.

## Casualties Suffered by Each Division

Among the 8,641 casualties occurring among "other units" there is one most interesting and not inconsiderable group. These are the men who deserted to the front. They went A. W. O. L. (absent without leave) from their organizations in the zone of supplies or in the training areas, and found their way up to the battle line where many of them took part in the fighting and some of them were killed or wounded. These cases were so numerous that General Pershing made special arrangements by which trained men who had rendered good service behind the lines could, as a reward, secure opportunity to go to the front, and take part in the fighting.

## HEALTH AND CASUALTIES.

F every 100 American soldiers who took part in the war with Germany, 2 were killed or died of disease during the period of hostilities. In the Northern Army during the Civil War the number was about 10. Among the other great nations in this war, between 20 and 25 in each 100 called to the colors were killed or died.

#### CHEONOLOGY OF AMERICAN OPERATIONS

#### COMPARATIVE TABLE OF TOTAL BATTLE CASUALTIES AND DIS-TINGUISHED SERVICE CROSSES AWARDED, BY DIVISION

#### Prepared by the War Department, Washington, D. C.

Note: Total battle casualties include killed in action, wounded, missing in action and prisoners Total battle casualties are as of March 8, 1919, and the numbers of distinguished service crosses are as of March 1, 1919.

Divisions numbered from 1-25 inclusive are Regular Army. Divisions numbered from 26-75 inclusive were formerly National Guard. Divisions numbered above 75 are National Army.

Division  Second First Third Twenty-eighth Thirty-second Fourth Forty-second Ninetieth Seventy-seventh Twenty-sixth Eighty-second Fifth Seventy-eighth Thirty-third Thirty-third Thirty-fifth Eighty-ninth Therty-first Eighteth Thirty-seventh Thirty-seventh Thirty-seventh Thirty-seventh Thirty-seventh Thirty-seventh Seventy-ninth Thirty-seventh Seventy-ninth Thirty-seventh Seventy-ninth Thirty-seventh Seventh Seventh Ninety-second Eighty-first Sixth Eighty-eighth	Partion 12 of 14 o	replomN 123455789011234567890123456789	polymany 102 12 19177704250401901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101901 101	lepiO 12381759941740673682035425689	10 e3cm 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	TO SEAL SEAL SEAL SEAL SEAL SEAL SEAL SEAL
Total	238,877		3,426	Average	1.4	%

The following table shows the award of Distinguished Service Crosses by arm of service:

Infantry	.2,942
Air Service	. 251
Medical Corps	. 238
Artillery Engineers	149
Engineers	. 150
Signal Corps Tank Corps	. 36
Others	. 70
-	

Note: There were 493 Distinguished Service Crosses awarded individuals belonging to units not a part of any Division.

The war was undoubtedly the bloodiest which has ever been fought. One possible competitor might be the Crimean War, in which the casualty rate per 100 men was equally heavy. More than four-fifths of the losses were, however, deaths from disease, while in the recent war with Germany disease deaths were inconsiderable as compared with battle deaths.

## Battle Deaths in Armics Engaged in Present War, 1914-1918

2 (2000)	
Russia	1,700,000
Germany	1,600,000
France	1.385.300
France	900,000
Great Britain	
Austria	000,000
Italy	220,000
Turkey	
Serbia and Montenegro	
Belgium	102,000
Roumania	100,000
Bulgaria	100,000
United States	
Greece	
Portugal	2.000
Loringar	_,
Total	7 450 200
TOTAL	.,100,200

The total battle deaths in the recent war were greater than all the deaths in all wars for more than 100 years previous. From 1793 to 1914 total deaths in war may safely be estimated at something under 6,000,000.

That American losses were not more severe is due to the fact that our armies were only in heavy fighting for 200 days. The weekly deaths during a part of that period were around the 6,000 mark.

The chances of death are much heavier in the Infantry than in any other branch of the service. Of each 1,000 enlisted men in the Infantry 46 were were killed or died of wounds. The officers show a higher rate. In the Air Service the casualties among officers are much higher than among men because in our service all aviators are officers.

## WOUNDED, PRISONERS, AND MISSING.


For every man who was killed in chattle, seven others were wounded, taken prisoner, or reported missing. The total battle casualties in the expeditionary forces are shown below. The number who died of wounds was only 6 per cent as large as the number who were wounded. The hospital records show that about 85 per cent of the wounded men sent to hospitals have been returned to duty. Many of the slightly wounded would not have been recorded as casualties in previous wars. Except for 297 who died, all the prisoners shown in the table have now been returned.

Battle Casualties in the American Expeditionary Forces Killed in action	
Died of wounds 14,729 Total dead 14,729	
Wounded severely 80,130	
Wounded slightly	
Total wounded	230,074
Taken prisoner	4,434
Crand total	286,330

The number of men reported as missing has been steadily reduced from a total of 22,724, exclusive of prisoners, to the figure 2,913 shown in the table.

The work of the Central Records Office of the American Expeditionary Forces in clearing up the cases of men listed as missing has been more successful than that done in any of the other armies or in any previous great war. On September 10, 1919, all but two of the missing had been accounted for and these were considered killed in action and the account of the missing was closed. The missing lists of the other nations still run into the hundreds of thousands.

The total number of lives lost in both Army and Navy from the declaration of war to May 1, 1919, is 122,500. Deaths in the Army, including marines attached to it, were 112,432. The diagram below shows the proportion which occurred in the United States and overseas, and also the proportion which disease deaths bore to battle deaths. Under "Others" are included deaths from accident. There



Total Deaths

were 768 lost at sea, of which 381 are included under battle deaths, since their loss was the direct result of submarine activity. If the comparison between disease and battle losses is limited to the expeditionary forces, battle losses appear more than twice as large as deaths from disease.

[Washington dispatches of Sept. 23, 1919, reported that the cost of the war to the United States in man-power was then estimated officially as 116,492 dead and 205,690 wounded, a total of 322,182. These figures included losses to army and marine units on all fronts to September 1. Killed in action totaled 35,585, or 11 per cent. of


the entire list; died of wounds, 14,742; died of disease, 58,073; died of accidents and other causes, 8,092. Under the head of "missing," the announcement records a zero, with the notation "all corrected."]

This is the first war in which the United States has been engaged that showed a lower death rate from disease than from battle. Since the time of the Mexican War a steady improvement has been made in the health of troops in war operations. The death rate from disease in the Mexican War was 110 per year in each 1,000 men; in the Civil War this was reduced to 65; and in the Spanish War to 26; while the rate in the expeditionary forces in this war was 19. The battle rate of 53 for the overseas forces is higher than in any previous war. It is higher than in the Civil War because all of the fighting was concentrated in one year, while in the Civil War it stretched over four years.

#### THE CONTROL OF DISEASE.

Some of the outstanding causes of the remarkably low disease death rate in the war against Germany are: (1) A highly trained medical personnel, (2) compulsory vaccination of the entire Army against typhoid fever, (3) thorough camp sanitation and control of drinking water, and (4) adequate provision of hospital facilities.

There were at the beginning of the war 2,089 commissioned medical officers, including the Reserves. During the war 31,251 physicians from civil life were commissioned in the Medical Corps. This number included leaders of medical science who made new discoveries during the course of the war, resulting in great saving of life in our own and other armies.



Deaths by Principal Diseases

The intestinal diseases such as dysentery, the typhoids, bubonic plague, cholera, and typhus, have ravaged armies in the past. During the Spanish-American War typhoid fever alone caused 85 per cent of the total number of deaths. In the War with Germany these diseases have been practically eliminated. The diagram shows the relative proportion of deaths caused by principal diseases. During the entire war up to May 1, 1919, a total of only 2,328 cases of typhoid fever have been reported and only 227 deaths from this cause.

It is evident from the diagram that pneumonia has been the greatest cause of death. More than 40,000 died of the disease. Of these, probably 25,000 resulted from the influenza-pneumonia epidemic which swept through every camp and cantonment in this country and caused thousands of deaths in the expeditionary forces. Up to September 14, 1918, only 9,840 deaths from disease had occurred in the Army. During the eight weeks from September 14 to the 8th of November 316,089 cases of influenza and 53,499 of pnemonia were reported among troops in this country. The epidemic reached its high point the second week in October, when 4 out of each 1,000 troops under arms in this country died.

Two other diseases which offered difficult problems for the medical force were measles and spinal meningitis. Measles was prevalent during the first year of the war and was particularly dangerous as the predecessor of pneumonia. Meningitis has caused nearly 2,000 deaths, ranking next to pneumonia as shown in the diagram. Both of these contagious diseases were largely the result of bringing numbers of men together in the confinement of camps and cantonments where

control of contagion is difficult.

Great success has also been experienced in the control of the venereal diseases. A comprehensive program of education, together with medical prophylaxis, has produced unusual results. While these diseases have continued to be the most frequent cause of admissions to the sick report, and the greatest source of non-effectiveness in the Army, a large proportion (9,610) of the 48,167 cases were contracted before entering the Army.

Up to September, 1918, there was steady reduction of non-effectiveness from venereal diseases in the Army overseas. At the beginning of that month there was less than one venereal patient in hospitals among each 1,000 men. While the relative number of patients increased after hostilities stopped, the record was still excellent.

At the beginning of the war what was then considered an extravagant program of hospital construction was entered upon, with the intent that in no case should the Army lack facilities for the care of its sick.

On December 1, 1918, there were available in Army hospitals 399,510 beds, or 1 bed to every 9 men in the Army. Of these, 287,-

290 were overseas and 112,220 were in this country. The hospital capacity was exceeded in this country only during the influenza epidemic, when it became necessary to take over barracks for hospital purposes. The overseas record was even better. Except during two weeks in October, at the height of the attack on the Hindenburg line, the number of patients did not exceed the normal bed capacity of the hospitals, and at that time there approximately 60,000 unused emergency beds.

#### CHAPTER XV.

#### A MILLION DOLLARS AN HOUR.

OR a period of 25 months, from April, 1917, through April, 1919, the war cost the United States considerably more than \$1,000,000 an hour. Treasury disbursements during the period reached a total of \$23,500,000,000, of which \$1,650,000,000 may be charged to the normal expenses which would have occurred in time of peace. The balance may be counted as the direct money cost of the war to the end of April, 1919, a sum of \$21,850,000,000. The figure is 20 times the pre-war national debt. It is nearly large enough to pay the entire costs of our Government from 1791 up to the outbreak of the European war. Our expenditure in this war was sufficient to have carried on the Revolutionary War continuously for more than a thousand years.

In addition to this huge expenditure loans of \$8,850,000,000 were advanced to the Allies, or nearly half a million dollars an hour.

Of the United States Government war costs, the Army was responsible for the expenditure of 64 per cent.



Where the Army Dollar Went

The total of our Army expenditures about equals the value of all the gold produced in the whole world from the discovery of America up to the outbreak of the European war. The single item of pay for the Army is larger than the combined salaries of all the public-school principals and teachers in the United States for the five years from 1912 to 1916.

As a result of the war efforts large quantities of munitions, supplies, and equipment have been secured which will be of value for many years to come. The Army now owns some of the finest docks in the world. The 16 National Army cantonments and 3 of the National Guard camps will be retained permanently as training camps. A number of first-class aviation fields and depots and balloon schools will be a permanent asset. We have stocks of most articles of clothing sufficient to last our Army for a number of years. There is a large supply of standardized trucks.

As to rifles and machine guns and their ammunition, light and heavy artillery and ammunition, tanks and tractors, of these we have a supply more than sufficient to equip fully an army of a million men and maintain them in active combat for six months. These munitions are of the best quality and latest design. Articles of miscellaneous equipment are available in like quantity and quality.

Thousands of Liberty motors and service planes are immediately available for any emergency. Engineer, signal, and medical equipment is on hand to the value of millions of dollars.

Estimated Total War Expenditures of Principal Nations to April 30, 1919
[All figures in billions of dollars and excluding normal expenses and loans to Allies]

	Billions	of
Country	dollars	
Great Britain and Dominions		38
France	• • • •	26
United States	• • • • •	22 18
Russia		13
Italy	, <b></b>	5
Japan and Greece		ĭ
-		
Total Allies and United States	1	.23
Germany		39
Austria-Hungary		21
Turkey and Bulgaria		3
Total Teutonic Allies		63
Grand Total	1	86

The total direct war costs amount to about \$186,000,000,000,000, and of this sum the enemy countries spent about one-third, and those on the allied side about two-thirds. Germany spent more than any other nation, and was closely followed by Great Britain, whose expenditures include those of her colonies. The figure for France is \$12,000,000,000 less than that for Great Britain, and our our figure is below that for France. The Austrian expenditure was almost equal to that of the United States. It is noteworthy that the United States spent about one-eighth of the entire cost of the war and something less than one-fifth of the expenditures on the allied side.


Duration of the War War declared War declared

War declared war declare	eu
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4 Polgium Alig. 4, 1914Apr. 4, 19	11 *
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8. PortugalMar. 9, 1916Nov. 23, 191	
9. Italy	
10. San Marino June 6, 19:	$\frac{1}{15}$ $\frac{3}{3}$ $\frac{4}{5}$
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10. Sali Marino 11. Roumania <sup>2</sup>	16 1 11 18
12. Greece	10 1 7 5
13. United States	7 4
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21. Nicaragua	3 30
22. Haiti	3 23
23. Honduras	2007777


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Treaty Mar. 3, 1918.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Treaty Mar. 6, 1918.

Some International Comparisons



#### Some International Comparisons



Number of battle airplanes in service at the date of the Armistice

#### CHAPTER XVI

#### MILITARY EXPLOSIVES.

By Arthur La Motte, Manager Technical Division, E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co.

LITARY explosives may be roughly divided into two classes—detonating explosives, such as T. N. T., and propellant explosives, such as the well-known smokeless powder. Detonating explosives are used as shell bursting charges, demolition charges for blowing up roads, bridges and other structures; charges used for sapping and mining; and charges in hand grenades, torpedoes, aeroplanes bombs and submarine mines. Propellant powders may differ in the size and shape of the "grains," but the principle of all of them is about the same. While the detonating explosives require an intermediate agent similar to a blasting cap to explode them, the propellant explosives are ignited by a flame and burn from the surface at a speed proportionate to the pressure under which they are confined.

There are, chemically speaking, two varieties of propellant explosives—those consisting of nitrocellulose and nitroglycerine, of which the well-known Cordite is an example, and those consisting of pure nitrocellulose only. The size and shape of the grain, as it is called, depends upon the character of the gun in which it is used, or more accurately, the length of time the projectile is travelling from the time it starts until the time it leaves the gun. The bigger the gun, generally speaking, the larger the grain, although a large bore short gun, such as a howitzer or mortar, would require a smaller grain than a gun of greater length but of smaller diameter. It is the endeavor of the Ballistic Engineer to design a grain which will give off all its gas, that is, one which will be consumed entirely during the travel of the projectile in the gun, and yet not to burn so quickly as to raise the pressure in the gun above the safety limit.

Among gunners, both of the types of propellant powders have their admirers. The smokeless powders containing nitro-glycerine have the advantage of ease of ignition and relatively small bulk. They have the disadvantage, however, of burning at a higher temperature which shortens the life of the gun. Cordite, the typical powder of the nitroglycerine class, is used almost exclusively by the

British Government, but the U. S. Government pins its faith to the nitrocellulose type, or the pyro powders as they are called. This type has the advantage of imparting a longer life to the gun, and is somewhat safer to make.

A grain of smokeless powder may be 1/32 of an inch in diameter and 1/16 of an inch long, with a perforation through the axis of the cylinder no bigger than a hair, or it may be 1 inch in diameter and 21/8 inches long with seven axial perforations, each one about as big as the core of graphite in an ordinary lead pencil. The former is a size adapted to small arms ammunition, while the latter is for the 16in. navy gun. Between these there is every conceivable variation in size, giving grains adapted for the well known 3-inch field gun, the 155-millimeter field gun, and every possible type of gun from a musket to a cannon. The object of the perforation is to provide for an increasing rate of burning. Without this the surface of a grain would be constantly diminishing while burning, and, therefore, the volume of gas would be greatest at the moment the projectile started. With one or more perforations, the powder burning on the inside of this hole constantly increases the area on fire so that the pressure of gas is sustained to just the rate desired. The small arms rifle powder may develop a pressure up to nearly 30 tons to the square inch. and imparts a muzzle velocity to the projectile of nearly 3,500 feet per second.

While it may seem that the dominant characteristic of modern propellant explosives is the fact that they are burned without giving off any smoke, which is responsible for their generic name of smokeless powders, the fact that an infinite variation in the design of the grain permits the Ballistic Engineer to obtain almost any result desired up to the capacity of the guns to stand, gives the smokeless powders an importance much beyond their freedom from smoke.

All smokeless powders are not employed in the art of war, many tons are used annually in the gentle, pleasant sport of trapshooting. In some of the powders made for this purpose a different method is employed from that used in the manufacture of the military powders. While the base of the more popular shotgun smokeless powder is nitrocellulose, it is not made into a hard colloid as in the case of the military powders, but is rolled up into a little fluffy ball, looking, under a microscope, like a snowball.

T. N. T. is probably the best advertised explosive in the world today. The popular conception of it is that it has enormous power, is very sensitive and dangerous, and has many times the strength of dynamite. As the idea people get of dynamite is that "one teaspoonful will blow up the City Hall," T. N. T. may be thought by many to be in the class of those of which a pinch will blow up a city block.

What is T. N. T.? It is known to the chemist as Trinitrotoluol—sometimes Trinitrotoluene and Trinitromethylbenzene, if you don't care what hard names you call it. Other names are Trilit, Trolite, Trinol, Trotyl, Tritolo, Tritone, Trotol and Triton. Its chemical formula is:

## $C_6H_2(NO_2)*CH*$

Now you know all about it!

To an ordinary human being, however, it is a yellow-brown powder, in appearance not unlike powdered mustard or maple sugar. It is very poisonous and, in process of manufacture, must be handled in such a way as to prevent its absorption through the skin or by inhalation. When the dust or vapor is inhaled or absorbed by the skin, symptoms may be produced, varying from an eruption of the skin to a toxic jaundice, which has caused fifty deaths in a year in the shell-loading plants in England.

T. N. T. is made by treating toluol, a water-white aromatic, oil-like liquid, a by-product from the gas industry, with nitric acid. Although toluol in normal times is not an expensive material, a great deal of nitric acid is used in its conversion into T. N. T., which runs the cost of finished product up to six or more times the cost of toluol.

T. N. T. is one of the most stable of all high explosives. It is also one of the most difficult to detonate, requiring a blasting cap nearly five times as strong as that which will fire straight dynamite. It is a powerful explosive, but not so strong as popularly supposed.

One of the tests for strength of high explosives is known as the Trauzl Block Test. It consists of firing about one-third of an ounce (10 grammes) of explosive in a hole drilled two-thirds through the axis of a lead cylinder, about eight inches in diameter and eight inches high, and measuring the expansion of the chamber produced. When carefully conducted with the use of lead blocks, made as nearly alike as possible, this gives fairly good results in comparing explosives, although it rather favors the quicker acting explosives.

The following table from Mashall on Explosives gives the expansion of the lead block by T. N. T., as compared with four other well-known explosives:

 Blasting Gelatin
 36.6 cubic inches expansion.

 75% Gelatin
 31.5 " " "

 70% Guhr Dynamite
 19.28 " " "

 T. N. T.
 18.3 " " "

 Black Blasting Powder
 6.6 " " "

70% Guhr Dynamite is not made in the United States, but it is about equal to a 40% Straight Active Base Dynamite in strength. It will be seen that T. N. T. is not a very tremendously strong explosive after all, as compared with well-known commercial explosives.

T. N. T. is a very quick-acting explosive. The detonation of a continuous train of it, fired at one end, would travel 17,000 feet in one second; 40% dynamite would only go 15,000 feet per second, while Black Blasting Powder, FF grain, loafs along at the rate of

1,540 feet per second.

When T. N. T. is used in submarine mines, depth bombs and torpedo heads, it is carefully packed in an air-tight container. Blasting Gelatin can remain immersed in water with no protection at all almost indefinitely. Dynamite can be used in wet bore holes even if left several hours. A small proportion of water in T. N. T. makes it so insensitive that it cannot be detonated at all except with a dry primer of T. N. T.

T. N. T. gives off a large volume of noxious fumes. It has what chemists call a "high oxygen deficiency," which means that it requires a considerable addition of oxygen-carrying salts to make the gases resulting from its explosion harmless when breathed in small quantities. Dynamite already has these oxygen-bearing salts incorporated in it. T. N. T. gives a thick black smoke and poisonous fumes, not objectionable in a military explosive, but most objectionable in a commercial explosive. It cannot be used in underground mining or tunneling.

However, T. N. T. is a good explosive in its way—no question about that. In fact, it may be said that it is an ideal military explosive. There is, however, a vast difference between what be called military and commercial explosives. One may reasonably doubt that an explosive that excels in one class may be well adapted to the

other.

A military explosive, excepting the smokeless powders known as propellants, may be roughly divided into four classes:

Demolition explosives for destroying railroads, bridges and other

lines of communication;

Submarine mines, bombs and torpedoes;

Shell bursting charges for high explosive shell;

Land mining.

T. N. T. is well adapted for demolition. It is made up in small highly-compressed bricks, carefully plated to make them waterproof. These blocks are very expensive, but expense is not considered when blowing up a bridge to prevent an enemy crossing a river. It is used successfully in submarine mines, because, being a solid, it is "non-freezing" and is not subject to chemical change on long storage. It works well in aeroplane bombs and in torpedoes, as it is quick, local and shattering in its action, and is not readily exploded when hit by a rifle bullet. It is used as a shell-bursting charge, as it can be melted and poured, while liquid, into the steel shell, in which condition it is so very insensitive that it can be fired from a cannon. For charging tunnels, driven under enemy trenches and fortifications, it

is useful, as it is strong enough to make a good-sized crater; is easy to handle, not sensitive to impact of rifle bullets, and the smoke and fumes given off are rather an advantage.

T. N. T. has been tried in quarries against 40% Dynamite, and has shown no great difference in execution. It did stain the rock black, however, which dynamite does not do. It has been used to a small extent as an ingredient in certain commercial high explosives in the United States since 1903.

The principal use of T. N. T. in the commercial explosive field has been in the manufacturing of "Cordeau Detonant," a well-known and valuable blasting accessory, as a means of completely detonating large charges of dynamite with certainty and efficiency. As a regular commercial high explosive, however, it leaves much to be desired.

## CHAPTER XXVII

THE GERMAN CHARACTER AS REVEALED BY PRE-WAR CRIME.

(Reprinted from The Literary Digest of August 30, 1919)

HEN stories of German atrocities began to circulate in the United States not long after the outbreak of the war in 1914, everybody here was astonished. The Germans had always been regarded as a good, kind-hearted people, abounding in poets, and philosophers, and scientific men of excessive erudition, but otherwise harmless. It was believed that the highest form of civilization ever seen on this planet was the variety found in Germany. Her institutions of learning were considered the best on earth, and few Americans ever felt perfectly satisfied with their training in any line unless they had spent some time at the fount of Teutonic learning. mans themselves admitted that they were supermen, and that their brand of Kultur had that of anybody else looking utterly futile. That such a people could be guilty of the dark and devious deeds attributed to them was beyond belief, and so the thing was explained by laying all the blame on an iniquitous autocracy, whose mandates these good, superior people were compelled to carry out. This idea seemed to be reflected even in the President's warmessage to Congress, in which it was said, in effect, that we had no quarrel with the German people, but did feel slightly irritated with their Government.

TABLE I.—CRIMES OF FRAUD AND LARCENY—A COMPARATIVE TABLE ILLUSTRATING CONDITIONS BEFORE THE WAR.

TELESTICATING CONDITIONS DEFORE THE WAR								
	German Empire			England and Wales	3	United States		
	Annual Average 5-Years 1904-08	Number per 100,000 Pop.	Annual Average 5-Years 1904~08	Number per 100,000 Pop.	Prop. German Empire Eng. Wales	Census for 1910	Numbe per 100,000 Pop.	Proportion German Empire
Fraud	30,925 24,863 818.4 105,059	50.7 40.7 1.84 171.77	2,347.8 1,377 50.4 49,062	4. .14	7.5 to 1 10 to 1 9.6 to 1 1.07 to 1	976	13.5 1.05 * 46.27	4 to1 40 to 1 4 to 1

<sup>\*</sup> Combined with fraud or larceny.

Considerable light is shed on the state of German civilization by the published researches of the Rev. Acton Griscom, M.A., who states that even in the peaceful and prosperous years before the war "Germany actually had the worst criminal record of almost any people known." It appears that the Rev. Mr. Griscom, in pursuance of studies for his university doctorate, has devoted some time to a study of statistics relating to German crime, using for that purpose only documents issued by the German Government, and his statements are all based on the results of such study. He says:

Americans do not realize that the outwardly clean streets of German cities but whited a rottenness within far exceeding the worst of Paris, London, or

New York. They have not really taken in the fact that Kultur was a myth, and that the German people and their German civilization were notably inferior.

Business men do not realize that the actual number of convictions for fraud in Germany, resulting in imprisonment, average forty to each one in the United States The actual figures for convictions for fraud in the German Empire for the five years from 1904 to 1908—well, before the war—were 154,626. This gives an annual average of 30,925, which means that for every 100,000 of population in Germany fifty-one persons are imprisoned for fraud annually. These figures come from German official sources, the "Statistick des Deutschen Reichs, Band 228," published by the Imperial Government. They may be found in Part II—"Kriminal-statistick für das Jahr 1908," p. 10. Embezzlement in Germany for the same five years totaled 124,317, with an annual average of 24,503, which means that forty-one men were imprisoned for that offense each year per 100,000 population.

If this annual average is again compared with the convictions as given by the United States Census Bureau for 1910, "Prisoners and Juvenile De-

linquents," pp. 28-29, the proportion is 40 to 1.

Especially it would be wise to watch the rising generation. If the reader will look at Table V, "Juvenile Statistics," he will see: "Larceny"—stealing in Germany is 127 to 1 in the United States; "Embezzlement," 250 to 1; "Fraud," 243 to 1; "Counterfeiting," 12 to 1, and so on.

These figures are without exception, from German official sources. They are not from handbooks or ready-reference manuals. They are from statistics of the Imperial German Government and have been available in our

TABLE II.—COMPARISON OF BAVARIAN AND NEW ENGLAND CRIME FIGURES

	Bavaria, 1911 Population, 1910 6,887,291	New England States: Popu- lation, 1910 6,553,631	Proportion Bavaria to New England
Homicide. Assault. Rape. Incest Unnatural sex crimes Fraud Larceny Arson	285	62	4.5 to 1
	21,628	2,132	10 to 1
	1,310	124	10 6 to 1
	61	11	5.5 to 1
	163	16	10 to 1
	13,591	473	29 to 1
	22,197	3,732	6 to 1
	294	24	12 to 1

libraries since they were published in 1910. They speak for more than the ill effects of Prussian militarism. They reveal a German character, a national psychology.

Other figures in these tables reveal other things in the boasted German Wesen—such as wholesale atrocities, systematically conducted. Take the figures for assaults in Tables II and IV. Note that the Bavarians, who, in America, are often extolled as superior in civilization to the Prussians, and as peaceable, home-loving people, are so far inferior to our New England population as one to ten. There were 21,623 convictions for assault in Bavaria in 1911. In 1910, in the United States, Census authority, there were 2,132 (p. 360). That is 10 to 1. Notice the rapes—over 10 to 1, and the frauds 29 to 1. The Bavarian figures are from the official "Statistick für das Königreich Bayern," 1913, p. 381.

Statistics, especially comparative statistics between different countries, are never easy to compile accurately, and, unless careful allowance be made for differences in the use of terms, are generally unreliable. Statistics for certain crimes, such as those already referred to, can be compared with accuracy. But in Tables IV and V, under the general caption, "Murder," it must be understood that the Germans list seven kinds of "death-resulting crimes,"

TABLE III.—JUVENILE CRIME AND ILLEGITIMACY

	Berlin Pop. in 1912, 2 079 553 4,766,883	New York Pop in 1912, 5,173,064; in 1910	London Pop. in 1912, 4,521,685	Saxony Pop in 1910, 4,806,661	Bavaria Pop. in 1910, 6,887,291	Alsace- Lorraine Pop. in 1910 1,874,014
Total births Illegitimate births Per cent. of total births Proportion with N. Y.	44,315 10,225 23 1 15 5 to 1 791 '08 736	135,625 2,017 1 49 	111,567 4,289 3 8 2.6 to 1 469	129,707 20,279 15 6 10 to 1 1,577	214,548 27,125 12.6 8.5 to 1 1,114	47,127 3,546 7.5 5 to 1 322
Suicides	38 4 '08 35.8	15.5	10.4	32.3	15.9	17.
Juvenile suicides to 19 years old	'08 47	23	26 under 25	217		
Number per 100,000 pop. Proportion of juveniles with N. Y	'08 2.29 5.2 to 1		59	4 52 10 to 1		

with only 15 per cent. entitled "murder" and "homicide." Comparisons under these two headings with similar headings in the United States statistics will produce an entirely false impression. It becomes impossible, therefore, to work out any proportions which represent facts, and the figures in Table V for juvenile delinquents are only absolute as far as the United States statistics are concerned. The proportions are given because the German juvenile percentage of even 15 per cent. of all murder is so astounding, as compared with the 100 per cent. of the United States, that the figures are worth considering. In this connection it might be well to quote from Dr. Gustav Aschaffenburg, professor of psychiatry in the Cologne Academy of Medicine. His book has been translated under the title, "Crime and Its Repression," and is widely known to all criminologists in this country. He summarizes to the effect that child crimes "show a steady increase since 1882, except in simple theft. The offenses enumerated have not been subject to any change in legislative enactment during the years reported. Hence the conclusion is unavoidable that brutality, recklessness, and licentiousness are spreading more and more in the growing generation."

In the opinion of Rev. Griscom, the reason for the large amount of youthful criminality is to a great extent to be found in the prevalence of illegitimacy. The Government, always anxious to develop "cannon-fodder," makes legitimization easy, but the net result was a large number of child suicides and criminals. We read further:

These figures of Sexual immorality in Germany is literally appalling. illegitimacy speak for themselves. But the figures for rape, incest, unnatural sex-crimes, and abortions prove what the character of too many Germans is. Rape in this country is punishable by death or imprisonment for life according to Sections 278-9 of the Federal Penal Code of 1910 (as quoted and annotated by Tucker and Blood, p. 283) and in New York State by not less than ten or twenty years, depending on the nature of the crime. In England the minimum penalty is three years, and the maximum life imprisonment. (Halsbury, "Laws of England," Vol. IX, Part XII, Sec. 2, pp. 611-5.) man Imperial Code—"Strafgesetzbuch" of the "Deutscher Reichsgesetze" (text and comments by Dr. Hans Rudorff, Berlin, 1910), which gives ten years for commerce with the enemy as a minimum, and the death penalty for even attempting to take the life of the Kaiser or Federal Prince, gives a maximum penalty of one year for the rape of a girl under sixteen years of age.

No wonder that German armies behaved as they did in Belgium, northern France, and Serbia. Yes, and Saxon and Bavarian armies—thousands of Saxons and Bavarian men. The author of the United States Census volume already quoted says: "Rape is a crime hardly less heinous than murder, and in some States is penalized by death, and in States where that is not the case by imprisonment for life or for a long term of years." The United States figures include "also those cases where rape was not actually committed but only attempted or intended." Such cases do not appear in the German figures, so the disproportion is even greater than the 6 to 1 against Germany given in Table IV. In the United States there would be one commitment for rape in each community of a thousand inhabitants every sixty-three years. In Germany there would be a similar commitment—excluding attempts every ten and a half years in every community of 1,000.

It should further be remembered in comparing United States with German

TABLE IV .- MAJOR CRIMES

	German Empire Average Pop. 1904-1908 61,163,600		]	nited Stat 1910 Population 92,309,348	1	England and Wales Average Pop. 1904–1998 34,845,712		
	Annual Average 1904-08	No. per 100,000 Pop.	Total 1910	No per 100,000 Pop.	German Empire Propor- tion to U.S.	Proportion Ger. Emp. to England	Average	Num. per 100,000 Pop.
Murder Grave-Mord Lesser-Totschglag. *Other kinds Assault Rapes.	1,775 88 183 6 1,503.4 130,580 5,839		2,902 967 1,935 22,670 1,480	3 2 24 6 1 6	7 to 8 8 7 to 1 6 to 1	76 8 to 1	205 967 798 2 yrs. only	.597 2 78 2 32 Based on 1910
Incest Unnatural sex crimes Procuring an abortion Procuration Malicious damage to property Arson.	483 1,179 649.4 3,752.4 4,649 1,286		114 233 ‡ 310 1,710 337	13 .25 ‡ .33 1 85 .365	6 to 1 7.7 to 1 18 6 to 1 4 to 1 5 8 to 1	6 to 1 23 to 1 236 to 1 10 to 1	36 111 17 9 262	only .14 .32 .049 .026 .76 .47

<sup>\*</sup>The Germans give 7 headings under "Crimes Against Life," all of which are included under the two headings of murder or homicide in the English and United States statistics. Hence an exact comparison by title only is entirely misleading. Notice that 85 per cent. of the murders in Germany are not called either murder or homicide, but "death by exposure," "child murder" (not an abortion), "death on request" (i.e. when one man induces his companion to kill him), and "death by criminal neglect."

† White slaving. † Not separately listed. Probably included under murder above.

crime statistics that in Germany most of the population is "pure" German stock, fit exponents of *Kulturization*. In the United States an increasing percentage are negroes, Japanese, and foreign-born whites. For this reason were included comparative figures with England, nearest to our own stock in blood, temperament, and standards, and of a homogeneous population such as that of Germany. Among rapes in the United States, German-born offenders were just double the number of English (table, p. 310). Negroes committed 9,480 out of 22,670 assaults in all, or 41 per cent., 392 cases of rape, or 27 per cent. of the total; and 1,527, or 53 per cent. of all homicides.

TABLE V.-JUVENILE CRIME STATISTICS

TABLE V. BOVILLED CIVALED										
!	German Empire 1908					United States 1910				
Juvenile Statistics Under 19 Years	Total Adult and Juvenile	Juvenile	Per Cent of Juvenile Total	Per Cent per Million of Pop.	Tota <b>!</b> Adult and Juvenile	Juven'e	Per Cent of Juv. Total	Per Cent per Mill. of Pop.	Proportion German Emp. to U.S.	
Rape by force on the unconscious, children, etc Murder* Homicide*	5,205 80 210	952 17 13	.18 .21 .06	16 .27 .21	1,480 867 *1,985	74 3 28	.05 .003 .01	.85 .03 .25	20 to 1 9 to 1	
Assault† (Light)	26,803 97,285 115,974 27,812 26,584 6,496 484 708 689	1,152 7,138 28,534 2,599 1,942 790 148 158 46	.04\.067 .07\int .25 .09 .07 .12 .34 .22 .07	135.5 466 5 42 5 31 8 12 9 2 4 2 6 .75	22,670 42,716 976 8,924 2,345 837 1,728 66	3,378 15 12 93 38 71 2	.007 .08 .016 .001 .04 .11 .04	1.7 8.66 .17 .13 1.07 .42 .77 .02	80 to 1 127 to 1 250 to 1 243 to 1 12 to 1 5 7 to 1 3 4 to 1 37.5 to 1	

<sup>\*</sup>The Germans give 7 headings under "Crimes Against Life," all of which are included under homicide in the U. S. statistics, such as "Criminal Neglect," "Child-Murder," etc. As the actual figures under Mord and Totschlag are so far incomplete, any calculation of proportions would be practically valueless if the disproportions were not, even with these reservations, so marked Notice the discrepancy between the total of murder plus homicide in Germany—290—and the total of all death-resulting crimes—1,957, or 85 per cent.

† The U. S. figures cover all assaults; the Germans give for juveniles only two out of six subheads; so the proportion favors the U. S. Cf. with Major Crimes for the total of assaults.

England, therefore, offers a better illustration for comparison than does our own country, and the proportions listed in the various tables will prove that the English stock has more of what the American calls civilization than

Summarizing the total average of the crimes enumerated gives a proportion of 11 to 1 more crimes in Germany than in the United States and more than 30 to 1 over England. In the United States 2.3 per cent. of those convicted were under fifteen years; in Germany 7.5 per cent. were under fifteen years old. Crimes involving deceit-namely, fraud and embezzlement-average 22 to 1.

#### CHAPTER XVIII

The history of the American Air Service on the western front is as remarkable for its sound and successful development of aviation tactics as for its spirit of unselfish devotion and daredevil gallantry which is unsurpassed by anything the Great War has produced.

JOHN J. PERSHING.

#### AMERICA OUTFLIES THE HUNS.

HOW THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND NAVY CREATED A FIGHTING AIR SER-VICE OUT OF INSIGNIFICANT BEGINNINGS

Although the United States Army had conducted on February 1, 1908, the first test of an airplane with a view to its military value, our priority had ended there. From that time until the opening of the European war our progress in aviation was practically negligible. Even with the object lessons of the war before us, we dallied in the perfection of this important arm; and, in April, 1917, when we entered the war, according to Major General Squier, we had "but a handful of fliers and very few training planes." The United States army had 52 officers, 1,100 enlisted men and 210 civilian employees. The total appropriations for aeronautics by the American Congress in ten years was under a million dollars. There was practically no airplane industry in the United States, a few plants existed and these were doing good work for the Allies, work on engines and parts for the Allies had also started in several plants.

One of the first demands made upon us by our Allies was for a marked speeding up of airplane production and the dispatch of planes by thousands to the western front. The result was a complete revision of earlier plans and the adoption of a plan so ambitious that it seemed impossible and almost proved so. After a year of disappointment and a shakeup in the production end of the Army air

service, the apparently inexplicable delay began to resolve into rapid performance, based on good work done which had required time to function. At the end we had permanently wrested the mastery of the air from the Germans and our machines were going to France in numbers that made impossible successful enemy competition.

It has been said that the knowledge the Germans had gained of our airplane production and our poison gas supply, and of the men ready to embark for France brought the surrender at least a year earlier than it could have been forced merely on the strength of the military situation on November 1st, 1918. In a few months we would have had enough planes in France to bomb Germany off the map and enough poison gas to obliterate the population. Germany had no stomach for such a dose and she quit while her sacred soil was un-

defiled. Germany had an eye to business.

The United States had in France and at home on May 31, 1918, when the Signal Corps turned over the aviation work to the Bureau of Military Aeronautics, 16,084 officers, of whom 7,938 had completed their training; 147,932 enlisted men and 9,838 civilian employees. By the time of the armistice more than 10,000 officers had been trained. 401 squadrons had been organized, also 89 balloon companies and 61 photographic sections. The United States had developed the Liberty engine, the standard for the world. We were ready for a mighty wallop, but Germany was not. She got out from under when she saw it coming. Her measure had been accurately taken by the doughboy on land and the gob at sea and she wasn't keen on accumulating any experience on the activities of the eagle in the air.

The following paragraphs are quoted from the Report of the

Chief Signal Officer to the Secretary of War for 1918.

One of the first steps taken by the Chief Signal Officer at the outbreak of the war was to outline an air program commensurate with the resources of the Nation and the importance of the part to be played by our Army in the war. It was necessary to have this in sufficient detail to form some estimate which could be presented to Congress as a basis for appropriations of funds to begin this work. A program was formulated and certain general estimates prepared to inaugurate the work, and in due course Congress appropriated the sum of \$640,000,000 for the purpose. This money became available July 24, 1917.

There was practically no aviation industry in this country, and the number of professional men trained as aeronautical engineers and designers was so small as to be practically negligible. Outside of a few men there was no one in the United States with experience in the design or building of even

training planes.

How, then, was this problem to be met? Within a few days after the outbreak of war, without proceeding through the regular diplomatic channels, an appeal was made to the military attaches of France, England, and Italy to send to this country forthwith the most experienced and trained flyers, aeronautical engineers, and designers who could be spared to assist us in this work. As a result, within a very short time, there arrived a number of foreign officers from these countries, who reported for duty officially to the Chief of Staff, and were immediately placed on the working staff of the

Chief Signal Officer, directly in his office. Special authority was obtained from Congress to pay the mileage of these officers sent here for duty and they were utilized in every possible way from the beginning in developing both a system of schools and the matérial required. Simultaneously a strong technical commission was sent to Europe. At the same time special designers from England, France, and Italy were brought to this country to design machines for the United States; some of them already have produced very promising results. Coincident with this the small group of aeronautical engineers which this country had available were set to work individually on different types of machines.

Within a very few days after the outbreak of war an arrangement was made between the War Department and Canada by which the United States was to receive the designs worked out for flying fields; and in order to hasten the training of our aviators during the construction of our training schools, American cadets were sent to Canada, France, and Italy to be trained in their In addition to this an arrangement was made by which 10 flying schools. flying squadrons of the Air Service were to be trained by the British Government and also equipped with machines and transport complete and ready for service at the front, in exchange for providing flying facilities for the Royal Flying Corps of Canada during the winter months. This resulted in the movement of the Royal Flying Corps establishment to the new fields constructed at Fort Worth, Tex. This exchange also resulted in a tremendous stimulus being given to our own flying schools, which in the meantime had been completed, as it furnished a standard of training in our midst which served as a pacemaker to our own cadets.

Beginning in 1917 with 52 officers and 100 enlisted men the Signal Corps turned over to the Division of Military Aeronautics and the Bureau of Aircraft Production June 1, 1918, 16,084 officers and 147,932 enlisted men. Of these, there were 7,938 officer flyers who successfully graduated from the ground and flying schools. There were 167 deaths due to flying accidents of the year in the United States, or one to every 147,840 miles of recorded flight,

a lower ratio of deaths than that of our allies.

In reporting upon the accomplishments of the year it must not be over-looked that the greatest thing done, in a fundamental way, was the creation of an industry capable of supplying the needs of the future for aircraft and aircraft accessories, there being now engaged in this work about 350 concerns, employing an industrial army of 200,000 men and women. This accomplishment is all the greater when it is realized that everything pertaining to aircraft equipment is of a highly technical nature, extremely difficult to produce.

When the United States entered the war, it was evident that the time was fast approaching when the reservoirs of raw material for the allies were to be found only in the United States and that America's efforts should be so organized from the beginning as to furnish a continuous flow of this necessary raw materials, not only for our own program but for those of our allies as well. In other words it was clear that the spruce, the fabric, the dope and the oil must be produced as a part of our program on a scale to supply also the air programs of our allies.

Manifestly, therefore, each step made in the beginning must be made with a view to our allies as well, and no policy must be restricted to the United States alone. The closest co-operation was established therefore with our allies in determining the scope of America's efforts. In addition, the needs of our own Navy and the Navy of Great Britain also were included in the Army's program for furnishing these essentials.

One of the serious mistakes which the allies had fallen into at the time the United States entered the war was the development of a multiplicity of types of engines and planes which made it impossible to have a large number of any one of these types. As a further consequence, the trained personnel on the ground to operate and repair the machines had grown to such a pro-

portion that it was estimated from 30 to 50 men were required on the ground to keep each one of the many types of planes in the air on the fighting line. Manifestly, unless this large number of trained men per fighting plane could be reduced by some means it would be hopeless to expect within a reasonable time to put into the air thousands of flying planes, because a single thousand planes on this basis would require from 30,000 to 50,000 men in attendance.

Common sense, therefore, dictated the following general policy, which was

followed:

(a) To fill up all vacancies in allied flying schools with the maximum number which could be accommodated, to gain time in training our flyers while our schools were being built. This was done to the limit which could be accepted by each of the allied Governments in Canada, Italy, England, and France.

(b) To purchase from France all the combat planes which the French could possibly spare from their own needs, for delivery at the earliest moment, to supply our forces overseas, pending the time our own production of battle planes could be developed. This was done and, furthermore, raw materials and even mechanics to help make these planes were furnished by the United States, and at the present time satisfactory deliveries are being made on these contracts entered into early in the war.

(c) To establish schools and build flying fields for training aviators in

this country.

(d) To provide training planes to train aviators in this country.

(e) To build such types of battle planes in this country as the needs of our Army at the front should indicate, and supply such additional aviation

equipment as was required for overseas use.

Obviously, the first task was to provide an adequate number of training planes for our cadets. The Curtiss JN4—D and the Standard J types were selected and passed upon by the Joint Army and Navy Technical Board as the two available planes then in this country. The production of primary training planes was within six months fully adequate to the needs of the service.

After the production of primary training planes was secured, it was necessary to develop planes for advanced training, and within six months these

planes were being produced at the rate of 3,924 per annum.

In the development of battle planes the first problem to be solved was that of the engine. Common sense required that the most approved types of European engines which could be made in this country should be ordered. This was done, the first large contract for Hispaño-Suiza engines being given July 30, 1917, while the first contract for liberty engines was not let until September 4 of that year. By the end of May, 1918, more than 2,000 of these foreign motors had been produced by American factories. It was early apparent, however, that the tendency was toward greater horsepower than was being developed by any approved foreign engine. Consequently, coincident with the production of such approved types of foreign engines as were available for production in this country, a new engine, later known as the liberty engine, was developed and placed in production. While the production of this engine at the end of May, 1918, was not as great as the production of the approved types of foreign engines which had been earlier arranged for, nevertheless, the wisdom of this course is becoming daily more apparent, since the foreign types produced here, although used by our allies on the western front, are not thought to be of sufficient horsepower to put in planes for overseas shipment, and the liberty engine has become the main reliance of our battle program. It has proved satisfactory not only to our own Army and Navy, but to the air service of our allies as well. It is not an invention. but stands as the accomplishment of American adaptability and foresight.

The development of the liberty motor was required by the logic of the situation, which the event has proved to have been correctly estimated. The production of battle planes had necessarily to follow the production of engines. The best aeronautical talent available in this country was employed to that end; but necessarily the accomplishment in this field must be due to the hearty and loyal co-operation of the representatives of the allies. This we received in the fullest measure and their able and generous assistance was utilized to the utmost.

Out of the appropriation available our allies produced in their factories the following planes for American units, 1,204 training planes and 910 battle-

planes.

Due to the fact that there was at the beginning of the war practically no airplane industry in this country, there was an inadequate supply of nearly all raw materials necessary in their construction. A broad foundation had to be laid in this regard to meet not only our own requirements, but those of the allies who were coming to depend more and more upon this country. The production of spruce had to be tremendously increased, necessitating the building of mills, railroads and other equipment. As it was impossible to produce the millions of yards of linen fabric required a suitable cotton substitute was developed which is now being manufactured in this country in quantities sufficient to meet the needs of both America and her allies. This accomplishment, heretofore thought to be impossible, ranks among achievements of the first importance. The dope which is used on the fabric of airplanes presented many difficulties not only to us but to our allies. This and other chemicals required are now being produced in this country in sufficient quantities for their requirements as well as our own. There was a great deficiency in the production of castor oil. This necessitated the planting of over 108,000 acres of castor bean plants as well as the establishment of the necessary crushing plants and refineries.

There were about 20 types of instruments developed and in production to June 30, 1918, as necessary to give airplanes, pilots, and observers the greatest possible usefulness. It may be said that the making of these instruments is a new industry for America. Their production must keep abreast of the battleplane production, as such planes without them are useless for battle

purposes.

During the 12 months ended June 30, 1918, there was expended a total of about \$373,000,000. From this should be deducted approximately \$165,000,-000 spent for completing training fields and for training and operation purposes in this country and abroad. This leaves a balance of about \$208,-000,000 expended in obtaining these items:

	8.488
Airplanes	10,000
The min or	32,020
Balloons	411
Balloons	115 655
Instruments of various kinds	110,000
TT	ه د ه و سد
Hangars	379
Squadron equipments	045 050
Time of emisters' slothing	011,000
Items of aviators comment	33.909
Items of motor transport	112

It is unnecessary to repeat the story of the liberty engine, although many of the details are yet to be told. The whole conception of a standardized American engine, utilizing the special American genius for quantity production, for service not only in the program of the United States but for universal service for all of the allies, was a national undertaking which for daring and farsightedness, it is believed, will be an increasing cause of pride for the American people. On October 12, 1918, the completion of the 10,000th liberty engine was celebrated in Detroit. There is no possible yard-stick to measure the present and potential value of the liberty engine. It can not be measured by any money standard. One has only to consider what would

be the result at this moment of subtracting from the allied air programs the liberty engines as a whole to obtain some idea of this accomplishment.

The American-made DeHaviland battle plane, modified to receive the liberty engine, was recognized as one of the best battle planes anywhere on the western front, and the delivery of these planes in France overtook the creation of the necessary facilities and personnel for their use.

The development of a fabric which can be furnished by America in required quantities and at price slightly over half that of the formerly used linen fabric, of which there was a limited supply, is another achievement of

American ingenuity and enterprise.

The creation of special radio apparatus, permitting new control of the operations of airplanes en masse, is another contribution to the credit of

American engineers and American manufacturers.

In short, it was always the general allied cause which controlled the decisions in founding this industry, rather than the needs of the United States alone, and this is obviously the only correct point of view. After four years of war, in which the United States entered but a year and a half ago the allies were depending largely upon America, to a greater and greater degree as the days passed, for the castor oil for their engines, the fabric to cover the planes and the dope with which to treat the fabric, the spruce and fir to make their planes, and the engines to propel them.

At the 345th meeting of the American Institute of Electrical Engineers on January 10, 1919, Major General Squier gave these addi-


tional interesting facts:

The work involved in training aviators and obtaining aeronautical equipment in the United States has been of such magnitude as to preclude the possibility of presenting here anything more than a brief resume of the major accomplishments.

The data is presented as of six o'clock a. m., November 11, 1918 (the

date of the signing of the armistice).

More than 8,600 fliers have been trained in the United States since its entry into the war.




There have been training fatalities in the United States, as in all other countries where training has been conducted on a large scale. However, when the fact is realized that our students have flown more than 880,000 hours, which is the equivalent to more than 66,000,000 miles, it will be seen that our training casualties have been astonishingly few. Statistics show that the United States has a lower percentage of fatalities than any other of the allied countries. The monthly average in the United States has been only one fatality for each 3,200 hours flown.

analyzed causes of these fatalities are shown in the figure at the left. Two independent investigations made in connection with this paper have developed the fact that more than 90 per cent. of training casualties are attributed to the aviator himself. The actual distribution of our fliers overseas on the signing of the armistice is shown in the table on the following page:

#### TRAINING EQUIPMENT.

Up to November 11, 1918, there were actually produced 7,602 planes, 15,450 engines, and 29,156 propellers.



#### RAW MATERIALS.

Some idea of the quantity of wood necessary for airplane and propeller construction may be obtained from the following table of actual deliveries: Spruce, 103,092,000 board feet; Douglas Fir, 71,625,000 feet; Port Orford Cedar, 4,513,000 feet; Mahogany, Central American, 8.721,815 feet; Mahogany, African, 469,035 feet; American Black Walnut, 4,504,876 feet; Quartered White Oak, 308,000 feet; Cherry, 618,000 feet; Ash, 120,565 feet; Birch, 663,000 feet.

In addition to airplane wood, it was found necessary to maintain strict supervision over the production of airplane and balloon fabrics. Of this class of material there had been produced to November 11, 1918, 3,187,000 yards of linen; 7,000,000 yards of cotton airplane fabric; 2,647,000 yards of balloon fabric.

#### ACCESSORIES.

The production of airplane accessories to November 11, 1918, was as follows: Air Pressure Gages, 9,994; Air Speed Indicators, 9,051; Altimeters, 19,657; Clocks, 17,593; Compasses, Type "B." 10,179; Fire Extinguishers, 12,209; Gasoline Gages, 550; Inclinometers, 40; Map Cases Rotating, 2,417; Oil Pressure Gages, 12,187; Oxygen Apparatus, 4,818; Oxygen Masks, 3,341; Oxygen Tanks, 12,000; Panels Switch, 15,466; Radiator Thermometers, 11,984; Tachometers, 20,549.

Ordnance for use in connection with the air service, such as aircraft machine guns, bombs, etc., were produced under the direction of the Air Service of the Army. Of this type of material there were manufactured to November 11, 1918, a total of \$1,754 machine guns for aircraft, divided as follows: 31,671 Lewis Guns, 11,904 Vickers Ground Guns, 411 Vickers Aircraft Guns, 37,768 Marlin Guns.

A total of 510,271 bombs to be launched from aircraft was produced to November 11, 1918, of which 114,809 were incendiary bombs; 386,543 were high-capacity demolition bombs, and 8,919 were high-capacity fragmentation bombs.

More than 16,000 Liberty engines were produced during the calendar year 1918. To November 11, 1918, more than 14,000 Liberty engines were produced. The production of service balloons met all service requirements.

On November 11, 1918, there had been developed, tested and adopted by the Army four airplanes, on which production would have started early in

the present calendar year. They were the Lepere or L. U. S. A. C.-11 equipped with the Liberty engine, the U. S. A. De Haviland 9-A equipped with the Liberty engine, the Martin Bomber equipped with two Liberty engines and the Loening two-seater fighter equipped with the 300-h.p. Hispano-Suiza engine.

One of the most striking accomplishments of the United States in airplane design has been the development by the Navy of the Naval Seaplane or flying boat NC-1. This plane has a central float 46 feet long, a wing span of 126 feet and a total wing area of 2,400 square feet. This plane is equipped with three Laberty engines with tractor screws. Fully loaded the plane weighs 22,000 pounds. The weight empty with water is 14,000 pounds.

This plane is the largest seaplane in the world, at the moment, and is an American product throughout. The hull was designed after tank experiments on models. On a recent test this plane made a flight at Rockaway Beach, New York, with fifty-one passengers aboard, getting off in fifty-three seconds. Upon landing it was discovered that the fifty-first passenger was a "stowaway" on board the plane.

#### SPRUCE PRODUCTION.

Some idea of the magnitude of the task involved in the procurement of the principal raw material used in the construction of the plane proper, namely spruce, may be obtained from the following figures on production and personnel. On June 30, 1918, the spruce production personnel consisted of 18,305 officers, enlisted men and civilians. Railroads were constructed into the forests of the West Coast and a cut-up plant having a maximum capacity of 9,000,000 board feet of lumber a month was erected at Vancouver Barracks near Portland, Oregon. To November 11, 1918, approximately 174,000,000 board feet of spruce and fir, as shown above, had been shipped of which more than two-thirds went to our Allies.

#### TRAINING OF PERSONNEL.

The personnel side of the Air Service, including the selection, training, organization, and operation of the flying forces, developed within the fiscal year 1917-18 into an educational system on a scale infinitely larger and more diverse than anyone had anticipated. Teaching men to fly, to send messages by wireless, to operate machine guns in the air, to know artillery fire by its bursts, and to travel hundreds of miles by compass, teaching other men to read the enemy's strategy from aerial photographs, and still others to repair instruments, ignition systems, propellers, airplane wings, and motors, has required a network of flying fields and schools, a large instructional force, and a maze of equipment and curricula.

Lieutenant-Colonel John H. Reynolds, D.S.C., writing in U. S. Air Service, gave several incidents and considerable explanatory information which is helpful to the Layman in gaining an idea of what our boys did in the air. He says:

In order to avoid discovery both sides carried on all movements of troops at night, and to detect these movements it was necessary either to make night observations, which were possible only under ideal atmospheric conditions, or to have ships over the lines at the first break of dawn, when they are able to observe the tail-end of enemy movements. This was the most disagreeable type of work we had, necessitating as it did rising as early as 2:30 A. M. and leaving the ground at 3:00 or 3:15, when it was absolutely dark and flying was most trying.

These early missions seldom encountered enemy aircraft but were often subjected to heavy and accurate anti-aircraft fire. It was the least exciting and most unpleasant duty but usually gave good results.

Upon the discovery of our ships the Boche chasse would come up from their fields to intercept us on our return. When the visibility was good, we often saw the Boche leave their field and then it was quite interesting to see if we could finish our mission before they were in a position to attack. On one occasion three ships on a photographic mission were attacked by a superior number of Boche when they still had some four or five plates unexposed. When he is attacked the observer has to use his guns and if necessary must stop operating the camera in order to attend to the other job. In this instance the Boche forced our formation back to the lines and then retired. One of our ships was damaged and forced to land, the other two returned to the objective, but had only taken one photograph when they were again attacked and driven back. Here, one of the two remaining ships was compelled to drop out, but, notwithstanding the fact that he was alone and Boche were in sight, the third ship went out again and succeeded in getting two more pictures—which practically completed his mission—before he was attacked a third time and driven off. By this time his gas was so low that he was forced to return to the field.

Another incident which showed the spirit with which the men worked occurred when a ship was attacked by four Boche who killed the observer and twice wounded the pilot in the head, rendering him unconscious. He recovered his senses after having fallen 2,800 metres, regained control of his ship and landed on his own field. His wounds were not serious, but his experience had not been entirely pleasant. He came to the squadron commander, who had no idea of calling on him for other work that day, and said that if he was really needed he would fly again but that as he had a slight headache he would much prefer to be let off for a few hours.

During the offensive at St. Mihiel the weather on the first two days was such that it was impossible to attain an altitude of more than 1,000 to 1,500 metres, which made the work of long distance reconnaissance very dangerous. In spite of this some of the best flights made by the Group were on these days. One formation of three ships went as far as Thionville, a distance of over 70 kilometres back of the Hun lines and at no time were at a greater altitude than 1,000 metres. During all this trip they were subjected to very heavy anti-aircraft and machine-gun fire and on their return were attacked with great determination about six kilometres northwest of Metz by enemy planes in great numbers. Through great coolness and courage, using clouds to hide in and taking advantage of every opportunity, they were successful in getting back, although one of the ships was so badly damaged that the pilot was just able to keep it in the air until he was over friendly territory. I believe that this achievement has never been equalled in the history of the war.

The meaning of this low altitude flying cannot be appreciated unless something is known of the effect of altitude on the performance of ships and the different conditions encountered as regards fire from the ground. Necessarily all ships lose speed as they attain altitude, but the larger ship loses it more slowly. At low altitudes the average chasse or pursuit monoplane ship has a speed of from 140 to 145 miles per hour, while the Salmson, which is a two-seater, and which we were using, had a speed of 116 miles per hour. At 5,000 metres, however, the difference in speed is reduced to such an extent that the chasse plane had very little advantage over us in this respect.

At low altitudes all calibers of guns could be used against us and the fire was far more accurate. Still another feature of low altitude flying which made it more dangerous was the circumstance that even a slight injury to the motor would compel the ship to land back of the enemy's lines. Whereas, if we had the altitude it would be possible to glide to friendly territory.

The general method of conducting the work was to keep as many ships over the enemy's lines as possible. However, it not infrequently occurred that the General Staff desired some special mission carried out and it was of the greatest importance that this work should be done with the least possible delay. It was found convenient therefore to retain a certain reserve on the field in constant readiness. Experience showed that one flight of six ships sufficed for this purpose and this reserve was known as the "Alert Flight." The ships on this detail were always ready for instant use and the pilots and observers required to remain at headquarters so that they could be sent up at a moment's notice.

A branch of the work of which but comparatively little is known is night reconnaissance. As a ship flying at night is practically immune to attack by chasse owing to the darkness, this work was carried on by single ships flying at an altitude of from 800 to 1,200 metres and carrying flares which could be dropped when over the desired objectives. The flare being attached to a parachute descended very slowly and burned for about seven minutes which was ample time to observe everything of importance in the illuminated area. The principal danger in this work lay in the navigation of the ship in darkness, but it required great skill and coolness as well as nerve to be

successfully accomplished.

All of the work done by the pilots and observers of the First Army Observation Group was most excellent, but it was made possible only by the equally excellent work of the enlisted personnel of the squadrons who maintained the ships in such perfect condition that we never lost one through engine failure or through any defect in the ship itself. The work of these men cannot be too highly praised. They had no regular hours. In summer flying started at 3:15 A. M. and continued until 8:00 and even 8:30 P. M. They had none of the excitement that so often helps a man to keep up in spite of fatigue. They had nothing but the knowledge—and of course the satisfaction that came with this knowledge—that they were doing good work and through their efforts making the good work of the flyers possible. There was no glory in their part of the job; but there was merit, merit which exceeds all the limitations of mere words adequately to praise. With men of this type on the ground and men with spirit, determination and courage in the air, success was a foregone conclusion.

#### CHAPTER XIX

# THE MEN WHO CLEARED THE CLOUDS. CAPTAIN EDDIE RICKENBACKER.

T is not possible in the compass of this book to give the stories of each of the men who distinguished himself in the Air Service of the United States in France. Some experiences, typical perhaps of others, but individual in themselves, are given in this chapter. We print first the personal narrative of Captain Eddie Rickenbacher, champion American Ace, which appeared in U. S. Air Service, the official publication of the Army and Navy Air Service. Captain Rickenbacker said:

I knew nothing about aviation and had only dreamed about it. I went over to France as a chauffeur, after trying to get up a flying unit which the Government refused to be interested in for reasons that I now see were entirely good, though I did not see it so clearly then. Once over there, I would not let them rest until they gave me a lieutenant's commission and sent me to Tours to see if I could learn to fly.

I learned pretty fast. Long practice in driving a racing car at 100 miles an hour or so gives first-class training in control and in judging distances at nigh speed, and helps tremendously in getting motor sense, which is rather the feel of your engine than the sound of it, a thing you get through your bones and nerves rather than simply your ears. All this is a part of the physical equipment of handling an airplane, and it makes a lot of difference if the fellow with the stick knows how to make a turn at 100 miles an hour or to allow for passing another fellow at twice that.

The proof of this is that after five and a half hours dual with an instructor they let me solo. But because I was a good mechanic and knew about motors they sent me to Issoudun to be engineer officer. Being engineer officer, I never had any advanced flying training according to rule. But I took up a ship whenever I could and learned that way.

I remember when I thought it was time to try a vrille or tail spin. I knew what I was supposed to do. I knew you put the stick over and crossed the controls, but I'd never seen anybody do it. I went up about 12,000 feet, got off some distance from the field, and flew around there for every bit of thirty minutes trying to get up my nerve to try the trick, but was too scared to begin. At last I said to myself, "What's the matter with you? You've got to do this," and threw the stick.

She went into the spin all right, but I had her back to neutral after just one whirl, and I tell you I was glad when she righted. Next day I went out and it took twenty minutes to make up my mind to try again. It was only on the third day that I went at the job with any confidence and let

her do a real spin.

That is still more or less the way I feel about doing a new stunt, after all the flying I have done at the front since. When you try a new thing you are never quite certain how the machine will behave, and though you may have confidence in your ability to get out of anything as long as you have the altitude, there is a sort of hesitation both in the machine and in you. The trouble is, you do not know what the strains will be on either.

The next thing was to get away from Issoudun. The men who had to stick over on this side as flying instructors know how hard it is to get away from a field when they have got you tied down to a job there. Those fellows are the ones that have my sympathy. They have stayed home—and not really home either, but in some particularly hot place down in Texas most likely—stayed there and made aces when they were themselves the stuff of which aces are made, and but for the luck of it would be, a lot of them, coming back here now with as many ribbons and decorations and Huns to their credit as any of us.

Instead, they have stuck on the job full of dangers and responsibilities with little chance of promotion and none of fighting or of fame. And the better they were the more certainly they were stuck. I was not an instructor over there at Issoudun. But even an engineer officer in France could not afford to be too good. I do not think I was. Still, when I asked to go to the front the C. O. said I could not be spared.

So I conspired with the medical officer. He does not know it yet, but I did. I got myself sent to the hospital for two weeks and at the end of that time I went to the C. O. and told him that it had been proved that I wasn't indispensable—because the other fellow had done the job better than I had. He could not deny it and he let me go.

That gave me my chance to try my luck as a fighting pilot. I have had extraordinary good luck. Every man who has been flying for any length of time at the front and is still alive has had good luck. But fighting in the air is not a sport. It is scientific murder. The men who have learned their trade go at it that way, and as long as they do go at it that way they have an excellent chance to accumulate victories and survive nevertheless.

The experienced fighting pilot does not take unnecessary risk. His business is to shoot down enemy planes, not to get shot down. His trained eye and hand and judgment are as much a part of his armament as his machine gun, and a fifty-fifty chance is the worst he will take or should take, except where the show is of the kind that either for offense or defense justifies the sacrifice of plane and pilot.

It is not the old hand and the expert flier and airfighter who gets another of the same sort. Both are wise and shy birds. You will see a couple of that kind meet now and then over the line and watch them circling experimentally around each other. The next thing you know, each has sized up his antagonist as just as good as, or better than, himself, and both have sheered off and are flying away to look for a more promising victim.

What each is hunting for is an enemy who can be pounced on suddenly unawares and a get-away made before his comrades are on the victor's trail. The obviously inexperienced pilot is the game the scientific airfighter goes after, and the majority of victories are won that way. But on the other hand, it is the novice usually who "gets" the famous ace by doing at some moment the unexpected thing. Sheer foolhardiness or plain clumsiness has done what skill and experience could not do. Or else accident does it, engine trouble, a jammed machine gun, or an oversight. I remember an incident which might easily have made an end of me.

An approved method of attack was to dive out of the sun at the rearmost Boche of a Hun formation, shoot him down if you had the luck, chandelle or spiral upward and dive again at the next tailender. I tried the trick

once and got as far as the first act on the program, but I had shut off my pressure and forgot about it, and when, after crashing my first Hun, I tried to regain my altitude, the Spad refused to climb.

I had to go into a roll which got my gravity feed into action, but by that time the Boche were all coming at me in a bunch with their guns spitting. There was nothing for it but to dive with full power, which in the case of a Spad means going down at the rate of about 300 miles an hour, and fortunately we were pretty high up. With half a dozen Huns after me, I went down 8,000 feet that way, and though I had some trouble getting her out of the dive, I managed it and got away in spite of the fine target I made.

There have been stories about the recklessness of the American flyers, and no doubt they went for the Hun whenever they could get at him and some took very long chances, but on the front as I saw it, the American

aviators in this regard came between the French and the British.

The French were inclined to be cautious as a settled military policy of getting the best results with the least expenditure of valuable lives and costly planes. The British were foolharly as a matter of principle and morale, because they found that they got the best results with their people in that way.

Compared with the French playing their own game in the way they had settled down to it toward the end of the war, our men seemed reckless. Compared with the British they seemed cautious. But, of course, the three systems had nothing to do with the courage of the three nations or of individual Frenchmen, Englishmen or Americans.

The French and English had each worked out a method of scientific murder that did the job. We were working out ours with the experience of both to help us and the methods of both to choose from. The result was, gen-

erally, a sort of compromise.

Right here I may mention as a matter of interest, that in point of maturity for this work, the Englishman of 18 is about even with the American of 22. Our men are generally at their best as flyers between the ages of 22 and 26; the English are best between 18 and 22. I have been asked why, and I think it is due to differences in early education in the two countries rather than to anything directly connected with the British and American practice of training fliers.

Returning for a moment to the stories of recklessness on the part of our aviators, there were men like Frank Luke, whose record is one of the brightest glories of our Air Service and who gave his all, his life, to the cause. Luke's 18 Huns included 11 balloons, and to get a balloon you have to go through the anti-craft and machine gun barrage and the flaming onions they send up to protect it. Getting a balloon is so much more difficult than getting a plane, in fact, that the Germans credit a pilot with two victories for every balloon brought down.

Luke from the beginning was a wild man in the air. He would take off and playfully do a series of loops within a few hundred feet of the ground. That sort of thing was strictly forbidden in my own squadron. Men and planes are too valuable and too difficult to replace at the front to be risked unless there is real reason for the risk.

But after a run of hard luck such as came along sometimes-when we had lost a lot of men and the spirits of the others were beginning to show the strain, I used to go out myself and do all sorts of stunts right out in front of them. It had a surprising moral effect. The men said:

"Anyway, they haven't got Rickenbacker's goat."

My own squadron, the 94th (Hat-in-the-Ring), had a fine record. were the first American squadron in the game; we had the first ace and the highest record of air victories of any American squadron at the end of the war, and, finally, we had a chance to go into Germany at the head of the American Army, which was a magnificent climax to the unit's active career

and an experience not to be forgotten by any of us—flying over those cities and castles and vineyards along the Rhine that we had been thinking of as the distant goal of all the fighting that went before.

Some of the men who have been flying over there in France came back saying they are fed up and have had enough of the air. But I do not think I am one of them. The sky means something to me it never meant before. When I look up and see the sun shining on the patch of white clouds up in the blue, I begin to think how it would feel to be up somewhere above it, winging swiftly through the clear air, watching the earth below and the men on it no bigger than ants.

I rarely go to church except with my mother when I am at home, to show that a plain Ohio raising has not been wasted on her boy, but there is something spiritual—I don't know what else to call it—in the feeling you get up there.

At all events, I expect to keep on flying and I expect a part of the future of flying to lie in the scope it gives to the initiative of the American boy in the sort of thing that hunting used to mean to him in the days when there was hunting close at hand for almost every boy, and that sport in many forms still means to him and always will mean to him.

Whatever happens or does not happen in the way of the commercial expansion of aviation, flying will always have the sporting element, and military aviation, which, through the fortune of war, is so much in advance of other forms of flying, must be kept alive and strong as the backbone of the others.

In a very real sense the future of aviation in this country is in the hands of the men who have been trained to fly in the army, who have mastered the art either on fields on this side or at the front, not without paying a heavy price for it in the lives of comrades just as good, but not so lucky as themselves.

(Rickenbacker holds the championship among American aces, with a score of 22 planes, 3 balloons, a total of 25. The British champion was the late Major Edward Mannock, whose victories numbered 73; Lieut.-Col. William A. Bishop, led the Canadian aces with a score of 72. Lieutenant Renee Fonck is the French and Allied champion with a total score of 115.

#### LIEUTENANT FRANK LUKE.

Next to Rickenbacker stands Lieutenant Frank Luke, Jr., of Arizona. Luke made a specialty of German sausage balloons, the eyes of the army. He was said in the service to have "swatted balloons like we kill summer flies at home." He gained the name of "Luke, the sausage-killer" and gained as well the admiration and affection of all the men who knew him. He died fighting and he made the Hun pay a price. His story was told in a special dispatch copyrighted by the *Chicago Tribune*. The correspondent quoted a captain as saying:

"Observation balloons just naturally were pie for that boy. He picked the eyes from the enemy faster than they could blow them up.

"On the rolls they call him Lieutenant Luke from Arizona. His full name was Frank Luke, Jr. On the ground the boy was a violet, but when he gave her gas and went gunning for balloons he was sure a cyclone.

"When he came to us last August we wondered who let him into the service. In four weeks he was showing the old-timers a new system for cleaning the skies of gas bags. In seventeen days more he knocked down fourteen flaming sausages in the Verdun and Toul areas.

"Here was his system: In the old days we would go after a boche balloon when he was riding over some field surrounded by every anti-aircraft gun the Germans ever invented. So it was just like going against machine

guns clad in pajamas.

"Luke hit upon the idea of tracking the balloons to their lair at sundown, when they were being lowered and put to bed in the uncertain light. He would ride behind the clouds all day and then follow them home at night.

"The next afternoon, just at dusk out swept Luke, flying low. Zamm! From right over the boche heads came torrents of incendiary bullets, and

he was gone in the darkening shadows.

"One might near Buzy they tried to gang him with eight Fokkers, and he burned the balloon right under their very noses. The next time he caught a flock of aerial guards near Labeauville, and he touched off two balloons and shot down three planes, all in ten minutes.

"They got Luke on Sept. 29, but not until he had plunged right into a cluster of sausages at Δvecourt and burned up three. They turned an ammunition dump on him. He got away again, and came back and let go his

bombs, just to give the boche a razz.

"A lucky shot caught him in the shoulder. He made his landing and fought it out with an automatic. The next morning they rushed his little bush, to find Luke cold. The box score of that raid was three balloons destroyed, eleven Germans killed, and one Yank.

"We found his grave, continued the Captain, "and to-day it bears this legend: 'Second Lieutenant Frank Luke, pilot of the 27th Aero Squadron,

nineteen victories. Killed in action Sept. 29, 1918."

#### CAPTAIN JACQUES M. SWAAB.

Captain Jacques M. Swaab is the third living ace of the American Air Service. He has ten Boches to his credit. Just before the Victory Loan in the Spring of 1919, he was called home to assist in putting over the big loan which was to bring the boys home. He preferred fighting Boche to facing audiences, but proved equally effective in both. Captain Swaab served seventeen months in France and was twice wounded. On September 8, 1918, in the little St. Mihiel argument, he had a fight of his own which lasted 60 minutes. Flying low in a swift Spad pursuit plane Captain Swaab came out of a mist and found himself over an enemy hangar with an enemy machine just in front of him. The American opened fire and the German fell on the enemy flying field. Almost immediately Swaab was attacked by a group of enemy planes. Sharp fighting followed in which two more German planes went down and Captain Swaab received three wounds in the head, he said they just grazed him, which were sufficiently serious to cause him to lose consciousness after the excitement was over. His plane crashed but he was not further hurt. On September 28, with his head still in bandages, he went up again and got another Boche. He waited three weeks for his next victory, this time two at once, a pursuit machine and a two-seater, both of

which went down in flames. Four days later he got another pair. He got his ninth shortly afterward and then was forced to chase a German two-seater up to 10,000 feet, where after a flight covering twenty miles he finally managed to maneuver into position for a shot and brought the German down. His fire caused an explosion on the German plane which blew it to pieces. Captain Swaab's identification number was 13, which was manifestly unlucky for the enemy. The Captain was reported, however, to be very modest about his record and to declare that the greatest victory belongs to the doughboy, that trench fighting is much more dangerous than aerial work.

#### A BOMBER WINS A CROSS.

Another American boy who made life uncertain for German air men was Lieutenant C. Raymond Blake of Westerly, R. I. Lieutenant Blake went to France early in the war with the American Ambulance field service and was attached to the French army. He won his way upward and was commissioned a Lieutenant in the French flying corps. Later he was attached to the French Escadrille No. BR-229 as an American officer. On August 9, 1918, returning from a successful bombing expedition, he found his plane attacked by five German planes. He maneuvered the plane so that his observer was enabled to down one German, then, finding his observer seriously wounded, he out-manouvered the other four Boche so that they were unable to damage his plane and landed safely not far from a base-hospital. He was awarded the French Croix to Guerre with Palm and the American Distinguished Service Cross for extraordinary heroism in action.

#### LIEUT. QUENTIN ROOSEVELT.

Colonel Theodore Roosevelt was so much a national character, the whole people felt so certainly that he belonged to all of them, that his own attempts to see service in the war drew the sympathy and admiration of millions; and the fortunes of his four boys became a common interest.

Quentin, the youngest, a sophomore at Harvard, entered the air service and got into action shortly before General Foch began the attack that ended only in the armistice. The Germans were making a desperate last effort for Paris and victory. They were throwing every available man and unit into the Marne salient, in the hope of spreading it both east and west, they were protecting their movements with a concentration of airplanes which gave them complete mastery of the air. The American 95th Air Squadron, to which Quentin Roosevelt belonged, was thrown into the battle above the seething salient, for observation and attack.

There were desperate battles day and night, battles in which the French and Americans, though outnumbered, fought effectively, downed the enemy by scores and secured vital information on which was laid the Allied plans to stop the last great offensive and begin the counterattack.

On July 14, Quentin Roosevelt went into the battle on his last flight. He did not come back. There were rumors that he had been seen falling. Then came word from the German air service that he had fallen near the little village of Chambray and had been buried with full honors. Although his fighting days had not been many, Lieutenant Roosevelt had already earned the name among his mates of the "Go and Get 'Em Man." He was said to have been the most democratic man in the squadron and to have been beloved by every man in it.

The grave was found by American patrols as the first great thrust of the Allied armies drove the Germans past Chambray. It was proposed to return the body to America but Colonel and Mrs. Roosevelt preferred that their boy should lie in the soil of France where he had fallen and where the foeman had buried him.

As a fitting end to this chapter we reprint from *The Boston Transcript* the story of the last bombing raid of the 220th Squadron as told by the Flight Leader:

(Thirty of our bombing planes executed a successful raid on Mouzon and Raucourt this morning, dropping over two tons of bombs with good effect.—American Communique of Nov. 6th.)

To the headquarters of the First Day Bombardment Group at Maulan,

To the headquarters of the First Day Bombardment Group at Maulan, south of Bar-la-duc on the evening of Nov. 4, came the daily telephonic order from General headquarters. This time the order said "Stand by to bomb Mouzon at 9:45 A. M."

On receiving this order the flight leaders and deputy leaders went to their maps to locate the new objective and study photographs of the town to pick out the points of military value. The town lay on the east bank of the Meuse with a suburb on the west bank where the railroad station and warehouses were situated. We decided to try to cut the railroad and destroy the warehouses.

The next morning our orderlies called us early enough to see a low-lying mist over the camp. It was just dawn. We felt that thrill which came only when we were on the alert to go over.

At seven-fifteen the flight leaders held their meeting in the office of the group commander, where the colonel outlined the plan of the formation to be used. This morning, if the weather cleared up, we were to go over in three "V's," the 166th Squadron first, then the 20th and lastly the 11th. We were to meet over our own field at 8,000 feet, fall in behind one another in order and climb to the final height of 13,000 to 14,000 feet during the final run to the lines. We were to bomb with the wind, which the weather report showed to be blowing toward Germany at a speed of about thirty miles an hour. This as rather a stiff wind, difficult but not impossible to operate in.

We dressed carefully in our flying clothes, climbed into the De Havillands and tested out our sights, machine guns and Verys pistols. Soon the signal "all set" was given. A Verys pistol was fired showing one green ball, giving the signal to start the Libertys. With a roar the long line of engines started almost all at once as the mechanics swung the propellers and the process

of warming up began. As we took off, numbers two and three started forward and in their turn leaped into the air, numbers four and five followed, then the next two and finally the ninth, until all the planes were in flight.

Our next difficulty was to gather the squadron into formation. The flight climbed together until we reached our desired altitude over the field. Tak-

ing one hour, this part of the trip is always very tiresome.

We returned over the field, looking meanwhile for the other two squadrons. Finally down below us we saw the leaders, the 166th, starting for the lines. We fell in line behind them, passing over Bar-le-Duc and flying up the valley with the Argonne forest on our left and Verdun on the right. As we neared the lines I signalled the planes into close formation so that by the time we crossed we were prepared to withstand an attack, the planes being stepped up and back with the V much smaller. One plane here firing a red light fell out with motor trouble, not being able to keep up with our speed. We all had orders to return in this contingency.

The clouds were numerous and heavy, but we could see the leading squadron ahead as well as patches of ground in spots showing us our position. We were travelling at a terrific rate, the wind being apparently much stronger than the weather report showed. Stenay was plainly visible on our right. I thought of turning and dropping our bombs there, but as the leaders still went on I followed. As they reached the place where Mouzon was situated they turned to the left over Raucourt because, as we learned later, Mouzon was covered with clouds when they passed it. All this time the anti-aircraft shells were bursting around us, but our speed compared with the ground was so great that they were very inaccurate at our height of 14,000 feet. They showed, however, that we were discovered by the enemy and we could expect an attack by their planes.

As we reached Mouzon luck caused a sudden rift to appear in the clouds and the town was plainly visible. I steered the pilot by the reins attached to his arms for the town, swinging the formation to the right. Getting the edge of the town in the sight I gave the "all set" signal. The town passed back along the bar of the sight, reached the cross bar and passed it. I pulled back the lever and let go our bombs. Waiting a few seconds to be sure all the squadron had dropped theirs, I signalled to the pilot that all was well and to go home. Leaning over the side of the plane as far as possible I tried to see the effects of the bursts, noticing one on a barracks and some flames near the railroad.

We turned now down the Meuse toward home against the wind, feeling that all was well. It had been a successful raid and we were feeling happy about it.

Without warning a blue body with a white cross flashed up in front of us. Grasping a Verys light, always kept prepared, I gave the "Enemy Aircraft" signal—seven red balls—and stood up at the guns ready for the attack. The first Boche passed from under our wing and came up under our tail. I gave him one volley as he passed and continued as he hung on his propeller not twenty feet from us, just behind our horizontal stabilizer. In this volley I shot away our right flipper wires so that I had to be careful in the future in shooting on the other side, as if both sides were shot away we would be forced to land. This blue fellow went down some distance but climbed up behind us again and reopened fire, his tracers flashing all around us but never hitting any vital part. I kept at him continually with bursts from my double Lewis so that he dared not come very near again, but was unable to see him fall out of control. The anti-aircraft shells continued to make black bursts in the sky all around us.

The other planes in the formation were having their troubles, too. From the leader's place I could see one Boche in flames above the rear of the formation and one Liberty going down below for protection. This plane was smoking but not yet in flames. Then the fight stopped just as suddenly

as it began. I counted the squadron and slacking speed to gather the planes back into the V, found there were seven left. We seemed to have got at least two Boches and had lost one of ours. Looking down below I could still see Stenay under our wing, showing what little progress we had made against the wind. However, I decided we were all right and I thought the

fight was over.

At this point two more German squadrons appeared from the rear. The first thing I saw was one of our rear planes dive down suddenly into the middle of the V with two black and white checked Fokkers after him. One of these fell out of control into a vrille; the other fell back and satisfied itself with long distance firing; the Liberty went back to its old position. The tracers were flying by in the rear of the formation in all directions, but it was impossible to see exactly how many Boches were in the attack. One started crawling up on us from behind about twenty-five feet below just so that it was difficult to get a bead on him with my sights. I fired bursts at him steadily but he still came on. Having made a habit of always keeping one magazine in reserve on the gun fully loaded. I felt in the cockpit, for a fresh one to replace the one just used up. There were none left. The reserve I had on the gun was now the last shot I had in the plane. As the German came nearer I fired in bursts of ten my last magazine. He turned back, luckily, as we were now helpless in case he persisted. I swung the useless tourelle back and forth pretending to point the guns at him as he hung back 400 yards behind. I showed my pilot our helpless condition by holding up an empty magazine. Finally we seemed to crawl by Stenay and got over our lines at Dun-sur-Meuse. Here again I counted the flight. There were five left.

We arrived back at the field to await the hardest part of the whole raid. After making our report we watched the sky for the missing planes to come in. One hour passed; then two; finally we heard a month later that one plane had gone in flames and two others had been forced to land in German territory. This was our last raid, as rain prevented further flights from Nov. 6 to Nov. 11.

#### CHAPTER XX.

#### THE NAVY'S PART.

ITH the submarine to hunt and merchant shipping and troops to convoy and protect, the United States Navy shared with the Army the necessity for haste in the organization of an air service. United States Air Service has published three articles, one by Commander John H. Towers, U. S. N., Captain of the N. C. 4, one by Commander G. C. Westervelt, U. S. N., and another by Majoreneral C. T. Menoher, U. S. A. Writing on Naval Aircraft in the war Commander Towers said:

A the declaration of war, the Navy had only one aircraft station, and a total of 38 aviators, and 22 training seaplanes. It had no seaplanes fit for service use. Its so-called "lighter-than-air" equipment was negligible. It was of course realized that naval aircraft would be required, but when, where, and in what quantity, nobody could say. The proposed army aviation program was at this time overshadowing everything else, and very few people realized that the Navy would have to embark on a schedule in any way comparable with that program.

However, additional orders were placed for training seaplanes and "lighter-than-air" craft. Additional flying schools were started, and enrollments in the Naval Reserve Flying Corps were got under way. A special board of officers was sent abroad to study foreign types, and, about this time, the French Navy requested the detail of trained and student aviators to France for further instruction—to assist eventually in combating the submarine along the French coast. It is interesting to note that this detail of naval aviators

was the first organized American force to land on French soil.

When this board returned from abroad with even more startling facts, regarding the submarine menace and the efficacy of aircraft in dealing with this menace, than we had realized on this side, it became apparent that we must put over aircraft far superior in type to any we then had in the Navy, and we must put them over in what appeared to be at that time astounding quantities. After what might be termed a heart-breaking session, lasting late into the night, a definite program of types was decided upon; and that program was adhered to through many storms of doubt and criticism. This adherence resulted in an uninterrupted production; and the performances of the aircraft vindicated those who were responsible for the selection of those types.

From this time on the situation developed rapidly, and by late summer, the Navy was embarked on an astonishingly large aviation program on both sides of the Atlantic. When the armistice was signed, there were in operation twenty-eight United States naval air stations abroad, thirteen in the United States and insular possessions, two in Canada, and twelve land squadrons for special offensive operations against submarines at their bases,

and the total aviation personnel numbered over 42,000, which is a figure nearly as large as the total personnel of the entire Navy at the outbreak

of the war.

Our problems of supply were very difficult, as the primary function of the stations, which was the "straffing" of submarines and the protection of shipping, necessitated the location of stations in strategic localities, regardless of communications. These locations abroad extended from the northern end of Ireland to the southern end of Italy, not to mention the Azores. Eight were located on islands off shore, necessitating considerable special water transportation.

Little has been published as to the nature or extent of naval aircraft operations during hostilities. As I said before, our primary mission was the destruction of the enemy submarine, wherever he could be found, and second only to this was the protection of supply and troop ships. The primary mission was purely offensive, and its execution, rather varied in

form, as follows:

1. Routine overseas patrols.

2. Emergency or S. O. S. patrols. 3. Bombing submarines in their bases.

Seaplanes of large cruising radius and airships were used for routine patrol. Each station had a zone assigned to it, and covered that zone as thoroughly as possible from daylight to dark. The patrol routes were so laid out that the greatest area was covered with the least possible mileage, and each seaplane traversed courses which were carefully laid down in the flight instructions to the pilot. These aircraft were armed with bombs of either 230 or 500 pounds, and also with machine guns for use against the crew of a submarine encountered on the surface, or against hostile aircraft. The seaplanes would stay out from four to nine hours, depending on the distance they had to cover, and the airships sometimes stayed out over forty hours.

Some concrete idea of the area of operations covered by a single naval air station may be gained from the fact that in one day the patrol squadron attached to one of our stations put in fifty-four hours and twenty-six minutes of flying time, covering a distance of 2827 nautical miles. By the establishment of refuelling depots this station was able to send out patrols each covering 400 miles in extent, and extending from the station to points 112 miles to the north, 125 miles to the south and 115 miles out to sea.

Not infrequently our overseas naval air stations were subjected to bombardments by enemy aircraft as well as by land batteries. At Dunkirk the station was subjected to upward of fifty enemy air attacks, as well as one sea raid, and over a dozen bombardments by enemy cannon located some 26 miles away.

Following is a sample of pilot's log for one day, March 15, 1918:

Called at 4 A.M. for inner patrol in H-12 No. 4545.

5:30 Left water-dark.

6:10 Sighted Kentish Knock Light Vessel.

6:40 Sunrise.

7:10 Sighted torpedoed British destroyer F-90 being towed toward Harwich by T. B. D. F-31.

7:10-7:30 Searched area.

8:15 Shipwah Light Vessel.

8:25 Sighted two Hun mines—sunk them both—machine gun fire. Reported their position to base by w/t.

8:40 Six trawlers sweeping.

9:00 Sunk Light Vessel.

9:20 Landed.

2 P.M. Three machines left water-Nos. 4280 Capt. Gordon-4285 Capt. Webster. 4290 Ens. Hawkins.

- 3:10 Sighted Dutch coast (Hook of Holland).
- 4:15 Sighted two Hun seaplanes (two seaters).
- 4:15 to 4.35 Dropped bombs and chased hostile aircraft.
- 4:35 Shot down rear Hun in flames—the other got away into clouds.
- 4:45 Turned west.
- 4:50 No. 4280 (Capt. Gordon) came down, engine trouble—landed O. K. in six foot swells.
- 4:50-5:05 Circled around No. 4280.
- 5:05 No. 4280 took off O. K .- carried on west.
- 5:35 Sighted large Hun mine laying submarine four miles off port bow fully blown on surface. Opened out for him—fired recognition signals—no answer. He got under just before we reached him—we had only Lewis guns, as had dropped bombs.
- 6:10 Sighted North Hinder Light Vessel.
- 7:00 Sighted coast-Orfordness.
- 7:20 Landed Felixstowe-dark.

Total flying time for day-9 hours, 10 minutes in air.

The emergency or S. O. S. patrol was made only when a submarine was reported as being located in the zone covered by the station, a limited number of seaplanes being held in reserve for such an emergency. Successful accomplishment of the mission depended almost entirely upon the rapidity with which fully equipped planes could be got off with complete written instructions as to the supposed location of the submarine, and the total area to be searched. The longest time required by any of the stations to get out orders, get two HS-1 type of planes launched, completely equipped and manned and in the air with full instructions, was seven minutes.

During the late winter and early spring of 1918, it was noticed that the aircraft operations were becoming so effective that submarines were more or less consistently avoiding the areas which could be covered by aircraft from the various stations of the Allies and the United States, and were extending their operations much further out to sea. They were able to do this because of the increased radius of action of the larger submarines. Of course, their chances of getting ships were reduced, as they were not within the cone shaped area through which all ships making for or departing from a port would have to pass, but, on the other hand, if they located an unarmed ship without escort, they were so far from the bases that they could destroy it before destroyers or other vessels from shore bases could render assistance. It was therefore decided that the proper plan was to attack the submarines in their bases, wherever such bases could be reached.

The secondary function of seaplane patrol related to escort of convoys. The very large overseas transportation of troops and supplies reguired that all possible protection be afforded, and aircraft, especially airships and kits balloons were used most extensively in this work. Convoys were escorted out of the United States ports to distances which could be considered comparatively safe, and were met outside European ports and escorted in. That so few troopships were torpedoed can be credited, to a considerable extent, to the arduous work of the aircraft. This work did not offer the excitement and interest of flying at the front or even of the offensive sea patrols, and those officers and men who did it, day after day, summer and winter, deserve a great deal of praise. And yet convoy escort was not wholly monotonous or devoid of interest; witness the case of an American seaplane operating off the French coast.

On April 23, 1918, while on morning patrol with a convoy of 26 American vessels, the observer discovered an enemy submarine awash and steering for the convoy. Two minutes later she submerged, only to reappear close to one of the vessels. The seaplane maneuvered directly over the undersea boat and dropped one bomb, scoring a direct hit close to the conning tower. At this time the top of the conning tower was showing about two feet above

Wreckage strewed the water and later enough was gathered up by trawlers to enable the type of destroyed "sub" to be readily determined.

While destruction of enemy submarines by United States seaplanes was far from being the usual thing, this was not the only instance of its kind

During the latter part of the hostilities, certain of our dreadnaughts in the war were equipped with fast planes for spotting, fighting and reconnaissance. The mactivity of the German fleet did not give any opportunity for a demonstration, under battle conditions, of the usefulness of these aircraft. There is no doubt, however, as to the growing necessity of having the fleet, especially the scouting forces, amply equipped with airplanes.

Discussing the "Navy's Part in Our Military Aerial Achievements," Commander Westervelt wrote more in detail as follows:

Up to the time of the entry of the United States into the World War, there had been expended by the Navy Department for aeronautical purposes a total amount probably not in excess of \$7,000.000. Since then more than \$100.000,000 has been expended. It may, therefore, be said that the Navy's consistent aeronautical development dates from the entry of the United States into this war. For several years before that event, the officers of the Naval service had struggled earnestly to overcome the handicap of almost invisible

appropriations.

As the result of lack of appropriations for aeronautics, the Navy, at the time of our entry into the World War, was provided with a few low powered planes of no military value except for training purposes, with a few inferior kite balloons, and with one inferior dirigible of the Blimp type. In actual figures the Navy had at this time twenty-two seaplanes, five kite balloons, two free balloons, and one dirigible. To operate them we boasted fifty-three officers of aviation training, and one hundred and sixty-three enlisted men. When the armistice was signed there were in service for patrol and bombing work 759 seaplanes, 140 airplanes or land machines, and eleven dirigibles; there were used for training purposes 491 seaplanes and 100 land airplanes; there were 12 planes of experimental types being tried out; and there were on hand 282 kite balloons and 7 free balloons. Aeronautical engines delivered to the Navy total 7,138, or enough power to fly a 21,500 ton ship at 80 miles an hour. In addition there were many hundreds of seaplanes and other aircraft on order for early delivery. Of officers for aviation purposes there were 1,656 aviators, 1,349 non-flying and 3,912 student officers. Enlisted men numbered 35,667.

After August, 1918, no seaplanes were shipped abroad for the Navy, as by the end of that month a surplus sufficient for several months had been

delivered to the assembly bases there.

Quite early in the war it was appreciated that the principal contribution of the aviation force of the Navy toward winning the war would be through counter-submarine measures. As a result of this realization, steps were taken to establish on the coasts of France, England and Ireland, and in the islands of the Azores. patrol stations equipped with aircraft for carrying out patrol bombing operations against submarines. Similar stations were located on the east coast of the United States, covering practically all of the waters from Cape Cod to Key West. At the same time an intensified manufacturing program was undertaken for the supply of the necessary seaplanes for these coast patrol bombing operations and for the planes for training aviators. Co-incident with this work in connection with heavierthan-air craft, development and manufacturing work was done in connection with lighter-than-air craft, both of the dirigible as well as of the kite balloon types. Much progress has been made, though we are still behind foreign development in lighter-than-air craft. In one direction in which

the Navy has co-operated, the production of the light, non-inflammable gas, helium, we may be said to lead the world, as, at present, no other sources of supply of commercial amounts except those developed by the United States are known.

For both the enlisted and the commissioned personnel required there offered themselves a flood of such splendid young men that it seems safe to say that no group of men of similar numbers ever previously gotten together has been of a higher average degree of excellence and ability than the aviation forces of the U. S. Navy during the war. It is impossible to speak with too much enthusiasm of these men from civil life who offered themselves faster than places could be found for them. Men chosen for training as officers were very largely graduates of technical institutions or of colleges giving technical courses, whereas the men for the non-commissioned grades were of technical or mechanical experience fitting them particularly for the work to be done.

The men trained and the planes constructed were distributed over a not inconsiderable portion of the world's surface. They could be found over both the east and west coasts of the United States, over practically the entire coast of France, in the north of Ireland and the south of Ireland, as well as on the east and west coasts of that island, at stations in England, and at stations in Italy. There were of Naval Air Stations in the United States eleven, in Ireland four, in England two, in France fourteen, in Italy two, in the islands of the Azores one, and in Panama one.

The signing of the armistice on November 11th interfered, to some extent, with the full flowering of the Navy's plans, just as it did with the full flowering of all other plans made by this country for the entire discomfiture of our enemies, but there can be no doubt that a pronounced effect was exercised on submarine activities by the aeronautical participation of the United States. It is quite certain that numbers of submarine attacks were prevented by our seaplanes, and that several submarines were actually sunk by them, and that the merchant shipping saved directly or indirectly by their activities represented a value far in excess of the total expenditures of the Navy Department on its aeronautical development. Figures are not yet complete regarding miles flown by the Navy, or ships convoyed by Naval aircraft, but the distance totalled to date (March, 1919) is in excess of 6,400,000 miles in the U.S. alone, and at one European patrol station alone U. S. Naval seaplanes assisted in convoying and protecting 6.187 ships, while the total ships for all stations reported to date is 74,244. A Navy dirigible has flown for forty-one hours, while a seaplane of the two motored boat type kept the air for nine hours and twenty-one minutes.

Major-General Charles T. Menoher, Director of Air Service, U. S. Army, tells of American industries' part in our air program. He says:

The demands of the vast war program on a nation without experience in producing many of the munitions of war tested the resources of American industry to their very limits. No part of this program required greater initiative and energy than the problem of supplying aviation material. The needs of the Air Service, both in the Army and the Navy, had to be provided for. These requirements included not only training and fighting airplanes and flying boats, but also the entire equipment of the balloon companies. The equipment of the fighting machines included armament, bombs, cameras, radio apparatus, oxygen equipment and special clothing. When these requirements for war in the air were first faced the country was almost without either military, technical or manufacturing experience applicable to the many and varied requirements.

A survey of conditions in the United States at the time of our entry into the war disclosed a condition of unpreparedness so absolutely complete and comprehensive that today it is almost impossible to vissualize it to the "man on the street," or persuade him that it really existed.

Resources and trained men or the special manufacturing facilities required were slight, indeed. There had been delivered to the United States Army in all the years prior to 1916 a total of 54 airplanes. In 1916 the airplanes delivered to the Army numbered 64, or a total of 118 prior to 1917. Most of these were obsolete or destroyed, and not a single machine was suitable for use on any battle front. In short, the Army had almost no resources of equipment or trained personnel. No one in the country knew what was required for war purposes, either as to size, capacity or type of plane, engine or equipment. Even the quantity required for military operations was unknown. Manufacturing facilities and actual aircraft experience was extremely limited, and totally non-existent in so far as most of the armament and accessories were concerned.

How industry handled this situation is shown in part, at least, by the results. In round numbers there had been shipped before the signing of the armistice 700 kite balloons, 14,000 airplanes and flying boats, and 30,000 aviation engines of over 7,800,000 horsepower. The production during the last month of the war was at the rate of over 20,000 airplanes and 60,000 engines per year.

Even these figures do not fully reflect the magnitude of the industrial problem. Demands for raw material differing from anything previously available in this country had to be made. Not only was material demanded for the program of the United States, but it was necessary for this country to furnish a large portion of the raw material required by the entire alled air program.

The engineering problems involved in initiating production not only on planes and engines but on all of the necessary armament and accessories were in themselves enormous, and particularly difficult was the problem of rapidly bringing together in a well-rounded and finished design all the elements of a fully equipped fighting machine.

The story of the production of 180,000,000 feet of spruce, more than twothirds of which went to our allies, is an epic of the Pacific Northwest. Lumbermen, loggers and the Army joined together in the "Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen" to meet the extraordinary demand for spruce suitable for airplane construction.

Linen to cover the wings was originally promised from England. The supply failed almost from the start, and in the fall of 1917 thousands of bales of long-fibre cotton were purchased. A suitable cotton airplane fabric was developed, and at the time of the signing of the armistice 2,400 looms were weaving this fabric, and already 10,000,000 yards had been produced. The same long-fibre cotton is the basis for a balloon fabric of such close weave that 3,600 looms were required on balloon fabric alone.

Technical skill was commandeered from all the professions. The Liberty engine was designed and put in production in less than a year; aircraft guns were developed, with all their special belts and ammunition; experts in photographic apparatus learned the new art of photography from the air; radio men developed the voice control for squadron flying; oxygen apparatus was developed. The great rubber plants at Akron revived the balloon-making art. Not only kite balloons themselves were made, but with them the endless equipment for making and handling of gas for filling the balloons, and winches for controlling them in the field.

While production of balloons went on, research continued, and from the

While production of balloons went on, research continued, and from the gas wells of the Central West wise men found how to secure the previ-




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#### FAMOUS FRENCH AVIATORS

Roland G. Garros and Lieutenant Rene Fonck, "aces among aces" in the French Escadrille. They have received the highest decorations in the gift of the French government, the Legion of Honor. Lieutenant Fonck was a friend of Lieutenant Guynemer who, after a splendid career as an airman, was shot down by a German aviator. His death was avenged by Lientenant Fonck a few days later. Lieutenant Fonck was the ace of aces in the French air service. His record was 115 German airplanes brought down. This made him the leading ace of aces of the entire war. Lieutenant Garros was a prisoner in Germany, finally escaping to England, and returning to France where he was compelled to learn the art of flying all over again, the style and improvement of the planes having changed so much during his imprisonment. This was all the more strange, as Garros was leader in the air when aviation was in its infancy, flying from Paris to Madrid, and from Madrid to Rome, also 558 miles across the Mediterranean. Garros was in New York in 1916, flying at Belmont Park.




COLONEL WILLIAM A. BISHOP British ace with record of 72 Hun planes




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AMERICAN AVIATORS

Capt. W. C. Schauffler and Lieut. Tillman, 90th Aero Squadron, 79th Div.







CAPT. EDDIE RICKENBACHER, American Ace of Aces.



© Underwood & Underwood
MAJOR BARACCA,
Italian Ace of Aces.



MAJOR VICTOR R LUFBERRY, Famous American Ace.



MAJOR WILLIAM THAW, Famous American Ace.

ously priceless helium, and a new vista of aerial development opened up. With this non-burnable gas, who can tell the future of the lighter than airmachines?

The great engine builders, centered at Detroit, gave all their resources to back the Air Program. The production of 5,297 aviation engines in the month of October bears witness to the success of their efforts, as does the production of over 15,000 Liberty engines within seventeen months from the starting of the design of the engine.

Out of the chaos had come results that actually helped the great fight for months on the Western Front. Willingly had the old makers of aircraft given all their knowledge. Willingly had Congress appropriated funds. Many industries were trained to do their special part in the Air Program. Still more important is it that many have learned their part. The resources created in this country both in the way of trained manufacturing personnel and of manufacturing facilities are without equal among any of the nations of the earth. Are we to lose all this and drop back into the semi-darkness of pre-war ignorance, or is a way to be found to link these great resources of men and industrial equipment with the nation's needs?

# CHAPTER XXI

### HONORS.

C IXTY-SIX United States aviators, by bringing of	lown fi	ve or	more
airplanes or balloons, qualified for the title	of "A	ce."	The
names, in order of their standing, are as follow	vs:		
Capt. Edward V. Rickenbacker, Columbus, Ohio94th	21	4	25
*2nd Lieut. Frank Luke, Jr., Phoenix, Ariz27th	4	14	18
*Major Victor Raoul Lufberry, Wallingford, Conn94th	17+		17
1st Lieut, George A. Vaughn, Brooklyn, N. Y17th	12	1	13
1st Lieur, Field E. Kindley, Gravette, Ark148th	12		12
1st Lieut, Elliott W. Springs, Lancaster, S. C148th	12	• •	12
1st Lieut. Reed G. Landis, Chicago, Ill	9	1	10
*1st Lieut, David E. Putnam, Brookline, Mass139th	10	• •	10
1st Lieut. Jacques Michael Swaab, Philadelphia, Pa. 22nd	10	• •	10
1st Lieut. Paul F. Baer, Fort Wayne, Ind103rd	9	• •	9
1st Lieut. Thomas J. Cassady, Spencer, Ind28th	9 9	• •	9
1st Lieut. Frank O'D. Hunter, Savannah, Ga103rd	8	i	9
1st Lieut. Chester E. Wright, Cambridge, Mass93rd	S		8
1st Lieut. Henry R. Clay, Jr., Fort Worth, Tex148th	5	3	8
*1st Lieut. Hamilton Coolidge, Boston, Mass94th 1st Lieut. Jesse C. Creech, Washington, D. C148th	8		8
2nd Lieut. J. C. Donaldson, Washington, D. CR.A.F.	8	• •	8
1st Lieut. William P. Erwin, Chicago, Ill1st	8	• • •	8
*1st Lieut. Lloyd A. Hamilton, Burlington, Vt17th	6	2	8
2nd Lieut. Clinton Jones, San Francisco, Cal22nd	8		8
Maj. James A. Meissner, Brooklyn, N. Y147th	7	1	8
<sup>†</sup> 2nd Lieut. Wilbert Wallace White, New York, N.Y.147th	7		7
Capt. Charles J. Biddle, Philadelphia, Pa13th	7		7
2nd Lieut. Howard Burdick, Brooklyn, N. Y17th	7	• •	7
1st Lieut. Reed M. Chambers, Memphis, Tenn94th	7	• :	7
1st Lieut. Harvey W. Cook, Toledo, Ohio94th	3	4	7
1st Lieut. Lansing G. Holden, New York, N. Y95th	2	5	7
1st Lieut. G. De Freese Larner, Washington, D. C.103rd	7	• •	<b>7</b> 7
1st Lieut. Wendel A. Robertson, Fort Smith, Ark. 139th	7 7	• •	7
1st Lieut. Leslie J. Rummel, Newark, N. J 93rd	7	• •	7
1st Lieut. William H. Stovall, Stovall, Miss13th	7	• •	7
*1st Lieut. Earl J. Schoen, Indianapolis, Ind139th	5	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	7
1st Lieut. Sumner Sewall, Bath, Maine95th	6	• • •	6
*1st Lieut. James D. Beane, Concord, Mass22nd 1st Lieut. Douglas Campbell, Mount Hamilton, Cal94th	6	• • •	ĕ
1st Lieut. Edward P. Curtis, Rochester, N. Y95th	6		6
1st Lieut. Murray K. Guthrie, Mobile. Ala13th	š	••	6
1st Lieut. Leonard C. Hammond. San Francisco, Cal. 91st	6		6
2nd Lieut. Frank E. Hays, Chicago, Ill13th	6		6

2nd Lieut, Howard C. Knotts, Carlinville, Ill17th	6		6
1st Lieut. Robert C. Lindsey, Madison, Wis139th	6		6
2nd Lieut. Harold McArthur27th	6		6
2nd Lieut. W. T. Ponder103rd	6	• •	6
2nd Lieut. K. L. Porter	6	• •	6
1st Lieut. Edgar Gardner Tobin, San Antonio, Tex. 103rd	6	• •	6
1st Lieut. Jerry Cox Vasconcelles, Denver, Colo27th	5	1	6
1st Lieut. H. L. Bair	5	• •	5
2nd Lieut. Wm. T. Badham, Birmingham, Ala91st	5	• •	5
1st Lieut Clayton L. Bissel, Kane, Pa148th	5	• •	5
1st Lieut. H. R. Buckley, Agawan, Mass95th	4	1	5
1st Lieut. Everett R. Cook, San Francisco, Cal91st	5	• •	5
1st Lieut. Arthur C. Easterbrook, Ft. Flagler, Wash1st	5	• •	5
1st Lieut. Harold H. George, Niagara Falls, N. Y139th	5	• •	5
1st Lieut. E. G. Grey	4	1	5
1st Lieut. Edward M. Haight, Astoria, N. Y139th	5	• •	5
1st Lieut. James A. Healy, Jersey City, N. J147th	5	• •	5
1st Lieut. James Knowles, Cambridge, Mass  95th	5	• •	5
1st Lieut. F. E. Luff	3	<b>2</b>	5
2nd Lieut. J. Sidney Owen, Baltimore County, Md. 139th	5	• •	5
1st Lieut. Ralph O'Neill, Nogales, Ariz147th	5	• •	5
1st Lieut C. A. Ralston	5	• •	5
Capt. Victor H. Strahm, Evanston, Ill91st	5	•:	5
2nd Lieut. R. M. Todd	4	1	5
1st Lieut. R. Vernam	3	2	5
1st Lieut. Joseph Fritz Wehner, Everett, Mass27th	• ;	5	5
1st. Lieut. R. D. Williams17th	4	1	5
Totals	437	52	489
			200

<sup>\*</sup> Indicates that the officer was killed in service.

The list of American Aces printed above was furnished on October 25, 1919, by the Chief, Historical Branch, War Plans Div. General Staff, United States Army. The list had been corrected to August 1, 1919, but was subject to possible revision as additional information was obtained.

In a list of 66 American aces given out by the Army Air Service and published in October by the New York Evening Post, some of the names given above are omitted, and the following names, not given above, are mentioned:

1st Lieut. M. Stenseth	6	• •	6
Major H. E. Harney27th	5		5
Capt. O. K. Peterson95th	5		5
1st Lieut. J. J. Searley	5	• •	5
1st Lieut. F. E. Luff	3	<b>2</b>	5
Maj. William Thaw103rd	4	1	5
1st Lieut. A. R. Brooks22nd	5	• •	5

It would appear that two separate branches of the army are engaged in figuring these records and that they are not in perfect agreement. In order not to do an injustice to any of our heroes we, therefore, publish all names.

<sup>†</sup> While with French Army.

R. A. F. indicates that the officer served as an individual attached to the Royal Air Force.

LIST OF ALL AERO SQUADRONS AND BALLOON OBSERVATION COMPANIES WHICH SERVED ABROAD APRIL 6, 1917-NOVEMBER 11, 1918

Service Squadrons: 1-(2), 8, 9-(4), 10, 11-(5), 12-(2), 13-(1), 16, 17-(1), 19, 20-(5), 21, 22-(1), 23, 24-(3), 25, 27-(1), 28-(1), 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 41, 43, 47, 49-(1), 50-(2), 72, 73, 85, 86, 88-(2), 89, 90-(2), 91-(3), 92, 93-(1), 94-(1), 95-(1), 96-(5), 97, 98, 99-(2), 100, 101, 102, 103-(1), 104-(2), 105, 120, 135, 137, 138, 139-(1), 140, 141-(1), 142, 147-(1), 148-(1), 149, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 163, 165, 166-(5), 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 176, 177, 182, 183, 184, 185-(1), 186, 187 188, 199, 210, 211, 218-(1), 216, 219, 220, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 247, 248, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 278, 279, 281, 282, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 318, 320, 321, 325, 326, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 341, 344-(6), 345-(6), 349, 350, 351, 353, 354, 356, 361, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378.

Note: It will be noted that the heading shows that all the above Service Squadrons served overseas; the foot-notes apply to those of the Service Squadrons which actually crossed the lines; in addition, many of the squadrons enumerated above, besides serving overseas, were directly in rear of the zone of advance but did not cross the lines, as they were waiting for the arrival of equipment or were prevented by other reasons from engaging in action.

- (1) Crossed over the lines in active operations against the Germans (Pursuit Squadron).
- (2) Crossed over the lines in active operations against the Germans (Corps Observation Squadron).
- (3) Crossed over the lines in active operations against the Germans (Army Observation Squadron).
- (4) Crossed over the lines in active operations against the Germans (Night Reconnaissance Squadron).
- (5) Crossed over the lines in active operations against the Germans (Bombardment Squadron).
- (6) Organized in France.

Construction Squadrons: 400, 362, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 506-(1).

(1) Organized in France.

SUPPLY SQUADRONS: 636-646 incl., 648, 649, 650, 655-660 incl., 667.

REPAIR SQUADRONS: 800, 801, 802, 803, 805, 806, 812, 822-841 incl., 852, 875, 876-(1), 1055-(1), 1099, 1101-(1), 1102-(1), 1103-(1), 1104-(1), 1105-(1), 1105-(1), 1106-(1), 1107-(1), 1108-(1), 1111-(1).

(1) Organized overseas.

Balloon Observation Companies: 1-(1), 2-(1), 3-(1), 4-(1), 5-(1), 6-(1), 7-(1), 8-(1), 9-(1), 10-(1), 11-(1), 12-(1), 13, 14, 15-(1), 16-(1), 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 30, 34, 35, 36, 42-(1), 43-(1), 44, 45, 58, 69-(1)(2), 101-(2), 102-(2).

- (1) On duty at the front at some time during the period covered; came under hostile fire.
- (2) Organized overseas.

# AIR SERVICE CITATIONS NUMBER THREE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FOUR

Three hundred and seventy-four awards and citations have been issued to members of the American Air Service to date.

The Director of Military Aeronautics has just received a second list of Honors and Awards conferred upon American Aero Squadrons and flying officers of the American Expeditionary Forces. This list gives the citations of five squadrons, including the Lafayette, the 17th and 148th, which were with the British; the 90th and the 90th Squadrons. The names of fifty-nine American flying officers awarded the Distinguished Service Cross are recorded. Thirteen awards of the Croix de Guerre and three French citations are listed. One award of the British Distinguished Flying Cross is announced. The list of Italian honors conferred shows that thirty-nine American officers won the Croce al Merito di Guerra; six others were mentioned in Italian citations.

Distinguished Service Medals have been awarded to Generals Menoher and Patrick, and Legion of Honor Medals, Commander, to Generals Menoher and Mitchell.

The list, together with the first list, which showed the citations of five American Squadrons, the 1st Day Bombardment Group and 126 Air Service officers, brings the number of Air Service citations up to two hundred and fifty individuals and eleven organizations, not including over one hundred other awards of Distinguished Service Crosses announced by the War Department.

The citation of the Lafayette Squadron, formerly the Lafayette Escadrille, is signed by General Petain, and reads as follows: "Brilliant unit which has shown itself, during the course of operations in: Flanders, worthy of its glorious past. In spite of losses which took away a third of its effectives in a difficult sector, it has assured a perfect security to our Corps Observation airplanes, a complete service of reconnaissance at both high and low altitude, and the destruction, not only near the front lines, but deep in the enemy's territory, of a great number of German airplanes and captive balloons.

The 17th and 148th Squadrons which served with the British Royal Air Force were cited in letters by both Generals J. M. Salmond and J. Byng, when they were transferred to the American Army. In citing the 90th Squadron, General Bell, commanding the 33rd Division, says in part: "I wish to express to you at this time my appreciation for the valuable and efficient work your squadron has done while serving with us. You have met all our requests with willing compliance unless prevented unquestionably by the elements. Your greatest co-operation has been in assisting us in locating our lines, which you have done repeatedly with uniform success and accuracy."

#### HONOR ROLL OF THE AIR SERVICE

The following officers of the American flying arm have been decorated for conspicuous bravery in action. The list, which includes both American and foreign awards, has been carefully compiled from available official sources, but the records are not yet complete.

#### DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

Thomas J. Abernathy2nd Lieut.	Dogan H. Arthur1st Lieut.
Perry H. Aldrich1st Lieut.	Benjamin L. Atwater1st Lieut.
Arthur H. Alexander1st Lieut.	Sterling C. Alexander1st Lieut.
Rodney M. Armstrong1st Lieut.	Flynn L. A. Andrew1st Lieut.
Paul Armengaud	Gardner Philip Allen. 1st Lieut, C.A.C.

Walter L. Avery. 1st Lieut. Philip R. Babcock. Captain David H. Backus. 1st Lieut. Wm. T. Badham. 1st Lieut. Paul Frank Baer. 1st Lieut. Ralph S. Bagby. 1st Lieut. Herbert B. Bartholf. 1st Lieut. Byrne V. Baucom. 1st Lieut. James D. Beane. 1st Lieut. David C. Beebe. 2nd Lieut. David C. Beebe. 2nd Lieut. William Belzer 2nd Lieut. William Belzer 2nd Lieut. Cito E. Benell 2nd Lieut. Chas. Raymond Blake 1st Lieut. Chas. Raymond Blake 1st Lieut. Hugh D. G. Broomfield 1st Lieut. Allen F. Bonnale 1st Lieut. Horace L. Borden 2nd Lieut. Horace L. Borden 2nd Lieut. Samuel C. Bowman 2nd Lieut. Theodore E. Boyd. 1st Lieut.	Lewis H. Brereton. Lt. Colonel Hugh Brewster
John E. Cousins Captain Edward P. Curtis 1st Lieut. Edward B. Cutter 1st Lieut. Ralph E. de Castro 1st Lieut. Willis A. Diekema Captain Raymond P. Dillon 1st Lieut. Charles R. D'Olive 1st Lieut. Kingman Douglass 1st Lieut. Kingman Douglass 1st Lieut. Meredith L. Dowd 2nd Ineut. Chas. W. Drew 1st Lieut. Arthur William Duckstein 1st Lieut. Arthur William Duckstein 1st Lieut. Warren Edwin Eaton 1st Lieut. Robert P. Elliott 1st Lieut. William P. Erwin 1st Lieut. J. Dickinson Este 1st Lieut. Leo C. Ferrenbach 1st Lieut.	Howard F. Fleeson
James Norman Hall Captain Lloyd A. Hamilton 1st Lieut. Leonard C. Hammond Captain Percival G. Hart 2nd Lieut. Harold E. Hartney Major Benjamin P. Harwood 1st Lieut. Frank K. Hays 2nd Lieut. James A. Healey 1st Lieut. Phil. A. Henderson 1st Lieut. J. A. Higgs 1st Lieut. Maury Hill Captain Raymond C. Hill 1st Lieut. Roger W. Hitchcock 1st Lieut. Cleveland W. McDermott .2nd Lieut.	James A. McDevitt

William T Transman Int Light	Chas. W. Plummer2nd Lieut.
William J. Hoover1st Lieut.	
Donald Hudson1st Lieut.	Lewis C. Plush1st Lieut.
D. C. Hunter1st Lieut.	Britton Polley1st Lieut.
Frank O'Driscoll Hunter1st Lieut.	William Thomas Ponder1st Lieut.
Livingston Gilson Irving1st Lieut.	Earl W. Porter2nd Lieut.
John N. Jeffers1st Lieut.	Charles P. Porter2nd Lieut.
Thomas M. Jervey1st Lieut.	Kenneth L. Porter2nd Lieut.
Arthur H. Jones1st Lieut.	Glen A. Preston2nd Lieut.
Clinton Jones2nd Lieut.	Percy Rivington Pyne1st Lieut.
John W. Jordan2nd Lieut.	John J. Quinn1st Lieut.
Clarence C. Kahle1st Lieut.	Joseph C. Raible, Jr1st Lieut.
Samuel Kaye, Jr1st Lieut.	John I. Rancourt1st Lieut.
Asher E. Kelty1st Lieut.	Howard G. Rath1st Lieut.
Geo. C. Kennedylst Lieut.	Robert F. Raymond, Jr1st Lieut.
Tield E Windler Lot Liout	
Field E. Kindley1st Lieut.	Clearton H. ReynoldsCaptain
Clair A. Kinney	John N. ReynoldsLt. Colonel
Wilbert E. Kinsley2nd Lieut.	James M. Richardson2nd Lieut.
James Knowles1st Lieut.	Edward V. RickenbackerCaptain
John H. Lambert1st Lieut.	Paul N. A. Rooney1st Lieut.
G. De Forrest Larner1st Lieut.	Hermon C. Rorison1st Lieut.
Walter R. LassonCaptain	Cleo J. Ross1st Lieut.
John B. Lee2nd Lieut.	Edward W. Rucker, JrCaptain
Robert Lindsay1st Lieut.	Leslie J. Rummell1st Lieut.
Frank A. Llewellyn1st Lieut.	Alexander P. Schenck1st Lieut.
K. P. LittauerMajor	Karl J. Schoen (Deceased).1st Lieut.
William O. Lowe2nd Lt. U.S.M.C.	Arthur F. Seaver1st Lieut.
Francis B. Lowry2nd Lieut.	Cecil G. SellersCaptain
Frank Luke, Jr1st Lieut.	Sumner Sewall1st Lieut.
Joel H. McClendon1st Lieut.	Richard B. Shelby1st Lieut.
Murray K. Guthrie1st Lieut.	Louis C. Simon, Jr2nd Lieut.
William MitchellBrig. General	John H. Snyder1st Lieut.
Edward Russell Moore1st Lieut.	Carl SpatzMajor
Edw. M. Morris2nd Lieut.	Richard Wilson Steele2nd Lieut.
Oscar B. Myers1st Lieut.	John H. Stevens2nd Lieut.
Roland H. Neel2nd Lieut.	John Y. Stokes, Jr1st Lieut.
Harlow P. Neibling1st Lieut.	Penrose V. Stout1st Lieut.
Harlow P. Neibilingist Lieut.	
George R. Nixon1st Lieut.	Wm. H. Stovall1st Lieut.
Sigbert A. G. Norris2nd Lieut.	Victor H. StrahmCaptain
Fred W. Norton1st Lieut.	W. J. R. Taylor1st Lieut.
Stephen H. NoyesCaptain	Walton B. Ten Eyck, Jr. 2nd Lieut.
Alan Nutt	William ThawLt. Colonel
Paul J. O'Donnell2nd Lieut.	Fred A. Tillman2nd Lieut.
Ralph A. O'Neill1st Lieut.	Edgar G. TobinCaptain
Edward Orr1st Lieut.	Wm. H. Vail1st Lieut.
Richard C. M. Page1st Lieut.	Remington D. Vernam1st Lieut.
Joseph A. Palmer2nd Lieut.	James E. WallisCaptain
William W. Palmer1st Lieut.	William W. Waring1st Lieut.
Alfred B. Patterson, Jr1st Lieut.	Donald P. Warner1st Lieut.
Karl C. Payne1st Lieut.	Pennington H. Way (Deceased),
Elmer Pendell1st Lieut.	2nd Lieut.
Josiah Pegues1st Lieut.	Joseph F. Wehner1st Lieut.
David McK. PetersonMajor	Wilbert W. White1st Lieut.
Glen Phelps1st Lieut.	Alan F. Winslow2nd Lieut.
Geo. R. Phillips1st Lieut.	Chester E. Wright1st Lieut.

### DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL

Charles T. Menoher....Maj. General Mason M. Patrick.....Maj. General

# DISTINGUISHED SERVICE ORDER—BRITISH A. F. Bonnalie..........1st Lieut.

### DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS-BRITISH

H. L. Bair1st Lieut.	P. T. Iaccaci1st Lieut.
M M L Campbell1st Lieut.	James Alfred Keatinglst Lieut.
Henry Robinson Clay, Jr1st Lieut.	Field E. Kindleylst Lieut.
John O. Donaldson2nd Lieut.	Reed G. LandisCaptain
Flord Andrews Hamilton 1st Lieut.	Frederick E. Luff1st Lieut.
Charles L. Heater1st Lieut.	Elliott W. SpringsCaptain
Thomas John Herhert 1st Lieut.	George Augustus Vaughn1st Lieut.

### LEGION OF HONOR-FRENCH

(Commander)

Maj. Gen. Charles T. Menoher Brig. Gen. William Mitchell

## CROSS OF THE LEGION OF HONOR-FRENCH

David E. Putnam......1st Lieut. Charles W. Miller......2nd Lieut.

#### CROIX DE GUERRE-FRENCH

James H. Ackerman 1st Lieut. Floyd H. Allport 2nd Lieut. Paul Frank Baer 1st Lieut. Walter V. Barneby 1st Lieut. James Henry Baucham James D. Beane 1st Lieut. Charles John Biddle Major Stewart Bird 1st Lieut. William O. Butler Captain Douglas Campbell Captain Richard Carside 1st Lieut. Thomas G. Cassady 1st Lieut. Thomas G. Cassady 1st Lieut. Chas. Wesley Chapman, Jr. 2nd Lieut. Arthur J. Coyle Captain Kenneth P. Culbert 2nd Lieut. Karl H. Eymann 2nd Lieut. Charles C. Fleet 1st Lieut. Christopher Wm. Ford Captain Ernest A. Giroux 1st Lieut. Raymond C. Hill 1st Lieut. Raymond C. Hill 1st Lieut. Raymond C. Hill 1st Lieut. Sidney I. Howell 1st Lieut. Frank O'Driscoll Hunter 1st Lieut. Henry Jones 1st Lieut.	Charles T. Menoher. Maj. Gen. G. DeFreest Larner. 1st Lieut. Manderson Lehr 1st Lieut. James A. Meissner. Major Charles I. Merrick. 1st Lieut. Paul Meyers 2nd Lieut. Robert Moore 1st Lieut. Leo L. Murphy. 1st Lieut. Leo L. Murphy. 1st Lieut. Carter Landram Ovington 1st Lieut. David McK. Peterson Major Granville Pollock 1st Lieut. William Ponder 2nd Lieut. Charles P. Porter 2nd Lieut. Charles P. Porter 2nd Lieut. John A. Posey 2nd Lieut. John A. Posey 2nd Lieut. Leifford R. Powell 1st Lieut. David E. Putnam 1st Lieut. David E. Putnam 1st Lieut. Joseph C. Raible, Jr. 1st Lieut. Joseph C. Raible, Jr. 1st Lieut. Rufus Randall Rand Sergeant Walter Davis Rheno Corporal Edward V. Rickenbacker Captain Ralph Royce Lt. Colonel Malcolm A. Sedgwick 2nd Lieut. Morteu Seymour Lieut. Harry Shaffer 2nd Lieut. Reginald Sinclaire Sergeant
	mateonii A. Seugwick in Lieut.
Frank O'Driscoll Hunter1st Lieut.	Morteu SeymourLieut.
Arthur H. Jones1st Lieut.	Harry Shaffer2nd Lieut.
Henry Jones1st Lieut.	Reginald Sinclaire Sergeant
Henry P. JonesSergeant	Louis C. Simon, Jr1st Lieut.
Charles Maury Jones Captain	Donald StoneCorporal
Charles Wayne KerwoodSergeant	William ThawLt. Colonel
Charles Kinsolving1st Lieut.	George Evans Turnure1st Lieut.
George Marion Kyle1st Lieut.	James E. Wallace1st Lieut.
deside marion rilerst ment	vames in manaco

William E. Wass1st Lie	eut. J	Joseph 1	Volney	Wilson	1st	Lieut
Charles Herbert Wilcox1st Lie	eut. E	Houston	Woody	ward	Coı	rporai
Alan Winslow2nd Lie	eut. J	James N	Torman	Hall	Ca	ıptain

#### FRENCH CITATIONS

Valentine J. Burger.....2nd Lieut. Alexander T. Grier.....2nd Lieut. Horace A. Lake .........2nd Lieut.

#### ITALIAN CROCE AL MERITO DI GUERRA

The following American officers serving with the Italian Royal Air Force have been awarded the Italian War Cross:

Major:

Fiorello H. La Guardia

First Lieutenants:

James L. Bahl (deceased) Raymond P. Baldwin Arthur M. Beach Allen W. Bevin Gilbert P. Bogert Arthur E. Clement

De Witt Coleman, Jr. (deceased) Kenneth G. Collins

William G. Cochran Alexander M. Craig Herbert C. Dobbs, Jr. Edmund A. Donnan Norton Downs, Jr. Arthur D. Farguhar Harry S. Kinkenstaedt

Warren S. Wilson

Spencer L. Hart

Second Lieutenants:

James Kennedy Norman Terry

Willis S. Fitch

Donald G. Frost

William O. Frost Gosta A. Johnson

Wallace Hoggson

LeRoy D. Kiley

Oble Mitchell William H. Potthoff

James P. Hanley, Jr. George C. Hering

Herman F. Kreuger

Paton MacGilvary

Aubrey G. Russel

Norman Sweetser

Warren Wheeler Alfred S. R. Wilson

William B. Shelton

Emory E. Watchorn Frederick K. Weyerhaeuser

### ITALIAN CITATIONS

The following American officers, first lieutenants, attached to the Italian Air Service, have been mentioned in citations: Norman Sweetser

James P. Hanley, Jr. Emory E. Watchorn George C. Hering

Frederick K. Weyerhaeuser William P. Shelton

## KILLED IN ACTION

The following list of officers of the Air Service, who lost their lives at the front in 1918, is compiled from official sources, but as all the records are not at hand it cannot be regarded as complete or final.

Aldrich, Perry Henry, 1st Lieut., 135th Aero Squadron, Oct. 29, Essex Junc-

Angel, Cyril M., 2d Lieut., 12th Aero Squadron, May 14, Attleboro, Mass. Armstrong, Henry Guion, 1st Lieut., 13th Aero Squadron, Oct. 4, Memphis, Tenn.

- Bahl, James La Verne, 1st Lieut., Italian front. Oct. 29, Wooster, Ohio. Baker, H. T., 1st Lieut. (C. A. C.), 91st Aero Squadron, Aug. 15, Williamsport, Pa.
- Barber, Newell C., 2d Lieut., French Escadrille No. 12, Aug. 21, Medford, Oreg.
- Beauchamp, Oliver T., 1st Lieut., 27th Aero Squadron, Aug. 1, Princess Anne, Md.
- Bellows, Franklin B, 2d Lieut., 50th Aero Squadron, Sept. 13, Wilmette, Ill. Bittenger, Howard P., 2d Lieut., 17th Squadron, Royal Air Force, Aug. 26, New York, N. Y.
- Bleckley, Erwin R., 2d Lieut. (F. A.), 50th Aero Squadron, Oct. 15, Wichita, Kans.
- Blodgett, Richard Ashley, 1st Lieut., 95th Aero Squadron, May 17, West Newton, Mass.
- Boldt, H. St. John, 2d Lieut. (102d Inf.), 1st Aero Squadron, July 20, New York, N. Y.
- Bowen, Joseph B., 2d Lieut., 32d Squadron, Royal Air Force, Sept. 7, Pawtucket, R. I.
- Bowyer, James E., 2d Lieut., 135th Aero Squadron, Sept. 12, Yankton, S. Dak. Brodne, Clarence A., 1st Lieut., 13th Aero Squadron, Oct. 1, Wichita, Kans. Broomfield, Hugh D. G., 1st Lieut., 93d Aero Squadron, Oct. 21, Gadstone, Ore.
- Brotherton, Wm. E., 2d Lieut., 147th Aero Squadron, Oct. 21, Gaussone, Ol.
- Bruce, Alexander Bern, 1st Lieut., 94th Aero Squadron, Aug. 17, Lawrence, Mass.
- Burns, Jas. S. G., 2d Lieut. (165th Inf.), 86th Aero Squadron, Aug. 11, New York, N. Y.
- Campbell, Murton L, 1st Lieut., 17th Squadron, Royal Air Force, Aug. 23, Wakeman, Ohio.
- Carpenter, J. I., 1st Lieut., 73d Squadron Royal Air Force, June 11, Rochelle, Ill.
- Case, Lyman E., 1st Lieut., 17th Squadron, Royal Air Force, Aug. 11, Lamoni, Iowa.
- Cassard, Daniel W., 1st Lieut., 147th Aero Squadron, July 16, Grand Rapids, Mich.
- Chapman, Charles Wesley, Jr., 2d Lieut., 94th Aero Squadron, May 3, Jackson, Mich.
- Cochran, Robert James, 1st Lieut., 8th Aero Squadron, Oct. 10, Camilla, Ga. Cochrane, Stanley L., 2d Lieut., 166th Aero Squadron, Oct. 31, Crisfield, Md. Coleman, DeWitt, Jr., 1st Lieut., Italian Front, Oct. 29, Tenafly, N. J.
- Coleman, Dewitt, Jr., 1st Lieut., Italian Front, Oct. 29, Tenany, N. J. Collins, Phelps, Captain, 103d Aero Squadron, March 15, Detroit Mich.
- Coolidge, Hamilton, Captain, 94th Aero Squadron, Oct. 27, Boston, Mass. Craig, Harry Worthington, 1st Lieut., French Escadrille No. 12, Aug. 20,
- Cleveland, Ohio. Cronin, Edward M., 1st Lieut., 96th Aero Squadron, Sept. 17, Bayonne, N. J. Crumb, Harris E., 2d Lieut., 9th Aero Squadron, Sept. 30, St. Louis, Mo.
- Crumb, Harris E., 2d Lieut., 9th Aero Squadron, Sept. 30, St. Louis, Mo. Culbert, Kenneth, 2d Lieut., Marine Corps, May 22, East Orange, N. J. Curry, Irby R., 1st Lieut., 95th Aero Squadron, Aug. 10, Marlin, Texas.
- Cutter, Edward B., 1st Lieut., 90th Aero Squadron, Oct. 21, Spokane, Wash.
- Davidson, Gilford C., 1st Lieut., Aug. 2, San Francisco, Cal. Davis, Philip W., 2d Lieut., 94th Aero Squadron, June 2, West Newton, Mass.
- Davis, Philip, 1st Lieut, 99th Squadron, Royal Air Force, July 30, Roselle, N. J.
- Dowd, Meredith, 2d Lieut., 147th or 177th Aero Squadron, Oct. 26, Orange, N. J.
- Emerson, William K. B., Jr., 2d Lieut. (F. A.), 12th Aero Squadron, May 14, Rye, N. Y.
- Eyman, Karl Henry, 2d Lieut. (Inf.), Second Infantry, June 5, Lancaster, Ohio.

Fuller, Roswell Hayes, 1st Lieut., 93d Aero Squadron, Sept. 28, Chicago, Ill. Gardiner, E. H., 2d Lieut. (F. A.), 50th Aero Squadron, Sept. 14, Boston, Mass.
Garnsey, Edward Grant, 1st Lieut., 94th Aero Squadron, Oct. 29, Chicago, Ill. Garrett, Claude S., 1st Lieut., 8th Aero Squadron, Oct. 10, Lourens, S. C. Giroux, Ernest A., 1st Lieut., 103d Aero Squadron, May 22, Boston, Mass. Goettler, Harold E., 2d Lieut., 50th Aero Squadron, Oct. 6, Chicago, Ill. Gracie, Ralph D., 1st Lieut., 17th Aero Squadron, Aug. 12, Bemidji, Minn. Grider, John McG., 1st Lieut., 85th Aero Squadron, June 18, Chicago, Ill. Gundelach, Andre A. H., 1st Lieut., 96th Aero Squadron and Royal Air Force,

Forbes, Earl, 2d Lieut., 20th Aero Squadron, Sept. 27, Fairmont, Neb. Fox, Raymond F., 1st Lieut., 1st Aero Squadron, Oct. 7, Buffalo, N. Y. Frobisher, Joseph E., 2d Lieut., 148th Squadron, Royal Air Force, Sept. 8,

Fisher, John Jacob, 1st Lieut., Oct. 14, Punxsutawney, Pa.

Arlington, N. J.

Sept. 14, Chicago, Ill.

N. C.

Hamilton, Lloyd A., 1st Lieut., 17th Aero Squadron, Aug. 26, Burlington, Vt. Hammer, Earl M., 1st Lieut., June 12, San Francisco, Cal. Hanscom, Austin F., 2d Lieut. (C. A. C.), 1st Aero Squadron, Sept. 26, Wilmar, Wis. Harris, David B., 2d Lieut., 20th Aero Squadron, Sept. 27, Chicago, Ill. Hill, R. C., 1st Lieut. (F. A.), 99th Aero Squadron, Sept. 14, Lewiston, Idaho. Hirth. F. K., 2d Lieut. (C.A.C.), 91st Aero Squadron, July 16, Toledo, Ohio. Hitchcock, R. W., 1st Lieut., 88th Aero Squadron, Sept. 4, Los Angeles, Cal. Hobbs, Warren T., 1st Lieut., 103d Aero Squadron, June 25, Worcester, Mass. Hunt, Jason Solon, 1st Lieut., 27th Aero Squadron, Aug. 1, Johnson, Vt. Jenkinson, Harry, Jr., 1st Lieut., 148th Squadron, Royal Air Force, Sept. 20, Elizabeth, N. J. Jerome, Gilbert M., 1st Lieut., July 12, New Haven, Conn. Johnson, Arthur Theodore, 1st Lieut., 135th Aero Squadron, Sept. 12, Chestertown, Ind. Johnson, Conrad G., 1st Lieut., Oct. 23, Duluth, Minn. Johnson, Donald, 1st Lieut., 104th Aero Squadron, Sept. 12, Harrisburg, Pa. Johnson, Harry F. W., 1st Lieut., May 21, South Bethlehem. Pa.
Kahle, Clarence C., 1st Lieut., 99th Aero Squadron, Oct. 3, Pittsburgh, Pa.
Kearney, Thomas E., 1st Lieut., Aug. 14, Memphis, Tenn.
Keesler, Samuel R., Jr., 2d Lieut. (Inf.), 24th Aero Squadron, Oct. 9, no record of address. Kelty, Asher E., 1st Lieut., 91st Aero Squadron, Sept. 26, Rice Lake, Wis. Kennedy, Chester H., 2d Lieut. (F. A.), 1st Aero Squadron, Oct. 23, McMinnville, Tenn. Ker, David, 1st Lieut., 1st Aero Squadron, Sept. 12, New York, N. Y. Kimber, Arthur C., 1st Lieut., 22d Aero Squadron, Sept. 26, Brooklyn, N. Y. Kinney, Clair A., 1st Lieut., 49th Aero Squadron, Oct. 4, Endicott, Wash. Kull, George P., 1st Lieut., Sept. 14, Chicago, Ill. Layton, Lawrence, 1st Lieut., French Escadrille No. 77, July 28, Georgetown, Del. Lehr, Mandernson, 1st Lieut., French Escadrille No. 117, July 15, Albion, Loud, Harold D., 2d Lieut., 88th Aero Squadron, Oct. 1, Oscada, Mich. Lowry, F. B., 2d Lieut. (C. A. C.), 91st Aero Squadron, Sept. 26, Denver, Col. Loughran, L. B., 1st Lieut., Royal Air Force, July 28, New York, N. Y. Lufberry, Victor Raoul, Major, 94th Aero Squadron, May 19, Wallingford, Conn.

Luke, Frank, Jr., 1st Lieut., 27th Aero Squadron, Sept. 30. Phoenix, Ariz. Lumsden, John C., 2d Lieut. (F. A.), 12th Aero Squadron, Aug. 15, Wilson,

- MacArthur, John, 2d Lieut., 27th Aero Squadron, July 20, Entiat, Wash. Manier, Emmet Malone, 1st Leiut., French Escadrille No. 117, Oct. 2, Chi-
- Matthews, Alexander F, 1sst Lieut., 84th Squadron, Royal Air Force, Aug. 24, Louisburg, W. Va.
- Matthews, Richard P., 1st Lieut., 23d Aero Squadron, Sept. 27, New York City.
- McClendon, Joel H., 1st Lieut., 88th Aero Squadron, Aug. 11, Farmers Branch,
- McCormick, Jno. Fletcher, 1st Lieut., 1st Aero Squadron, Nov. 7, Collins, Miss. McCormick, Vaughn R., 2d Lieut., 139th Aero Squadron, Sept. 12, Columbus,
- Miller, Jas. Ely, Captain, 95th Aero Squadron, March 9, New York City.
- Miller, John C, 1st Lieut., 12th Aero Squadron, July 28, Fairview, N. C.
- Miller, Walter B., 2d Lieut., Aug 16, Washingtonville, N. Y. Mitchell, John L., Captain, 95th Aero Squadron, May 27, Milwaukee, Wis.
- Moody, Richard Wm., 2d Lieut., French Escadrille No. 12, July 16, Minneapolis, Minn.
- Moore, Frank M., 2d Lieut. (F. A), 88th Aero Squadron, Sept. 4, Houston, Texas.
- Morse, Guy Edward, 2d Lieut., 135th Aero Squadron, Sept. 16, Kansas City,
- Mortimer, Richard, Jr., 1st Lieut., May 22, Tuxedo Park, N. Y.
- Noble, Ralph M., 2d Lieut. (Inf.), May 14, Galesburg, Ill. Norton, Frederick W., 1st Lieut., 27th Aero Squadron, July 23, Columbus, Ohio.
- Nutt, Alan, 1st Lieut., 94th Aero Squadron, Sept. 26, Cliffside, N. J.
- O'Donnell, Paul John, 2d Lieut., 96th Aero Squadron, Sept. 26, Wilmington,
- Offutt, Jarvis J., 1st Lieut., 56th Squadron. Royal Air Force, Aug. 13, Omaha, Neb.
- Ovington, Carter L., 1st Lieut., French Escadrille No. 98, May 29, Paris, France.
- Palmer, Keene M., 1st Lieut., 103d Aero Squadron, Oct. 13, South Dayton,
- Parker, Raymond W., 2d Lieut. (Inf.), With French, May 4, Champaigne, Ill. Parrott, Edmund Anthony, 1st Lieut., 20th Aero Squadron, Sept. 26, San Mateo, Cal.
- Patterson, Alfred D., 1st Lieut., 93d Aero Squadron, Oct. 29, Wilkinsburg, Pa. Petree, Harris E., 1st Lieut., 22d Aero Squadron, Sept. 26, Washington, D. C. Phillips, Walter A., 1st Lieut. (F. A.), 1st Aero Squadron, Oct 7, Nixon, Texas.
- Plummer, Chas. W., 2d Lieut. (F. A.), 88th Aero Squadron, Aug. 11, Boston, Mass. (?)
- Potter, Wm. C., 1st Lieut., 20th Aero Squadron, Oct. 10, New York City. Prentice, Lee C., 2d Lieut., 104th Squadron, Royal Air Force, Minneapolis,
- Putnam, David E., 1st Lieut., 139th Aero Squadron, Sept. 14, Allston, Mass. Reilly, Lloyd Geary E., 1st Lieut., 99th Aero Squadron, Oct. 31, Memphis.
- Rhinelander, Philip N., 1st Lieut., 20th Aero Squadron, Sept. 27. Germantown.
- Richards, John Francisco, 1st Lieut., 1st Aero Squadron, Sept. 26. Kansas City, Mo.
- Roosevelt, Quentin, 1st Lieut., 95th Aero Squadron, July 14, Oyster Bay, Long Island, N. Y.
- Ross, Cleo Jepson, 1st Lieut., 8th Balloon Company, Sept. 26, Titusville, Pa. Roth, Irving, 1st Lieut., 49th Aero Squadron, Sept. 26, New York City.

Russell, Wm. Mint, 1st Lieut., 95th Aero Squadron, Aug. 11, Detroit, Mich. Rust, Charles E., 2d Lieut., 104th Aero Squadron, Oct. 11, Gallipolis, Ohio.

Sanford, Jos. R., 1st Lieut., April 12, Skowhegan, Me.

- Sands, Charles B., 1st Lieut., 27th Aero Squadron, Aug. 1, Richmond, Va. Shilling (Franz F.). Francis S., 1st Lieut. (C.A.C.). 91st Aero Squadron, July 2, Schenectady, N. Y.
- Schoen, Karl, 1st Lieut., 139th Aero Squadron, Oct. 30. Indianapolis, Ind. Sebring, Raymond R., 2d Lieut., 91st Aero Squadron, Sept. 7, Morena, Mich. Seibold, George V., 1st Lieut., 148th Aero Squadron, Aug. 26, Washington,

Shaw, Irvin D., 1st Lieut., 48th Squadron, Royal Air Force, July 9, Sumter,

Shoemaker, Harold G., 1st Lieut., 17th Squadron, Royal Air Force, Oct. 5, Bridgeton, N. J.

Simon, Herbert J., 1st Lieut., 13th Aero Squadron, Oct. 14, San Francisco,

Simpkins, Jas. Claude, 2d Lieut., Sept. 18, Missoula, Mont.

Smyth, Walter William, 1st Lieut., 94th Aero Squadron, Aug. 17, New York City.

Stephenson, Wayne B., 1st Lieut., 28th Aero Squadron, Sept. 13, Berkeley, Cal. Stevens, Henry L., 1st Lieut., 50th Aero Squadron, Sept. 14, Marcks' Corner. S. C.

Stevens, John H., 1st Lieut., 147th Aero Squadron, Albion, N. Y.

Stiles, Robert H., 1st Lieut., 13th Aero Squadron, Sept. 16, Fitchburg, Mass. Suiter, Wilbur C., 1st Lieut., 135th Aero Squadron, Sept. 13, Shamokin, Pa. Sykes, Don J., 2d Lieut. (Inf.), 1st Aero Squadron, Aug. 1, Peedee, N. C.

Taylor, Everett Alan, 2d Lieut., 20th Aero Squadron, Sept 27, Cleveland,

Okla. Thomas, Gerald P., 2d Lieut., 17th Squadron, Royal Air Force, Sept. 22. Flushing, N. Y.

Upton, Charles H., 1st Lieut., 50th Aero Squadron, Aug. 28, Arlington Heights. Mass.

Way, Howard Pennington, 2d Lieut., 96th Aero Squadron, Sept. 14, St. Davids, Pa.

Wehner, Joseph Fritz, 1st Lieut., 27th Aero Squadron, Sept. 20, Everett, Mass. White, Sidney Warren, 1st Lieut., 27th Aero Squadron, Oct. 31, Elizabeth City, N. C. White, Wilbert Wallace, 1st Lieut., 147th Aero Squadron, Dec. 13, New

York City.

Whitner, R. H., 2d Lieut., March 13, Rock Hill. S. C.

Wicks, Glenn D., 1st Lieut., 17th Squadron, Royal Air Force, Oct. 5, San Quoit, N. Y.

Wold, Ernest G., 1st Lieut., 1st Aero Squadron, Aug. 1, Minneapolis, Minn. Wood, Francis A., 2d Lieut., 99th Squadron, Royal Air Force, Sept. 13, Nwe York City.

Wooten, Jas. C. (or T.), 2d Lieut. (C.A.C.), 1st Aero Squadron, Aug 1, Columbia, Tenn.

Zellers, George H., 1st Lieut., 20th Squadron, Royal Air Forces, July 30, Lancaster, Pa.

Thirty-two officers were killed and thirty-nine injured in accidents behind the lines, 133 were wounded in action and 145 were taken prisoner.

Dr. Henry Van Dyke wrote these memorial verses especially for "U. S. Air Service."

"In the blue heaven the clouds will come and go, Scudding before the gale, or drifting slow As galleons becalmed in Sundown Bay; And through the air the birds will wing their way Soaring to far-off heights, or flapping low, Or darting like an arrow from the bow; And when the twilight comes the stars will show, One after one, their tranquil bright array

In the blue heaven.

"But ye who fearless flew to meet the foc, Eagles of freedom—nevermore, we know, Shall we behold you floating far away. Yet clouds and birds and every starry ray Will draw our hearts to where your spirits glow In the blue heaven."

### CHAPTER XXII.

#### GENERAL HAIG'S STORY OF THE GERMAN DEFEAT.

(Published January 3, 1919, as a Supplement to *The London Gazette*. The Essential Portion Republished in This Volume by Special Permission.)

The Secretary of State for War has received the following dispatch from Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, G.T., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., Commander-in-Chief of the British armies in France:

#### GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

# (1) State of the British Armies.

At the end of April, 1918, though the onrush of the German Armies had been stemmed for the time being, the situation on the Western Front, and particularly on the British portion of it, was still critical.

The immense weight of the enemy's first and heaviest onslaughts in March and April, and the unprecedented masses of men and material employed by him had called for practically the whole strength of the British Armies to withstand them, and had left our forces greatly weakened. Although prompt steps had been taken by the home authorities to dispatch to France as rapidly as possible all reinforcements then available in England, as well as to recall considerable bodies of troops from other theatres of war, these reinforcements required time to arrive. A further period was needed to complete their training and equipment to allow troops brought from abroad to become acclimatised, and to enable the new drafts to become assimilated within their various units.

Meanwhile it had become impossible to maintain at an effective strength the full number of our divisions. At the beginning of May no less than eight divisions had been reduced to cadres and were temporarily written off altogether as fighting units. . . .

Arrangements had been made at the end of April to hand over to the French for employment on a quiet part of their front a further five divisions, comprising the IX Corps. These had only just been reconstituted, and, being badly in need of rest and training, were not yet considered fit to hold an active sector. In return for these

five British divisions . . . the French had dispatched a number of their divisions to be held in reserve in rear of the British right and to strengthen the Flanders front.

There remained available for operations on the British front fortyfive British infantry divisions most of which were below establishment. . . . All were urgently in need of rest; they contained a large number of young, partially trained and totally inexperienced recruits.

# (2) The Position of Our Allies.

The French though as yet they had been less heavily engaged than ourselves had none the less been obliged to employ a substantial proportion of their reserves in the fighting south of the Somme and

north of the Lys.

The American Army, though rapidly increasing in numbers and efficiency, was not yet ready to take the field in sufficient strength materially to affect the situation. In short, the German attacks, though they had failed to break the Allied line, had stretched the resources of the Allies to the uttermost; while before Amiens and Hazebrouck they had brought the enemy within a short distance of strategic points of great importance. . . .

# (3) The Enemy's Position.

On the other hand, the enemy had undoubtedly paid heavily for his successes, and had used up a great number of divisions, among them his best and his most highly trained. . . . The enemy was estimated to possess seventy-five divisions in reserve on the Western Front. It was evident that further German attacks could not long be postponed if the enemy was to achieve a decision before the weight of the American Army was thrown into the scale.

# (4) The Enemy's Intentions.

At this period, early in May, the Allied High Command repeatedly expressed the opinion that the enemy would renew his attack on a large scale on the front Arras-Amiens-Montdidier. The strategic results to be obtained by the capture of Amiens, the separation of the French and British Armies, and an advance toward the sea along the Valley of the Somme were very great, and might well have proved decisive. . . .

# (5) The Policy of the British Armies.

The enemy still possessed a sufficient superiority of force to retain the initiative, and it was known that he would be compelled to act within a comparatively limited time if he were to turn his superiority to account before it passed from him. . . . The common object of the French and ourselves was to tide over the period which must still



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MAJ.-GEN. JOHN F. O'RYAN,
Commander of the 27th Div., U. S. A.



GEN. OMAR BUNDY, Commander U. S. Marines.



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GENERAL PETAIN,
Commander of French Army under Gen.
Foch.



BRIG.-GEN. WILLIAM MITCHELL, Chief of the Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces.



LT.-GEN. ROBERT L. BULLARD, Commander of the Second American Army.




LIEUT. J. NORMAN HALL, American Ace.



GEN. ALBERTUS WRIGHT CATLIN, of the U. S. Marines.



LIEUT. LESLIE J. RUMMELL,
American Ace.




☼ Underwood & Underwood LIEUT. J. M. SWAAB, American Ace.



SERGT. FRANK L. BAYLIS, American Ace.



LIEUT. CYRIL BALL, Royal Flying Corps.



LIEUT. PAT O'BRIEN, American Aviator, Enlisted in Royal Flying Corps.



MAJOR JAMES MEISNER American Ace.



LIEUT. GEORGE A. VAUGHN, JR., American Ace.



© Underwood & Underwood LIEUT. JEAN CHAPUT, French Ace.



SERGT. DAVID E. PUTNAM, American Ace.

elapse until the growth of the American Armies and the arrival of Allied reinforcements placed the opposing forces once more on a foot-

ing of equality.

The situation was an anxious one, but it was confidently expected that, if all measures open to us were undertaken promptly and executed with the energy and zeal demanded by the occasion, the enemy's future assaults would be met and overthrown as those had been which he had already made. If the Allies could preserve their front unbroken until August at the latest there was every hope that during the later portion of the year they would be able to regain the initiative and pass to the offensive.

The period under review accordingly divides itself naturally into two main sections. During the first, the policy governing the action of the forces under my command was the maintenance of an active defence, whereby our line might be preserved unbroken, while every opportunity was taken to rest and train our sorely-tried Divi-

sions. . .

The second period arrived when the swelling list of German casualties and the steady influx of American and Allied reinforcements had produced an equilibrium of strength between the opposing forces. The complete success of the Allied counter-attack on the 18th July near Soissons marked this turning-point in the year's campaign, and commenced the second phase of the Allied operations. Thereafter the initiative lay with the Allies and the growing superiority of their forces enabled them to roll back the tide of invasion with ever-increasing swiftness. At this point and in this connection I should like to pay my personal tribute to the foresight and determination of the French Marshal in whose hands the co-ordination of the action of the Allied Armies was placed.

# PART I-THE PERIOD OF ACTIVE DEFENCE.

#### Reorganization. (6)

During the period following the breakdown of the German attacks on the Lys the military centre of gravity moved to the south. . . .

At the outset of this period, the most pressing need after that of filling up the gaps in our divisions, was to close the breaches which the German advances had made in our successive defensive systems.

Further, the depth to which the enemy had penetrated in the Somme and Lys valley had disrupted important lateral lines of railway, and had created a situation of extreme gravity. . . . At Amiens, Béthune and Hazebrouck much-used railway junctions had been brought under the effective fire of the enemy's guns. To relieve the situation a comprehensive program of railway construction was undertaken by us in conjunction with the French. This involved ex-

tensive doublings and quadruplings of existing railways and the building of new lines for which some 200 miles of broad gauge track was laid during the period April-July. . . . A complete series of new defensive lines was built, involving the digging of 5,000 miles of trench.

# (7) Minor Operations in May and June.

While intense activity prevailed behind the lines, our fighting troops were not idle. Full use was made of harassing tactics by all arms, and in the Lys salient in particular the German troops were continually subjected to a most effective system of artillery harassing fire.

The losses suffered by the enemy in the Lys sector and the destruction caused to his artillery and material were very great.... These tactics undoubtedly postponed the renewal of the German offensive on this front until the Allied counter-offensive made it impossible....

## (8) Operations in July; Hamel Captured.

Two months of comparative quiet worked a great change in the condition of the British Armies. Our effective infantry divisions had risen from forty-five to fifty-two. In artillery we were stronger than we had ever been. . . .

I now felt strong enough to undertake operations of a somewhat larger scope, which would at once strengthen our position for defence and fit in with future schemes. . . .

A necessary preliminary to any operation to disengage Amiens was the recapture of our old positions east of Hamel and Vaire Wood and the clearing of the Villers Bretonneux Plateau. This was accomplished on the 4th July by the Australian Corps (Lieut.-General Sir J. Monash), with the aid of four companies of the 33rd American Division and sixty tanks. . . .

Our success at Hamel was followed by a series of admirably executed operations north of the Lys. . . .

### (9) Operations on the French Front.

By the end of July the reconstitution of the British Armies had been completed.... I had once more at my command an effective striking force, capable of taking the offensive with every hope of success.

Meanwhile, events of the utmost and most critical importance had

been taking place on the French front. . . .

At the end of May the enemy launched a violent surprise attack on the Aisne front. In this attack certain British divisions constituting the IX British Corps, which had been sent there to rest, became involved from the outset. . . .

About the 26th May, prisoners taken by the French gave the first definite information regarding the great offensive launched by the enemy on the Aisne front on the morning of the 27th May. This attack, delivered by twenty-eight German divisions supported by Tanks, was directed against the Sixth French Army on a front of about thirty-five miles northwest of Rheims. It involved the whole of the IX British Corps.

Preceded by an artillery and trench mortar bombardment of great intensity, the German infantry broke into battle positions of the Allied divisions. The enemy gained a footing on the Chemin des Dames at an early hour, and pressing on in the centre of his attack in overwhelming strength, forced the line of the Aisne on a wide front.

. .

On the 28th May and following days the enemy launched fresh attacks in great force on the whole battle front, pressing back our Allies to west of Soissons and south of Fere en Tardenois. The IX British Corps, greatly reduced in numbers by severe and incessant fighting, was forced to withdraw across the Vesle, and thence gradually pressed back in a south-easterly direction between the Vesle and the Ardre. . . . By the evening of the 30th May, at which date in the centre of his attack the enemy had reached the Marne, the rate of his advance in the British sector had begun to slacken. . . .

Though the enemy's attacks continued persistently for some time longer, and on the 6th June culminated in two determined attempts upon the important position known as the Montagne de Bligny which commands the valley of the Ardre, all these attacks were most gal-

lantly repulsed, and the enemy's advance definitely stayed.

Throughout this long period of incessant fighting against greatly superior numbers the behaviour of all arms of the British forces engaged was magnificent. What they achieved is best described in the words of the French General, under whose orders they came, who wrote of them: "They have enabled us to establish a barrier against which the hostile waves have beaten and shattered themselves. This none of the French who witnessed it will ever forget."

### (11) The Second Battle of the Marne.

While our troops were still engaged in the fighting southwest of Reims a fresh battle had broken out on the 7th June on the French front between Noyon and Montdidier. In this case the enemy did not succeed in effecting a surprise, but the strain thrown upon the French Armies by these two attacks was considerable. . . .

While, on the one hand, at the beginning of July it was known that Prince Rupprecht's reserve group of divisions about Douai and Valenciennes were still intact and opposite the British front, on the other hand, for a number of reasons, it was believed at French General Headquarters that the Germans were about to attack in strength

east and west of Reims. . . . Marshal Foch accordingly withdrew the whole of the French forces, some eight divisions, from Flanders, and transferred them southward to the French front. In addition he asked that four British divisions might be moved two of them to areas south of the Somme and two to positions astride that river, so as to ensure the connection between the French and British Armies about Amiens and to enable him to move four French divisions farther east to his right flank. . . .

On the 13th July a further request was received from Marshal Foch that these four British divisions might be placed unreservedly at his disposal, and that four other British divisions might be dispatched to take their places behind the junction of the Allied Armies.

Meanwhile, on the 15th July, the enemy had launched his expected attack east and southwest of Reims, and after making some progress at first and effecting the passage of the Marne, was held by the French, American and Italian forces on those fronts. On the 18th July Marshal Foch launched the great counter-offensive which he had long been preparing on the front between Chateau-Thierry and Soissons, supporting this successful stroke by vigorous attacks also on other parts of the German salient.

... The sector assigned to the British troops, XXII Corps, covered a front of 8,000 yards astride the Ardre River, and consisted of an open valley bottom, with steep wooded slopes on either sides. Both valley and slopes were studded with villages and hamlets, which were for the most part intact and afforded excellent cover to the

enemy.

On this front our troops were engaged for a period of ten days in continuous fighting of a most difficult and trying nature. Throughout this period steady progress was made in the face of vigorous and determined resistance. . . . in these operations, throughout which French artillery and Tanks rendered invaluable assistance. . . .

Meanwhile, on the 23rd July, the 15th and 34th Divisions attacked on the west side of the salient, south-west of Soissons. These divisions also had many days of heavy and continuous fighting on different parts of this front until withdrawn during the first days of August. . . . The 15th Division in particular earned distinction in the fierce struggle for Buzancy.

#### PART II-THE PERIOD OF OFFENSIVE ACTION.

### (13) The Situation at the End of July.

The definite collapse of the ambitious offensive launched by the enemy on the 15th July, and the striking success of the Allied coun-

ter-offensive south of the Aisne, effected a complete change in the whole military situation. The German Army had made its effort and had failed. The period of its maximum strength had been passed, and the bulk of the reserves accumulated during the winter had been used up. On the other hand, the position of the Allies in regard to reserves had greatly improved. The fresh troops made available during the late spring ard early summer had been incorporated and trained. The British Army was ready to take the offensive; while the American Army was growing rapidly and had already given convincing proof of the high fighting quality of its soldiers.

At a conference held on the 23rd July, when the success of the attack of the 18th July was well assured, the methods by which the advantage already gained could be extended were discussed in detail. The Allied Commander-in-Chief asked that the British, French and American Armies should each prepare plans for local offensives, to be taken in hand as soon as possible, with certain definite objectives of a limited nature. These objectives on the British front were the disengagement of Amiens and the freeing of the Paris-Amiens Railway by an attack on the Albert-Montdidier front. The role of the French and American Armies was to free other strategic railways by operations farther south and east.

In addition to the disengagement of Amiens, the situation on the British front presented strong arguments in favour of certain other schemes such as the disengagement of Hazebrouck by the recapture of Kemmel Hill, combined with an operation in the direction of La Bassee. . . .

These different operations had already been the subject of correspondence between Marshal Foch and myself. I had come to the conclusion that of the tasks assigned to the British forces the operation east of Amiens should take precedence, as being the most important and the most likely to give large results.

It would depend upon the nature of the success which might be obtained in these different Allied operations whether they could be more fully exploited before winter set in. . . . It was obviously of vital importance to the enemy to maintain intact his front opposite St. Quentin and Cambrai, and for this purpose he depended on the great fortified zone known as the Hindenburg Line.

# (14) General Scheme of British Operations.

The brilliant success of the Amiens attack was the prelude to a series of battles, in which, throughout three months of continuous fighting, the British armies advanced without a check from one victory to another. The progress of this mighty conflict divides itself into certain stages, which themselves are grouped into well-defined phases.

- (a) During the first part of the struggle the enemy sought to defend himself in the deep belt of prepared positions and successive trench systems which extended from the springtide of the German advance, about Albert and Villers Bretonneux to the Hindenburg Line between St. Quentin and the Scarpe. From these positions, scene of the stubborn battles of the two preceding years, the German Armies were forced back step by step by a succession of methodical attacks which culminated in the breaking through of the Hindenburg Line defences.
- (b) Thereafter, during the second period of the struggle our troops were operating in practically open country against an enemy who endeavored to stand, on such semi-prepared or natural defensive positions as remained to him, for a period long enough to enable him to organize his retreat and avoid overwhelming disaster. The final stages of our operations, therefore, are concerned with the breaking of the enemy's resistance on these lines.

Throughout this latter period, the violence of our assaults and the rapidity of our advance toward the enemy's vital centres of communication about Maubeuge threatened to cut the main avenue of escape for the German forces opposite the French and American Armies. The position of the German Armies in Flanders themselves unable to withstand the attacks of the Allied forces operating under the King of Belgians was equally endangered by our progress behind their left flank. To the south and north of the area in which our victorious Armies were driving forward through his weakening defence the enemy was compelled to execute hasty withdrawals from wide tracts of territory.

The second phase had already reached its legitimate conclusion when the signing of the Armistice put an end to hostilities. Finally defeated in the great battles of the 1st and 4th November and utterly without reserves the enemy at that date was falling back without coherent plan in wide-spread disorder and confusion.

### The Armistice

At 11 a. m. on the 11th November, in accordance with instructions received from the Commander-in-Chief of Allied Armies, hostilities were suspended. At that hour the right of the Fourth Army was east of the Franco-Belgian frontier and thence northwards our troops had reached the general line Sivry—Erquelinnes—Boussu—Jurbise—Herghies—Ghislenghien—Lessines—Grammont.

The military situation on the British front on the morning of 11th November can be stated very shortly. In the fighting since November 1st our troops had broken the enemy's resistance beyond possibility of recovery, and had forced on him a disorderly retreat along the whole front of the British Armies. Thereafter, the enemy

was capable neither of accepting nor refusing battle. . . . Our attack had been decisive. It had been followed by a rapid and costly withdrawal to the line of the Meuse.

The strategic plan of the Allies had been realized with a completeness rarely seen in war. When the armistice was signed by the enemy his defensive powers had already been definitely destroyed. A continuance of hostilities could only have meant disaster to the German Armies and the armed invasion of Germany.

### The Work of the Troops.

In three months of epic fighting the British Armies in France have brought to a sudden and dramatic end the great wearing-out battle of the past four years.

In our admiration for this outstanding achievement, the long years of patient and heroic struggle by which the strength and spirit and the enemy were gradually broken down cannot be forgotten. . . .

The work begun and persevered in so steadfastly by those brave men has been completed during the present year with a thoroughness to which the event bears witness, and with a gallantry which will live for all time in the history of our country. The annals of war hold record of no more wonderful recovery than that which, three months after the tremendous blows showered upon them on the Somme and on the Lys, saw the undefeated British Armies advancing from victory to victory, driving their erstwhile triumphant enemy back to and far beyond the line from which he started, and finally foreing him to acknowledge unconditional defeat.

The great series of victories won by the British forces between the 8th August and the 11th November is the outstanding feature of the events described in this Despatch. At Amiens and Bapaume, in the breaking of the Drocourt-Queant and Hindenburg systems, before Le Chateau and on the Selle, in Flanders and on the Sambre, the enemy was again and again brought to battle and defeated.

In the decisive contests of this period, the strongest and most vital parts of the enemy's front were attacked by the British, his lateral communications were cut and his best divisions fought to a stand-still. On the different battle fronts 187,000 prisoners and 2,850 guns were captured by us, bringing the total of our prisoners for the present year to over 201,000. Immense numbers of machine guns and trench mortars were taken also, the figures of those actually counted exceeding 29,000 machine guns and some 3,000 trench mortars. These results were achieved by 59 fighting British divisions, which in the course of three months of battle engaged and defeated 99 separate German divisions.

This record furnishes the proof of the skill of our commanders and their staffs, as well as of the fine fighting qualities of the British

regimental officer and soldier. It is a proof also of the overwhelmingly decisive part played by the British Armies on the western front

in bringing the enemy to his final defeat.

It is an accepted military doctrine that in good defensive positions any given force can hold up an attacking force of considerably greater numbers. This doctrine was proved in the fighting of March and April of this year, when, despite the enormous superiority of force which the enemy was able to concentrate against the right of the British Armies, all his efforts to effect a definite break-through were frustrated by our defence. Yet, as has been seen, when the tide of battle turned and the British Armies advanced to the attack, throughout practically the whole of the long succession of battles which ended in the complete destruction of the German powers of resistance, the attacking British troops were numerically inferior to the German forces they defeated.

It would be impossible to devise a more eloquent testimony to the unequalled spirit and determination of the British soldier, of all ranks and services. . . .

Our Allies.

At the moment when the final triumph of the Allied cause is assured, we and all others of the Allied and Associated Armies can look back on the years that have gone with a satisfaction undimmed by any hint of discord or conflict of interest and ideals. Few alliances of the past can boast such a record. Few can show a purpose more tenaciously and faithfully pursued, or so fully and gloriously realized. If the complete unity and harmony of our action is to be ascribed in part to the justice of our cause, it is due also to the absolute loyalty with which that cause has been pursued by all those entrusted with the control of the different Allied Armies that have fought side by side with ours.

I have the honor to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient servant,

D. HAIG,

Field-Marshal.

Commanding-in-Chief, British Armies in France.

#### CHAPTER XXIII

GENERAL ALLENBY'S OWN STORY OF THE SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN IN PALESTINE.

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The Secretary of State for War has received the following Dispatch from General Sir Edmund Allenby, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., Commanding-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force:

My Lord:

I have the honor to forward a dispatch describing the operations which, commencing on September 19th, resulted in the destruction of the enemy's army, the liberation of Palestine and Syria, and the

occupation of Damascus and Aleppo.

The last Indian battalions to arrive had been incorporated in divisions early in August. Some of these battalions had only been formed a few months, and I should have liked to have given them further opportunities to accustom themselves to the conditions prevailing on this front before calling on them to play a part in arduous operations on a large scale. The rains, however, usually commence at the end of October, rendering the plains of Sharon and Esdraelon impassable for transport, except along the few existing roads. Consequently, operations could not be postponed beyond the middle of September.

At the beginning of September I estimated the strength of the IVth, VIIth and VIIIth Turkish Armies to be 23,000 rifles, 3,000 sabres and 340 guns. The IVth Army, 6,000 rifles, 2,000 sabres and 74 guns, faced my Forces in the Jordan Valley. The VIIth Army held a front of some 20 miles astride the Jerusalem-Nablus road with 7,000 rifles and 111 guns, while the VIIIth Army front extended from Furkhah to the sea, and was held by 10,000 rifles and 157 guns.

In addition, the garrison of Maan and the posts on the Hejaz rail-way north of it and the enemy's general reserve, distributed between Tiberias, Nazareth and Haifa, brought his total strength to some 4,000 sabres, 32,000 rifles and 400 guns—representing a ration strength, south of the line Rayak-Beirut, of 104,000.

I had at my disposal two cavalry divisions two mounted divisions, seven infantry divisions, an Indian infantry brigade, four unallotted battalions, and the French detachment (the equivalent of an infantry brigade, with other arms attached), a total, in the fighting line, of some 12,000 sabres, 57,000 rifles and 540 guns.

I had thus a considerable superiority in numbers over the enemy,

especially in mounted troops.

I was anxious to gain touch with the Arab Forces east of the Dead Sea, but the experience gained in the raids which I had undertaken against Amman and Es Salt in March and May had proved that the communications of a force in the hills of Moab were liable to interruption as long as the enemy was able to transfer troops from the west to the east bank of the Jordan. This he was in a position to do, as he controlled the crossing at Jisr ed Damieh.

The defeat of the VIIth and VIIIth Turkish Armies west of the Jordan would enable me to control this crossing. Moreover, the destruction of these armies, which appeared to be within the bounds of possibility, would leave the IVth Army isolated, if it continued to occupy the country south and west of Amman. I determined, there-

fore, to strike my blow west of the Jordan.

With the exception of a small and scattered reserve, the whole of the Turkish Force west of the Jordan was enclosed in a rectangle 45 miles in length and only 12 miles in depth. The northern edge of this rectangle was a line from Jisr et Damieh on the Jordan, through Nablus and Tul Keram, to the sea. All the enemy's communications to Damascus ran northwards from the eastern half of this line, converging on El Afule and Beisan, some 25 miles to the north. Thence with the exception of the roads leading from El Afule along the western shore of the Sea of Galilee, his communications ran eastwards up the valley of the Yarmuk to Deraa, the junction of the Palestine and Hejaz Railways.

Thus El Afule, Beisan and Deraa were the vital points on his communications. If they could be seized, the enemy's retreat would be cut off. Deraa was beyond my reach, but not beyond that of mobile

detachments of the Arab Army.

El Afule, in the Plain of Esdraelon, and Beisan, in the Valley of Jezreel, were within reach of my cavalry, provided the infantry could break through the enemy's defensive systems and create a gap for the cavalry to pass through. It was essential that this gap should be made at the commencement of operations, so that the cavalry might reach their destinations, 45 and 60 miles distant, before the enemy could make his escape. Moreover, whichever route the cavalry followed, the hills of Samaria, or their extension toward Mount Carmel, had to be crossed before the plain of Esdraelon and the valley of Jezreel could be reached; and it was most important that the enemy should not be given time to man the passes.

For this reason I decided to make my main attack in the coastal plain, rather than through the hills north of Jerusalem. In the hills the ground afforded the enemy positions of great natural strength, and taxed the physical energy of the attackers to the utmost. In addition, the route along the coast would enable the cavalry to pass through the hills of Samaria into the plain of Esraelon at their narrowest point, thus ensuring greater speed and less likelihood of being checked.

The coastal plain at Jiljulieh, the ancient Gilgal, is some 10 miles in width. The railway from Jiljulieh to Tul Keram skirts the foothills, running through a slight depression on the eastern edge of the plain. To the west of this depression the Turks had constructed two defensive systems. The first, 14,000 yards in length and 3,000 in depth, ran along a sandy ridge in a north-westerly direction from Bir Adas to the sea. It consisted of a series of works connected by continuous fire trenches. The second, or Et Tireh system, 3,000 yards in rear, ran from the village of that name to the mouth of the Nahr Falik. On the enemy's extreme right the ground, except for a narrow strip along the coast, is marshy, and could only be crossed in a few places.

The railway itself was protected by numerous works and by the fortified villages of Jiljulieh and Kalkilieh. The ground between our front line at Ras El Ain and these villages was open, and was overlooked from the enemy's works on the foothills round Kefr Kasim.

By reducing the strength of the troops in the Jordan Valley to a minimum, and by withdrawing my reserves from the hills north of Jerusalem, I was able to concentrate five divisions and the French detachment, with a total of 383 guns, for the attack on these defences. Thus, on the front of attack I was able to concentrate some 35,000 rifles against 8,000, and 383 guns againist 130. In addition, two cavalry and one Australian mounted divisions were available for this front.

The main difficulties lay in concealing the withdrawal of two cavalry divisions from the Jordan Valley, and in concentrating secretly, a large force in the coastal plain.

To prevent the decrease in strength in the Jordan Valley being discovered by the enemy, I ordered Major-General Sir Edward Chaytor to carry out a series of demonstrations with the object of inducing the enemy to believe that an attack east of the Jordan was intended, either in the direction of Madeba or Amman.

The concentration in the coastal plain was carried out by night, and every precaution was taken to prevent any increased movement becoming apparent to the Turks. Full use of the many groves round Ramleh, Ludd and Jaffa was made to conceal troops during the day. The chief factor in the secrecy maintained must be attributed, how-

ever, to the supremacy in the air which had been obtained by the Royal Air Force. The process of wearing down the enemy's aircraft had been going on all through the summer. During one week in June 100 hostile aeroplanes had crossed our lines. During the last week in August this number had decreased to eighteen. In the next few days a number were shot down, with the result that only four ventured to cross our lines during the period of concentration.

That the enemy expected an offensive on my part about this date is probable. That he remained in ignorance of my intention to attack in the coastal plain with overwhelming numbers is certain.

While the concentration in the coastal plain was nearing completion the enemy's railway communications at Deraa were attacked by the Royal Air Force, and by the Mobile Column of the Arab Army, which, after concentrating at Kasr el Azrak, 50 miles east of Amman, had moved into the Hauran. The line was attacked both north and west of Deraa, extensive demolitions being carried out. As the result of these demolitions all through traffic to Palestine ceased, and a considerable quantity of transport, which had been intended for the Hejaz, was diverted to bridge the break in the railway.

The concentration in the coastal plain had been completed by the morning of September 18th. During the night of September 18th-19th, the XXth Corps swung forward its right on the east of the Bireh-Nablus Road. The 53rd Division descended into the basin at the head of the Wadi Samieh, captured Gh Jibeit, El Mugheir, and the ridge on the far side of the basin.

In the early hours of September 19th El Afule and the headquarters of the Turkish VIIth and VIIIth Armies at Nablus and Tulkeram were bombed by the Royal Air Force with a view to disorganizing their signal communications.

At 4:30 a. m. the artillery in the coastal plain opened an intense bombardment, lasting fifteen minutes, under cover of which the infantry left their positions of deployment. Two torpedo boat destroyers assisted, bringing fire on the coastal road to the north.

The operations which followed fall into five phases.

The first phase was of short duration. In 36 hours, between 4:30 a.m., on September 19th, and 5 p.m., on September 20th, the greater part of the VIIIth Turkish Army had been overwhelmed, and the troops of the VIIth Army were in full retreat through the hills of Samaria, whose exits were already in the hands of my cavalry.

In the second phase the fruits of this success were reaped. The infantry, pressing relentlessly on the heels of the retreating enemy, drove him into the arms of my cavalry, with the result that practically the whole of the VIIth and VIIIth Turkish Armies were captured, with their guns and transport.

This phase also witnessed the capture of Haifa and Acre, and the occupation of Tiberias, and of the country to the south and west of the Sea of Galilee.

As the result of the rout of the VIIth and VIIIth Armies the IVth Turkish Army, east of the Jordan retreated, and Maan was evacuated.

The third phase commenced with the pursuit of this army by Chaytor's Force, and closed with the capture of Amman, and the interception of the retreat of the garrison of Maan, which surrendered.

The fourth phase witnessed the advance by the Desert Mounted Corps to Damascus, the capture of the remnants of the IVth Turkish Army, and the advance by the XXIst Corps along the coast from Haifa to Beirut.

In the fifth phase my troops reached Homs and Tripoli without opposition. My cavalry then advanced on Aleppo, and occupied that

city on October 26th.

The attack in the Coastal Plain on the morning of September 19th was attended with complete success. On the right, in the foothills, the French Tirailleurs and the Armenians of the Légion d'Orient advanced with great dash, and, in spite of the difficulties of the ground, and the strength of the enemy's defences, had captured the Kh. Deir El Kussis ridge at an early hour. On their left the 54th Division stormed Kefr Kasim village, and wood, and the foothills overlooking the railway from Ras El Ain to Jiljulieh. North of Kefr Kasim the advance was checked for a time at Sivri Tepe, but the enemy's resistance was quickly overcome, and the remaining hills, south of the Wadi Kanah, captured.

In the Coastal Plain the 3rd (Lahore) Division attacked the enemy's first system between Bir Adas and the Hadrah road. On its left the 75th Division attacked the Tabsor defences, the 7th (Meerut) Division the works west of Tabsor, while the 60th Division attacked along the coast. The enemy replied energetically to our bombardment, but in most cases his barrage fell behind the attacking infantry. The enemy was overwhelmed. After over-running the first system, the three divisions on the left pressed on, without pausing, to the Et Tireh position. On the left the 60th Division reached the Nahr Falik, and moved on Tul Keram, leaving the route along the coast clear for the Desert Mounted Corps. The 7th (Meerut) Division, after passing through the second system, swung to the right, and headed for Et Taiyibeh, leaving Et Tireh, where the 75th Division was still fighting, on its right.

By 11:00 the 75th Division had captured Et Tireh, a strongly fortified village standing on a sandy ridge, where the enemy offered a determined resistance. On the right the 3rd (Lahore) Division turned to the east, and attacked Jiljulieh, Railway Redoubt, Gefr

Saba and Kalkilieh, all of which were defended with stubbornness by the enemy. His resistance was, however, broken; and the 3rd (Lahore) Division pressed on eastwards into the foothills near Hableh, joining hands with the 54th Division north of the Wadi Kanah.

Disorganized bodies of the enemy were now streaming across the plain toward Tul Keram, pursued by the 60th Division and the 5th Australian Light Horse Brigade. This brigade, which had been attached to the XXIst Corps, consisted of two Australian Light Horse Regiments, with a composite regiment of Chasseurs d'Afrique and Spahis attached. Great confusion reigned at Tul Keram. Bodies of troops, guns, motor lorries and transport of every description were endeavoring to escape along the road leading to Messudie and Nablus. This road, which follows the railway up a narrow valley, was already crowded with troops and transport. The confusion was added to by the persistent attacks of the Royal Air Force and Australian Flying Corps, from which there was no escape. Great havoc was caused, and in several places the road was blocked by overturned lorries and vehicles. Later in the evening, an Australian regiment, having made a detour, succeeded in reaching a hill four miles east of Tul Keram, overlooking the road. As a result, a large amount of transport and many guns fell into our hands.

In the meantime the 7th (Meerut) Division and 3rd (Lahore) Division had entered the hills, and, in conjunction with the 54th Division, had pressed eastward. By dusk the line Bidieh-Kh. Kefr Thilth-Jiyus-Felamieh-Taiyibeh had been reached. The 75th Division

remained in the vicinity of Et Tireh in corps reserve.

As soon as the success of the initial attack by the XXIst Corps, on the morning of September 19th, had become apparent, I ordered the XXth Corps to advance that night on Nablus, and the high ground northeast of that town, in order to close the roads leading to the lower valley of the Jordan, and to drive the enemy from the triangle formed by the Kh. Fusail-Nablus road, our original front line, and the El Funduk-Nablus track, by which the 3rd (Lahore)

Division was advancing.

The two divisions of the XXth Corps had been concentrated beforehand, in readiness to carry out this operation. The enemy had long anticipated an attack astride the Bireh-Nablus road, and had constructed defences of great strength on successive ridges. For this reason the 10th Division was ordered to attack in a north-easterly direction astride the Furkhah-Selfit and Berukin-Kefr Haris ridges, thus avoiding a direct attack. Even so, the task of the XXth Corps was a difficult one. The enemy in this portion of the field was not disorganized, and was able to oppose a stout resistance to the advance. The country is broken and rugged, demanding great physical exertion on the part of the troops, and preventing the artillery keeping pace with the infantry.

Nevertheless, good progress was made on the night of September 19th and during the following day. The 53rd Division captured Kh. Abu Malul, and advanced their line in the centre. On their right Khan Jibeit was heavily counter-attacked on the morning of September 20th. The Turks succeeded in regaining the hill, but were driven off again after a sharp fight. This incident, and the necessity of making a road, to enable the guns to be brought forward caused delay.

The 10th Division advanced in two columns, and by midday on September 20th the Division had driven the enemy back seven miles. The artillery, however, had been unable to keep up with the infantry,

and little progress was made during the afternoon.

On the left of the 10th Division the XXIst Corps had continued its advance in three columns. By evening the line Baka-Beit Lid-

Messudie Station-Attara had been reached.

The 3rd (Lahore) and 7th (Meerut) Divisions encountered a determined and well-organized resistance, which stiffened as the Meerut Division approached Beit Lid. The enemy showed no signs of demoralization, and the country was very rugged and difficult.

Considerable confusion existed, however, behind the enemy's rearguards. It is probable that the enemy did not yet realize that my cavalry was already in Afule and Beisan, and had blocked his main

lines of retreat.

Thanks to the rapidity with which the infantry broke through both Turkish systems of defence, the cavalry obtained a good start. By noon the leading troops of the Desert Mounted Corps had reached Jelameh, Tell ed Drurh and Hudeira, eighteen miles north of the original front line. After a brief rest the advance was continued. The 5th Cavalry Division moved north to Ez Zerghaniyeh. It then turned north-east, and, riding through the hills of Samaria past Jarak, descended into the Plain of Esdraelon at Abu Shusleh. The 13th Cavalry Brigade was then directed on Nazareth, the 14th on El Afule.

The 4th Cavalry Division turned north-east at Kh. es Sumrah, and followed the valley of the Wadi Arah into the hills. The valley

gradually narrows as the pass at Musmus is reached.

The enemy had sent a battalion from El Afule to hold this pass, but only its advanced guards arrived in time. Overcoming its resistance, the cavalry encountered the remainder of the battalion at El Lejjun. The 2nd Lancers charged, killed forty-six with the lance, and captured the remainder, some 470 in number.

The 4th Cavalry Division then marched to El Afule, which it reached half an hour after its capture by the 14th Cavalry Brigade.

In the meantime the 13th Cavalry Brigade of the 5th Cavalry Division, riding across the Plain of Esdraelon, had reached Nazareth, the site of the Yilderim General Headquarters, at 5:30 a.m. Fight-

ing took place in the streets, some 2,000 prisoners being captured. Liman von Sanders had already made good his escape, but his papers and some of his staff were taken. This brigade then marched to El Afule; arriving there as the 4th Cavalry Division rode down the Plain of Jezreel to Beisan, having covered some eighty miles in thirty-four hours. The 4th Cavalry Division detached a regiment to seize the railway bridge over the Jordan at Jisr Mejamie.

The Australian Mounted Division, which had followed the 4th Cavalry Division into the Plain of Esdraelon, was directed on Jenin, where the road from Messudie to El Afule leaves the hills. Jenin was reached at 5:30 p. m. and was captured after a sharp fight, a large

number of prisoners being taken.

Thus, within 36 hours of the commencement of the battle, all the main outlets of escape remaining to the Turkish VIIth and VIIIth Armies had been closed. They could only avoid capture by using the tracks which run south-east from the vicinity of Nablus to the crossings over the Jordan at Jisr ed Damieh. These were being rapidly denied to them.

The first phase of the operations was over.

The enemy's resistance had been broken on September 20th. On September 21st the Turkish rearguards were driven in early in the morning. All organized resistance ceased. The 5th Australian Light Horse Brigade, with the French Cavalry leading, entered Nablus from the west; the 10th Division from the south.

By evening, the IXth Corps had reached the line Neby Belan, on the high ground northeast of Nablus, and Mount Ebal; the XXIst

Corps the line Samaria, Attara, Belah.

Since the early hours of the morning great confusion had reigned in the Turkish rear. Camps and hospitals were being hurriedly evacuated; some were in flames. The roads leading north-east and east from Nablus to Beisan and the Jordan Valley were congested with transport and troops. Small parties of troops were moving east along the numerous wadis. The disorganization which already existed was increased by the repeated attacks of the Royal Air Force. of the transport continued along the road to Beisan, where it fell into the hands of the 4th Cavalry Division. The greater part made for the Jordan along the Wadi Farah. Nine miles from Kh. Ferweh, at Ain Shibleh, a road branches off to the north to Beisan. A mile beyond this point the Wadi Farah passes through a gorge. The head of the column was heavily bombed at this point. The drivers left their vehicles in panic, wagons were overturned, and in a short time the road was completely blocked. Still attacked by the Royal Air Force, the remainder of the column turned off at Ain Shibleh, and headed for Beisan.

The VIIth Turkish Army was by this time thoroughly disorganized, and was scattered in the area between the Kh. Ferweh-Beisan road and the Jordan. These parties had now to be collected.

On September 22nd the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade and the British West Indies Battalions of Chaytor's Force seized the bridge at Jisr ed Damieh. All hope of escape for the enemy in that direction had vanished.

In the early hours of the morning, parties of Turks, of strengths varying from 50 to 300, began to approach Beisan, preceded by white

flags.

At 8:00 a.m. a column, with transport and guns, 10 miles long, was reported by the Royal Air Force to be moving north along the Ain Shibleh-Beisan road, its head being 9 miles south of Beisan. The 4th Cavalry Division was ordered to send detachments toward it, and also to patrol the road, which follows the Jordan on its east bank, to secure any parties which might escape across the Jordan.

The Royal Air Force had proceeded to attack the Turkish column, which broke up and abandoned its guns and transport. Great quantities of transport and numerous guns were found abandoned by the roadsides. On one stretch of road, under five miles in length, 87

guns, 55 motor lorries and 842 vehicles were found.

Numerous bodies of Turks surrendered to the 4th Cavalry Division. One column attempted to escape across the Jordan at Makhadet Abu Naj, 5 miles south-east of Beisan, but was intercepted.

On September 24th the last remnants of the VIIth and VIIIth Turkish Armies had been collected. As Armies they had ceased to

exist, and but few had escaped.

Whilst the 4th Cavalry and the Australian Mounted Divisions were collecting the remnants of the VIIth and VIIIth Turkish Armies, I ordered the Desert Mounted Corps to occupy Acre and Haifa. The roads leading to Haifa from Tul Keram are only country tracks, which, in the event of rain, might become impassable for motor lorries at any time. Any force advancing northward from Haifa along the coast would have to depend on supplies landed at that port. It was necessary, therefore, to occupy the town without delay, in order that the harbor could be swept for mines, and the landing of stores taken in hand.

Part of the garrison of Haifa, which was attempting to reach Tiberias, was intercepted on the morning of September 22nd. It was attacked in the moonlight by the 18th Lancers, who killed a large

number of Turks and captured over 300.

That afternoon Haifa was reconnoitered by a battery of armored cars. It was still held by the enemy. The road was barricaded, and the armoured cars were shelled from the slopes of Mount Carmel.

The road from El Afule to Haifa skirts the northeastern edge of the Mount Carmel range. Some two miles before Haifa is reached

the road is confined between a spur of Mount Carmel on the left and the marshy banks of the River Kishon and its tributaries on the right. When the 5th Cavalry Division reached this point on September 23rd it was shelled from the slopes of Mount Carmel, and found the road and the river crossings defended by numerous machine guns.

Whilst the Mysore Lancers were clearing the rocky slopes of Mount Carmel the Jodhpur Lancers charged through the defile, and, riding over the enemy's machine guns, galloped into the town, where a number of Turks were speared in the streets. Colonel Thakur Dalpat Singh, M.C., fell gallantly leading this charge.

In this operation 1.350 prisoners and 17 guns were taken.

At Acre 13th Cavalry Brigade met with little opposition. small garrison, consisting of 150 men and 2 guns, attempted to escape

to the north, but was overtaken and captured.

As a result of the defeat of the VIIth and VIIIth Armies, the position of the IVth Army east of the Jordan was no longer tenable, and by the morning of 23rd September this Army was in full retreat on Es Salt and Amman, pursued by the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division, and bombed by the Royal Air Force. At 4:30 p. m., the New Zealanders captured Es Salt, taking 380 prisoners and three guns. The pursuit was continued on a broad front, in face of stout opposition from the enemy's rearguards. On 25th September Amman was attacked and captured.

The enemy retreated northwards along the Hejaz railway and the Pilgrim route in a disorganized state, harassed by the Royal Air Force and the Arabs. He was pursued by the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Divisions, and left over 5,000 prisoners and 28

guns in their hands.

I ordered Chaytor's Force to remain at Amman to intercept the troops of the 2nd Turkish Army Corps, who were retreating from the Hejaz. The Turkish commander, seeing that escape was impos-

sible, surrendered on Sept. 29 with 5,000 men.

In addition to bringing about the retreat of the IVth Turkish Army, the total defeat of the VIIth and VIIIth Armies had removed any serious obstacle to an advance on Damascus. On 25th September I ordered the Desert Mounted Corps to carry out this operation, occupy the city, and intercept the retreat of the remnants of the IVth Turkish Army.

At 6:00 a, m., on October 1st, the Desert Mounted Corps and the Arab Army entered Damascus amidst scenes of great enthusiasm. After the German and Turkish troops in the town had been collected and guards had been posted, our troops were withdrawn.

The advance to Damascus, following on the operations in the Plain of Esdraelon and the Valley of Jezreel, had thrown a considerable strain on the Desert Mounted Corps. Great results were, however.

achieved.

On September 26th, when the advance began, some 45,000 Turks and Germans were still in Damascus or were retreating on it. It is true that all units were in a state of disorganization, but, given time, the enemy could have formed a force capable of delaying my advance.

The destruction of the remnants of the IVth Army and the capture of an additional 20,000 prisoners prevented any possibility of this. The remnants of the Turkish Armies in Palestine and Syria, numbering some 17,000 men, of whom only 4,000 were effective rifles, fled northwards a mass of individuals, without organization, without transport, and without any of the accessories required to enable it to act even on the defensive.

I determined to exploit this success and to advance to the line Rayak—Beirut. An alternative and shorter line of supply would thus be obtained.

The Desert Mounted Corps, leaving the Australian Mounted Division at Damascus, moved on Rayak and Zahle on October 5th. No opposition was encountered, and both places were occupied on the following day.

In the meantime, the 7th (Meerut) Division had marched from Haifa to Beirut. Leaving Haifa on October 3rd, it marched along the coast. Crossing the Ladder of Tyre, it was received by the populace of Tyre and Sidon with enthusiasm. On October 8th it reached Beirut, where it was warmly welcomed, the inhabitants handing over 660 Turks, including 60 officers, who had surrendered to them. Ships of the French Navy had already entered the harbor.

On October 9th I ordered the Desert Mounted Corps to continue its advance and occupy Homs, leaving one division at Damascus. At the same time I ordered the XXIst Corps to continue its march along the coast to Tripoli. Armoured cars occupied Baalbek on October 9th, taking over 500 Turks who had surrendered to the inhabitants. The 5th Cavalry Division, which led the advance, reached Baalbek on October 11th, and reached Homs on October 15th, having marched over eighty miles since leaving Rayak.

On the coast, Tripoli was occupied by the XXIst Corps Cavalry Regiment and armoured cars on October 13th. Having secured Homs and Tripoli, I determined to seize Aleppo with the least possible delay. The 5th Cavalry Division and the Armoured Car Batteries were alone available. The Australian Mounted Division at Damascus was over 100 miles distant from Homs, and could not be brought up in time. The 4th Cavalry Division at Baalbek was much reduced in strength by sickness, and needed a rest to reorganize. Time was of importance, and I judged that the 5th Cavalry Division would be strong enough for the purpose. The information available indicated

only some 8,000 were combatants, and they were demoralized. Moreover, reports from all sources showed that considerable numbers of the enemy were leaving the town daily by rail for the north.

The armoured cars had reached Hama without opposition on October 20th. On the following day the 5th Cavalry Division commenced its advance. On October 22nd the armoured cars reached Khan Sebit, halfway between Homs and Aleppo. On the afternoon of October 25th the armoured cars were joined by the 15th (Imperial Service) Cavalry Brigade. That evening a detachment of the Arab Army reached the eastern outskirts of Aleppo, and during the night forced their way in, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy.

Early on the morning of October 26th the armoured cars and the 15th Cavalry Brigade, moving round the west side of the town, followed the enemy along the Aleppo-Katma road and gained touch with him south-east of Haritan. The Turkish rearguard consisted of some 2,500 infantry, 150 cavalry, and eight guns. The Mysore Lancers and two squads of the Jodhpur Lancers attacked the enemy's left, covered by the fire of the armoured cars, the Machine Gun Squadron and two dismounted squadrons of the Jodhpur Lancers. The Mysore and Jodhpur Lancers charged most gallantly. A number of Turks were speared, and many threw down their arms, only to pick them up again when the cavalry had passed through, and their weakness had become apparent. The squadrons were not strong enough to complete the victory, and were withdrawn till a larger force could be assembled.

That night the Turkish rearguard withdrew to a position near Deir el Jemel, twenty miles north-west of Aleppo. The 5th Cavalry Division remained in observation, astride the roads leading from Aleppo to Killis and Katma, and occupied Muslimie Junction.

It was too weak to continue the advance to Alexandretta till the arrival of the Australian Mounted Division, which had already left

Damascus to join it.

Before the latter could arrive, the armistice between the Allies and Turkey had been concluded, and came into force at noon on October 31st.

The 5th Cavalry Division captured fifty prisoners and eighteen guns in Aleppo. Aleppo is over 300 miles from our former front line. The 5th Cavalry Division covered 500 miles between September 19th and October 26th, and captured over 11,000 prisoners and fifty-two guns.

Between September 19th and October 26th 75,000 prisoners have been captured. Of these, over 200 officers and 3,500 other ranks are

Germans or Austrians.

In addition, 360 guns have fallen into our hands, and the transport and equipment of three Turkish armies. The captures include over 800 machine guns, 210 motor lorries, 44 motor cars, some 3,500

animals, 89 railway engines and 468 carriages and trucks. Of these many are unserviceable, but none have been included that are beyond repair.

The plan of operations and the arrangements for the concentration were carefully prepared and well executed by Commanders and Staffs. During the subsequent days of fighting full advantage was taken of every opportunity offered.

The gallantry and determination of all ranks and of all arms has been most marked. Many units had already made their reputation in this, and other, theatres of the war. Some had yet to gain their first experience of modern warfare. British, French and Indian troops, and those of the Dominions and Colonies, have all alike done magnificently.

The infantry, in a few hours, broke through the defences, which the enemy had spent months in strengthening, thus enabling the cavalry to accomplish its mission. The subsequent advance through the hills, over most difficult country, and in face of determined and organized resistance by the enemy's rearguards, tried the infantry severely. Nothing, however, stopped its progress, and the relentless pressure maintained on the enemy's rearguards allowed him no time to carry out an organized retreat, and drove him, in disorganized bodies, into the arms of the cavalry.

Of the fighting troops, all have taken their share, and have car-

ried out what was required of them.

Brilliant work has been done by the Palestine Brigade, Royal Air Force, and the Australian Flying Corps, not only during the actual operations, but in the preceding months.

The Arab Army has rendered valuable assistance, both in cutting the enemy's communications before and during the operations, and in co-operating with my cavalry during the advance on Damascus.

The fighting troops have been loyally assisted by the administrative services and departments, who have carried a heavy burden on their shoulders, both in front of and behind railhead.

My thanks are due to the Royal Navy for its assistance in arranging and securing the landing of supplies at the various harbors along my line of advance, and to the French Navy for valuable information gained in the reconnaissance of the northern ports.

The Italian detachment carried out to my entire satisfaction the task allotted to it, and throughout the operations gave valuable and

loyal assistance.

From the first day of operations the Egyptian Labor Corps has followed the troops as they advanced, working hard and successfully to improve the roads. On 19th September companies were working on the roads in front of our original line while our guns were still firing.

The Camel Transport Corps has rendered valuable services, which have greatly aided in the victorious campaign.

The Signal Service, strained to its utmost, has maintained uninterrupted communication with units of the Army as far east as Am-

man, and as far north as Aleppo.

The rapid advance has rendered difficult the task of evacuating the sick and wounded. The difficulty was increased by the large number of prisoners who, after marching for days, with little food or water, surrendered in a state of extreme weakness, unable to march another day. The care and evacuation of these men has heavily taxed the Medical Services, who have worked untiringly.

I have the honor to be,

Your Lordship's most obedient servant, E. E. H. ALLENBY, General, Commanding-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

# CHAPTER XXIV.

# WHAT VICTORIOUS GERMANY WOULD HAVE EXTORTED REVEALED IN BOASTFUL THREATS OF HER LEADERS

(Compiled by The New York World)

THE Germans complained of the harshness of the Allied peace terms, yet these were mild as compared with the terms that would have been imposed on the Allies had the Germans triumphed. Abundant evidence of this fact is furnished by utterances made from time to time during the war, not only by the Kaiser himself and his trusted advisers, but also by numerous popular expressions. Following are some of the most striking examples:

#### STATEMENTS BY THE KAISER.

To a person connected with the Bavarian court in June, 1915:

"Our only object is a peace profitable for the German states. This peace may be concluded sooner than thought. If it gave for the time being only an incomplete result it would at least serve as a preparation for the future. It could be signed to-morrow if I wished.

"When my august grandfather placed the empire on its present basis he did not pretend to have realized a completed work. The empire always is susceptible of growth. What cannot be achieved today will be achieved later."

From a speech to German troops starting for the front:

"Remember that the German people are the chosen of God. On me, as German Emperor, the spirit of God has descended; I am His weapon; His sword, and His vice-regent. Woe to the disobedient, death to cowards and unbelievers!"

Order issued in Belgium, August, 1914:

"It is my royal and imperial command that you concentrate your energies for the immediate present on one single purpose—that is, that you address all your skill and all the valor of my soldiers to exterminate first the treacherous English and walk over Gen. French's contemptible little army."

### VON BERNSTORFF DISCLOSED GERMANY'S AMBITIONS.

Count von Bernstorff, the German representative in this country, was much more specific than his imperial master in stating Germany's



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aims. M. Clemenceau published in October, 1914, a letter he had received concerning a conversation between Bernstorff and an American banker in the presence of several Berliners.

One of the Berliners asked Bernstorff what the Kaiser would take from France at the end of the war. The German ambassador, says

the letter, replied, counting off points on his fingers:

"First-All the colonies, Morocco entire; Algeria and Tunis.

"Second—All of France from St. Valery in a straight line to Lyons (or more than a quarter of France, with more than 15,000,000 inhabitants).

"Third-An indemnity of ten billion (probably francs, equiva-

lent to \$2,000,000,000).

"Fourth—A commercial treaty permitting German goods to enter France duty free for twenty-five years without reciprocity; thereafter a continuation of the trade conditions of the treaty of Frankfort.

"Fifth—(Missing).

"Sixth—The demolition of all French fortresses.

"Seventh—A gift by France of 3,000,000,000 rifles, 3,000 cannon and 40,000 horses.

"Eighth—Patent rights for German patents without reciprocity

for twenty-five years.

"Ninth-France to abandon her alliance with Russia and England.

"Tenth—A twenty-five year treaty of alliance with Germany."

The American, says M. Clemenceau, wrote that the foregoing were what Count von Bernstorff literally called "The ten German commandments."

As to the other allies, Bernstorff is quoted as having said:

"Germany will buy Russia and will finish off England; then treacherous England will turn against Russia. Each will call for our help against the other.

"As for France, she must be reduced, sunk forever, made another Portugal or Turkey, even if we have to kill 5,000,000 Frenchmen to do it."

Rudolph Martin, former German minister of the Interior, in a pamphlet issued in Berlin in March, 1915, predicted that after dictating peace in London, Germany would exact a tribute of \$30,000,000,000 to \$37,000,000,000. A large slice of France would be cut off; Belgium and her Congo colony would be absorbed; Serbia would go to Austria-Hungary; Egypt and the Suez Canal to Turkey.

#### WOULD HAVE SEIZED ALL BELGIUM AND FRENCH COAL AND IRON

The popular sentiment is indicated by two petitions to the Government presented in 1915 in the presence of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg. One from the "Six Associations," representing manufac-

turers, merchants, agriculturists, peasants and middle class citizens, urged the necessity and desirability of seizing all the coal and iron

land of France and the annexation of all Belgium.

The other from the "Intellectuals," professors, schoolmasters, students, clergymen, judges, etc., numbering about 1,350, who announced the determination to extend "our territory" and insisted: "There must be no misplaced attempts at reconciliation (with France). For the sake of our own existence we must ruthlessly weaken her both economically and politically, and must improve our military and strategic position in regard to her.

"We naturally desire such an indemnity as will as far as possible cover the public cost of the war, make restoration possible in East Prussia and Alsace, guarantee the establishment of a pension fund for cripples, widows and orphans, indemnify private individuals for losses inflicted on them contrary to international law, and provide

for the renewal and further development of armaments.

#### FRANCE WAS TO PAY FOR HER OWN INDUSTRIES.

"The most important business undertakings (of all France) must be transferred from anti-German ownership to German hands, France taking over and compensating the former owners. Such portion of the population as is taken over by us must be allowed absolutely no influence in the empire. "A peace which has not these results will render new struggles inevitable at an early date, but with the chances much less favorable for Germany."

Referring to Belgium, it says: "Because it is necessary to assure our credit on the sea and the future military and economic situation with respect to England—because Belgian territory, so economically important, is closely linked with our principal industrial territory—Belgium should be, from a monetary, financial and postal viewpoint, subject to the legislation of the Empire. Its railroads and waterways

should be most closely linked with our communications."

Matthias Erzberger, who has been one of the loudest protestants over the Allied terms, demanded in 1914, among other things:

Sovereignty over Belgium, possession of the Channel Islands, the mines of Alsace-Lorraine, and the foundings of a German Empire in Africa.

"Germany, in the first place, cannot tolerate the presence on her frontiers of so-called neutral states insufficiently strong to preserve their neutrality, or which do not want to remain neutral," said Erzberger. "Her second aim must be to free herself from the insupportable leading strings of England on all questions of world policy. In the third place, she must break up the Russian colossus.

"Consequently, Germany must have sovereignty not only over Belgium but the French coast from Dunkirk to Boulogne, and possession of the Channel Islands. She must also take the mines in French Lor-

raine and create an African German Empire by annexing the Belgian and French Congos, British Nigeria, Dahomey, and the French West Coast.

#### NEED NOT CONSIDER CAPACITY TO PAY IN FIXING INDEMNITIES.

"In fixing indemnities, the actual capacity of a state at the moment should not be considered. Besides a large immediate payment, annual instalments spread over a long period could be arranged. France would be helped in making them by decreasing her budget of naval and military appropriations, the reduction to be imposed in the peace treaty being such as would enable her to send substantial sums to Germany.

"Indemnities should provide for the repayment of the full costs of the war, and the damages of war, notably in East Prussia; the redemption of all of Germany's public debt and the creation of a vast

fund for incapacitated soldiers."

### CHAPTER XXV

#### INCIDENTS OF THE WAR.

HIS little volume can not hope to be exhaustive in extent; but we can not close it without relating a few of those episodes which show humanity at its best and which gild with personality the story of conflict.

#### SERGEANT ALVIN C. YORK.

One of the most notable heroes of the war was Elder Alvin C. York of Pall Mall, Tennessee. York, four years converted and a leader in his mountain church, had been thinking only of serving God when the war alarm rang through America and he was at first unable to accommodate his ideas to the demands of fighting. But when he had gained a complete understanding of what Germany had done and still planned to do to the world, he went into the army through the draft with no qualms of conscience. When the time came for him to take his turn he showed that he could lead in fighting as well as in prayer. His natural leadersip had drawn him up through the ranks to a sergeancy and on October 8, 1918, he led his section into action against the entrenched enemy. He was told to reach a certain objective and he did it. His afternoon's work netted 25 dead Germans, 132 captives headed by a Major, thirty-five German machine gun nests put out of action and a counter-attack, by an entire battalion, smashed. Sergeant York was decorated for his good work, receiving the Distinguished Service Cross, the French Croix de Guerre with palm and the Congressional Medal of Honor. With all that, he came back to America unspoiled, his heart still true to the church and his best girl back in Tennessee. He wondered if they'd let him continue an Elder after the killing he had been mixed up in. All attempts to make a spectacle of him, to parade him, to turn his head with adulation failed completely. He just declared, "I reckon I don't want to show off anv."

When he got back to Tennessee there was a wedding and the wedding trip took the sergeant and his bride to Columbus to the great Centenary Celebration. He enjoyed it, but he refused all offers to make speeches, to appear in movies or on the stage. He did plan a

short lecture tour and then he wanted nothing more than to return to the mountains of Tennessee and build schools for his people and lead them toward the truth.

A reporter for the *New York Sun* did get York to tell the story of his famous fight. York drew a map showing the position of his company on Hill 223 in the Argonne. The objective was a railway, two kilometers across a valley and a stream.

"Half of the men had dropped before we were half way across," said York, "and machine gun fire was beating on us from all sides. There were Germans all around us, but we pushed on because our orders were to get

there and take the railway and we had to do it.

"We made a detour across the valley until we got behind a nest of the enemy, from which the crew of a machine gun had been picking off a right smart lot of our boys. It was very bushy and we were within two or three yards of the gun before we realized it. One of our men shot at them and he sure started something. They fired on us from every direction. Our boys either ran or fell on their stomachs and the Germans did the same. I sat right where I was, and it seemed to me that every machine gun the Germans had was shooting at me. All this time, though, I was using my rifle and they was beginning to feel the effects of it, because I was shootin' pretty good.

"One of our boys yelled at me that it was impossible for us to get the best of the Germans, and I yelled back for him to shut up, because I knew that one American could lick ten Germans if he kept his wits. I turned in time to see a German Lieutenant, with six or seven men, charging up the hill at me with fixed bayonets. They were only twenty yards from me when I

pulled my automatic and knocked them off, one after another.

"There was a Major with the first bunch of Germans we come across, and he was lyin' on his stomach to keep from gettin' hit by his own machine gun bullets, and he called to me in English that if I would stop shootin' he would make them all surrender, so I did. Then I called all our boys and we herded the Germans in front of us and started back toward our lines. I walked among four German officers and had our wounded bring up the rear. Once the Major asked me how many men I had, and I told him I had a-plenty.

"On our way back we walked into two or three machine gun nests, but every time the Major told me if I wouldn't shoot he would make them surrender, and I didn't shoot, and he did. He would order the gunners to quit shooting, and then he would blow in a whistle and everybody would get in line and away we would go, and we had 132 of the Germans when we got back to our own people.

"We lost six boys, though, and three others were badly wounded.

### JUST TWO PRIVATES.

New York was proud of her 77th division of drafted men. When the home-coming review of the division was being planned, the *New York Times* published the following story of the first engagement of this division as told by members of the advance staff of the division:

In the early part of last August the 77th Division was sent near the village of Bazoches, on the Vesle River, about twelve kilometers northeast of Chateau-Thierry. There was a forest across in the valley from the village and behind a plateau leading to the Aisne. The 26,000 men were there but a short time when it was decided to shell Bazoches and to send out a mopping

party to capture as many prisoners as possible to hunt out machine gun nests. At 4:15 o'clock on the morning of the day set, Captain Bull and 175 men went "over the top" and into the village. They engaged in hand to hand encounters with the enemy, and despite the olds against them held their ground. Only sixty out of the party survived the attack.

As a result of this attack the enemy was driven back eight miles in the four following days. They were driven so fast that they were compelled to leave valuable supplies and ammunitions behind.

Three days after the mopping party had gone out two privates of the 302d Engineers, who had been separated from their commands, came straggling in. When the attack was over they found themselves some distance inside the German lines, and hid among charcoal sacks and lived during the three days on their reserve rations. They told General Wittenmyer that they had overheard the conversations of two German officers, in which the latter discussed the appearance of the American army on the front. Both boys were of German descent and understood the language.

"By God, those Americans must be crazy the way they fight. There must be a million of them," the two privates said one of the German officers exclaimed.

The last of their reserve rations gone, the two privates decided to brave the machine guns to return to their own lines on the other side of the Vesle River. Both had hand grenades, which they used effectually on the gunners of the two machine-gun nests nearest them, and then bolted for the river. On the way they stumbled over the body of an American who had been wounded, and had been lying there for three days. Although their own lives were imperiled by the machine guns the two men carried their wounded comrade, and swam across the Vesle with him to their own lines.

The two privates received divisional citations, and were recommended for the Distinguished Service Cross.

#### THE ELEVENTH ENGINEERS.

The first American troops to get into active service in France were detachments of the medical corps and of the engineering corps. Probably the first to see real fighting was the 11th Engineers. They were dubbed "The Fighting Engineers" when they swapped picks and shovels for rifles and helped to stop the German counter-attack that neutralized the most important results of General Byng's offensive in November, 1917. The following story was told by Major C. Raymond Hulsart and was published in the New York Sun:

"The whole regiment had been engaged since November 1 in preparations for the Byng offensive against Cambrai. Four companies were working on maintenance of railroads, which they put in better shape than they had even been, strengthening bridges and building sidings. Companies B and F, with part of Company E, were preparing railheads for handling supplies, troops and the big fleet of tanks with which General Byng was to surprise the Boche.

"In the three nights preceding the offensive of Nov. 20, we unloaded 500 tanks from trains—the largest number of tanks up to that time in the war. As the offensive got under way, our detachment in cooperation with Canadian railway troops, started building tracks in the wake of the advance. We worked in shifts, building ten miles of track in eight days.

"We were working most of the time under shell fire and frequently the men had to quit work and dart for cover. The last day we worked steadily

from 2 A. M. to 10 P. M., in order to finish up for a rest on the next day, which was Thanksgiving. This brought the track to Marcoing village, the furthest point of Byng's advance. We connected up with a German line and had what we called 'the first track through to Berlin.'"

The advance had penetrated the Hindenburg line and we got a look at the famous dugouts, with the German officers' breakfast still on the table, and elaborately furnished with full-sized beds, pianos and full-length mirrors.

The 29th, Thanksgiving, was a real holiday, with turkey sent up to us from the base ports. On the 30th we started work on an advance depot and railway line on the line to Gouzeaucourt. The shelling was heavier than usual, but we were getting along well with half a mule of track. Shelters had been dug into the railroad bank and these saved the lives of many of our men when the Boche started a heavy barrage which cut diagonally across the track and cut off many of the men from the detachment.

"We thought at the time the game was simply to smash the railroad; we had no intimation that the Boche would counter-attack. But we gathered the

men together in a sunken road several hundred yards to the rear.

Following the barrage the air was thick with Boche airplanes peppering us with machine gun spray. And the Boche infantry came over, I never knew just what happened in the front lines. But there had been no fugitives from the British forces and no word of warning. I concluded that the Tommies had stuck to their posts and been overwhelmed.

We had been doing rush work and did not have our rifles with us. But some of our men got hold of rifles that the British had dropped and fought with the irregular forces that tried to stop the advance. Others swung their picks and shovels at the Jerries rather than be taken.

Two battalions of the Coldstream and Irish Guards came up and covered

our retreat.

The Boche airplanes followed along the route of the ambulances, firing at them. One of our men, Sergt. Frank Haley, in an ambulance with six pieces of shrappel in his body, was hit in the head by a Boche bullet.

Another sergeant, Edgar Hardy, took his men for shelter in the bank of the road, where they saw a Boche advance patrol coming toward them. Hardy yelled out in German, "Advance dressing station!" and the patrol went ahead. Hardy and his men escaped to a communicating trench.

Sergeant Burt and his men were cut off by the barrage from the main party and got into shelter with some Tommies and a British officer. They saw some of Jerry's infantry advancing. Whereupon the British officer said.

"Don't get the wind up; it's nothing."

But Burt was intent on getting his men to a communicating trench about ten feet away. The trouble was that a machine gun had started playing over that ground. But, as the fire would swing, the engineers, one by one, got across. The British officer wouldn't retreat. Some of the Tommies also got to the trench.

With our men together again we reported to the British authorities and were detailed to prepare and man a section of support trenches. But the British halted the attack and we got back to camp at Fins. The shelling was heavy here but most of the shells were duds, which accounted for many a lucky escape. We pulled out of there, as it was a bit unhealthy, and marched ten miles to Bruisle, where our regimental headquarters was. This was about Dec. 2. We got away from Fins just in time, as most of the shacks there disappeared the next day under shell fire. Major Hulsart happened to be officer in charge of field operations at the time of this incident. In being decorated with the British Military Cross, it was noted that he directed the escape of his men under heavy fire and remained until all of them had left. Later he passed twice through barrage fire, once to assist in the removal of American soldiers and again to search for wounded British soldiers.

#### THE GREATEST MOMENT OF THE WAR.

Frederick Palmer, veteran war correspondent, was General Pershing's official observer in France. In an interview printed in the *New York Times* Magazine after he was home again and discharged, Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer said:

I know what you are going to ask first, "Isn't my occupation over if the League of Nations succeeds?" It's over anyway. I'll take in washing before I'll go to another war.

Of all the experiences of these four years, which was the most memor-

able?

Nov. 1, the day when, after the weeks of attack in the Meuse-Argonne battle, our own army broke the German line. When General Foch read the German communique which confessed that the German line was broken, it was said that for the first time since he had begun the offensive operations he allowed himself an outburst of emotion. The night before the attack there was a dramatic scene of which history will make much at the head-quarters of General Summerall, who commanded the 5th Corps, which was to strike the great blow in the centre of our army. Marshal Foch had sent General Maestre to the 5th Corps Headquarters to ascertain if all plans were ready for the morrow. General Pershing arrived about the same time. They were waiting when Summerall, who was hoarse from making talks to his troops, came in. "Will we go through?" both Pershing and Maestre asked Summerall. "Are you all ready?"

Summerall answered: "We will go through. Everything is ready. There

is nothing to change."

We knew by the morning of Nov. 2 that the war was won, whether the Germans concluded to fight on or to make peace. We knew we could demand and win unconditional surrender. No other memory could equal that of the sight of our soldiers as they pursued the Germans from the 3d until the 11th of November on the way to the Meuse and across the Meuse.

I should place next in sentiment the sight of King Albert returning to Brussels. I had been there when he retired before the Germans. Next, my first sight of the French flag flying from the Strassbourg Cathedral. It was the symbol of victory by a people who had waited forty-four years and then fought four years for victory. Then there was that soldier of ours standing on a bridge of the Rhine in sight of the old castles as he looked gloomily down the stream, "Isn't that the nearest way to the sea, to home and Kansas?" he asked. Castles did not appeal to him. He wanted Kansas.

# A GIRL'S GLIMPSE OF PERSHING.

HE CHRISTIAN HERALD sent Margaret E. Sangster to France after peace had been declared. She went to see and to tell what she saw that would help the mothers and fathers and sisters and brothers and friends of our boys to realize a little of what the boys had done in France. She had the good fortune to meet General Pershing and this is the way she told about it:

THE General doesn't give any interviews," they told me in the outside office. "He couldn't! For everybody in the world, almost, wants to interview him."

I looked wistfully at the great tight-shut mahogany door that divided the outside office from the inner one. Somewhere behind those solid panels sat General Pershing.

"Of course he's right," I said slowly. "And, if he gave one paper an interview, the others would be quite justified in expecting something, too. He's quite right. But oh," I added with a rush, "if I could only see him, I'd have a real message to give to the mothers—the mothers who have sons in the army."

The aide who was a major looked at the aide who was a lieutenant. Then they both looked at me. And I, with my eyes upon the great door, tried to look pathetic. Finally the aide who was a major spoke.

"Well," he said, slowly, "if that's all you want-"

"Perhaps"-it was the lieutenant-"if you come back in an hour-"

I came back in an hour. The heutenant was sitting at a desk busily writing. He looked up and smiled at me as I stood in the doorway.

"Come in," he called. "And if you don't mind waiting about ten min-

utes, the General will see you!"

The lieutenant laid down his pen.

"You'll like the General," he told me; "he's real. We, who are near to him, are devoted to him. And being devoted means a good bit more than being loyal! He's so splendid—"

"Is he as wonderful," I questioned, "as he looks—in the movies?"

The lieutenant laughed.

"More wonderful," he told me-"much more wonderful!"

"He's a very great man," I said, looking down at the finger-tips of my

brown gloves, and wishing that they were white.

"Yes," agreed the lieutenant, "he is a great man. He's great enough to be just as kind to folk who aren't a bit important as to folk who are. Why, once when we were going through the street in the car, a very new soldier who didn't know anything about military discipline jumped up on the running-board and said:

"General, I want to shake hands with you!" And the General shook hands with him just as cordially as he would have shaken hands with the

President.

The lieutenant stopped for a minute. And then, as I made no comment, he went on.

"The General was having his portrait painted when you were here before," he told me. "It seems as if all of the well-known sculptors and painters are doing pictures and busts of the General! You'd think that it would make a man feel sort of"—the lieutenant hesitated and laughed—"But he's just as pleased and interested in every bit of work that's done as you or I would be. We don't any of us think that the portraits do him justice—but that's because we're so fond of him. We don't feel as if anything can do him justice—"

"I thought that no one ever got near enough to a general to feel really

fond of him," I said.

"That's the wonderful thing about our General," the lieutenant answered, and I wish that you could have heard him say "our." "You can't help feeling near to him! There's something about him that makes you want to tell him your troubles, that makes you know that he'il understand—and sympathize. There's a certain simplicity about him that, mixed with his calm assurance and efficiency, makes a rather wonderful combination—and a decidedly unusual combination. Yes, he's big enough to feel a personal interest in every one of his men. He gives them little informal religious talks, sometimes. And he wants to know about how they're getting on. He's—"

A third man came into the room. I think he was a colonel.

"The General will see you, Miss Sangster," he told me, "if you'll come this way..."

I rose hurriedly and followed him. And the big door swung to behind me.

General Pershing was standing with his hand outstretched in friendly greeting. As I laid mine in it, I was conscious that he was taller and broader than I had supposed. He gave the impression, in that conventional office, of one who has lived much in the open, who has known long plains and mist-hung mountain heights, and the glow of the sunset sky in far places. And then, all at once, he smiled, and I forgot quite suddenly and completely that he was a great man and a general.

"I'm not scared of you at all," I said, and I didn't in the least mean to

say it. "I thought I would be!"

General Pershing's smile grew deeper until it seemed like some silent sort of laughter.

"Of course you're not," he answered. "Why should you be?" And then,

"You wanted to see me?" he questioned.

"It was so that I could write a message for the mothers back home," I told him hurriedly; "the mothers who have sons in your army."

"You know, of course, that I'm not giving interviews," General Pershing asked, "and so of course there's not a great deal that I can say. And I

don't," he added after a minute, "like to talk much anyway!"

"I know that," I agreed. "I know that. That's why folk want to hear everything you do talk about. But I can say something to those mothers. can't I? I can say that you think their sons are regular men "...

Enthusiasm swept over the General's face, and I all at once knew why he

was such a splendid leader.

"They're the best men in the world!" he told me—"the best in the world!" Then he laughed. "But don't get me talking about them or I'll be giving you an interview-and I can't!"

"And you can't." I echoed.

"I wish"—there was a note of very real pride in the General's voice— "that you could walk down the line one day and see them snap up to salute -as I see them. Then you'd know!"

I didn't make any answer. For I was looking at the General-forming a mental picture of him to carry away with me. I was wondering how power and strength and vivid intellect and personal charm could be so distinctly

allied to each other in one face.

"Then you'd know!" repeated the General again. "You'd know how I feel every time I see one of them on the street, or in any public place, or on parade. They're splendid soldiers—and they're splendid boys—and you can tell their mothers that they've made a splendid showing.

My time was up. I knew it. But somehow I didn't want to go.

"I don't know-" I began, and faltered-"how to thank you," I finished.

The General took my fingers into a man-sized handshake.

"Don't thank me," he said. "Why, I'm interested in you. I like to meet people who are doing things!"

I went out in a half-daze. The lieutenant came toward me, around the

side of his desk.

"Well, what did you think of him?" asked the lieutenant.

I groped, a moment, for the right word. When one has met a really great man and has discovered that he is even greater than one imagined, words are hard to find. I resorted, finally, to the lieutenant's own description.

"Why, he's real." I said.

#### THE RIVER WHERE GERMANY FAILED.

Miss Sangster, in her early days in France, while going to visit the American Hospital at Luzancy, got her first glimpse of the river

whose name twice stood to the Germans as the symbol of defeat. She tells it thus in the Christian Herald:

Buzancy is not on the railroad. It is some five miles from the nearest station, five country miles over real country roads. We were met at that station by a young woman doctor—all of the staff at the hospital are women—who had driven down in one of the ambulances. As I climbed gingerly into the back of it I felt rather like a character in a story book. And I said so to the doctor.

"This isn't true," I told her. "I'm not really here-I'm back in Paris.

It's such a short time since I left the city-"

"Oh, you're not in Paris!" laughed the doctor. She had started the car and she swung it, as she spoke, into the village street. "You're way out in the wilds. You're on a road, now, that the Germans marched down in 1914—"

I gasped. "Do you mean to say—?" I began, and stopped. For suddenly, overwhelmingly, the war had been brought home to me. I had never realized before, how close the Germans came to Paris—I had never known how nearly the war ended in that first, awful autumn time! Forty or fifty miles sound a very safe distance when you sit in front of your own hearth fire and read the figures on the page of a newspaper! But when you've traveled those miles in an hour and a half—well, you understand!

"I never knew," I told the doctor.

"Not many people in America did know-then!" the doctor answered;

"but France knew!"

We were going down a narrow lane with tall trees on either side of it. cobblestones they were; and the ambulance clattered across them. I, looking out of the back of the ambulance, saw houses whirling away from me, saw the public square vanish, and the market place fade into the distance. I saw everything dimly, for village streets, in France, are practically unlighted after the sun goes down. But I watched with fascinated eyes. For the houses, looming up in silhouette, were of white stone and the roofs of them were thatched. And there were high walls, and archways, and queer nooks that might, at one time, have held shrines.

"Wouldn't an artist love this place!" I said softly.

"Artists have loved it—great artists," answered the doctor. Deftly she turned the car into a crossroad that led away from the village. "Corot lived here, at one time, and many of his pupils have come back to paint the bits of landscape that he most cared for. . . ."

We weregoing down a narrow lane with tall trees on either side of it. And then, all at once, we turned another corner. And, in the dim light, I

could see that we were following a stream of water.

"What is that brook called?" I questioned idly, "or hasn't it any

The doctor turned squarely in her seat and looked at me.

"Brook?" she exclaimed, "that's not a brook! That's the Marne!"

For the second time that evening I had a thrill. I leaned forward breathlessly.

"Do you mean to tell me," I asked, "that that is the Marne? Why, I thought—" I hesitated. How could I explain that I had expected the Marne to be wide and deep—a great menacing sheet of dark water——

"It measures about thirty-two feet across," the doctor told me. She might have been reading my thoughts. "It runs along at the foot of the hospital garden. We all love the Marne! It's almost more than a river to us—"

I didn't answer for a moment. I sat very still and watched the silver flicker of the stream that flowed so calmly beside our path. And as I watched I thought of the spirit back of a race who could make an impene-

trable barrier of such a slight thing—who had made an impenetrable barrier of it! And suddenly I, too, loved the Marne.

"Yes, it's more than a river," I echoed, "it's a symbol!"

### BELLEAU WOOD.

HERE was glory enough for all in the great war and the Regular Divisions earned their share. It fell to the lot of the 2nd Division to have a share in stopping the German drive toward Paris from the flank of the Marne salient. The Germans drove until they met the American line and then they stopped. During the next few days they were driven back in desperate fighting that made Belleau Wood and the Americans Marines famous. The story was told in the New York Times by Major General A. W. Greeley, U. S. A. He said:

General misapprehension exists as to the place where the 2d Division fought its first open battles, which occurred at Belleau Wood, about six kilometers northwest of Chateau-Thierry. The fighting at the latter place, where the American soldiers won imperishable glory, was by the 3d Division, and not by the 2d, whose brilliant record for gallantry was elsewhere gained.

Seasoned by weeks of arduous service in trench warfare near Verdun, orders for its first campaign of open warfare came to the 2d Division at Chaumont-en-Vexin. The most critical phase of the war had arrived, as the Allies stood with their back to the wall. Having forced the so-called impregnable front on the Chemin des Dames, the victory-flushed German legions steadily pressed backward the outnumbered French divisions, and from their furthest in the Marne Valley looked exultantly on speedy entrance into Paris, barely fifty miles distant.

Fortunately German strength had momentarily reached its limit and now America came to the front to prevent its ever again winning the preponderance. Assigned to the Sixth French Army, under General Duchesne, 13,000 of the infantrymen of the 2d Division were rushed forward to the fighting line in French auto trucks near Meaux in the Marne Valley, twenty miles east of Paris. Further advance eastward was over roads almost impassable from countless motor trucks, fleeing fugitives, retreating troops, etc. For a time the supply system of food and ammunition was practically destroyed. However, on June 1 the 2d Division was in a post of honor—nearest the enemy—between the 7th and 38th French Corps. Its sector front of twelve kilometers was held from right to left by the 9th Infantry, 23rd Infantry, 5th Marines, and 6th Marines, with the artillery well-placed in support. The centre of the sector was within a mile of Bouresches, strongly held by the enemy. Their arrangements perfected, the Germans attacked repeatedly on June 3 and 4, but despite grenades, machine guns and shock troops their utmost efforts failed to dislodge our troops.

The military situation was, and continued to be most adverse. The Germans controlled the air, their machine guns and infantry held the forests, and their artillery-crowned hills dominated the terrain for miles. No troops could be moved, no supplies transported or work done by day without immediately drawing destructive artillery fire. For forty days, says General Bundy, neither fire nor hot food could be had at the front—yet the morale was unshaken.

To improve their position the marines opened an offensive campaign with fine spirit, and took Bouresches on June 6, holding it against desperate counterattacks, but they were only partly successful in their more important

objective to the north. There Belleau Wood, a forest about a mile square, with dense undergrowth was a hard problem, for the ground was easy of defense and difficult to penetrate. It was held by well-intrenched picked infantry, whose machine-gun nests and trench mortars were well concealed and strongly supported by artillery. One machine gun would be captured, only to disclose that its position was commanded by another nest of guns. But the marines would not be denied, and despite terrible casualties they gained on June 6 a foothold in the forest which they never lost. Two subsequent advances in the next week gave additional ground, though paid for by lamentable losses. Eventually the Belleau contingent was so reduced in strength it was replaced by the 7th Regular Infantry of the 3d Division, which was placed at General Bundy's disposal from June 11 to 21. Recuperated and reinforced, the marines returned to the conflict, and by persistent attacks succeeded in occupying the whole forest by June 29. Over 1,000 prisoners and many machine guns were captured in this prolonged forestal campaign.

During the struggle for Belleau Wood the rest of the 2d supported the operations efficiently, although from their exposed positions they suffered daily from gas and shell bombardments. Digging in and camouflaging their intrenchments, they were continuously under fire, and yet they repulsed determined attacks on four separate days. In short, they held their ground and died where they stood. On July 1 a general advance was attempted to improve the situation. The French attack to the south failed to capture Hill 204, which dominated the main allied sector. The 2d Division at the north was more successful against Vaux as an objective. The field artillery operated a creeping barrage, the moving sheet of shot and shell keeping 100 yards in advance of the attacking columns of the 9th Infantry, 23d Infantry, and 2d Engineers. Vaux fell with its railway line and a German division sought in vain to expel our men, who dug in and held grimly to the captured town. Relieved July 10 by the 26th Division, the 2d withdrew to prepare for

the great offensive.

#### STORIES OF THE RAINBOWS.

Probably no division won greater interest in the war than the 42nd, or Rainbow Division, which represented nearly all the States and which, early in France and at the forefront in every action, kept the nation following its exploits from early in the spring of 1918 through all the 200 days of America's organized battling with the Hun. The following extracts are taken from the story of the Division as published in the New York Times Magazine:

No Man's Land in front of us (Baccarat sector near Luneville) was from 200 to 1,000 meters wide, and when we were placed there it was completely owned and dominated by the enemy. One of the first orders given on going into the sector—in fact before we went in—was to take over No Man's Land.

It took us weeks to get control of No Man's Land, but we retained it until the end; our control was so complete that the Germans abandoned the front-line trenches, except for a few look-outs here and there. This was verified by frequent raids into front and sometimes into second line trenches without finding any Germans. It was stiff work for the first few days after we went into the trenches, and various stories were told of the experiences of patrols. The first patrol to capture a prisoner was one from the 165th Infantry, formerly the 69th New York, and the story of the capture was about as follows:

A detachment of some eight or ten men from the 165th came upon a German patrol of nearly equal size without being discovered. Disposition

was made to surround the German patrol and succeeded. Just as the leader of our patrol, creeping forward, was about to account for the leader of the German patrol that man turned suddenly and shot the American patrol. Almost at the same instant two Americans landed on the German leader with bare trench knives, the only weapons these two had, which is indicative of their determination for finish fighting, and the poor German hadn't the ghost of a show, because one of the Americans was an ex-Broadway policeman and the other an ex-warder of a New York insane asylum, men alert and quick from long experience. The other Germans surrendered.

Another story of the old 69th has two points, one the zeal of the men to capture prisoners, the other the effectiveness of modern surgery. our patrols attacked a German patrol; two of the enemy were killed and the leader and three other survivors taken prisoner, and brought into the American lines. On the way the Sergeant in command discovered that the leader of the German patrol was seriously wounded. At that time the French were giving a reward for all captured Germans. The Sergeant, who counted on participating in a reward for three, at once began to hustle the wounded men in ahead of the others. A thing that ordinarily would have cost the man's life was actually what saved him, because he was put on the operating table with great promptness. It was found that the German was wounded in both thighs and through the abdomen, with thirteen perforations in the intestines, yet he was evacuated in two weeks practically well.

The Rainbow Division was withdrawn for rest and replacements, but after only a short rest was recalled, owing to the demands of the military situation, and on Sept. 12 was given the main effort in the St. Mihiel salient We were ordered to advance by hard night marches, and in the first great operation of the American Army were given a position in the centre of the 4th Army Corps, and our men were instructed to deliver the main blow in the direction of the heights overlooking the Madine River. In the battle which followed, the 42d took every objective in accordance with the plan of army commander. They advanced fourteen kilometers in twentyeight hours, and forward elements pushed five kilometers further, or nineteen kilometers beyond their original starting point. They took more than 1,000 prisoners from nine enemy divisions, seven villages, and forty-two square kilometers of territory were captured by the division and large supplies of food, clothing, ammunition, guns, and engineering material were seized.

It was in the salient here that Brig-Gen. Douglas MacArthur, who commanded the 84th Brigade, decided to outwit the Germans during the time conditions on the line were stabilizing after the main battle. He occupied a beautiful chateau, the Chateau St. Benoit, from which he had as good a view of the nearest part of the Hindenburg line as could be had. He had made several raids on the Germans and had been successful in taking many pris-He was warned that he had better get out, as the Germans would most surely shell the chateau, but he insisted that he would fool them every time. He succeeded in this until early one morning the Germans decided to put some 9-inch shells into the chateau. At the first shot General MacArthur realized that it was time to get out, so he proceeded to fool the Germans another time, getting out just before the Germans obtained the exact range. The chateau was completely destroyed only a short time after General Mac-Arthur left.

After organizing a new sector in St. Mihiel the division was withdrawn and sent into the Argonne just to the west of Mount Faucon, to participate in the great blow which our army was to strike west of the Meuse. Some very desperate hand-to-hand fighting took place in the woods of the Argonne. Men even fought with their bare hands, and from tree to tree in Indian fashion, yelling at the top of their voices. Major Ross's battalion of the 168th Infantry (Iowa regiment) particularly distinguished itself here. Both he and General MacArthur were cited for extraordinary gallantry in action.

The 42d took Hill 288, La Tuilerie Farm, and the Côte de Chatillon, and as the result broke squarely across the Kriemhilde Stellung, the last line of defense of the Hindenburg line, clearing the way for the advance beyond St. Georges and Landres at St. Georges. Marching and fighting day and night, the men of the Rainbow thrust through the advancing lines of the First Army. They drove the enemy across the Meuse. They captured the heights dominating the river before Sedan and reached in the enemy line the furthest point attained by any American troops.

The advance of the division to the outskirts of Sedan was probably one of the most rapid ever made against opposition. The men were pushed day and night to the limit of endurance, but they responded here as they had always when called upon for extreme effort. They made 24 kilometres in 28 hours; this was done through the most difficult country and in about the

nastiest weather I ever saw in my life.

#### THE LOST BATTALION.

No story that came out of the dispatches stirred the heart of America more than did the exploits of "The Lost Battalion," which wasn't really lost. It knew where it was all the time, so did the Germans and so did the American command, the story is well told in a summary of the official history of the 77th division printed in the New York Times Magazine. It runs like this:

On the 30th of September, the 154th Brigade, with artillery help, drove the enemy from the hills north of Depot de Machines, to the ridge south of the Binarville-la-Viergette road, where he occupied apparently prepared positions extending across this ridge and through the Bois de la Naza on the front of the 153d Brigade. Outposts of machine guns and snipers guarded this line. The 153d Brigade swinging to the left encountered the most persistent resistance. And in these hills and deep ravines the artillery could render little aid; not only was the terrain against it, but our lines were often so close to the enemy that it would have been impossible to reach him without shooting into our own men.

By noon of Oct. 2 the 153d Brigade had fought its way to the enemy intrenched and wired position on the heights of the Bois de la Naza. Here

they were stopped. The situation was critical all along our line.

On that same day the 154th Brigade attacked, with the result that six companies of the 308th under Major Charles S. Whittlesey succeeded in penetrating a gap found in the German trenches at the bottom of a deep draw running north and south on the left of the brigade sector; this force pushed forward to the ravine at Charlevaux Mill, about one kilometer; on its right the 307th was again checked.

This was the so-called "Lost Battalion"—a battalion that never was lost! Major Whittlesey's six companies made their advance far to the front, carrying out instructions to smash through wherever they could "without regard to flanks." On one side of Major Whittlesey the 307th was halted; on the other an enemy trench line was held in force, so that the Germans could pass by the flank in rear. Major Whittlesey's orders had been to hold his ravine position until the other elements of the line could join him. When it was reported that he was practically cut off the 3d Battalion of the 307th was immediately sent out to join him, but only one company, K, succeeded in getting through.

From Oct. 2 to Oct. 7 these men were not "lost," but surrounded by the enemy, fighting against an apparently overwhelming force, unable to get food, (ration details were sent out on the 3d, but never returned), and unable to companying the thir country.

There was water in the ravine below, but luck must be added to heroism to get it. They were near to starvation; the enemy was firing from all sides, raining hand grenades from the trees above them, using every means in his power to trick or cow them into submission. Under these conditions they not only fought on without a thought of surrender, but disposed their forces, made their plans, worked out the details of their defense, with the utmost coolness.

On the night of the 3d voices were heard on the left-German voices. Others were soon audible on the front. The front line rested on a road, above which was a cliff eighteen or twenty feet high, and here a scout reported Germans. Soon the German commands could be heard from the A fierce grenade attack was launched, that lasted about ten minutes, and then the Germans got ready for another. The Americans heard the first word of command, "Alles ist in Stellung," but the signal, "Alles zusammen!" was never given; the Americans were ready and they fired. The boches were caught out of their funk holes. They replied with machine guns, not grenades, but after ten minutes they quieted down for that night. The next day there were more attacks, tricks tried by Germans who spoke English. To follow the events of each day, to distinguish between the attacks, is almost an impossibility. On the night of Oct. 4 the firing of our troops could be heard to the south, and the "lost battalion's" hopes ran high of relief next day. But no American troops came, although on the 5th our artillery was able to crash into large forces of the enemy just massed for an attack from the south, and then to stop a would-be attack with hand grenades from the cliff.

By the 6th, hunger was becoming torture for the men who were left. And very few men were left. Only 275 effectives were left. The ammunition for machine guns was almost exhausted.

On the 7th the Germans sent a characteristic note to Major Whittlesey. They "appealed to his humane sentiments" to surrender. Major Whittlesey read the note, and handed it to Captain McMurtry. He passed it on to Captain Holderman. They looked at each other and smiled. Two white panels had been spread on the ground to show our position to our airplane. Major Whittlesey took those in; nothing white should show on that hillside. And among the men, soldiers too weak to stand on their feet raised upon their

elbows and cried: "Come over and get us!"

That night the 307th broke through on the right. Half an hour later patrols of the 308th were reported on the south. On the morning of the 8th the 252 survivors of the 679 that had entered the "pocket" with their sick and wounded, marched south to rest.

They had held their post.

#### A STORY OF THE 78TH.

The Bois des Lodges is a tract of scrubby undergrowth about a kilometer square, cut by numerous wood roads in all directions and by natural gullies, resembling a gigantic sheet of corrugated iron, except in the northwest, where it rises abruptly to a bald peak 216 metres high, descending into a long westward ridge. The trees are dense enough to obscure against observation for artillery fire, but not dense enough to obstruct machine gun bullets. ing ravines strengthened its natural defenses. The enemy had established an interlocking system of machine gun nests, often only 40 yards apart, which could sweep the terrain in all directions.

At 6 o'clock the morning of October 16 the 78th attacked this area, supported by artillery of the 77th and 82d Divisions. It required two weeks of bitter, costly smashing to take Grandpre through the Bois de Lodges, and it was November 3 before the enemy fled the city.

Without pausing for rest or food or equipment, the men of the 78th dashed after the retreating foe, fighting the Boche rear guard for twenty-four kilometres.

The Rainbow Division was hurrying up to relieve the wearied 78th. The Germans had ploughed up the roads to delay the pursuing 78th. But the engineers accomplished incredible work, so the doughboys kept pace with the Boche.

It was Nov. 5 before the Rainbows caught up. Said the commander of the first arriving unit of the Rainbows: "I was ordered to leap frog you and

take the line, but how could I when I couldn't catch up with you?"

The 78th had reached Tanay, a small town on the west bank of the Meuse, opposite Stenay. They had drubbed the foe mightly. Now they drudged and trudged along muddy roads to a rest. A limber got caught in the ruts. A staff car almost crashed into it. Yelled an irate Lieutenant to the driver of the limber and its truck:

"Why don't you get out of the road? You ought to be in jail!"

"I wish I was in jail," retorted the distressed driver.

So tired that they zigzagged and staggered, caked with mud and dirt, their uniforms worn with battle, their chins bearing days' growths of beard, their stamina almost spent, yet they grinned as they passed through towns. One jigged at times under an old plug hat he had found somewhere. Another pushed a baby carriage laden with precious war junk.

Then, one night, as they were entering St. Menehould, they beheld a wondrous flare in the skies, the burning of fireworks, the glow of myriad beautiful rockets. American doughboys ran out to greet them, to hug them and

dance with them.

The armistice had been signed. The long, long trail back to New York and New Jersey was started. They trudged no longer. They forgot fatigue and exhaustion and just danced their darned feet off.

#### A TALE ABOUT THE 80TH.

The following letter from Major J. Howard Eager of the 314th Field Artillery was published in the Baltimore Sun:

We are way inside the original German lines, living in German dugouts, cooking on German stoves, using German maps, observing instruments, cooking utensils, blankets, furniture, and even food. You should have seen the mess the boches left when our first great barrage hit them. Their dugouts had everything thrown about as if a tornado had hit them.

In one place we found 800 pounds of potatoes, a quarter of veal and a whole bag of white meal biscuits, exactly like Maryland beaten biscuits, helmets, clothes, a bag of clean laundry, mess kits—all sorts of salvage that we have found very useful. At first we were a little afraid of traps and tricks, but they evidently left in too great a hurry to do anything like that.

We have been fighting for twelve days and you can imagine what a strenuous time we are having. We left Camp —— Sept. 13, spent forty-eight hours on the train and moved toward the front for five days or more, marching at night and camping all day in the woods where the enemy could not see us with their planes. Then we had a few days' rest and came up to our positions about two kilometres from the front lines.

We took part in the great barrage, a curtain of fire forty miles wide, lasting three hours, and preceded by six hours' shooting by the big guns. Our men went forward for about five miles the first day, and since then we have moved forward several kilometres every few days, firing and fighting most of the time. I have been shot at by boche planes which swooped down on me with machine guns, bombed by planes at night, shelled by light and heavy German guns, and have had an exciting time generally.

Our first artillery preparation played havor—great shell holes everywhere, trenches and dugouts smashed in, and everything showing signs of the most disordered retirement. I have been fortunate in most cases in finding a good German dugout to live in. They are cramped, dirty and damp, but it feels fine to have twenty or thirty feet of earth above me, which is the case just now. Except when we are moving forward or fighting in the open, my job is down in a dugout surrounded by maps, which I study by candle light with a telephone by my side.

I have a fine telephone officer, and as soon as we move forward my linemen get to work, and I am soon linked up to everybody by telephone. Our lines kept getting cut up by shell fire, but I have a nervy crowd of linemen, who go right out under shell fire and repair them by day or night. We have to talk in code always, for the Germans have wonderful listening in sets, and can catch what we say miles away. They are burning up all the towns

in front of us, which is most encouraging.

At our stationary points I lead a curious life. Just now I am in a dugout writing at a folding table by candle light. I have just shot up a German railroad station with two trains in it, and I am preparing to drop shells on a road where I am told some trucks are moving. It seems queer to be sitting in an underground office and doing it all by telephone. I am busy every hour of the twenty-four. My bed consists of a quilt and some blankets rolled up behind my chair, which I unroll when night comes.

I stretch out with my gas mask and telephone by my head. One man has written on his mask, "I need thee every hour." Teething babies have nothing on this life, for I am apt to be up five or six times during the night, giving orders or receiving instructions from the colonel or the general. You

lose all sense of time, day and night and everything else.

At certain intervals my cook brings some food and says it is time to eat, and the first thing I know he is back again with another meal, mostly coffee, canned beef, bread, rice and tomatoes. Yesterday we got some flour and had cakes for breakfast—a great treat.

had cakes for breakfast—a great treat.

My bagage was left in the rear, so what I have is a haversack with toilet articles, bedding, a change of underwear (already changed) and a few extra socks. Things are starting up again, so I must stop. Let's hope for Christmas dinner together.

#### WHO FOUGHT AT CHATEAU-THIERRY?

A mix-up in dispatches and cumulative misinformation resulted n crediting the Marine Corps with the action at the Bridge across the Marne at Chateau-Thierry in which the intention of the Germans to cross to the other side was greatly discouraged and finally abandoned. The following paragraph from "The Watch on the Rhine," the official publication of the Third Division, states the matter clearly:

Up until this time there is a general impression among the American people that the Marines, which compose one brigade of the Second Division, accomplished the tremendous task of holding the enemy at Chateau-Thierry, particularly in the Belleau Woods, but with the Second Division in this defensive action was the 7th Machine Gun Battalion, the motorized machine gun battalion of the Third Division. This battalion held the bridges in the City of Chateau-Thierry from May 31, 1918, until the night of June 4, 1918, and repulsed the strong attacks of the Germans. Neither the Marines nor any part of the Second Division ever fought at Chateau-Thierry and up until this time the 7th Machine Gun Battalion was the only American unit that ever fought there. During the Third Battle of the Marne, in July, 1918,

the 4th Infantry, Third Division, held the eastern outskirts of the city, the

French holding the city itself.

The 7th Machine Gun Battalion, being motorized, traveled overland in small Ford trucks from its training area in the vicinity of Chateau Villain, and reached Chateau-Thierry late in the afternoon on the 31st of May. Positions were immediately taken up in that historic city, part of which was already occupied by the enemy. After a thorough reconnaissance each company was given a mission. The general mission was to repulse any attempt of the enemy to advance on Chateau-Thierry by the bridges entering the city.

About 1 o'clock in the morning of June 2d a detachment of this battalion was forced from its position on the north side of the river and fell back across the large bridge. In the meantime the enemy had formed in considerable strength on the north end of the bridge and attempted to enter into Chateau-Thierry. This bridge was then blown up and caused the immediate failure of the enemy attack.

#### ST. MIHIEL.

The taking of the salient at St. Mihiel was graphically described by Henry Russell Miller, a Y. M. C. A. secretary, in the Christian Herald:

Supper was over, he wrote. In the little lean-to which was the battalion P. C. we smoked and chatted by fits and starts, nervously anxious for the hour to move. It was raining, the same steady downpour that for four days had been turning field and road into heavy, sticky mire. In the gathering dusk our fire sent shadows dancing through the woods. A little way up the narrow-gauge railroad a group was receiving absolution from the Catholic chaplain. Platoons and companies stood in loose formation along the roadside, awaiting the command to fall in.

The major puffed hard on his cigar, rubbing his hands restlessly. Occasionally he cast a quick appraising glance in the direction of "Germany." then around the grove in which we were camped. I noticed we all did that often. The same uneasy thought was in all our minds. The adjutant finally

gave it voice.

"This is going to be a pas bon place when the ball opens. The Boche'll just soak it to these woods. Hope they don't open up before we start."

"If only," mused the Lieutenant Doctor, "if only they haven't laid a trap There's something phony about this quiet. Of course, they know what's up."

"It ought to be worse than Soissons," was the Supply Officer's cheerful

contribution.

The Major sighed. "I'll feel better if we reach Nonsard to-morrow night." It was to be his first experience under fire. I think he did not mind that;

but it was to be his first command in battle, and that did count.

It was September 11. On the morrow was to begin the drive to wipe out the St. Mihiel salient, that famous series of ridges and hills that, despite some of the bloodiest fighting of the war, had withstood all French attempts to take it. This was to be practically an all-American affair, under our own command. As far back as the winter before, when Our Division held the Toul sector, I had seen preparations making for it; lately I had glimpsed some of the results: railroads criss-crossing the woods, running almost to the front lines, battery after battery of heavy guns, ammunition enough-so it seemed-to blow Montsec from the face of the earth. The prophecies of last winter were about to be fulfilled. Our Division was to outflank and take the terrible Butte.

It was not, alas! the same division. The artillery had come practically intact out of the Soissons fighting, and a few of the wounded doughboys had strayed back; but during August the infantry had been recruited to full war strength with new men, fine, strapping fellows from the draft and the later officers schools in the States. Their training had been brief, they had never been under fire; but we had no doubt of them. They had heard of the greatness of Soissons, were strong in the resolve that the standard should not be lowered. The personnel of a fighting division changes; its tradition, its soul,

Nine o'clock and black as Egypt, the rain heavier than ever. We fell into line, the surgeon's group, with which I was to work, in the lead. We began to march through heavy, clinging mud knee-deep; every step an effort. Along a twisting road, across a field that was worse-"Look out for shell holes!" Too late: they dragged me out of the watery pit. A snicker ran down the

line. "A man fell in. He's in the army now!"

We came to a railroad, where the going was better. A whistle blew sharply ahead, we jumped aside to let a "dinkey" and train of flat-cars pass. "What's a train doing here?" Out of the darkness a voice: "Delivering bonbons for the Boche. Going to be some barrage, believe me! See you in Metz!" Somehow our group got lost. For two hours we groped around, falling headlong into invisible trenches, crawling painfully through barbedwire entanglements. We came out at last, in tatters and soaked to the skin, on the crest of a hill. We huddled down under a roadbank. It was five minutes to one. We counted the seconds.

At one o'clock the deep-throated "boom" we awaited. We followed up the sound of the shell, saw the flash as it fell on the flank of the Butte. The night was suddenly alight, and quivering with sound. All the great cannon that for months had lain hidden and silent for this hour, were vomiting fire and steel upon Montsec. The wet sky grew red with the blaze of it. Fountains of white flame outlined the ridges. The towering Butte was a cataract of fire.

But, strange, there was no answer from the German guns. It seemed, to be sure, that nothing could live and move through that inferno across the valley, and yet-! Montsec was a fortress perfected through four years of German occupation: when the French attacked, they had been greeted by a very fury of artillery. The enemy must know we were lying there in waiting, and he had our range to a nicety; our ridge was pitted and furrowed, its villages shapeless ruins, from his fire of other days. The silence, as the hours dragged on, seemed ominous; he was holding back, that the storm, when it burst, might be the more terrible. We almost wished he would open up and get it over.

The rain ceased. Dawn came, gray and cold, a keen wind blowing. We could make out our battalion lying a little behind us on the slope. "Now,"

we said, "the Boche will begin." But he did not.

A whistle cut faintly through the din of guns. The scattered groups on the slope stiffened into line, the open formation our Americans know and use so well. Down on the plains the first wave jumped from the trenches and began to move forward. "Now!" And I mentally braced myself. Nothing happened. The second wave topped the crest and began the descent; we swung in behind it; and still that ominous silence from the enemy guns. Then the whole malicious German plan dawned on me. They would wait until we were all over and well down the hill, then put a box barrage around us and cut us to pieces. And they could do it. We had at least three kilometers to go, all in full view from those frowning heights. Not a man of us could reach them alive. The third and last wave came over. . . . It is very hard to be brave in the cold gray of dawn. I became acutely conscious that I was very wet and very cold. I shivered. My teeth chattered noisily. "G-go-goodness!" I said. "B-b-but—that wind is c-c-cold!"

"Shucks." said the man beside me. "I'm scared too!"

Before us lay the Montsec panorama we Americans had been wistfully viewing for nearly a year. The wide valley-plain dotted with groves and ruined villages, Boucainville, Richecourt, Seichprey of bloody memory for one Yankee division; beyond, rising steeply, the wooded ridges, and in their van, flying streamers of smoke, the grim Butte. Over the plain rolled the barrage, the tanks, the first wave, pigmy-like under the shadow of the hills. Down our slope moved the second and third waves. All the infantry of the division was in sight at once, bayonets fixed; three parallel hedges of bristling steel moving steadily toward the heights. Overhead airplanes darted and circled. The man beside me, forgetting that he was scared, caught his breath. "I want to live to remember this."

A few shells burst over the first wave.

That was all until the wood at the right of Butte was entered. The Germans were there, and a few machine-gunners—as ever, the enemy's best soldiers—tried to put up a fight. A little later we passed over their dead bodies. The rest had but one thought—to surrender before it was too late. The astounding truth burst upon us. The enemy, overcome by the strength of our preparations, was running away! This formidable fastness, four years impregnable, was being given up with only such fighting as rearguards could make.

Our spirits bounded sky-high. Expecting shambles, another Soissons or worse, we had found only a manoeuver. The wind and exercise dried out our wet clothes. We grew warm; we were boys out on a holiday; we liked this war. Even the few wounded who trickled back from the first wave took their hard luck as a joke.

We combed the woods. Then our regiment swung to the right, up the valley. All day we marched and maneuvered, moving with beautiful precision from objective to objective. Everywhere we found the same thing; for the most part a frightened, docile enemy, here and there a fanatic machine-gunner. When such an obstreperous one was encountered, the doughboys in front of him would flatten out, creep around to flanking positions, then pick him off with a rifle or dash in upon him from the sides. Or a tank would lumber casually toward him, spitting fire. Usually he saw the light; if he didn't—so much the worse for him! There was one who, having cried "Kamerad!" suddenly tried to turn his gun upon his advancing captors. It was very bad for him. The roar of our guns died down; there was no need to waste ammunition on an enemy who would not stand. Cavalry went around us and dashed ahead to cut off the fleeing Germans.

Nonsard, I think, had been set as a second day's objective for our regiment. Late in the afternoon of the first day the three waves reformed in the fields before the town—another picture to remember. The sun had come out and was setting in a sky of rose. Bayonets caught and flung back the gleam of it. At Vigueulles, to our left, great pillars of violet smoke rose from ammunition dumps the Germans had not had time to save; there was the merry cackle of thousands of harmlessly exploding shells. Jauntily we marched up to the town, just as our cavalry was disappearing at its other end; through it, and on into the woods beyond. There, cold and blanketless, hungry and supperless, but happier than kings may be, we halted.

That evening came the news: the left our division had touched hands with an American division that had smashed through from the other side of the salient. Nearly fifteen thousand prisoners had been taken, more than one

hundred guns. The St. Mihiel salient was a thing of the past.

Shortly after midnight I awoke from a doze, to find an old Frenchman replenishing my fire. He was weeping, and saying over and over to himself, "La grande liberation! The truth was beginning to dawn upon him.

#### THE BATTLE OF THE TICONDEROGA.

American naval markmanship had little opportunity in the war. At such times as it had a chance it gave a good account of itself. In one case, the only contest, between an American cargo transport (Ticonderoga) and a submarine, the submarine outranged the transport and even at that it took two hours to decide the issue. The Ticonderoga went down with her flag flying and the story was told by her captain, Lieutenant-Commander James Madison. He told the story to a reporter for the New York Sun as he lay convalescing from his injuries in a hospital in Brooklyn. Here is his narrative:

The *Ticonderoga* was a pretty big ship and was formerly the German steamship Camilla Rickmers, plying between Bremen and the far East. She was new just before the war, 400 feet long, and would carry 12,000 tons deadweight.

"Poor coal, you might say, was the cause of all the trouble. We had started in convoy with twenty-seven other ships for France and were about midway across the ocean when we began to drop behind on the night of September 29. At the time the convoy was making only nine and a half knots, but our coal was so full of dust and dirt that we were twelve miles behind the bunch when the first streaks of dawn came in the east next morning.

It was gray and chilly, but with little sea on. I was just about to leave the bridge as three bells struck, when the lookout called from the forrad crow's nest, "Submarine dead ahead!"

And there it was right in our path, only 500 yards away. Immediately the alarm bells were going and the gun crews making ready to fire.

The sub was low in the water, but I could see she was a big one and also her gun crews were busy. We had evidently surprised him or he would have maneuvered so as to shoot us up with a torpedo. As we had her dead ahead I decided to keep right on and try to ram her.

We had two five-inch guns forward and a six-inch gun on the stern platform. The forward guns were ordered to fire immediately, but the bow was so high they could not bear on the submarine. As I had my hand on the telegraph the first shot cracked from the sub. What it did to us was a'olenty. They couldn't miss. It was point-blank range.

That first shot seemed to fill the air with debris.

The second shot carried away the starboard forward gun so there was not any use worrying about that one any longer. Six men of the gun crew were killed. I was still trying to keep head on to the sub, I did not want to sheer off and give him the ship's broadside to shoot at with his torpedoes.

They begun to shoot us up for fair, both the sub's guns firing with great frequency. They paid particular attention to the bridge.

When we sailed we had 260 men on board, 147 of them being members of a field artillery outfit. Of the crew we had forty in the fire and engine rooms and the rest on deck, and for gun crews 117 men all told.

They kept beating us up with big shells and I finally decided to swing off and give the stern gun a chance. Muller was in charge back there and said that gun could be deflected. It was a gambler's chance.

As I moved from one side of the bridge to the other for the last time the steel beams and supports underneath could be seen, all the planking having been shot away. Then there was a crash and the next thing I knew I was lying on the main deck, thirty feet below. My left leg was paining like

the devil and blood was running into my eyes and down my neck from splinter wounds.

Rage filled me more than ever after the bad wound and my only idea then was to fight on. I heard the sound of our stern gun and could have shouted with laughter that we were getting into it. As our surgeon had been killed, Magruder formed an emergency first aid squad and patched up my knee. I yelled for two sailors and leaning on their shoulders I managed to get along the deck to have a look around.

The midship section was a wreck, all splintered woodwork and twisted steel. The funnel and most of the super-structure had been bumped off. All along the deck the crushed planking was ablaze. I remembered that there was a fifty-two gallon drum of gasolene in a store room aft I knew that if the fires reached that we would be all blown to pieces as well as shot up by the sub. I called for volunteers to go in and get the tank and throw it over the side.

I heaved a sigh of relief when it dropped into the sea.

With the after gun bearing on him the sub had decided not to stay so close. She went off half a mile or so and presented a small target. The aftergun was making him hustle about then and one shell seemed to make a clean hit. She disappeared quickly and all of our crowd left gave a cheer, thinking we had finished her.

"It was a false alarm, however, as she soon came to the surface again, ahead of us once more. She ripped it through us for fair this time and the *Ticonderoga* was soon afire from stem to stern.

At this time, I spoke to Magruder, the paymaster, who was on top of the engine room skylight, watching the sub. I turned and when I looked again Magruder had disappeared, apparently having been blown to pieces just that minute. Scores of men had been killed about the decks and some of them dreadfully mangled. With the hand steering gear aft blown away I knew that we were gone. No use holding on, so I gave the order to abandon ship.

The next I remember I was in the lifeboat. How I got there I did not know until Ringleman told me about it.

When I came to I was lying in the bottom of the boat and the men were pulling away from the side of the ship. Altogether there were twenty-two in our boat, including fourteen soldiers, all of whom were privates. In the other boat, lowered from the starboard quarter, there were thirty men, including Lieutenants Muller and Fulcher, when it was fired on by the submarine. The boat was shattered and the men thrown into the water, many of them having been badly wounded. The survivors clambered onto a life-raft that had floated off, and it was from this group that the sub took Muller and Fulcher. Both these officers were American-born and game to the core.

As the *Ticonderoga* was taking her last plunge her bow raised up almost straight in the air, until fifty feet of her keel showed, then she settled back with a great splashing and rumbling underneath the waves. "Well, that's the last of the old *Ticonderoga*," said one of the men, and I continued to rage there in the bottom of the boat, powerlessly against the pirates.

It was 7:45 then and the fight had lasted a little over two hours—and we were the losers. Just then the submarine hailed us and soon came along-side, and an officer with an automatic in each hand shouted in loud tones; "Up mitt der hands!"

He wanted the captain, he said, and wanted him "damn quick." "Captain's dead and sunk with the ship," said Tappley, the chief quartermaster. "I saw him layin' on the deck myself." I didn't deny this. Never would they have taken the human wreck lying in the bottom of the boat for the skipper of what had been two hours before a fine big ship.

"Fine bunch of heroes, those Huns," said Tappley as the sub steamed away in the direction of the life-raft which was bobbing around about a

mile away. I heard afterward from Muller that there were two very badly wounded soldiers on the raft, one with his shoulder shot away, and one whose foot had been blown off. They were wild with thirst and begged the U-boat commander, whose name was Franze, for some water.

"Gott will look out for you," was all the satisfaction they got from this officer as the submarine steamed away triumphantly with Muller and Fulcher.

We took account of stock in the life boat and found we had plenty of biscuit to last several days, but were comparatively short on water. The submarine disappeared, but we could still see the life-raft.

Every wave that broke over the raft washed one or more of the men off and before we could get to them every man had been washed into the

#### A PRISONER AT LARGE.

War is always prolific of true tales that read like fables and the late war has added to the former tales a new sort brought down out of the air, for in this war for the first time men fought in the air. One of the most striking stories is told by Captain Alan Bott of the British Royal Air Service. He was 22 years old when he enlisted at the opening of the war and his first service was in France where his adventures were those of the average aviator and included a toll of seven enemy machines destroyed, and the British Military Cross for valor added to his laurels.

When Allenby expedition to Jerusalem was being arranged, Captain Bott was sent to join the army in Palestine. He was with them until April, 1918, when having chased an enemy machine sixty miles beyond the lines from his base at Jaffa he was himself set upon by two antagonists and his machine sent spinning to the ground. He was pinned down by his engine, was discovered by some Arabs who could not quite decide whether to kill him or sell him to the Turks. They were tossing up to settle the question when a Turkish force came along, drove the Arabs off and made him a prisoner.

After three weeks of convalescing in an Austrian Hospital, 75 miles from Jaffa he essayed an escape but failed because of his bad leg, and was transferred to Nazareth where he was imprisoned with common criminals, murderers and brigands whom he described as "filthy brutes." At first he was put into an underground dungeon. After eating his daily bowl of soup and loaf of bread and fighting cooties for a few days he planned several means of escape which he said did not appeal to the Turks, and finally feigned insanity and was sent to Constantinople, but a wreck not far from Constantinople gave him an opportunity to escape. He met a Turkish officer in a German uniform, paid him two Turkish pounds to exchange uniforms and spent some time in Constantinople being saluted everywhere by Turkish-German soldiers and having a lot of fun listening to the plotting and planning in the cafes while he avoided German officers. He learned that Turkey was ready to make a separate peace but had no way to get the news through the lines. The Allies appeared not to realize Turkey's readiness to quit. finally stowed away in a cargo steamer bound for Odessa but the crew went Bolshevik en route and the steamer rolled with her engines dead for nearly three weeks before the officers and crew compromised and continued. Odessa he heard of Bulgaria's surrender and so stowed away by another ship bound for the Bulgarian coast where he landed in safety finally reaching the British lines.

#### THE NAMES OF THE DIVISIONS.

Twenty-five of the divisions in the A. E. F. accumulated nicknames by which they were known throughout the army and at home,

of which they were proud and under which they doubtless will march down the long line of history.

These names were as follows:

Third-Marne Division: Nickname conferred on unit by Major-Gen. Joseph T. Dickman following its exploits on the Marne line opposite Chateau-Thierry. Fourth-Ivy Division: Derived from insignia, a Roman numeral IV.

Fifth-Red Diamond Division: Two derivations of this unit's nickname The first is as follows: "Diamond Dye-it never runs." The second derivation is quoted from a staff officer and states, "The 'Red Diamond' represents a well-known problem in bridge building-it is made up of two adjacent isosceles triangles, which make for the greatest strength."

Twenty-sixth-Yankee Division: Derived from the fact that the unit was formed of New England National Guardsmen and applied because original

Yankees came from New England.

Twenty-seventh-New York Division: Derived from fact that personnel of

unit is from New York.

Twenty-eighth-Keystone Division: From fact that unit was formed of men mostly from Pennsylvania, the "Keystone State." Divisional description states, "It has always occupied the center of the corps front-it has had the keystone position."

Twenty-ninth-Blue and Gray Division: Derived from fact that men

comprising unit were drawn from both Northern and Southern states.

Thirtieth-Old Hickory Division: From fighting qualities of Andrew Jack-

son, whose military career gained him the same title.

Thirty-second-Les Terribles and Iron Jaw: Of these two nicknames, the first was given the unit by a French writer, and the second is derived from the fact that the division, while engaged on the Marne, was employed on both flanks of that salient.

Thirty-third—Yellow Cross Division: Derived from insignia of unit. Thirty-fourth—Sandstorm Division: From sandstorms which division en-

countered while training at Camp Cody, Deming, New Mexico.

Thirty-sixth—Lone Star Division: From fact that the Lone Star is the

emblem of Texas.

Thirty-seventh-Buckeye Division: Nickname is derived from fact that division was formed of the National Guard of Ohio, the Buckeye State.

Fortieth-Sunshine Division: Inspired by favorable climatic conditions

under which unit trained.

Forty-first-Sunset Division: From sunsets of Pacific Coast, section from

which men forming unit were drawn.

Forty-second-Rainbow Division: From fact that the War Department decided to make the first National Guard division for service in France a representative American division. Nickname was applied before division was formed.

Seventy-seventh—Liberty Division: Nickname derived from unit's insignia,

a miniature Statue of Liberty.

Seventy-eighth—Lightning Division.

Eightieth—The Blue Ridge Boys: Derived from Blue Ridge mountains, and is representative of the States of Virginia, West Virginia and Pennsylvania, which originally formed the unit.

Eighty-first-Wildcat Division: Derived from fact that a small stream which flowed through Camp Jackson, where the unit was organized, was

called Wildcat Creek.

Eighty-second-All American Division: From fact that enlisted men represent nearly every State in the Union and comprise Americans of every racial origin.

Eighthy-eighth—Cloverleaf Division: Adopted because the four leaf clover is representative of the four States of Iowa, Minnesota, Illinois and North

Dakota, from which enlisted men who formed unit were drawn, and is also conventionally the numerical designation of the division, with a loop for each State.

Eighty-ninth—Western Division: From fact that unit was originally formed of enlisted men from States in the Middle West.

Ninety-first—Wild West Division: Nickname derived from fact that officers and men came from eight Western States.

Ninety-second—Buffalo Division: From Indian wars of pioneer days, when the negro was called upon to aid in suppressing Indian uprisings. The redskin, learning to respect the negroes as soldiers, nicknamed them "Buffaloes." Title is inherited from the 367th Regiment incorporated in division.

### AMERICA'S RECORD IN WAR FINANCE.

	Quota	${f Amount}$	Number of
	For Nation	Subscribed	Subscribers
First Liberty Loan	.\$2,000,000,000	\$3,035,226,850	4,500,000
Second Liberty Loan	. 3,000.000,000	4,617,532.300	9,500,000
Third Liberty Loan	. 3,000,000,000	4,176,516,850	18,000,000
Fourth Liberty Loan	. 6,000,000,000	6,693,073,250	21,000,000
Victory Liberty Loan	4,500,000,000	*5,500,000,000	*10,000,000

<sup>\*</sup>Estimated.

### HOW THE WAR AFFECTED SHIP TONNAGE OF THE WORLD.

Gains and losses of maritime nations shown by figures compiled from the report of Chairman Edward N. Hurley to the United States Shipping Board:

omphing source.	
Steam sea-going merchant tonnage of the world, July, 1914	
Steam sea-going tonnage of world to-day, excluding 1,000,000 tons	
for abandonment, etc	37,010,000
Net loss	4,245,000
Loss through failure of normal increase by new construction	12,000,000
World shortage	16,245,000

ALLIES AND NEUTRALS	CENTRAL POWERS
Losses	Losses
Gross tons	Gross tons
By enemy action12,815,000	By enemy action 199,000
Marine risk 2,192,000	Marine risk 424,000
Capture or seizure	Capture or seizure
by enemy 211,000	by enemy 2,393,000
15,218,000	
Gains	Total 3,016.000
New construction.11,856,000	Gain
Capture or seizure	New construction. 740,000
from enemy 2,393,000	
<del>14,249,000</del>	Net loss 2,276,000
Net loss 969,000	

#### NET GAINS

United States (500 gross tons and over)		Per Cent. Gross tons 125 25
Great Britain (100 gross tons and over)	3,443,000	18

### GROSS LOSSES

The figures below give gross losses through enemy action. With the exception of the United States, Japan and Great Britain, where net figures are available and given above, there is probably small difference between gross and net losses on account of war-time difficulties in replacing lost tonnage.

Gross			Gross	
tons	Per cent.		tons	Per cent.
Portugal 92,382	76.4	Sweden	201,733	18.1
Italy 852,124	50.6	Russia	183,852	17.5
Norway1,178,335	47.1	Holland	199,975	13.3
Greece	40.3	Uruguay	6,889	13.0
France 907.168	39.1	Brazil	25,464	7.9
Great Britain7,753,746	36.8	Japan	127,470	7.5
Denmark 239,922	29.2	United States	383,987	7.2
Belgium 98,874	28.0	Rumania	3,688	6.5
Spain 167,693	18.7	Argentine	4,275	1.9
		Peru	1,419	2.7

### CHAPTER XXVI.

THE TREATY OF PEACE AND THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

THE PREAMBLE TO THE TREATY

The United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, these powers being described in the present treaty as the principal Allied and Associated powers; Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, the Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Rumania the Serb-Croat-Slovene States, Siam, Czechoslovakia, and Uruguay, these powers constituting with the principal powers mentioned above the Allied and Associated Powers of the one part; and Germany, of the other part: Bearing in mind that on request of the Imperial German Government an armistice was granted on November 11, 1918, to Germany by the principal Allied and Associated Powers in order that a treaty of peace might be concluded with her, and the Allied and Associated Powers being equally desirous that the war in which they were successively involved directly or indirectly, and which originated in the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on July 28, 1914, against Serbia; the declaration of war by Germany against Russia on Aug. 1, 1914, and against France on Aug. 3, 1914, and in the invasion of Belgium, should be replaced by a firm. just, and durable peace;

For this purpose the high contracting parties represented as follows: (Here follow the names of signers of the treaty) who having communicated their full powers found in good and due form, HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

From the coming into force of the present treaty the state of war will terminate. From that moment and subject to the provisions of this treaty official relations with Germany and with any of the German States will be resumed by the Allied and Associated Powers.

#### THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The high contracting parties, in order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just and honorable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another, agree to this covenant of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 1—Provides that such of the signatories of the treaty and of the other nations named in the annex to the covenant as shall accede to the covenant shall become the first members of the League of Nations. Also, that any self-governing State, dominion or colony not named may become a member by a two-thirds vote of the League Assembly. Any member of the League may withdraw after two years provided all its international obligations and its obligations under the covenant have been fulfilled.

ARTICLE 2—"The action of the League under this covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of an assembly and of a council with a permanent secretariat."

ARTICLE 3.—Provides that the assembly shall consist of representatives of members of the League, that it shall meet at stated intervals, that it may deal "with any matter within the sphere of the League or affecting the peace of the world" and that each member of the League shall have one vote in the

assembly and not more than three delegates.

ARTICLE 4.—Provides that "the Council shall consist of representatives of the principal Allied and Associated Powers with representatives of four other members of the League" to be elected by the Assembly, Belgium, Brazil, Spain and Greece to be represented until the Assembly elects. Both the permanent membership and the total membership in the Council may be changed by the Council in agreement with the Assembly. The Council may take up any question permitted to be considered by the assembly and provision is made for special representation on the council of an unrepresented member of the League specifically interested in a question before that body.

ARTICLE 5.—Provides that "except where otherwise expressly provided" all decisions of either the Assembly or the Council must be unanimous. Provides also that the President of the United States shall call the first meet-

ings of both bodies.

ARTICLE 6.—Provides for the establishment and support of the permanent

Secretariat at the seat of the League.

ARTICLE 7.—Provides for the first establishment of the seat of the League at Geneva and provides for diplomatic privileges and immunity for all representatives and officers engaged in the business of the League.

ARTICLE 8.—Provides for the reduction of armaments to "the lowest point consistent with national safety" and lays upon the council the duty of formulating plans for such reduction, the plans to be subject to reconsideration every ten years. Provides further that no member of the League shall exceed the limits thus fixed without the consent of the council and that all members shall exchange freely military information. Private manufacture of war materials is declared open to grave objections.

ARTICLE 9.—"A permanent commission shall be constituted to advise the council on the execution of the provision of Articles 1 and 8 and on military

and naval questions."

ARTICLE 10.—"The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."

ARTICLE 11.—Providies that any war or threat of war is a matter of concern to the League and that the League shall take action to safeguard peace. Provides also that any member may bring to the notice of the League any

question "which threatens to disturb international peace."

ARTICLES 12 and 13.—Are an absolute agreement not to go to war until three months after an award by arbitrators or a decision by the council, report to be made within six months. Arbitration may be resorted to in compliance with treaties already in effect and such matters as the interpretation of a treaty, a question of international law, the determination of a fact regarding a breach of international obligations, or the nature and extent of reparation are declared matters capable of being arbitrated. All members of the League are bound to carry out in good faith any award rendered and not to go to war against a member complying with an award.

ARTICLE 14.—Provides for the creation on a Permanent Court of Interna-

tional Justice.

ARTICLE 15.—Provides for the submission to the council of a dispute not submitted to arbitration, for the publication of the facts and the terms of

settlement, for the publication of the facts and recommendations if the case is not settled, provides that in case of an unanimous report by the council, excepting delegates of interested parties, no member shall go to war with a party to the dispute who complies with the award, leaves the members of the League free in case of no decision "to take such action as they may deem necessary for the maintenance of right and justice," provides for the submission of a case to the assembly on request of a party thereto and provides that the assembly shall be governed in its decision by the same rules as the council and that its decisions shall have the same force.

ARTICLE 16.—Provides that a resort to war in violation of Articles 12, 13 or 15 shall be deemed an act of war against all members of the League and that all financial, commercial or personal intercourse with the offending nation shall be severed. The council is to recommend military action in such a case. Provides also for the expulsion from the League by unanimous vote of the council, not including the representative of the offending nation, of

any member violating any covenant of the League.

ARTICLE 17.—Provides for the settlements of disputes and the maintenance of peace when countries not members of the League are involved; such countries are to be invited to accept the obligations of the League for the purposes of such dispute.

ARTICLE 18.—Provides that no treaty shall be binding unless registered at

the League Secretariat.

ARTICLE 19.—Authorizes the assembly to advise reconsideration of treaties which have become inapplicable or which endanger peace.

ARTICLE 20.—Provides for the abrogation of international covenants in

conflict with the terms of this treaty.

ARTICLE 21.—"Nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace."

ARTICLE 22.—Provides for the government of "peoples not yet able to stand by themselves" under a system of mandatories, provides for the suppression of the slave trade, arms traffic and liquor traffic in Africa and provides for annual reports to the council by the mandatories and for a commission "to advise the council on all matters relating to the mandates."

ARTICLE 23.—Binds the League members to "endeavor to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women and children" in all countries; to undertake to secure just treatment of native inhabitants; to "intrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements regarding the traffic in women, children, opium and other dangerous drugs;" to entrust to the League supervision over the arms traffic; to make provision to secure and maintain freedom of commerce, to take steps for the prevention and control of disease.

ARTICLE 24.—Provides for the taking over by the League of all interna-

tional bureaus already established.

ABTICLE 25.—Provides for the encouragement and promotion of the Red Cross.

ARTICLE 26.—Provides for the amendment of the covenant, amendments to be ratified by the members represented in the council and to secure a majority vote in the assembly.

THE ANNEX.—Original members of the League of Nations signatories of

the Treaty of Peace.

United States of China
America Cuba
Belgium Ecuador
Bolivia France
Brazil Greece
British Empire Guatemala

Liberia Nicaragua Panama Peru Poland Portugal

Uruguay

Rumania Canada Haiti

Australia Serb-Croat-Slovene Hedjaz South Africa Honduras State New Zealand Siam Italy Japan Czecho-Slovakia India

States invited to accede to the covenant:

Argentine Republic Netherlands Salvador Chile Norway Spain Colombia Paraguay Sweden Denmark Persia Switzerland Venezuela

The First Secretary General of the League of Nations is the Honorable Sir James Eric Drummond, K. C. M. G., C. B.

#### PART II-BOUNDARIES OF GERMANY

ARTICLE 27.—The boundary of Germany are fixed or indicated in the treaty. With Belgium the old boundary of 1914 is rectified to add to Belgium the former neutral territory of Moresnet, the Kreis of Eupen and the Kreis of Malmedy. With Luxemburg the boundary of 1914 stands as far as the new French boundary. The French boundary is the boundary of 1870 but the Sarre coal basin is in addition as provided in a later Article. The former boundary with Switzerland stands and the former Austrian boundary stands to a point about eight kilometers east of Neustadt. Here the new Polish boundary begins and cuts northward to the Baltic along a line drawn to conform to the ethnological situation. (See the maps for this line.) The boundary with Denmark was to be fixed according to provisions in Articles 110-111.

ARTICLE 28 - Fixes the boundaries of East Prussia. (See maps.) ARTICLES 29 and 30.—Define certain terms and declare that in conflicts between maps and text the text shall be final.

#### PART III-POLITICAL CLAUSES FOR EUROPE

SECTION 1, BELGIUM. ARTICLES 31 to 39—Germany consents to the abrogation of the treaty of 1839 (the scrap of paper) and agrees to consent to the engagement between Belgium and the Netherlands which shall take its place. Germany also cedes to Belgium sovereignty of former disputed or German territory placed in Belgium by the boundary provisions, agrees to the transfer to Belgian sovereignty of German nationals in the ceded territory. subject to the right conferred upon them to adopt German nationality and to remove to German territory without loss of property. Germany agrees to restore all archives and documents carried off from occupied territory.

SECTION 2. LUXEMBURG. ARTICLES 40-41. Germany consents to the abrogation of all treaties binding Luxemburg to Germany and agrees to grant to Luxemburg all the rights and advantages granted Allied and Associated

Powers in the treatv.

SECTION 3. LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE. ARTICLES 42-44-Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications on the left bank of the Rhine or to the west of a line drawn fifty kilometers east of the Rhine. She may neither assemble nor maneuver armed forces west of this line. A violation of this provision will be considered an act of war.

Section 4, Saabe Basin. Articles 45-50 and Annex—As compensation for the destruction of the coal mines in the North of France and as part payment of reparation Germany cedes to France full and absolute possession of the coal mines situated in the Saare Basin. (For boundaries, see maps.) Frontier is to be traced by a Commission of the League of Nations, the

League being trustee for the territory for fifteen years when a vote by the inhabitants will decide the permanent sovereignty of the territory. The personal rights of individuals are protected, the owners are to be indemnified for their loss by Germany, the German mining laws and regulations remain in force, French teaching may be required in the schools. The government is to be by a commission of five members representing the League of Nations. Existing civil and criminal courts are continued. On the taking of the vote of the people after fifteen years Germany agrees to cede sovereignty to France covering all or part of the Basin as determined by the League in accordance with the vote. If the Basin votes to return to Germany, Germany will pay France in gold for the rights of ownership in the mines but, even though returned to Germany, the mines will be required to furnish to France amounts of coal found by the League of Nations necessary for her industrial and domestic needs.

SECTION 5. ALSACE-LORRAINE. AETICLES 51-79 and Annex.—"The high contracting parties, recognizing the moral obligation to redress the wrong done by Germany in 1781, both to the rights of France and to the wishes of the population of Alsace-Lorraine . . . agree"

That territories ceded to Germany by France in the treaties of Versailles (Feb. 26, 1871) and Frankfort (May 10, 1871) shall be restored to French

sovereignty.

That all documents, archives and records relating to the administration of the territory shall be handed over to France by Germany.

That Germany and France shall make separate agreements establishing the civil rights and rights of nationality of residents of Alsace-Lorraine.

That the territories shall return to France free of public debt. That all State property in the territories shall revert to France.

That Germany will repay in marks to Alsace-Lorraine all moneys contributed and expenses incurred by the territories for the prosecution of the war; and that Germany shall continue to pay all civil and military pensions earned in Alsace-Lorraine prior to November 11, 1918.

In addition there are provisions for the government of the Rhine traffic for the transfer of the railways and the Rhine bridges to France; for freedom of importation into Germany for ten years of Alsace-Lorraine products; for the renunciation by Germany of all rights in the potash and other industries; for the settlement of debts due residents of Alsace-Lorraine by residents of the German states; for the protection of property rights of Alsace-Lorrainers in Germany; for the liquidation by France, Germany paying the bill, of the property rights of Germans in Alsace-Lorraine; for the validation of existing contracts between residents of Alsace-Lorraine and residents of Germany; for the transfer to France by Germany of all reserves accumulated for the payments of disability and old age pensions, miners' superannuation funds and similar funds, which would fall to the insurance fund at Strassbourg; and for further conventions to settle points not covered in the present treaty.

Section 6. Austria. Abticle 80—This section binds Germany to recognize the independence of Austria and prevents her from annexing Austria to Germany without the consent of the League of Nations.

Section 7. Czechoslovak State. Articles 81 to 86—Provide for German recognition of Czechoslovak independence and of the boundaries established by the Allied and Associated Powers; for the cession to Czechoslovakia of certain territory in Silesia adjoining that ceded to Poland and for a commission to define the Czechoslovak-Polish boundary in Silesia; for automatic Czechoslovak nationality for Germans habitually resident in Czech-Slovakia, subject to permission to adopt German nationality within two years; and for the protection by Czechoslovakia of the rights of racial minorities within her borders.

SECTION 8. POLAND. ARTICLES 78 to 92-Provide for the recognition of the independence of Poland and for cession to Poland of territory bounded by the Baltic and the new boundaries of Germany. Danzig and East Prussia, except certain boundaries to be decided by a commission; for plebiscite in Upper Silesia to be conducted by a commission within eighteen months after the coming into force of the treaty, to decide whether the territory shall be German or Polish; for freedom of transit between Germany and East Prussia across Polish territory of persons and goods; for the purchase by German nationals on terms as favorable as are accorded Polish citizens of the products of Polish mines; for automatic transfer to Polish nationality of Germans resident in Poland before January 1, 1908, subject to permission to adopt German nationality within two years, persons adopting German nationality being required to leave Poland within twelve months but without loss of immovable property; for the assumption by Poland of a fair share of the German financial liabilities proportioned to the German territory ceded to Poland and the German State property acquired by Poland, except that Poland is to receive free of cost all property of the former Kingdom of Poland; for the liquidation of the interest of German nationals in Polish territory, the proceeds being paid to the owners; and for the protection of racial minorities in Poland.

Section 9. East Prussia. Articles 94 to 98.—Provide for plebiscites under the control of a commission to decide the national allegiance of those parts of East Prussia not definitely established as parts of Germany and for conventions between Germany and Poland to provide for adequate railway and wire communication between Germany and East Prussia and between Poland and Danzig.

SECTION 10. MEMEL. ARTICLE 99—Leaves the sovereignty of the territory about Memil to the decision of the Allied and Associated Powers.

SECTION 11. DANZIG. ARTICLE 100 to 108—Provide for the establishment of the Free City of Danzig and for the establishment by a commission of the boundaries of the territory of the city; for the guarantee of the constitution of the Free City, by the League of Nations; for the negotiation of a treaty between Poland and Danzig including Danzig within the Polish customs frontier, providing for Polish control of the Vistula and Polish use of the waterfront and harbor and providing that Poland shall conduct the foreign relations of Danzig; for the establishment of nationality of persons and for the sharing by Danzig in the German debt on the same basis as in the case of Poland.

Section 12. Schleswig. Articles 109 to 114.—Provide for plebiscites in northern Schleswig to determine whether the territory in question shall remain German or be returned to Denmark; and for the establishment of individual nationality and assumption of a share of the German debt on terms similar to those governing the case of Poland.

Section 13. Heligoland. Abticle 115.—Provides for the destruction of all fortifications, military works and harbors on the islands of Heligoland and Dune and forbids the construction of any similar works in the future.

Section 14. Russia and Russian States. Articles 116 and 117.—Provide for German recognition of the independence of Russia and of all the territories which were a part of Russia in 1914; for the abrogation of the Brest-Litovsk treaty and all other agreements and conventions between Germany and Russian Maximalist Government; assert Russia's right to reparation under the present treaty; and bind Germany to recognize the full force of any treaties entered into by the Allied and Associated Powers with the whole or any part of the former Empire of Russia.

#### PART IV-GERMAN RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OUTSIDE GERMANY

ARTICLE 118.—Provides for the renunciation by Germany to the Allied and Associated Powers of all rights, titles and privileges to any territory outside her European boundaries as provided by the treaty.

Section 1. German Colonies. Articles 119 to 127.—Re-affirm Germany's renunciation of her rights in her overseas possessions; provide for transfer of German State property to the Government exercising authority over the territory under the treaty; for the protection of the economic rights of the inhabitants of the territories; for reparation to French nationals for German military and civil aggression in the Camerroons; for the renunciation by Germany of all rights existing under agreements with France regarding equatorial Africa and the payment by Germany to France of sums held by her under these agreements; for the recognition by Germany of trade regulations made by the Allies for her former colonies; and for diplomatic protection of the natives by the Government exercising authority over them.

Section 2. China. Abticles 128 to 134.—Provides that Germany shall renounce in favor of China all benefits and privileges resulting from the protocol signed at Pekin Sept. 7, 1901; for the relinquishment of advantages under other agreements; for the cession to China of all German Government property, except diplomatic and consular buildings, in Tientsin, Hankow or elsewhere in Chinese territory; for the restoration to China of astronomical instruments removed from China by German troops in 1901; for the restoration to China of full sovereignty and the abrogation of the leases granting Germany rights in Tientsin and Hankow, the areas to be opened freely to international trade; for the waiving by Germany of all claims against China growing out of the war; for the renunciation in favor of German property rights in the British concession at Canton and in favor of France and China of German school property in the French concession at Shanghai.

Section 3. Siam. Articles 135 to 137.—Provide for the cancellation of all treaties and agreements between Siam and Germany; for the transfer to Siam of all German State property in Siam and for the waiving by Germany of all war claims against Siam.

SECTION 4. LIBERIA. ARTICLES 138 to 140.—Provide for the renunciation by Germany of her right to participate in the government of Liberia; for the termination of all treaties between Liberia and Germany and for the settlement of German property rights in Liberia.

Section 5. Morocco. Articles 141 to 146.—Provide for the renunciation by Germany of all rights conterned by the act of Algeeiras, April 7, 1906, and later agreements; for the recognition of the French protectorate and the renunciation of the capitulations; for the granting to the Sherifian Government of complete liberty of action in regulating the status of German nationals and the withdrawing of special privileges enjoyed by German agricultural associations; for the Transfer to Morocco of title to all German Government property and property of the German crown; for the settlement of property rights of German nationals in Morocco, for the Transfer to France of German-held stock in the State Bank of Morocco and for equal treatment of French Moroccan goods entering Germany.

Section 6. Egypt. Articles 147 to 154.—Provide for the recognition by Germany of the British protectorate over Egypt and the renunciation of the capitulations; for the abrogation of all agreements between Germany and Egypt; for the government of German nationals by the Egyptian government; for the abrogation of the decree of the Khedive of Nov. 28, 1904; for the transfer to the British government of the powers of the Sultan relating to the navigation of the Suez Canal and the renunciation by Germany of her

right to participate in the Sanitary, Maritime and Quarantine Boards of Egypt; for the transfer to the Egyptian Government of all German State property in Egypt and for equal treatment of Egyptian and British goods entering Germany.

SECTION 7. Tubkey and Bulgabia. Article 155.—Provides for the recognition by Germany of all arrangements made by the Allies with Bulgaria and

Turkey which affect the rights of Germany or her nationals.

SECTION 8. SHANTUNG. ARTICLES 156 to 158.—Provide that "Germany renounces in favor of Japan all her rights, titles and privileges" in Shantung including her rights in the Tsing-tao-Tsinan-Fu railway, the German cables to Shanghai and Che-foo and all movable property of the German State in the concession; and provide for the handing over to Japan within three months of all records and documents relating to the administration of the territory and particulars regarding all agreements establishing German rights in the territory.

### PART V-MILITARY, NAVAL AND AERIAL CLAUSES

ABTICLES 159 to 213.—The bulk of these articles are too technical for the purposes of this volume. In the preamble to the section it is declared that Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses, "in order to render possible a general limitation of armaments." The maximum army permitted to Germany is to be 100,000 officers and men comprising not more than seven divisions of infantry and three divisions of cavalry. There must not be more than 4,000 officers and the army must be reduced, within the limit set, by March 31, 1920. Germany must give to the Allied Powers complete data regarding the number and caliber of all guns in the coast or inland fortifications she is allowed to retain, arms and military material may only be manufactured in works approved by the Allies, within two months after the coming into force of the treaty all stocks of war materials including aircraft in excess of the amount permitted to Germany must be delivered to the Allies; importation of arms or war material into Germany is prohibited, the manufacture of poisonous gases is prohibited, and Germany must reveal to the Allies the chemical formulæ and processes of manufacture of her explosives and gases; Germany must abolish compulsory military service and must raise her army by voluntary enlistment, the term of enlistment for the men shall be twelve years and for officers twenty-five years and not more than five per cent. may be discharged in any one year, all military schools in Germany, not essential for the education of the officers permitted, must be abolished; the mobilization of the army is forbidden; Germany may not send military or naval missions to other countries and is bound to prevent her nationals from leaving her territory to enlist in the armies of another country; all military works in Germany west of a line drawn fifty kilometers east of the Rhine must be dismantled and the construction of new fortifications in this zone is forbidden; Germany is permitted to have for her army 84,000 rifles, 18,000 Carbines, 792 heavy machine guns, 1134 light machine guns, 63 medium trench mortars, 189 light trench mortars, 204 7.7 cm. guns and 84 10.5 cm. howitzers with an amount of ammunition sufficient for any peace time emergency; Germany may have not more than six battleships of the Deutschland type, six light cruisers, twelve destroyers and twelve torpedo boats but no submarines and the personnel may not exceed 15,000 officers and men; the German warships interned at Scapa Flow must be surrendered and all warships under construction must be broken up all submarines, submarine salvage vessels and docks must be surrendered to the Allies or broken up, Germany may not maintain or construct fortifications commanding the maritime routes between the North Sea and the Baltic; Germany is not permitted to have any military or naval airplanes or dirigibles, all military airplanes, guns, instruments and material existing in Ger-

many must be delivered to the Allies. All of these requirements are to be enforced by Inter-allied commissions of Control. These regulations are to continue until Germany is admitted to the League of Nations.

#### PART VI-PRISONERS OF WAR AND GRAVES

ARTICLES 214 to 224.—Provide for the reciprocal repatriation of prisoners of war as rapidly as possible, expense of the exchange to be borne by Germany; for the sending to neutral countries or the continued residence in an allied country of those prisoners who do not desire to return to Germany; for cooperation by Germany with an Allied commission inquiring into the cases of prisoners who cannot be traced; for the mutual respecting and maintenance by Germany and the Allies of the graves of former enemy soldiers or sailors buried in their territories and for the exchange of complete information regarding those who died while prisoners or were buried without identification after battle.

#### PART VII-PENALTIES

ARTICLES 227 to 230.—Under the first of these articles, "The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties." Provision is made for the establishment of a special tribunal to try the former Kaiser. The right of the Allies is recognized to try Germans accused "of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war" and Germany is obligated to furnish all documents required to insure a fair trial.

### PART VIII-REPARATION.

ABTICLES 231 to 247 with Annexes.—Article 231 declares "The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies." The other articles recognize Germany's inability to make complete reparation and bind her to make such reparation as is possible, the amount to be determined as also the rate of payment by a Reparation Commission appointed under the League of Nations, Germany must however pay 20,000,000,000 gold marks before May 1, 1921, must reimburse Belgium for the sums borrowed from the Allies to prosecute the war and must liquidate the whole sum required of her by the reparations commission within thirty years. Germany must restore cash, animals, securities and objects of every nature taken away, seized or sequestrated by her. The sums required in reparation shall be anticipated by the issuance of gold bearer bonds, 20,000,000,000 marks to be due May 1, 1921, 40,000,000,000 due in thirty years and an additional 40,000,000,000 marks if the Reparations Commission shall decide that Germany can meet them. The commission is empowered to require further issues if its investigations indicate ability to pay.

Although recognizing the right of the Allied Governments to reparation ton for ton, for shipping lost the treaty does not require this of Germany. It does provide for the cession to the Allies of all German owned merchant ships of 1,600 tons or over, 50% of ships from 1000 tons to 1600 tons, one-quarter of the steam trawlers and one-quarter of other fishing boats. Germany must also build in her shipyards and deliver to the Allies within five years 1,000,000 tons of new ships. Germany is permitted to use goods or credits in lieu of gold in payment of reparation and is required to devote her economic resources directly to the physical restoration of the invaded areas.

The Allied governments may file lists of animals, machinery, equipment, tools and articles of a commercial character seized, consumed or destroyed by Germany and the restoration of which they deem urgent, as well as materials required to restore buildings. As a beginning Germany is required to deliver to France, in the first three months following the coming into force of the treaty, 500 stallions, 30,000 fillies and mares, 2,000 bulls, 90,000 milch cows, 1,000 rams, 100,000 sheep, and 10,000 goats and to Belgium 200 stallions, 5,000 mares, 5,000 fillies, 2,000 bulls, 50,000 milch cows, 40,000 heifers, 200 rams, 20,000 sheep, and 15,000 sows.

Germany must deliver to France 7,000,000 tons of coal a year for ten years and an additional tonnage to cover the difference between the production of Franch mines in the occupied area before the war and in the years specified; Germany must also deliver to Belgium 8,000,000 tons of coal a year, to Italy 4,500,000 between July, 1919, and July, 1920, and increasing amounts each year until 1923-1924 when 8,500,000 tons must be delivered, this rate to be maintained for five years thereafter. Germany must also continue to supply coal to Luxemburg. This coal is to be paid for at pit price, plus freight, provided this price is not more than the price for British coal. Germany is also required to deliver to France yearly for three years, 35,000 tons of Benzol, 50,000 tons of coal tar and 30,000 tons of sulphate of ammonia. The Reparation Commission is also to have an option on German dyestuffs and chemicals.

As a credit against the reparations account Germany cedes to the Allies all her rights and the rights of her nationals in the German submarine cables,

except those in German territorial waters and the North Sea.

Germany is also required to return to France trophies, archives, works of art, political papers and battle flags taken by her in 1870 and 1871; to return to the King of the Hedjaz the original Koran of the Caliph Othman, removed from Medinah by the Turkish authorities and said to have been presented to William II, to restore to the University of Louvain manuscripts, books, maps and other articles corresponding in number and value to those destroyed by the burning of the library; and to Belgium paintings of former Belgian ownership held in the museums of Berlin and Munich.

#### PART IX-FINANCIAL CLAUSES

ARTICLES 248 to 263.—These articles require Germany to pay the whole cost of the armies of occupation and of the Reparation Commission, and provide rules for assessing and collecting the cost. Under them also Germany confirms the armistice agreements and agrees to reimburse her nationals for losses of property in Allied hands or in ceded colonies. Provision is also made for the manner of determining the portion of the German pre-war debt to be assumed by the States except France to which German territory is ceded. All rights of German nationals to participation in the government or in commercial exploitation in any Allied state or in the territory of any of Germany's former allies are renounced. Germany is required to deliver to the Reparation Commission all reserves held against loans to any of her former allies, and Germany is also required to restore to Rumania or to the Allied Powers monetary instruments, and securities or goods received from Russia and Rumania under the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk, which treaties are repudiated. Germany must also transfer to the Allies all financial claims against her former allies

#### PART X-ECONOMIC CLAUSES

ARTICLES 264 to 312.—Provide for equal treatment in German ports of all nations and prevent any discrimination against the commerce of Allied States; provide for exemption from duty for a period of five years of com-

merce between Germany and Alsace-Lorraine and Luxemburg and for a period of three years between Germany and territory ceded to Poland; provide that the German pre-war tariff shall be in effect for the first six months after the coming into force of the treaty, with special exemptions for thirty months covering wine, vegetable, oils, artificial silk, and washed or scoured wool coming from Allied sources; re-establish rules covering registration of vessels for the maritime, coastwise and fishing trade and require Germany to recognize Allied regulations; provide for the prevention by Germany of unfair competition through false labels or descriptions of merchandise and for reciprocal recognition by Germany and the Allies of duly registered appellations of wines and spirits; provide equal rights to live and trade in Germany for the nationals of Allied and other States and for the prohibition of any taxations of aliens in Germany which is not also applicable to German nationals; provide for protection of the life and property of Allied nationals in Germany and their free access to German courts; provide for the re-establishment of consular systems in Germany; re-establish in effect, as between Germany and the Allied Powers, as well as new states which may adhere to them, of the Postal and Telegraphic Conventions and twenty-five other conventions covering protection of submarine cables, customs inspection of railway trucks, standardization of railways, publication of customs tariffs, unification of commercial statistics, the Turkish customs, toll dues on the sound and belts, stade toll on the Elbe, toll dues on the Scheldt, free use of the Suez Canal, regulations regarding collision and salvage at sea, exemption of hospital ships from port charges, tonnage measurement for vessels in inland navigation, suppression of night work for women, suppression of use of white phosphorous in matches, suppression of white slave traffic, suppression of obscene publications, various sanitary conventions, the metric system, unification of pharmacopoeil formulæ for potent drugs, establishment of a concert pitch, the creation of the International Agricultural Institute at Rome, precautionary measures against phylloxera, protection of birds useful to agriculture, and protection of minors.

The articles also re-establish the conventions regulating fisheries in the North Sea outside territorial waters, regulating the North Sea liquor traffic, protecting industrial property and protecting literary and artistic works.

The Hague Convention of July 17, 1905, relating to civil procedure is renewed except as to France, Portugal and Rumania.

German special rights in Samoa are terminated.

Provision is made for revival by each of the Allied States of such conventions with Germany as it may wish to revive, in so far as these do not conflict with the terms of this treaty.

Germany recognizes the abrogation of all treaties made between her and Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey since August 1, 1914, and between her and Russia or any State formerly a part of Russia as also the annulment of all special favors granted to her or her nationals.

Provision is made for the bringing into force of the opium convention signed at the Hague January 23, 1912, signature to this treaty constituting

acceptance of the convention.

Clearing offices are established and elaborate rules provided for the settlement of debts payable before the war by a national of one power to a national of an opposing power and settlement of these debts in any way other than through these clearing offices is prohibited, except that causes which the clearing office may hold to be outside its jurisdiction may be prosecuted in the courts.

Germany is required to stop the liquidation of property of Allied nationals and to restore property capable of being restored. The Allies are, however, permitted to liquidate all German holdings within their jurisdiction, applying the proceeds to reparation and Germany agrees to compensate her nationals for any losses so caused.

Germany is bound to accord to property rights of Allied nationals equal treatment with those of German nationals, and also to pay compensation if this regulation is violated.

Acts of any of the high contracting parties relating to property rights of nationals of an opposing nation during the war are validated except as to German acts in invaded territories or to acts by German authorities since Nov. 11, 1918.

Arbitration of individual claims for reparation is provided for, the arbitrator to be appointed by Gustav Ador, President of the Swiss Republic.

Germany is required within six months to deliver to each Allied Power all the stock certificates, deeds and documents of title held by German nationals covering property rights in the territory of each particular power and Germany is required to furnish particulars regarding German investments in Allied countries since July 1, 1914. Germany must also render a complete account of all the property rights of Allied nationals affected by her war measures and must account for all cash assets resulting from liquidations or sales.

In general, contracts between enemies are cancelled, but this does not apply to the United States, Brazil or Japan, or in the case of contracts which in the general interest should be continued. Provision is made for an Arbitral Tribunal which shall readjust contracts which, because of changes due to the war, can not be carried out without loss to one of the parties thereto. Negotiable instruments which could not be presented or paid during the war are reinstated and given three months within which to be presented after the going into force of the treaty.

Contracts for life and fire insurance between persons or concerns who became enemies are held not to have been made void by the war and sums due under these contracts are declared payable with interest. Contracts for marine insurance and for reinsurance are held to have been abrogated by the parties thereto becoming enemies.

Arbitral Tribunals of three members are to be created between Germany and each of the Allied Powers to have jurisdiction over all the complicated questions arising from the economic provisions of the treaty.

Rights in industrial, literary and artistic property are to be restored as before the war but no indemnities shall be paid by any Allied Power for use of these properties during hostilities and licenses granted for use of these properties shall stand. The Allied powers, however, retain the right to impose limitations or restrictions on German owned property of these classifications (except trademarks) to cover possible discrimination by Germany.

PART XI-AERIAL NAVIGATION

ARTICLES 313 to 320.—Provide that Allied aircraft shall have full liberty of passage over German territory and full use as needed of landing fields and airdromes. Germany also accepts for her own air craft the rules for air traffic agreed upon by the Allied Powers.

### PART XII-PORTS, WATERWAYS AND BAILWAYS

ARTICLE 321 to 386.—Provide for freedom of transit, without subjection to any duty, undue delays or restrictions, for persons, goods, vessels, wagons and mails coming from one Allied or Associated Power to another, across German territory or territorial waters. Germany is permitted to make necessary regulations to establish the bona fide nature of the traffic. Germany agrees not to levy any export or import sur-tax or otherwise discriminate against Allied commerce or Allied ports. The nationals of all Allied Powers are to have the same rights as German nationals in all German ports and in all inland navigation routes in Germany. Any preference granted by Germany to one Allied Power shall extend at once to all the others. Free zones are to be established in all German ports which goods may enter and leave

or be consumed within the zone without payment of any tax or duty except charges made to cover expense of administration. Goods going from a free zone into Germany shall pay import duties.

The Rivers Elbe, Oder, Niemen and Danube, wherever navigable, are internationalized as is also the proposed Rhine-Danube waterway whenever constructed. Flags of all powers shall be treated alike, but German ships must have permission to trade between two Allied ports. Charges necessary for the maintenance or improvement of the channels may be levied alike on all shipping. Special commissions are to be created to administer each international waterway, and the Rhine Commission is to be reorganized.

The international agreements in force before the war covering shipment of goods by rail are reaffirmed until a new convention can be concluded and it is provided that goods going through Germany from one Allied country to another shall pay no higher rates than are charged on similar German goods, similarly carried. Germany is also required to participate with the Allies in selling through tickets for passengers across her territory and to accept trains from the Allies and transport them across her territory, without needless delay. Germany is required within ten years to equip her goods wagons for inclusion in goods trains of Allied lines without hampering the continuous brake and to accept goods wagons from Allied lines for inclusion in her own trains. Provision is also made for the handing over by Germany of lines and rolling stock in territory ceded to an Allied or Associated Power. Disputes are referred to the League of Nations.

The Kiel Canal is to be maintained free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations at peace with Germany on terms of entire equality."

#### PART XIII-LABOR

AETICLES 387 to 427.—This part of the treaty is predicated upon the declaration that universal peace can only be established if it is based upon social justice. The articles provide for a permanent organization to promote the object set forth in the preamble which include regulation of the hours of work, a maximum working day and week, regulation of labor supply to prevent unemployment, the provision of an adequate living wage, protection of workers against sickness, disease and injury, protection of children, young persons, and women and provision for old age and injury, protection of workers in countries other than their own, recognition of the principle of freedom of association and vocational and technical education.

The permanent organization is to consist of a General Conference of four representatives of each of the Members of the League of Nations and an International Labor Office controlled by a governing body. The General Conference is to meet from time to time as occasion requires but at least once a year. Of the four delegates of each member, two shall be government delegates and the others shall represent the employers and workpeople respectively. Advisers may also be appointed to advise the delegation on technical points to be considered by the Conference.

The Governing Body of the International Labor Office shall consist of twelve persons representing governments, six elected by the delegates to the Conference representing the employers and six by the delegates representing labor. The period of office shall be three years. The Governing Body may elect its own Chairman and also a Director.

The International Labor Office is commissioned to collect and distribute of industrial life and labor and particularly subjects which it is proposed to bring before the Conference with a view to the conclusion of international conventions.

Provision is made for the enforcing of covenants and for reports by the Nations in the League of Nations of the steps taken by each to enforce con-

ventions to which they are parties.

The first meeting of the first Conference was set for October, 1919, at Washington to consider the application of the principle of the 8-hour day or of the 48-hour week, the question of preventing or providing against unemployment, the question of the employment of women (a) before and after childbirth, (b) during the night, (c) in unhealthy processes; and the employment of children, (a) minimum age of employment, (b) during the night, (c) in unhealthy processes. The Conference was also to consider the extension and application of the International Conventions adopted at Berne in 1906 on the prohibition of night work for women employed in industry and the prohibition of the use of white phosphorus in the manufacture of matches.

The following high princples are asserted by the High Contracting Parties: That labor shall not be regarded as a commodity or an article of commerce.

The right of association, for lawful purposes, alike for employer and employee.

The payment of an adequate wage to the employed sufficient to maintain a reasonable standard of life.

The adoption of the standard 8-hour day and 48-hour week.

The abolition of child labor and the limitation of the labor of youth so as to insure continuation of education and proper physical development.

Men and women should receive equal pay for work of equal value.

The standard set by law in each country with respect to the conditions of labor should have due regard to the equitable economic treatment of all workers lawfully resident therein.

Each State should make provision for a system of inspection in which women should take part in order to insure the enforcement of the laws and regulations for the protection of the unemployed.

#### PART XIV-GUARANTEE

ARTICLES 428 to 433.—These articles provide for Allied occupation of the German territory west of the Rhine and the bridgeheads, for a period of fifteen years, the area of occupation to be restricted each five years if Germany complies with the terms of the treaty, and the occupation to cease completely in case Germany complies in full with every requirement of the treaty before the end of the fifteen years, or to be extended if the fifteen years sees necessary terms still unsatisfied. Provision is also made for the withdrawal of all German troops from the regions east of Germany in former Russian territory, the troops to remain until relieved by Allied troops or until the Allies consider their presence no longer necessary to maintain order.

#### PARTY XV-MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

ARTICLES 484 to 440 and Annexes.—These articles provide for recognition by Germany of treaties entered into by the Allied and Associated Powers with her former allies; for readjustment of certain neutral zones between France and Switzerland; for recognition of the relationship between France and the Principality of Monaco; for the continuation in missionary service of the property of German missionary societies in territory under Allied jurisdiction before the war or coming under Allied jurisdiction under this treaty, the interests of the missions being safeguarded; for the renunciation by Germany of all claims for indemnity from any nation which severed diplomatic relations with her or which declared war upon her; for the acceptance by Germany of the decisions of Allied prize courts.

Both the English and French texts are declared to be authentic and it is provided that the treaty shall become effective whenever ratifications are exchanged between Germany and three of the principal Allied and Associated Powers. The deposit of ratifications is to be made in Paris and after the first exchange of ratifications is to be made in Paris and after the first exchange of ratifications the treaty shall come into effect as regards each nation on the deposit of its ratification. The original signed treaty will remain in the archives of the French Republic.

#### THE SIGNERS OF THE PEACE TREATY

For America,

The Honorable Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States.

The Honorable Robert Lansing, Secretary of State.

The Honorable Henry White, Former American Ambassador to Italy and to France.

The Honorable Edward M. House.

General Tasker H. Bliss, United States Military Representative on the Supreme War Council.

For the British Empire:

The Right Honoral le David Lloyd George, M.P., Prime Minister.

The Right Honorable Andrew Bonar Law, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

The Right Honorable Viscount Milner, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., Sec'y of State for the Colonies.

The Right Honorable Arthur James Balfour, O.M., M.P., Sec'y of State for Foreign Affairs.

For the Dominion of Canada:

The Right Honorable Sir George Eulas Foster, G.C.M.G., Minister of Trade and Commerce.

The Right Honorable Charles Joseph Doherty, Minister of Justice.

For the Commonwealth of Australia:

The Right Honorable William Morris Hughes, Prime Minister.

The Right Honorable Sir Joseph Cook, G.C.M.G., Minister for the Navy. For the Union of South Africa.

General the Right Honorable Louis Botha, Prime Minister.

Lieut.-Gen. the Right Honorable Jan Christian Smuts, K.C., Minister of Defense.

For the Dominion of New Zealand:

The Right Honorable William Ferguson Massey, Prime Minister.

For India ·

The Right Honorable Edwin Samuel Montague, M.P., Secretary of State for India.

Major General his Highness Maharaja Sir Ganga Singh Bahadur, Maharaja of Bikaner, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., A.D.C.

For France.

M. Georges Clemenceau, President of the Council, Minister of War.

M. Pichon, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

M. L. L. Klotz. Minister of Finance.

M. Andre Tardieu, Commissary General for Franco-American Military Affairs

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of France.

For Italy:

Because of the overthrow of the Orlando cabinet just as the treaty was to be signed, Italy was represented by a new delegation, headed by Signor Tittoni, Foreign Minister.

For Japan:

Marquis Saionzi, formerly President of the Council of Ministers.

Baron Makino, formerly Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Viscount Chinda, Japanese Ambassador at London.

Mr. K. Matsui, Japanese Ambassador to France.

Mr. H. Ijuin, Japanese Ambassador to Italy.

For Belgium:

Mr. Hymans, Minister of Foreign Affairs and of State.

Mr. Van Den Heuvel, Minister of State.

Mr. Vandervelde, Minister of Justice.

For Bolivia:

Mr. Ismael Montes, Bolivian Minister to France.

For Brazil:

Mr. Epitacio Pessoa, former Minister of State, Federal Senator.

Mr. Pandia Calogeras, Deputy.

Mr. Paul Fernandes.

For China:

Delegates withheld signatures because of inability to secure modification of Shantung decision.

For Cuba:

Mr. Antonio Sanchez de Bustamente, President of Cuban Society of International Law.

For Ecuador:

Mr. Enrique Dorny de Alsua, Ecuadorean Minister to France.

For Greece:

Mr. Eleftherios Venizelos, President of the Council of Ministers.

Mr. Nicholas Politis, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

For Guatemala:

Mr. Joaquin Mendez, Special Minister to France.

For Haiti:

Mr. Tertullien Guilbaud, Haitian Minister to France.

For the Kingdom of the Hedjaz:

Mr. Rustem Haidar.

Mr. Abdul Hadi Aouni.

For Honduras:

Dr. Policarpe Bonilla, former President, on special mission to Washington. For Liberia:

The Honorable C. D. B. King, Secretary of State.

For Nicaragua:

Mr. Salvador Chamorro, President of the Chamber of Deputies.

For Panama:

Mr. Antonio Burgos, Panamanian Minister to Spain.

For Peru:

Mr. Carlos G. Candamo, Peruvian Minister to France.

For Poland:

Mr. Roman Dmowski, President of the Polish National Committee.

Mr. Ignace Paderewski, President of the Council of Ministers.

For Portugal:

Dr. Affonso Costa, formerly President of the Council of Ministers.

Mr. Augusto Soares, formerly Minister of Foreign Affairs.

For Rumania:

Mr. Jean J. C. Bratiano, President of the Council of Ministers. General Constant in Coanda.

For the Serb-Croat-Slovene State:

Mr. N. P. Pachitch, formerly President of the Council of Ministers.

Mr. Ante Trumbic, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Milenko R. Vesnitch, Minister of Jugoslavia to France.

For Siam:

Prince Charoon, Siamese Minister to France.

Prince Traidos Prabandhu, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. For Czecho-Slovakia:

Mr. Charles Kramar, President of the Council of Ministers. Mr. Edouard Benes, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

For Uruguay:
Mr. Juan Antonio Buero. Minister of Foreign Affairs.

For Germany: Dr. Hermann Muller, Foreign Secretary.

Dr. Johannes Bell, Colonial Secretary.

### CHAPTER XXVII

### GENERAL PERSHING'S OWN STORY.

Official report of the Commanding General covering the entire American military effort:

THE War Department planned as early as July, 1917, to send to France by June 15, 1918, twenty-one divisions of the then strength of 20,000 men each, together with auxiliary and replacement troops, and those needed for the line of communications, amount to over 200,000, making a total of some 650,000 men. Beginning with October, six divisions were to be sent during that quarter, seven during the first quarter of 1918, and eight the second quarter. While these numbers fell short of my recommendation of July 6, 1917, which contemplated at least 1,000,000 men by May, 1918, it should be borne in mind that the main factor in the problem was the amount of shipping to become available for military purposes, in which must be included tonnage required to supply the allies with steel, coal and food.

#### ESTIMATE IS CABLED

On December 2, 1917, an estimate of the situation was cabled to the War Department, with the following recommendation:

"Paragraph 3. In view of these conditions, it is of the utmost importance to the allied cause that we move swittly. The minimum number of troops we should plan to have in France by the end of June is four army corps of twenty-four divisions in addition to troops for service of the rear. Have impressed the present urgency upon General Bliss and other American members of the conference. General Robertson, Foch, and Bliss agree with me that this is the minimum that should be aimed at. This figure is given as the lowest we should think of and is placed no higher because the limit of available transportation would not seem to warrant it.

"Paragraph 4. A study of transportation facilities shows sufficient American tonnage to bring over this number of troops, but to do so there must be a reduction in the tonnage allotted to other than army needs. It is estimated that the shipping needed will have to be rapidly increased up to 2,0000,000 tons by May, in addition to the amount already allotted. The use of shipping for commercial purposes must be curtailed as much as possible. The allies are very weak and we must come to their relief this year, 1918. The year after may be too late. It is very doubtful if they can hold on until 1919 unless we give them a lot of support this year. It is therefore recommended that a complete readjustment of transportation be made and that the needs of the War Department as set forth above be regarded as immediate. Further details of these requirements will be sent later."

#### A SECOND APPEAL

Again on Dec. 20, 1917:

"Understood here that a shipping programme based on tonnage in sight prepared in War College Division in September contemplated that entire First Corps with its corps troops and some 32,000 auxiliaries were to have

been shipped by end of November, and that an additional programme for December, January, and February contemplates that the shipment of the Second Corps with its corps troops and other auxiliaries should be practically completed by the end of February. Should such a programme be carried out as per schedule and should shipments continue at corresponding rate, it would not succeed in placing even three complete corps, with proper proportion of army troops and auxiliaries, in France by the end of May. The actual facts are that shipments are not even keeping up to that schedule. It is now the middle of December and the First Corps is still incomplete by over two entire divisions (The First, Forty-second, Second, and Twenty-sixth Divisions had arrived; but not the Replacement and the Depot Divisions), and many corps troops. It can not be too emphatically declared that we should be prepared to take the field with at least four corps by June 30. In view of past performances with tonnage heretofore available such a project is impossible of fulfillment, but only by most strenuous attempts to attain such a result will we be in a position to take a proper part in operations in 1918. In view of fact that as the number of our troops here increases, a correspondingly greater amount of tonnage must be provided for their supply, and also in view of the slow rate of shipment with tonnage now available, it is of the most urgent importance that more tonnage should be obtained at once as already recommended in my cables and by General Bliss."

#### SIX-DIVISION PLAN

During January, 1918, discussions were held with the British authorities that resulted in an agreement which became known as the sub-division plan and which provided for the transportation of six entire divisions in British tonnage, without interference with our own shipping programme. High commanders, staff, infantry, and auxiliary troops were to be given experience with British divisions, beginning with battalions, the artillery to be trained under American direction, using French material. It was agreed that when sufficiently trained these battalions were to be united for service under their own officers. It was planned that the period of training with the British should cover about ten weeks. To supervise the administration and training of these divisions the Second Corps staff was organized Feb. 20, 1918.

In the latter part of January joint note No. 12, presented by the military representatives with the supreme war council, was approved by the council. This note concluded that France would be safe during 1918 only under cer-

tain conditions, namely:

"(a) That the strength of the British and French troops in France are continuously kept up to their present total strength and that they receive the expected reinforcements of not less than two American divisions per month."

### GERMAN 1918 OFFENSIVE AND ALLIED AGREEMENTS

The first German offensive of 1918, beginning March 21, overran all resistance during the initial period of the attack. Within eight days the enemy had completely crossed the old Somme battlefield and had swept everything before him to a depth of some fifty-six kilometers. For a few days the loss of the railroad centre of Amiens appeared imminent. The offensive made such inroads upon French and British reserves that defeat stared them in the face unless the new American troops should prove more immediately available than even the most optimistic had dared to hope. On March 27 the military representatives with the supreme war council prepared their joint note No. 18. This note repeated the previously quoted statement from joint note No. 12, and continued:

"The battle which is developing at the present moment in France, and which can extend to the other theatres of operations, may very quickly place

the allied armies in a serious situation from the point of view of effectives, and the military representatives are from this moment of opinion that the above-detailed condition can no longer be maintained, and they consider as a general proposition that the new situation requires new decisions.

"The military representatives are of opinion that it is highly desirable that the American government should assist the allied armies as soon as possible by permitting in principle the temporary service of American units in allied army corps and divisions. Such reinforcements must, however, be obtained from other units than those American divisions which are now operating with the French, and the units so temporarily employed must eventually be returned to the American army.

"The military representatives are of the opinion that from the present time, in execution of the foregoing, and until otherwise directed by the supreme war council, only American infantry and machine-gun units, organized as that government may decide, be brought to France, and that all agreements or conventions hitherto made in conflict with this decision be modified accordingly."

#### CONFERS WITH BAKER

The Secretary of War, who was in France at this time, General Eliss, the American military representative with the supreme war council, and I at once conferred on the terms of this note, with the result that the secretary recommended to the President that joint note No. 18 be approved in the following sense:

"The purpose of the American government is to render the fullest cooperation and aid, and therefore the recommendation of the military representative with regard to the preferential transportation of American infantry and machine-gun units in the present emergency is approved. Such units, when transported will be under the direction of the commander-in-chief of the American Ebpeditionary Forces and will be assigned for training and use by him in his discretion. He will use these and all other military forces of the United States under his command in such manner as to render the greatest military assistance, keeping in mind always the determination of this government to have its various military forces collected, as speedily as their training and the military situation permit, into an independent American army, acting in concert with the armies of Great Britain and France, and all arrangements made by him for their temporary training and service will be made with that end in view."

While note No. 18 was general in its terms, the priority of shipments of infantry more especially pertained to those divisions that were to be trained in the British area, as that government was to provide the additional shipping, according to the six-division plan agreed upon even before the beginning of the March 21 offensive.

On April 2 the War Department cabled that preferential transportation would be given to American infantry and machine-gun units during the existing emergency. Preliminary arrangements were made for training and early employment with the French of such infantry units as might be sent over by our own transportation. As for the British agreement, the six-division plan was to be modified to give priority to the infantry of those divisions. However, all the allies were now urging the indefinite continuation of priority for the shipment of infantry and its complete incorporation in their units, which fact was cabled to the War Department on April 3, with the specific recommendation that the total immediate priority of infantry be limited to four divisions, plus 45,500 replacements, and that the necessity for future priority be determined later.

5. The Secretary of War and I held a conference with British authorities on April 7, during which it developed that the British had erroneously

assumed that the preferential shipment of infantry was to be continuous. It was agreed at this meeting that 60,000 infantry and machine gun troops, with certain auxiliary units to be brought over by British tonnage during April, should go to the ritish area as part of the six-division plan, but that there should be a further agreement as to susbequent troops to be brought over by the British. Consequently, a readjustment of the priority schedule was undertaken on the basis of postponing "shipment of all noncombatant troops to the utmost possible to meet present situation, and at the same time not to make it impossible to build up our own army."

### FOE ATTACKS ON THE LYS

The battle line in the vicinity of Amiens had hardly stabilized when, on April 9, the Germans made another successful attack against the British lines on a front of some forty kilometres in the vicinity of Armentieres and along the Lys River. As a result of its being included in a salient formed by the German advance, Passchendaele Ridge, the capture of which had cost so dearly in 1917, was evacuated by the British on April 17.

The losses had been heavy and the British were unable to replace them entirely. They were, therefore, making extraordinary efforts to increase the shipping available for our troops. On April 21, I went to London to clear up certain questions concerning the rate of shipment and to reach the further agreement provided for in the April 7 conference. The result of this

London agreement was cabled to Washington April 24, as follows:

"(a) That only the infantry, machine guns, engineers, and signal troops of American divisions and the headquarters of divisions and brigades be sent over in British and American shipping during May for training and service with the British army in France up to six divisions and that any shipping in excess of that required for these troops be utilized to transport troops necessary to make these divisions complete. The training and service of these troops will be carried out in accordance with plans already agreed upon between Sir Douglas Haig and General Pershing, with a view at an early date of building up American divisions.

"(b) That the American personnel of the artillery of these divisions and such corps troops as may be required to build up American corps organizations follow immediately thereafter, and that American artillery personnel be trained with French material and join its proper divisions as soon as thor-

oughly trained.

"(c) If, when the programme outlined in paragraphs (a) and (b) is completed the military situation makes advisable the further shipment of infantry, etc., of American divisions, then all the British and American shipping available for transport of troops shall be used for that purpose under such arrangements as will insure immediate aid the the allies, and at the same time provide at the earliest moment for bringing over American artillery and other necessary units to complete the organization of American divisions and corps. Provided that the combatant troops mentioned in (a) and (b) be followed by such Service of the Rear and other troops as may be considered necessary by the American commander-in-chief.

"(d) That it is contemplated American divisions and corps when trained and organized shall be utilized under the American commander-in-chief in an

American group.

"(e) That the American commander-in-chief shall allot American troops to the French or British for training them with American units at his discretion, with the understanding that troops already transported by British shipping or included in the six divisions mentioned in paragraph (a) are to be trained with the British army, details as to rations, equipment, and transport to be determined by special agreement."

#### APPEALS ARE MADE

At a meeting of the supreme war council held at Abbeville May 1 and 2, the entire question of the amalgamation of Americans with the French and British was reopened. An urgent appeal came from both French and Italian representatives for American replacements or units to serve with their armies. After prolonged discussion regarding this question and that of priority generally the following agreement was reached, committing the council to an independent American army and providing for the immediate shipment of certain troops:

"It is the opinion of the Supreme War Council that, in order to carry the war to a successful conclusion, an American army should be formed as early as possible under its own commander and under its own flag. In order to meet the present emergency it is agreed that American troops should be brought to France as rapidly as allied transportation facilities will permit, and that as far as consistent with the necessity of building up an American army, preference will be given to infantry and machine gun units for training and service with French and British armies; with the understanding that such infantry and machine gun units are to be withdrawn and united with its own artillery and auxiliary troops into divisions and corps at the direction of the American commander-in-chief after consultation with the commander-in-chief of the allied armies in France.

"Subparagraph A. It is also agreed that during the month of May preference should be given to the transportation of infantry and machine gun units of six divisions, and that any excess tonnage shall be devoted to bringing over such other troops as may be determined by the American com-

mander-in-chief.

"Subparagraph B. It is further agreed that this programme shall be continued during the month of June upon condition that the British government shall furnish transportation for a minimum of 130,000 men in May and 150,000 men in June, with the understanding that the first six divisions of infantry shall go to the British for training and service, and that troops sent over in June shall be allotted for training and service as the American commander-in-chief may determine.

"Subparagraph C. It is also further agreed that if the British government shall transport an excess of 150,000 men in June that such excess shall be infantry and machine gun units, and that early in June there shall be

a new review of the situation to determine further action.

#### PANIC IN PARIS

The gravity of the situation had brought the allies to a full realization of the necessity of providing all possible tonnage for the transportation of American troops. Although their views were accepted to the extent of giving a considerable priority to infantry and machine gunners, the priority agreed upon as to this class of troops was not as extensive as some of them deemed necessary, and the Abbeville conference was adjourned with the understanding that the question of further priority would be discussed at a conference to be held about the end of May.

The next offensive of the enemy was made between the Oise and Berry-au-Bac against the French instead of against the British, as was generally expected, and it came as a complete surprise. The initial Aisne attack, covering a front of thirty-five kilometres, met with remarkable success as the German armies advanced no less than fifty kilometres in four days. On reaching the Marne that river was used as a defensive flank and the German advance was directly toward Paris. During the first days of June something akin to a panic seized the city and it was estimated that 1,000,000 people left during the spring of 1918.

#### IN DESPERATE STRAITS

The further conference which had been agreed upon at Abbeville was held at Versailles on June 1 and 2. The opinion of our allies as to the existing situation and the urgency of their insistence upon further priority for infantry and machine gunners are shown by the following message prepared by the prime ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy, and agreed to by General Foch:

"The prime ministers of France, Italy, and Great Britain, now meeting at Versailles, desire to send the following message to the President of the

United States:

"'We desire to express our warmest thanks to President Wilson for the remarkable promptness with which American aid, in excess of what at one time seemed practicable has been rendered to the allies during the past month to meet a great emergency. The crisis, however, still continues. General Foch has presented to us a statement of the utmost gravity, which points out that the numerical superiority of the enemy in France, where 162 allied divisions now oppose 200 German divisions, is very heavy, and that, as there is no possibility of the British and French increasing the number of their divisions (on the contrary, they are put to extreme straits to keep them up) there is a great danger of the war being lost unless the numerical inferiority of the allies can be remedied as rapidly as possible by the advent of American troops. He, therefore, urges with the utmost insistence that the maximum possible number of infantry and machine gunners, in which respect the shortage of men on the side of the allies is most marked, should continue to be shipped from America in the months of June and July to avert the immediate danger of an allied defeat in the present campaign, owing to the allied reserves being exhausted before those of the enemy. In addition to this, and looking to the future, he represents that it is impossible to foresee ultimate victory in the war unless America is able to provide such an army as will enable the allies ultimately to establish numerical superiority. places the total American force required for this at no less than one hundred divisions, and urges the continuous raising of fresh American levies, which, in his opinion, should not be less than 300,000 a month, with a view to establishing a total American force of one hundred divisions at as early a date as this can possibly be done.

"'We are satisfied that General Foch, who is conducting the present compaign with consummate ability, and on whose military judgment we continue to place the most absolute reliance, is not overestimating the needs of the case, and we feel confident that the government of the United States will do everything that can be done, both to meet the needs of the immediate situation and to proceed with the continuous raising of fresh levies, calculated to provide, as soon as possible, the numerical superiority which the commander-in-chief of the allied armies regards as essential to ultimate vic-

tory.'

(Signed)

D. LLOYD GEORGE, CLEMENCEAU, ORLANDO."

#### TRAINED FORCE EXHAUSTED

Such extensive priority had already been given to the transport of American infantry and machine gunners that the troops of those categories which had received even partial training in the United States were practically exhausted. Moreover, the strain on our services of supply made it essential that early relief be afforded by increasing its personnel. At the same time, the corresponding services of our allies had in certain departments been

equally overtaxed and their responsible heads were urgent in their representations that their needs must be relieved by bringing over American specialists. The final agreement was cabled to the War Department on June 5, as follows:

"The following agreement has been concluded between General Foch, Lord Milner, and myself with reference to the transportation of American

troops in the months of June and July:

"The following recommendations are made on the assumption that at least 250,000 men can be transported in each of the months of June and July by the employment of combined British and American tonnage. We

recommend:

"(a) For the month of June: (1) Absolute priority shall be given to the transportation of 170,000 combatant troops (viz. six divisions without artillery, ammunition trains, or supply trains, amounting to 126,000 men and 44,000 replacements for combat troops); (2) 25,400 men for the service of the railways of which 13,400 have been asked for by the French minister of transportation; (3) the balance to be troops of categories to be determined by the commander-in-chief, American Expeditionary Forces.

"(b) For the month of July: (1) Absolute priority for the shipment of 140,000 combatant troops of the nature defined above (four divisions minus artillery 'et cetera' amounting to 84,000 men, plus 56,000 replacement); (2) the balance of the 250,000 to consist of troops to be designated by the com-

mander-in-chief, American Expeditionary Forces."

#### "SEND THE UNTRAINED

"(c) It is agreed that if the available tonnage in either month allows of the transportation of a larger number of men than 250,000, the excess tonnage will be employed in the transportation of combat troops as defined above.

"(d) We recognize that the combatant troops to be despatched in July may have to include troops which have had insufficient training, but we consider the present emergency is such as to justify a temporary and exceptional departure by the United States from sound principles of training, especially as a similar course is being followed by France and Great Britain.

(Signed)

"FOCH,

"MILNER, "PERSHING."

The various proposals during these conferences regarding priority of shipment, often very insistent, raised questions that were not only most difficult but most delicate. On the one hand, there was a critical situation which must be met by immediate action, while, on the other hand, any priority accorded a particular arm necessarily postponed the formation of a distinctive American fighting force and the means to supply it. Such a force was, in my opinion, absolutely necessary to win the war. A few of the allied representatives became convinced that the American services of supply should not be neglected but should be developed in the common interest. The success of our divisions during May and June demonstrated fully that it was not necessary to draft Americans under foreign flags in order to utilize American manhood most effectively.

### NAMING OF ALLIED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

When on March 21, 1918, the German army on the western front began its series of offensives, it was by far the most formidable force the world had ever seen. In fighting men and guns it had a great superiority, but this

was of less importance than the advantage in morale, in experience, in training for mobile warfare, and in unity of command. Ever since the collapse of the Russian armies and the crisis on the Italian front in the fall of 1917, German armies were being assembled and trained for the great campaign which was to end the war before America's effort could be brought to bear. Germany's best troops, her most successful generals, and all the experience gained in three years of war were mobilized for the supreme effort.

#### TIDE IS STEMMED

The first blow fell on the right of the British armies, including the junction of the British and French forces. Only the prompt co-operation of the French and British general headquarters stemmed the tide. The reason for this objective was obvious and strikingly illustrated the necessity for having some one with sufficient authority over all the allied armies to meet such an emergency. The lack of complete co-operation among the allies on the western front had been appreciated and the question of preparation to meet a crisis had already received attention by the supreme war council. A plan had been adopted by which each of the allies would furnish a certain number of divisions for a general reserve to be under the direction of the military representatives of the supreme war council of which General Foch was then the senior member. But when the time came to meet the German offensive in March these reserves were not found available and the plan failed.

#### FOCH IS SELECTED

This situation resulted in a conference for the immediate consideration of the question of having an allied commander-in-chief. After much discussion during which my view favoring such action was clearly stated, an agreement was reached and General Foch was selected. His appointment as such was made April 3 and was approved for the United States by the President on April 16. The terms of the agreement under which General Foch exercised his authority were as follows:

"Beauvais, April 3, 1918.

"General Foch is charged by the British, French, and American governments with the co-ordination of the action of the allied armies on the western front; to this end there is conferred on him all the powers necessary for its effective realization. To the same end, the British, French, and American governments confide in General Foch the strategic direction of military operations.

"The commander-in-chief of the British, French, and American armies will exercise to the fullest extent the tactical direction of their armies. Each commander-in-chief will have the right to appeal to his government, if in his opinion his army is placed in danger by the instructions received from General Foch.

(Signed)

G. CLEMENCEAU,
PETAIN,
F. FOCH,
LLOYD GEORGE,
D. HAIG, F. M.,
HENRY WILSON,
General 3, 4, 18,
TASKER H. BLISS,
General and Chief of Staff,
JOHN J. PERSHING,
General, U. S. A.

### EMPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN DIVISIONS, MARCH TO SEPTEMBER

The grave crisis precipitated by the first German offensive caused me to make a hurried visit to General Foch's headquarters at Bombon, during which all our combatant forces were placed at his disposal. The acceptance of this offer meant the dispersion of our troops along the allied front and a consequent delay in building up a distinctive American force in Lorraine, but the serious situation of the allies demanded this divergence from our plans.

On March 21, approximately 300,000 American troops had reached France. Four combat divisions, equivalent in strength to eight French or British divisions, were available—the First and Second then in line, and the Twenty-sixth and Forty-second just withdrawn from line after one month's trench warfare training. The last two divisions at once began taking over quiet sectors to release divisions for the battle; the Twenty-sixth relieved the First Division, which was sent to northwest of Paris in reserve; the Forty-second relieved two French divisions from quiet sectors. In addition to these troops, one regiment of the Ninety-third Division was with the French in the Argonne, the Forty-first Depot Division was in the Services of Supply, and three divisions (Third, Thirty-second and Fifth) were arriving.

#### THE FIRST AT CANTIGNY

On April 25 the First Division relieved two French divisions on the front near Montdidier and on May 28 captured the important observation stations on the heights of Cantigny with splendid dash. French artillery, aviation, tanks, and flame throwers, aided in the attack, but most of this French assistance was withdrawn before the completion of the operation in order to meet the enemy's new offensive launched May 27 toward Chateau-Thierry. The enemy reaction against our troops at Cantigny was extremely violent, and apparently he was determined at all costs to counteract the most excellent effect the American successes had produced. For three days his guns of all calibres were concentrated on our new position and counter attack succeeded counter-attack. The desperate efforts of the Germans gave the fighting at Cantigny a seeming tactical importance entirely out of proportion to the numbers involved.

Of the three divisions arriving in France when the first German offensive began, the Thirty-second, intended for replacements, had been temporarily employed in the services of supply to meet a shortage of personnel, but the critical situation caused it to be reassembled, and by May 21 it was entering the line in the Vosges. At this time the Fifth Division, though still incomplete, was also ordered into the line in the same region. The Third Division was assembling in its training area and the Third Corps staff had just been organized to administer these three divisions. In addition to the eight divisions already mentioned, the Twenty-eighth and Seventy-seventh had arrived in the British area, and the Fourth, Twenty-seventh, Thirty-third, Thirty-fifth, and Eighty-second were arriving there. Following the agreements as to British shipping, our troops came so rapidly

that by the end of May we had a force of 600,000 in France.

The third German offensive on May 27, against the French on the Alsne, soon developed a desperate situation for the allies. The Second Division, then in reserve northwest of Paris and preparing to relieve the First Division, was hastily diverted to the vicinity of Meaux on May 31, and early on the morning of June 1, was deployed across the Chateau-Thierry-Paris road near Montreuil-aux-Lions in a gap in the French line, where it stopped the German advance on Paris. At the same time the partially trained Third Division was placed at French disposal to hold the crossings of the Marne, and its motorized machine gun battalion succeeded in reaching Chateau-Thierry in time to assist in successfully defending that river crossing.

#### BELLEAU WOODS

The enemy having been halted, the Second Division commenced a series of vigorous attacks on June 4, which resulted in the capture of Belleau Woods after very severe fighting. The village of Bouresches were taken soon after, and on July 1 Vaux was captured. In these operations the Second Division met with most desperate resistance by Germany's best troops.

To meet the March offensive, the French had extended their front from the Oise to Amiens, about sixty kilometres, and during the German drive along the Lys had also sent reinforcements to assist the British. French lines had been further lengthened about forty-five kilometres as a result of the Marne pocket made by the Aisne offensive. This increased frontage and the heavy fighting had reduced French reserves to an extremely

low point.

Our Second Corps, under Major-General George W. Read, had been organized for the command of the ten divisions with the British, which were held back in training areas or assigned to second-line defenses. After consultation with Field Marshal Haig on June 3, five American divisions were relieved from the British area to support the French. The Seventy-seventh and Eighty-second Divisions were removed south to release the Forty-second and Twenty-sixth for employment on a more active portion of the front; the Thirty-fifth Division entered the line in the Vosges, and the Fourth and Twenty-eighth Divisions were moved to the region of Meaux and Chateau-Thierry as reserves.
On June 9 the Germans attacked the Montdidier-Noyon front in an ef-

fort to widen the Marne pocket and bring their lines nearer to Paris, but were stubbornly held by the French with comparatively little loss of ground. In view of the unexpected results of the three preceding attacks by the enemy, this successful defense proved beneficial to the allied morale, particularly as

it was believed that the German losses were unusually heavy.

On July 15, the date of the last German offensive, the First, Second, Third, and Twenty-sixth Divisions were on the Chateau-Thierry front with the Fourth and Twenty-eighth in support, some small units of the last two divisions gaining front-line experience with our troops or with the French: the Forty-second Division was in support of the French east of Rheims; and four colored regiments were with the French in the Argonne. On the Alsace-Lorraine front we had five divisions in line with the French. Five were with the British army, three having elements in the line. In our training areas four divisions were assembled and four were in the process of arrival.

#### PUT TO THE TEST

The Marne salient was inherently weak and offered an opportunity for a counter offensive that was obvious.

If successful, such an operation would afford immediate relief to the allied defense, would remove the threat against Paris, and free the Paris-Nancy railroad. But, more important than all else, it would restore the morale of the allies and remove the profound depression and fear then existing. Up to this time our units had been put in here and there at critical points as emergency troops to stop the terrific German advance. trial, whether on the defensive or offensive, they had proved themselves equal to any troops in Europe. As early as June 23 and again on July 10 at Bombon, I had very strongly urged that our best divisions be concentrated under American command, if possible, for use as a striking force against the Marne salient. Although the prevailing view among the allies was that American units were suitable only for the defensive, and that at

all events they could be used to better advantage under allied command, the suggestion was accepted in principle, and my estimate of their offensive fight-

ing qualities was soon put to the test.

The enemy had encouraged his soldiers to believe that the July 15 attack would conclude the war with a German peace. Although he made elaborate plans for the operation, he failed to conceal fully his intention, and the front of attack was suspected at least one week ahead. On the Champagne front the actual hour for the assault was known and the enemy was checked with heavy losses. The Forty-second Division entered the line near Somme Py immediately, and five of its infantry battalions and all its artillery became engaged. Southwest of Rheims and along the Marne to the east of Chateau-Thierry the Germans were at first somewhat successful, a penetration of eight kilometres beyond the river being effected against the French immediately to the right of our Third Division. The following quotation from the report of the commanding general Third Division gives the result of the fighting on his front:

"Although the rush of the German troops overwhelmed some of the front line positions, causing the infantry and machine gun companies to suffer, in some cases a 50 per cent. loss, no German soldier crossed the road from Fossoy to Crezancy, except as a prisoner of war, and by noon of the following day (July 16) there were no Germans in the foreground of the Third Division sector except the dead."

#### BRILLIANT ACHIEVEMENT

On this occasion a single regiment of the Third Division wrote one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals. It prevented the crossing at certain points on its front, while on either flank the Germans who had gained a footing pressed forward. Our men, firing in three directions met the German attacks with counter-attacks at critical points and succeeded in throwing two German divisions into complete confusion, capturing 600 prisoners.

The selection by the Germans of the Champagne sector and the eastern and southern faces of the Marne pocket on which to make their offensive was fortunate for the allies, as it favored the launching of the counterattack already planned. There were now over 1,200,000 American troops in France, which provided a considerable force of reserves. Every American division with any sort of training was made available for use in a counter-

offensive.

General Petain's initial plan for the counter-attack involved the entire western face of the Marne salient. The First and Second American divisions, with the First French Moroccan Divisions between them, were employed as the spearhead of the main attack, driving directly eastward, through the most sensitive portion of the German lines, to the heights south of Soissons. The advance began on July 18, without the usual brief warning of a preliminary bombardment, and these three divisions at a single bound broke through the enemy's infantry defenses and overran his artillery, cutting or interrupting the German communications leading into the salient. A general withdrawal from the Marne was immediately begun by the enemy, who still fought stubbornly to prevent disaster.

#### AMERICANS ADVANCE

The First Division, throughout four days of constant fighting, advanced 11 kilometres, capturing Berzy-le-Sec and the heights above Soissons and taking some 3,500 prisoners and 68 field guns from the seven German divisions employed against it. It was relieved by a British division. The

Second Division advanced 8 kilometers in the first twenty-six hours, and by the end of the second day was facing Tigny, having captured 3,000 prisoners and 66 field guns. It was relieved the night of the 19th by a French division.

The result of this counter-offensive was of decisive importance. Due to the magnificent dash and power displayed on the field of Soissons by our First and Second divisions the tide of the war was definitely turned in favor of the allies.

Other American divisions participated in the Marne counter-offensive. A little to the south of the Second Division, the Fourth was in line with the French and was engaged until July 22. The first American Corps, Major-General Hunter Liggett commanding, with the Twenty-sixth Division and a French division, acted as a pivot of the movement toward Soissons, capturing Torcy on the 18th and reaching the Chateau-Thierry-Soissons road on the 21st. At the same time the Third Division crossed the Marne and took the heights of Mont Saint Peter and the villages of Charteves and Jauligonne.

### FORTY-SECOND CROSSES OURCQ


In the First Corps, the Forty-second Division relieved the Twenty-sixth on July 25 and extended its front, on the 26th relieving the French division. From this time until Aug. 2 it fought its way through the Forest de Fere and across the Ourcq, advancing toward the Vesle until relieved by the Fourth Division on Aug. 3. Early in this period elements of the Twenty-eighth Division participated in the advance.

Farther to the east the Third Division forced the enemy back to Roncheres Wood, where it was relieved on July 30 by the Thirty-second Division from the Vosges front. The Thirty-second, after relieving the Third and some elements of the Twenty-eighth on the line of the Ourcq River, advanced abreast of the Forty-second toward the Vesle. On Aug. 3 it passed under kontrol of our Third Corps, Major General Robert L. Bullard, commanding, which made its first appearance in battle at this time, while the Fourth Division took up the task of the Forty-second Division and advanced with the Thirty-second to the Vesle River, where, on Aug. 6, the operation for the reduction of the Marne salient terminated.

In the hard fighting from July 18 to Aug. 6 the Germans were not only halted in their advance, but were driven back from the Marne to the Vesle and committed wholly to the defensive. The force of American arms had been brought to bear in time to enable the last offensive of the enemy to be crushed.

#### HOLD THE VESLE


The First and Third corps now held a continuous front of eleven kilometres along the Vesle. On Aug. 12 the Seventy-seventh Division relieved the Fourth Division on the First Corps front, and the following day the Twenty-eighth relieved the Thirty-second Division in the Third Corps, while from Aug. 6 to Aug. 10 the Sixth Infantry Brigade of the Third Division held a sector on the river line. The transfer of the First Corps to the Woevre was ordered at this time, and the control of its front was turned over to the Third Corps.




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FOUR ALLIED HEROES CITED FOR BRAVERY
Lt. B. E. Kindley, Aviator, U. S. A.; Lt. Col. Breast, French Army;
Lt. Gen. Robert L. Bullard, U. S. A.; Lt. D. M. Davis, U. S. A.




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Clinedinst

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On Aug. 18, General Petain began an offensive between Rheims and the Oise. Our Third Corps participated in this operation, crossing the Vesle on Sept. 4 with the Twenty-eighth and Seventy-seventh Divisions and overcoming stubborn opposition on the plateau south of the Aisne, which was reached by the Seventy-seventh on Sept. 6. The Twenty-eighth was withdrawn from the line on Sept. 7. Two days later the Third Corps was transferred to the region of Verdun, the Seventy-seventh Division remaining in line on the Aisne River until Sept. 17.

The Thirty-second division upon its relief from the battle on the Vesle, joined a French corps north of Soissons and attacked from Aug. 29 to 31, capturing Juvigny after some particularly desperate fighting and reaching

the Chauny-Soissons road.

On the British front two regiments of the Thirty-third Division participated in an attack on Hamel July 4, and again on Aug. 9 as an incident of the allied offensive against the Amiens salient. (Ine of these regiments took Gressaire Wood and Chipilly Ridge, capturing 700 prisoners and considerable material.

# ASSEMBLING OF THE FIRST AMERICAN ARMY

In conference with General Petain at Chantilly on May 19 it had been agreed that the American army would soon take complete charge of the sector of the Woevre. The twenty-sixth Division was already in line in the Woevre north of Toul and was to be followed by other American divisions as they became available, with the understanding that the sector was to pass to our control when four divisions were in the line. But demands of the battle then going on farther west required the presence of our troops, and the agreement had no immediate result. Due to the presence of a number of our divisions northeast of Paris, the organization of an American corps sector in the Chateau-Thierry region was taken up with General Petain, and on July 5 the First Corps assumed tactical control of a sector in that region. This was an important step, but it was by no means satisfactory, as only one American division at the moment was operating under the control of the First Corps, while we had at this time eight American divisions in the front line serving in French corps.

## EMERGENCY PASSED

The counter-offensive against the Marne salient in July, and against the Amiens salient in August had gained such an advantage that it was apparent that the emergency, which justified the dispersion of our divisions, had passed. The moment was propitious for assembling our divisions. Scattered as they were along the allied front, their supply had become very difficult. From every point of view the immediate organization of an independent American force was indicated. The formation of the army in the Chateau-Thierry region and its early transfer to the sector of the Woevre, which was to extend from Nomeny, east of the Moselle, to north of St. Mihiel, was therefore decided upon by Marshal Foch and myself on Aug 9, and the details were arranged with General Petain later on the same day.

# AMERICANS IN THE ST. MIHIEL OPERATION

At Bombon on July 24 there was a conference of all the commanders-inchief for the purpose of considering allied operations. Each presented proposals for the employment of the armies under his command, and these formed the basis of future co-operation of the allies. It was emphatically determined that the allied attitude should be to maintain the offensive. At the first operation of the American army the reduction of the salient of St.

Mihiel was to be undertaken as soon as the necessary troops and material could be made available. On account of the swampy nature of the country it was especially important that the movement be undertaken and finished before the fall rains should begin, which was usually about the middle of September.

Arrangements were concluded for successive relief of American divisions, and the organization of the First American Army under my personal command was announced on Aug. 10, with La Fertesous-Jouarre as headquarters. This army nominally assumed control of a portion of the Vesle front, although at the same time directions were given for its secret concentration in the St. Mihiel sector.

## SECRET CONCENTRATION

The force of American soldiers in France at that moment was sufficient to carry out this offensive, but they were dispersed along the front from Switzerland to the Channel. The three Army Corps headquarters to participate in the St. Mihiel attack were the First, Fourth and Fifth. The First was on the Vesle, the Fourth at Toul, and the Fifth not yet completely organized. To assemble combat divisions and service troops and undertake a major operation, within the short period available and with staffs so recently organized, was an extremely difficult task. Our deficiencies in artillery, aviation, and special troops, caused by the shipment of an undue proportion of infantry and machine guns during the summer, were largely met by the French.

The reduction of the St. Mihiel salient was important, as it would prevent the enemy from interrupting traffic on the Paris-Nancy railroad by artillery fire and would free the railroad leading north through St. Mihiel to Verdun. It would also provide us with an advantageous base of departure for an attack against the Metz-Sedan railroad system which was vital to the German armies west of Verdun, and against the Briey Iron Basin which was necessary for the production of German armament and munitions.

The general plan was to make simultaneous attacks against the flanks of the salient. The ultimate objective was tentatively fixed as the general line Marieulles (east of the Ioselle) heights south of Gorze-Mars la Tour-Etain. The operation contemplated the use on the western face of three or four American divisions, supported by the attack of six divisions of the Second French Army on their left, while seven American divisions would attack on the southern face, and three French divisions would press the enemy at the tip of the salient. As the part to be taken by the Second French Army would be closely related to the attack of the First American Army, General Petain placed all the French troops involved under my personal command.

By Aug. 20, the concentration of the scattered divisions, corps, and army troops of the quantities of supplies and munitions required, and the necessary construction of light railways and roads, were well under way.

## PLANS ARE LAID

In accordance with previous general consideration of operations at Bombon on July 24, an allied offensive extending practically along the entire active front was eventually to be carried out. After the reduction of the St. Mihiel sector the Americans were to co-operate in the concerted effort of the allied armies. It was the sense of the conference of July 24, that the

extent to which the different operations already planned might carry us could not be then foreseen, especially if the results expected were achieved before the season was far advanced. It seemed reasonable at that time to look forward to a combined offensive for the autumn, which would give no respite to the enemy and would increase our advantage for the inauguration of succeeding operations extending into 1919.

### FOCH'S CAMPAIGN

On Aug. 30, a further discussion with Marshal Foch was held at my head-quarters at Ligny-en-Barrois. In view of the new successes of the French and British near Amiens and the continued favorable results toward the Chemin des Dames on the French front, it was now believed that the limited allied offensive, which was to prepare for the campaign of 1919, might be carried further before the end of the year. At this meeting it was proposed by Marshal Foch that the general operations as far as the American army was concerned should be carried out in detail by:

(a) An attack between the Meuse and the Argonne by the Second

French Army, reinforced by from four to six American divisions.

(b) A French-American attack, extending from the Argonne west to the Souain road, to be executed on the right by an American army astride the

Aisne and on the left by the Fourth French army.

To carry out these attacks the ten to eleven American divisions suggested for the St. Mihiel operation and the four to six for the Second French Army, would have eight to ten divisions for an American army on the Aisne. It was proposed that the St. Mihiel operation should be initiated on Sept. 10, and the other two on Sept. 15 and 20, respectively.

## NOT ACCEPTABLE

The plan suggested for the American participation in these operations was not acceptable to me because it would require the immediate separation of the recently formed First American Army into several groups, mainly to assist French armies. This was directly contrary to the principle of forming a distinct American army, for which my contention had been insistent. An enormous amount of preparation had already been made in construction of roads, railroads, regulating stations, and other installations looking to the use and supply of our armies on a particular front. The inherent disinclination of our troops to serve under allied commanders would have grown and American morale would have suffered. My position was stated quite clearly that the strategical employment of the First Army as a unit would be undertaken where desired, but its disruption to carry out these proposals would not be entertained.

## PERSHING WINS POINT

A further conference at Marshal Foch's headquarters was held on Sept. 2, at which General Petain was present. After discussion the question of employing the American army as a unit was conceded. The essentials of the strategical decision previously arrived at provided that the advantageous situation of the allies should be exploited to the utmost by vigorously continuing the general battle and extending it eastward to the Meuse. All the allied armies were to be employed in a converging action. The British armies, supported by the left of the French armies, were to pursue the attack in the direction of Cambrai; the centre of the French armies, west of Rheims, would continue the actions already begun to drive the enemy beyond the Aisne; and the American army, supported by the right of the French armies, would direct its attack on Sedan and Mezieres.

It should be recorded that although this general offensive was fully outlined at the conference no one present expressed the opinion that the final victory could be won in 1918. In fact, it was believed by the French high command that the Meuse-Argonne attack could not be pushed much beyond Montfaucon before the arrival of winter would force a cessation of operations.

The choice between the two sectors, that east of the Aisne including the Argonne Forest, or the Champagne sector, was left to me. In my opinion no other allied troops had the morale or the offensive spirit to overcome successfully the difficulties to be met in the Meuse-Argonne sector, and our plans and installations had been prepared for an expansion of operations in that direction. So the Meuse-Argonne front was chosen. The entire sector of 150 kilometers of front, extending from Port-sur-Seille, east of the Moselle, west to include the Argonne Forest, was accordingly placed under my command, including all French divisions then in that zone. The First American army was to proceed with the St. Mihiel operation, after which the operation between the Meuse and the western edge of the Argonne Forest was to be prepared and launched not later than Sept. 25.

### THE FIELD OF BATTLE

As a result of these decisions the depth of the St. Mihiel operation was limited to the line Vigneulles-Thiaucourt-Regnieville. The number of divisions to be used was reduced and the time shortened. Eighteen to nineteen divisions were to be in the front line. There were four French and fifteen American divisions available, six of which would be in reserve, while the two flank divisions of the front line were not to advance. Furthermore, two army corps headquarters, with their corps troops, practically all the army artillery and aviation, and the First, Second, and Fourth divisions, the first two destined to take a leading part in the St. Mihiel attack, were all due to be withdrawn and started for the Meuse-Argonne by the fourth day of the battle.

The salient had been held by the Germans since September, 1914. It covered the most sensitive section of the enemy's position on the Western front; namely, the Mezieres-Sedan-Metz Railroad and the Briey Iron Basin; It threatened the entire region between Verdun and Nancy, and interrupted the main rail line from Paris to the east. Its primary strength lay in the natural defensive features of the terrain itself. The western face of the salient extended along the rugged, heavily wooded eastern heights of the Meuse; the southern face followed the heights of the Meuse for eight kilometres to the east and then crossed the plain of the Woevre, including within the German lines the detached heights of Loupmont and Montsee which dominated the plain and afforded the enemy unusual facilities for observation. The enemy had reinforced the position by every artificial means during a period of four years.

On the night of Sept. 11, the troops of the first army were deployed in position. On the southern face of the salient was the First Corps, Major-General Liggett, commanding, with the Eighty-second, Ninetieth, Fifth and Second Divisions in line, extending from the Moselle westward. On its left was the Fourth Corps, Major-General Joseph T. Dickman, commanding, with the Eighty-ninth, Forty-second and First divisions, the left of this corps being opposite Montsec. These two army corps were to deliver the principal attack, the line pivoting on the centre division of the First Corps. The First Division on the left of the Fourth Corps was charged with the double mission of covering its own flank while advancing some twenty kilometres due north toward the heart of the salient, where it was to make contact with the troops of the Fifth Corp. On the western face of the salient lay the

Fifth Corps, Major-General George H. Cameron, commanding, with the Twenty-sixth Division, Fifteenth French Colonial Division, and the Fourth Division in line, from Mouilly west to Les Eparges and north to Watronville. Of these three divisions, the Twenty-sixth alone was to make a deep advance directed southeast toward Vigneulles. The French Division was to make a short progression to the edge of the heights in order to cover the left of the Twenty-sixth. The Fourth Division was not to advance. In the centre, between our Fourth and Fifth Army corps, was the Second French Colonial Corps, Major-General E. J. Blondiat, commanding, covering a front of forty kilometres with three small French divisions. These troops were to follow up the retirement of the enemy from the tip of the salient.

### ADVANCE AT DAWN

The French independent air force was at my disposal which, together with the British bombing squadrons and our own air forces, gave us the largest assembly of aviation that had ever been engaged in one operation. Our heavy guns were able to reach Metz and to interfere seriously with German rail movements.

At dawn on Sept. 12, after four hours of violent artillery fire of preparation, and accompanied by small tanks, the infantry of the First and Fourth Corps advanced. The infantry of the Fifth Corps commenced its advance at 8 a. m. The operation was carried out with entire precision. Just after daylight on Sept. 13, elements of the First and Twenty-sixth Divisions made a junction near Hattonchatel and Vigneulles, eighteen kilometres northeast of St. Mihiel.

The rapidity with which our divisions advanced overwhelmed the enemy, and all objectives were reached by the afternoon of Sept. 13. The enemy had apparently started to withdraw some of his troops from the tip of the salient on the eve of our attack, but had been unable to carry it through. We captured nearly 16,000 prisoners, 443 guns, and large stores of material and supplies. The energy and swiftness with which the operation was carried out enabled us to smother opposition to such an extent that we suffered less than 700 casualities during the actual period of the advance.

During the next two days the right of our line west of the Moselle River was advanced beyond the objectives laid down in the original orders. This completed the operation for the time being and the line was stabilized to be held by the smallest practicable force.

## AN ACCOMPLISHED FACT

The material results of the victory achieved were very important. An American army was an accomplished fact, and the enemy had felt its power. No form of propaganda could overcome the depressing effect on the morale of the enemy of this demonstration of our ability to organize a lrage American force and drive it successfully through his defenses. It gave our troops inplicit confidence in their superiority and raised their morale to the highest pitch. For the first time wire entanglements ceased to be regarded as impassable barriers and open-warfare training which had been so urgently insisted upon, proved to be the correct doctrine. Our divisions concluded the attack with such small losses and in such high spirits that without the usual rest they were immediately available for employment in heavy fighting in a new theatre of operations. The strength of the First Army in this battle totaled approximately 500,000 men, of whom about 70,000 were French.

## MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION

The definite decision for the Meuse-Argonne phase of the great allied convergent attack was agreed to in my conterence with Marshal Foch and General Petain on Sept. 2. It was planned to use all available forces of the First Army, including such divisions and troops as we might be able to withdraw from the St. Muhiel front. The army was to break through the enemy's successive fortified zones to include the Kriemhilde-Stellung, or Hindenburg Line on the front Brieulles-Romagne sous Montfaucon-Grandpre, and thereafter, by developing pressure toward Mezieres, was to insure the fall of the Hindenburg Line along the Aisne River in front of the Fourth French Army, which was to attack to the west of the Argonne Forest. A penetration of some twelve to fifteen kilometres was required to reach the Hindenburg Line on our front, and the enemy's defenses were virtually continuous throughout that depth.

The Meuse-Argonne front had been practically stabilized in September, 1914, and, except for minor fluctuations during the German attacks on Verdun in 1916 and the French counter-offensive in August, 1917, remained unchanged until the American advance in 1918. The net result of the four years' struggle on this ground was a German defensive system of unusual depth and strength and a wide zone of utter devastation, itself a serious obstacle to offensive operations.

The strategical importance of this portion of the line was second to none on the western front. All supplies and evacuations of the German armies in northern France were dependent upon two great railway systems—one in the north, passing through Liege, while the other in the south, with lines coming from Luxemburg, Thionville, and Metz, had as its vital section the line Carignan-Sedan-Mezier. No other important lines were available to the enemy, as the mountainous masses of the Ardennes made the construction of east and west lines through that region impracticable. The Carignan-Sedan-Mezieres line was essential to the Germans for the rapid strategical movement of troops. Should this southern system be cut by the allies before the enemy could withdraw his forces through the narrow neck between Mezieres and the Dutch frontier, the ruin on his armies in France and Belgium would be complete.

### THE ENEMY'S PIVOT

From the Meuse-Argonne front the perpendicular distance to the Carignan-Mezieres railroad was 50 kilometres. This region formed the pivot of German operations in northern France, and the vital necessity of covering the great railroad line into Sedan resulted in the convergence on the Meuse-Argonne front of the successive German defensive positions. As an effect of this convergence the distance between "no man's land" and the third German withdrawal position in the vicinity of the Meuse River was approximately 18 kilometres; the distance between the corresponding points near the tip of the great salient of the western front was about 65 kilometres, and in the vicinity of Cambrai was over 30 kilometres. The effect of a penetration of 18 kilometres by the American army would be equivalent to an advance of 65 kilometres farther west; furthermore, such an advance on our front was far more dangerous to the enemy than an advance elsewhere. The vital importance of this portion of his position was fully appreciated by the enemy, who had suffered tremendous losses in 1916 in attempting to improve it by the reduction of Verdun. As a consequence it had been elaborately fortified, and consisted of practically a continuous series of positions 20 kilometres or more in depth.

## GERMANS HOLD HEIGHTS

In addition to the artificial defenses, the enemy was greatly aided by the natural features of the terrain. East of the Meuse the dominating heights not only protected his left, but gave him positions from which powerful artillery could deliver an oblique fire on the western bank. Batteries located in the elaborately fortified Argonne forest covered his right flank, and could cross their fire with that of the guns on the east bank of the Meuse. Midway between the Meuse and the forest the heights of Montfaucon offered observation and formed a strong natural position which had been heavily fortified. The east and west ridges abutting on the Meuse and Aire River valleys afforded the enemy excellent machine-gun positions for the desperate defense which the the importance of the position would require him to make. North of Montfaucon densely wooded and rugged heights constituted natural features favorable to defensive fighting.

### A DIFFICULT TASK

When the First Army became engaged in the simultaneous preparation for two major operations, an interval of fourteen days separated the initiation of the two attacks. During this short period the movement of the immense number of troops and the amount of supplies, confined entirely to the hours of darkness, was one of the most delicate and difficult problems of the war. The concentration included fifteen divisions of which seven were involved in the pending St. Mihiel drive, three were in sectors in the Vosges, three in the neighborhood of Soissons, one in a training area, and one near Bar-le-Duc. Practically all the artillery, aviation, and other auxiliaries to be employed in the new operations were committed to the St. Mihiel attack and, therefore, could not be moved until its success was assured. The concentration of all units not to be used at St. Mihiel was commenced immediately, and on Sept. 13, the second day of St. Mihiel, reserve divisions and army artillery units were withdrawn and placed in motion toward the Argonne front.

That part of the American sector from Fresnes-en-Woevre, southeast of Verdun to the western edge of the Argonne Forest, while nominally under my control, did not actively become a part of my command until Sept 22, on which date my headquarters were established at Souilly, southwest of Verdun. Of French troops, in addition to the Second French Colonial Corps, composed of three divisions, there was also the Seventeenth French Corps of three divisions holding the front north and east of Verdun.

### FRENCH ACT AS SCREEN

At the moment of the opening of the Meuse-Argonne battle the enemy had ten divisions in line and ten in reserve on the front between Fresnesen-Woevre and the Argonne Forest, inclusive. He had undoubtedly expected a continuation of our advance toward Metz. Successful ruses were carried out between the Meuse River and Luneville to deceive him as to our intentions, and French troops were maintained as a screen along our front until the night before the battle, so that the actual attack was a tactical surprise.

The operations in the Meuse-Argonne battle really form a continuous whole, but they extended over such a long period of continuous fighting that they will here be considered in three phases, the first from Sept. 26 to Oct. 3, the second from Oct. 4 to 31, and the third from Nov. 1 to 11.

### BATTLE'S FIRST PHASE

On the night of Sept. 25 the nine divisions to lead in the attack were deployed between the Meuse River and the western edge of the Argonne

Forest. On the right was the Third Corps, Major-General Bullard commanding, with the Thirty-third, Eightieth and Fourth divisions in line; next came the Fifth Corps, Major-General Cameron, commanding, with the Seventy-ninth, Thirty-seventh, and Ninety-first divisions; on the left was the First Corps, Major-General Liggett commanding, with the Thirty-fifth, Twenty-eighth and Seventy-seventh divisions. Each corps had one division in reserve and the army held three divisions as a general reserve. About 2,700 guns, 189 small tanks, 142 manned by Americans, and 821 airplanes, 604 manned by Americans, were concentrated to support the attack of the infantry. We thus had a superiority in guns and aviation, and the enemy had no tanks.

The axis of the attack was the line Montfaucon-Romagne-Buzancy, the purpose being to make the deepest penetration in the centre, which, with the Fourth French Army advancing west of the Argonne, would force the enemy to evacuate that forest without our having to deliver a heavy attack in that difficult region.

### TANKS IN ACTION

Following three hours of violent artillery fire of preparation the infantry advanced at 5.30 a. m. on Sept. 26, accompanied by tanks. During the first two days of the attack, before the enemy was able to bring up his reserves, our troops made steady progress through the network of defenses. Montfaucon was held tenaciously by the enemy and was not captured until noon of the second day.

By the evening of the 28th a maximum advance of eleven kilometers had been achieved and we had captured Baulny, Epinonville, Septsarges and Dannevoux. The right had made a splendid advance into the woods south of Brieulles-sur-Meuse, but the extreme left was meeting strong resistance in the Argonne. The attack continued without interruption, meeting six new divisions which the enemy threw into first line before Sept 29. He developed a powerful machine-gun defense supported by heavy artillery fire, and made frequent counter-attacks with fresh troops, particularly on the front of the Twenty-eighth and Thirty-fifth Divisions. These divisions had taken Varennes, Cheppy, Baulny, and Charpentry, and the line was within two kilometres of Apremont. We were no longer engaged in a manoeuvre, for the pinching out of a salient but were necessarily committed generally speaking, to a direct frontal attack against strong, hostile positions fully manned by a determined enemy.

### SUFFER HEAVY LOSSES

By nightfall of the 29th the First Army line was approximately Bois de la Cote Lemont—Nantillois—Apremont—southwest across the Argonne. Many divisions, especially those in the centre that were subjected to cross-fire of artillery, had suffered heavily. The severe fighting, the nature of the terrain over which they attacked, and the fog and darkness sorely tried even our best divisions. On the night of the 29th the Thirty-seventh and Seventy-ninth Divisions were relieved by the Thirty-second and Third Divisions, respectively, and on the following night the First Division relieved the Thirty-fifth Division.

The critical problem during the first few days of the battle was the restoration of communications over "no man's land." There were but four roads available across the deep zone, and the violent artillery fire of the previous period of the war had virtually destroyed them. The spongy soil and the lack of material increased the difficulty. But the splendid work of our engineers and pioneers soon made possible the movement of the troops, artillery, and supplies most needed. By the afternoon of the 27th, all the

divisional artillery, except a few batteries of heavy guns, had effected a passage and was supporting the infantry action.

#### SECOND PHASE OF BATTLE

At 5.30 a.m. on Oct. 4 the general attack was renewed. The enemy divisions on the front from Fresnes-en-Woerve to the Argonne had increased from ten in the first line to sixteen, and included some of his best divisions. The fighting was desperate, and only small advances were realized, except by the First Division on the right of the First Corps. By evening of Oct. 5 the line was approximately Bois de la Cote Lemont-Bois du Fays-Gesnes-Hill 240-Fleville-Chehery, southwest through the Argonne.

It was especially desirable to drive the enemy from his commanding positions on the heights east of the Meuse, but it was even more important that we should force him to use his troops there and weaken his tenacious hold on positions in our immediate front. The further stabilization of the new St. Mihiel line permitted the withdrawal of certain divisions for the extension of the Meuse-Argonne operation to the east bank of the Meuse River.

On the 7th the First Corps with the Eighty-second Division added, launched a strong attack northwest toward Cornay, to draw attention from the movement east of the Meuse and at the same time outflank the German position in the Argonne. The following day the Seventeenth French Corps, Major-General Claudel commanding, initiated its attack east of the Meuse against the exact point on which the German armies must pivot in order to withdraw from northern France. The troops encountered elaborate fortifications and stubborn resistance, but by nightfall had realized an advance of six kilometres to a line well within the Bois de Consenvoye, and including the villages of Beaumont and Haumont. Continuous fighting was maintained along our entire battle front, with especial success on the extreme left, where the capture of the greater part of the Argonne Forest was completed. The enemy contested every foot of ground on our front in order to make more rapid retirements farther west and withdraw his forces from northern France before the interruption of his railroad communications through Sedan.

## REPLACEMENTS INSUFFICIENT

We were confronted at this time by an insufficiency of replacements to build up exhausted divisions. Early in October combat units required some 90,000 replacements and not more than 45,000 would be available before Nov. 1 to fill the existing and prospective vacancies. We still had two divisions with the British and two with the French. A review of the situation, American and allied, especially as to our own resources in men for the next two months, convinced me that the attack of the First Army and of the allied armies further west should be pushed to the limit. But if the First Army was to continue its aggressive tactics our divisions then with the French must be recalled, and replacements must be obtained by breaking up newly arrived divisions.

In discussing the withdrawal of our divisions from the French with Marshal Foch and General Petain on Oct. 10, the former expressed his appreciation of the fact that the First Army was striking the pivot of the German withdrawal, and also held the view that the allied attack should continue. General Petain agreed that the American divisions with the French were essential to us if we were to maintain our battle against the German pivot. The French were, however, straining every nerve to keep up their attacks and before those divisions with the French had been released, it became

necessary for us to send the Thirty-seventh and Ninety-first divisions from the First Army to assist the Sixth French army in Flanders.

## "MOST DESPERATE BATTLE"

At this time the First Army was holding a front of more than 120 kilometers; its strength exceeded 1,000,000 men; it was engaged in the most desperate battle of our history, and the burden of command was too heavy for a single commander and staff. Therefore, on Oct. 12, that portion of our front extending from Port-sur-Seille, east of the Moselle, to Fresnes-en-Woevre, southeast of Verdun, was transferred to the newly constituted Second Army with Lieutenant-General Robert L. Bullard in command, under whom it began preparations for the extension of operations to the east in the direction of Briey and Metz. On Oct. 16 the command of the First Army was transferred to Lieutenant-General Hunter Liggett, and my advance head-quarters was established at Ligny-en-Barrois, from which the command of the group of American armies was exercised.

### HINDENBURG LINE BROKEN

Local attacks of the First Army were continued in order particularly to adjust positions preparatory to a renewed general assault. The First and Fifth divisions were relieved by the Forty-second and Eighteenth divisions, which were now fresh. An attack along the whole front was made on Oct. 14. The resistance encountered was stubborn, but the stronghold on Cote Dame Marie was captured and the Hindenburg Line was broken. Cunel and Romagne-sous-Monfaucon were taken and the line advanced 2 kilometres north of Sommerance. Maximum advance of 17 kilometres had been made since Sept. 26 and the enemy had been forced to throw into the fight a total of fifteen reserve divisions.

During the remainder of the month important local operations were carried out, which involved desperate fighting. The First Corps, Major-General Dickman commanding, advanced through Grandpre; the Fifth Corps, Major-General Charles P. Summerall commanding, captured the Bois de Bantheville; the Third Corps, Major-General John L. Hines commanding, completed the occupation of Cunel Heights; and the Seventeenth French Corps drove the enemy from the main ridge south of La Grande Montagne. Particular heavy fighting occurred east of the Meuse on Oct. 18, and in the further penetration of the Kriemhilde-Stellung on Oct. 23 the Twenty-sixth Division entering the battle at the time relieved the Eighteenth French Division.

### THE RESULTS

Summarizing the material results which had been attained by the First Army by the end of October, we had met an increasing number of Germany's best divisions, rising from twenty in line and reserve on Sept. 26, to thirty-one on Oct. 31; the enemy's elaborately prepared positions, including the Hindenburg Line, in our front had been broken; the almost impassable Argonne Forest was in our hands; an advance of twenty-one kilometres had been effected; 18,600 prisoners, 370 cannon, 1,000 machine guns, and a mass of material captured; and the great railway artery through Carignan in Sedan was now seriously threatened.

The demands of incessant battle which had been maintained day by day for more than a month had compelled our divisions to fight to the limit of their capacity. Combat troops were held in line and pushed to the attack until deemed incapable of further effort because of casualties or exhaustion; artillery once engaged was seldom withdrawn and many batteries fought until practically all the animals were casualties and the guns were towed out of

line by motor trucks.

The American soldier had shown unrivaled fortitude in this continuous fighting during most inclement weather and under many disadvantages of position. Through experience the army had developed into a powerful and smooth-running machine, and there was a supreme confidence in our ability to carry through the task successfully.

While the high pressure of these dogged attacks was a great strain on our troops, it was calamitous to the enemy. His divisions had been thrown into confusion by our furious assaults, and his morale had been reduced until his will to resist had well-nigh reached the breaking point. Once a German division was engaged in the fight, it became practically impossible to effect its relief. The enemy was forced to meet the constantly recurring crisis by breaking up tactical organizations and sending hurried detachments to widely separated portions of the field.

Every member of the American Expeditionary Forces, from the front line to the base ports, was straining every nerve. Magnificent efforts were exerted by the entire Services of Supply to meet the enormous demands made on it. Obstacles which seemed insurmountable were overcome daily in expediting the movements of replacements, ammunition and supplies to the front, and of sick and wounded to the rear. It was this spirit of determination animating every American soldier that made it impossible for the enemy to maintain the struggle until 1919.

### THIRD PHASE

The detailed plans for the operations of the allied armies on the western front changed from time to time during the course of this great battle, but the mission of the First American Army to cut the great Carignan-Sedan-Mezieres Railroad remained unchanged. Marshal Foch co-ordinated the operations along the entire front, continuing persistently and unceasingly the attack by all allied armies; the Belgian army, with a French army and two American divisions, advancing eastward; the British armies and two American divisions, with the First French army on their right, toward the region north of Givet; the First American army and Fourth French army toward Sedan and Mezieres.

On the 21st my instructions were issued to the First army to prepare thoroughly for a general attack on Oct. 28 that would be decisive, if possible. In order that the attack of the First army and that of the Fourth French army on its left should be simultaneous, our attack was delayed until Nov. 1. The immediate purpose of the First army was to take Buzancy and the heights of Barricourt, to turn the forest north of Grandpre, and to establish contact with the Fourth French army near Boult-au-Bois. The army was directed to carry the heights of Barricourt by nightfall of the first day and then to exploit this success by advancing its left to Boult-aux-Bois in preparation for the drive toward Sedan. By strenuous effort all available artillery had been moved well forward to the heights previously occupied by the enemy, from which it could fully cover and support the initial advance of the infantry.

On this occasion and for the first time the army prepared for its attack under normal conditions. We held the front of attack and were not under the necessity of taking over a new front, with its manifold installation and services. Our own personnel handled the communications, dumps, telegraph lines, and water service; our divisions were either on the line or close in rear; the French artillery, aviation, and technical troops which had previously made up our deficiencies had been largely replaced by our own organizations, and our army, corps, and divisional staffs were by actual experience second to

none.

## FOE'S LAST DEFENCE

On the morning of Nov. 1, three army corps were in line between the Meuse River and the Bois de Bourgogne. On the right the Third Corps had the Fifth and Nineteenth Divisions; the First Corps occupied the centre of the line, with the Eighty-ninth and Second Divisions, and was to be the wedge of the attack on the first day; and on the left the First Corps deployed the Eightieth, Seventy-seventh, and Seventy-eighth Divisions.

Preceded by two hours of violent artillery preparation, the infantry advanced closely followed by "accompanying guns." The artillery acquitted itself magnificently, the barrages being so well co-ordinated and so dense that the enemy was overwhelmed and quickly submerged by the rapid onslaught of the infantry. By nightfall the Fifth Corps, in the centre, had realized an advance of almost nine kilometres to the Bois de la Folie, and had completed the capture of the heights of Barricourt, while the Third Corps, on the right, had captured Aincreville and Andevanne. Our troops had broken through the enemy's last defense, captured his artillery positions, and had precipitated a retreat of the German forces about to be isolated in the forest north of Grandpre. On the 2nd and 3d we advanced rapidly against heavy fighting on the front of the right and centre corps; to the left the troops of the First Corps hurried forward in pursuit, some by motor trucks, while the artillery pressed along the country roads close behind. Our heavy artillery was skillfully brought into position to fire upon the Carignan-Sedan Railroad and the junctions at Longuyon and Conflans. By the evening of the 4th, our troops had reached La Neuville, opposite Stenay, and had swept through the great Foret de Dieulet, reaching the outskirts of Beaumont, while on the left we were eight kilometres north of Boult-aux-Bois.

### WITHDBAWAL FORCED

The following day the advance continued toward Sedan with increasing swiftness. The Third Corps, turning eastward, crossed the Meuse in a brilliant operation by the Fifth Division, driving the enemy from the heights of Dun-sur-Meuse and forcing a general withdrawal from the strong positions he had so long held on the hills north of Verdun.

### APPEALS FOR ABMISTICE

By the 7th the right of the Third Corps had exploited its river crossing to a distance of ten kilometres east of the Meuse, completely ejecting the enemy from the wooded heights and driving him out into the swampy plain of the Woevre; the Fifth and First Corps had reached the line of the Meuse River along their respective fronts and the left of the latter corps held the heights dominating Sedan, the strategical goal of the Meuse-Argonne operation, forty-one kilometres from our point of departure on Nov. 1. We had cut the enemy's main line of communications. Recognizing that nothing but a cessation of hostilities could save his armies from complete disaster, he appealed for an immediate armistice on Nov. 6.

Meanwhile general plans had been prepared for the further employment of American forces in an advance between the Meuse and the Moselle, to be directed toward Longwy by the First Army, while the Second Army was to assume the offensive toward the Briey Iron Basin. Orders directing the preparatory local operations involved in this enterprise were issued on Nov. 5.

Between the 7th and 10th of November the Third Corps continued its advance eastward to Remoiville, while the Seventeenth French Corps, on its right, with the Seventy-ninth, Twenty-sixth, and Eighty-first American divisions, and two French divisions, drove the enemy from the final foothold on the heights east of the Meuse. At 9 P. M. on Nov. 9 appropriate orders

were sent to the First and Second armies in accordance with the following telegram from Marshal Foch to the commander of each of the allied armies:

"The enemy, disorganized by our repeated attacks, retreated along the entire front.

"It is important to co-ordinate and expedite our movements.

"I appeal to the energy and the initiative of the commanders-inchief and of their armies to make decisive the results obtained."

## NOVEMBER 11, 1918

In consequence of the foregoing instructions, our Second Army pressed the enemy along its entire front. On the night of the 10th, 11th and the morning of the 11th the Fifth Corps, in the First Army, forced a crossing of the Meuse east of Beaumont and gained the commanding heights within the re-entrant of the river, thus completing our control of the Meuse River line. At 6 a. m. on the 11th notification was received from Marshal Foch's headquarters that the armistice had been signed and that hostilities would cease at 11 a. m. Preparatory measures had already been taken to insure the prompt transmission to the troops of the announcement of an armistice. However, the advance east of Beaumont on the morning of the 11th had been so rapid and communication across the river was so difficult that there was some fighting on isolated portions of that front after 11 a. m.

### GREAT ODDS OVERCOME

Between Sept. 26 and Nov. 11, twenty-two American and four French divisions, on the front extending from southeast of Verdun to the Argonne Forest, had engaged and decisively beaten forty-seven different German divisions, representing 25 per cent. of the enemy's entire divisional strength on the Western front. Of these enemy divisions twenty had been drawn from the French front and one from the British front. Of the twenty-two American divisions, twelve had, at different times during this period, been engaged on fronts other than our own. The First Army suffered a loss of about 117,000 in killed and wounded. It captured 26,000 prisoners, 847 cannon. 3,000 machine guns, and large quantities of material.

The dispositions which the enemy made to meet the Meuse-Argonne offensive, both immediately before the opening of the attack and during the battle, demonstrated the importance which he ascribes to this section of the front and the extreme measures he was forced to take in its defense. From the moment the American offensive began until the armistice, his defense was desperate and the flow of his divisions to our front was continuous.

# OPERATIONS OF THE SECOND AMERICAN ARMY

Under the instructions issued by me on Nov. 5, for operations by the Second Army in the direction of the Briey Iron Basin, the advance was undertaken along the entire front of the army and continued during the last three days of hostilities. In the face of the stiff resistance offered by the enemy, and with the limited number of troops at the disposal of the Second Army, the gains realized reflected great credit on the divisions concerned. On Nov. 6 Marshal Foch requested that six American divisions be held in readiness to assist in an attack which the French were preparing to launch in the direction of Chateau-Salins. The plan was agreed to, but with the provision that our troops should be employed under the direction of the commanding general of the Second Army.

This combined attack was to be launched on Nov. 14, and was to consist of twenty French divisions under General Mangin and the six Ameri-

can divisions under General Bullard. Of the divisions designated for this operation the Third, Fourth, Twenty-ninth and Thirty-sixth were in army reserve, and were starting their march eastward on the morning of Nov. 11, while the Twenty-eighth and Thirty-fifth were being withdrawn from line on the Second Army front.

# AMERICAN ACTIVITIES ON OTHER FRONTS

During the first phase of the Meuse-Argonne battle American divisions were participating in important attacks on other portions of the front. The Second Army Corps, Major-General Read commanding, with the Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth Divisions on the British front, was assigned the task in co-operation with the Australian Corps, of breaking the Hindenburg Line at Le Cateau, where the St. Quentin Canal passes through a tunnel under a ridge. In this attack, carried out on Sept. 29 and Oct. 1, the Thirtieth Division speedily broke through the main line of defense and captured all of its objectives, while the Twenty-seventh progressed until some of its elements reached Gouy. In this and later actions from Oct. 6 to 19, our Second Corps captured over 6,000 prisoners and advanced about twenty-four kilometres.

On Oct. 2-9 our Second and Thirty-sixth divisions assisted the Fourth French army in its advance between Rheims and the Argonne. The Second Division completed its advance on this front by the assault of the wooded heights of Mont Blanc, the key point of the German position, which was captured with consummate dash and skill. The division here repulsed violent counter-attacks, and then carried our lines into the village of St. Etienne, thus forcing the Germans to fall back before Rheims and yield positions which they had held since September, 1914. On Oct. 10 the Thirty-sixth Division relieved the Second, exploiting the latter's success, and in two days advanced with the French, a distance of twenty-one kilometres, the enemy retiring behind the Aisne River.

In the middle of October, while we were heavily engaged in the Meuse-Argonne, Marshal Foch requested that two American divisions be sent immediately to assist the Sixth French Army in Belgium, where slow progress was being made. The Thirty-seventh and Ninety-first divisions, the latter being accompanied by the artillery of the Twenty-eighth Division, were hurriedly dispatched to the Belgian front. On October 30, in continuation of the Flanders offensive, these divisions entered the line and attacked. By Nov. 3 the Thirty-seventh Division had completed its mission by rapidly driving the enemy across the Escaut River and had firmly established itself on the east bank, while the Ninety-first Division, in a spirited advance, captured Spitaals Bosschen, reached the Scheldt, and entered Audenarde.

# AMERICAN TROOPS IN ACTION IN ITALY

The Italian government early made request for American troops, but the critical situation on the western front made it necessary to concentrate our efforts there. When the secretary of war was in Italy during April, 1918, he was urged to send American troops to Italy to show America's interest in the Italian situation and to strengthen Italian morale. Similarly a request was made by the Italian prime minister at the Abbeville conference. It was finally decided to send one regiment to Italy with the necessary hospital and auxiliary service, and the 332d Infantry was selected, reaching the Italian front in July, 1918. These troops participated in action against the Austrians in the fall of 1918 at the crossing of the Piave River and in the final pursuit of the Austrian army.

## AMERICAN TROOPS ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT

It was the opinion of the supreme war council that allied troops should be sent to co-operate with the Russian, either at Murmansk or Archangel, against the Bolshevist forces, and the British government through its ambassador at Washington, urged American participation in this undertaking. On July 23, 1918, the War Department directed the despatch of three battalions of infantry and three companies of engineers to join the allied expedition. In compliance with these instructions the 339th Infantry, the First Battalion, 310th Engineers, 337th Field Hospital Company, and 337th Ambulance Company were sent through England, whence they sailed on Aug. 26.

bulance Company were sent through England, whence they sailed on Aug. 26.

The mission of these troops was limited to guarding the ports and as much of the surrounding country as might develop threatening conditions. The allied force operated under British command, through whose orders the small American contingent was spread over a front of about 450 miles. From September, 1918, to May, 1919, a series of minor engagements with the Bolshevist forces occurred, in which eighty-two Americans were killed and seven died of wounds.

In April, 1919, two companies of American railroad troops were added to our contingent. The withdrawal of the American force commenced in the latter part of May, 1919, and on Aug. 25 there was left only a small detachment of Graves registration troops.

## THE ALLIED ADVANCE INTO GERMAN LAND

In accordance with the terms of the armistice, the allies were to occupy all German territory west of the Rhine, with bridgeheads of thirty kilometre radius at Cologne, Coblenz, and Mayence. The zone assigned the American command was the bridgehead of Coblenz and the district of Treves, this territory was to be occupied by an American army, with its reserves held between the Moselle-Meuse rivers and the Luxemburg frontier.

The instructions of Marshal Foch, issued on Nov. 16, contemplated that two French infantry divisions and one French cavalry division would be added to the American forces that occupied the Coblenz bridgehead, and that one American division would be added to the French force occupying the Mayence bridgehead. As this arrangement presented possibilities of misunderstanding due to difference of views regarding the government of occupied territory, it was represented to the marshal that each nation should be given a well-defined territory of occupation, employing within such territory only the troops of the commander responsible for the particular zone. On Dec. 9 Marshal Foch accepted the principle of preserving the entity of command and troops, but reduced the American bridgehead by adding a portion of the eastern half to the French command at Mayence.

Various reasons made it undesirable to employ either the First or Second army as the army of occupation. Plans had been made before the armistice to organize a third army, and on Nov. 14 this army with Major-General Joseph T. Dickman as commander, was designated as the army of occupation. The Third and Fourth army corps staffs and troops, less artillery, the First Second, Third, Fourth, Thirty-second, and Forty-second divisions and the Sixty-sixth Field Artillery Brigade was assigned to the Third Army. This force was later increased by the addition of the Seventh Corps, Major-General William M. Wright, commanding with the Fifth, Eighty-ninth and Ninetieth

### IN WAKES OF RETREAT

The advance toward German territory began on Nov. 17 at 5 a. m., six days after signing the armistice. All of the allied forces from the North Sea to the Swiss border moved forward simultaneously in the wake of the

retreating German armies. Upon arrival at the frontier a halt was made until Dec. 1, when the leading elements of all allied armies crossed the line into Germany. The Third Army headquarters were established at Coblena and an advance general headquarters located at Treves. Steps were immediately taken to organize the bridgehead for defenses and dispositions were made to meet a possible renewal of hostilities.

The advance to the Rhine required long, arduous marshes through cold and inclement weather, with no opportunity for troops to rest, refit and refresh themselves after their participation in the final battle. The Army of Occupation bore itself splendidly and exhibited a fine state of discipline both

during the advance and throughout the period of occupation.

The zone of march of our troops into Germany and the line of communications of the Third army after reaching the Rhine lay through Luxemburg. After the passage of the Third army, the occupation of Luxemburg, for the purpose of guarding our line of communications, was entrusted to the Fifth and Thirty-third divisions of the Second army. The city of Luxemburg, garrisoned by French troops and designated as the headquarters of the allied commander-in-chief, was excluded from our control.

Upon entering the Duchy of Luxemburg in the advance, a policy of non-interference in the affairs of the Grand Duchy was announced. Therefore, when the French commander in the city of Luxemburg was given charge of all troops in the Duchy, in so far as concerned the "administration of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg," my instructions were that our troops would not be subject to his control. Later, at my request, and in order to avoid possible friction, Marshal Foch placed the entire Duchy in the American zone.

## RETURN OF TROOPS TO THE UNITED STATES

On the day the armistice was signed the problem of the return of our troops to the United States was taken up with the War Department, and on Nov. 15 a policy recommended of sending home certain auxiliaries so that we could begin to utilize all available shipping without delay. On Dec. 21 the War Department announced by cable that it had been decided to begin immediately the return of our forces, and continue as rapidly as transportation would permit. To carry this out a schedule for the constant flow of troops to the ports was established, having in mind our international obligations pending the signing of the treaty of peace.


While more intimately related to the functions of the services of supply than to operations, it is logical to introduce here a brief recital of the organizations created for the return of our troops to America. Prior to the armistice but 15,000 men had been returned home. Although the existing organization was built for the efficient and rapid handling of the incoming forces, the embarkation of this small number presented no difficulties. But the armistice suddenly and completely reversed the problem of the services of supply at the ports and the handling of troops. It became necessary immediately to reorganize the machinery of the ports, to construct large embarkation camps, and to create an extensive service for embarking the homeward-bound troops.

### THE CAMP AT BREST


Brest, St. Nazaire, and Bordeaux became the principal embarkation ports, Harseilles and Le Havre being added later to utilize Italian and French liners. The construction of the embarkation camps during unseasonable winter weather was the most trying problem. These, with the billeting facilities available, gave accommodation for 55,000 at Brest, 44,000 at St. Nazaire, and 130,000 at Bordeaux. Unfortunately the largest ships had to be handled at Brest, where the least shelter was available.



REAR ADMIRAL HUGH RODMAN, Commander of the Overseas U. S. Battleship Division.




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


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GEN. OMAR BUNDY OF THE U. S. MARINES
"My men would not understand an order to retreat."



☼ Underwood & Underwood ADMIRAL SIR DAVID BEATTY, Commander of the British Naval Forces



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Top left hand side Col. THEODORE ROOSEVELT CAPT. KERMIT ROOSEVELT CAPT. ARCHIE ROOSEVELT right " " CAPT. ARCHIE ROOSEVELT LIEUT. QUENTIN ROOSEVELT

To maintain a suitable reservoir of men for Brest and St. Nazaire, an embarkation centre was organized around Le Mans, which eventually accommodated 230,000 men. Here the troops and their records were prepared for the return voyage and immediate demobilization. As the troops arrived at the base ports, the embarkation service was charged with feeding, reclothing, and equipping the hundreds of thousands who passed through, which required the maintenance of a form of hotel service on a scale not hitherto attempted.

On Nov. 16 all combat troops, except thirty divisions and a minimum of corps and army troops, were released for return to the United States. It was early evident that only limited use would be made of the American division, and that the retention of thirty divisions was not necessary. Marshal Foch considered it indispensable to maintain under arms a total, including Italians, of 120 to 140 divisions, and he proposed that we maintain thirty divisions in France until Feb. 1, twenty-five of which should be held in the zone of the armies, and that on March 1 we should have twenty divisions in the zone of the armies and five ready to embark. The plan for March 1 was satisfactory, but the restrictions as to the divisions that should be in France on Feb. 1 could not be accepted, as it would seriously interfere with the flow of troops homeward.

In a communication dated Dec. 24 the marshal set forth the minimum forces to be furnished by the several allies, requesting the American army to furnish twenty-two to twenty-five divisions of infantry. In the same note he estimated the force to be maintined after the signing of the preliminaries of peace at about thirty-two divisions, of which the American army was to furnish six.

### TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS

In reply it was pointed out that our problem of repatriation of troops and their demobilization was quite different from that of France or Great Britain. On account of our long line of communications in France and the time consumed by the ocean voyage and travel in the United States, even with the maximum employment of our then available transportation, at least a year must elapse before we could complete our demobilization. Therefore, it was proposed by me that the number of American combat divisions to be maintained in the zone of the armies should be reduced on April 1 to fifteen divisions and on May 1, to ten divisions, and that in the unexpected event that the preliminaries of peace should not be signed by May 1 we would continue to maintain ten divisions in the zone of the armistice until the date of signature.

The allied commander-in-chief later revised his estimate, and on Jan. 24, stated to the Supreme War Council that the German demobilization would permit the reduction of the allied forces to 100 divisions, of which the Americans were requested to furnish fifteen. In reply, it was again pointed out that our problem was entirely one of transportation, and that such a promise was unnecessary inasmuch as it would probably be the summer of 1919 before we could reduce our forces below the number asked. We were, therefore, able to keep our available ships filled, and by May 19, all combat divisions, except five still in the army of occupation, were under orders to proceed to ports of embarkation. This provided sufficient troops to utilize all troop transports to include July 15.

The President had informed me that it would be necessary for us to have at least one regiment in occupied Germany, and left the details to be discussed by me with Marshal Foch. My cable of July 1 summarizes the agreement reached:

"By direction of President, I have discussed with Marshal Foch the question of forces to be left on the Phina Following agreed many The Fourth

and Fifth Divisions will be sent to base ports immediately, the Second Division will commence moving to base ports on July 15, and the Third Division on Aug. 15. Date of relief of First Division will be decided later. Agreement contemplates that after compliance by Germany with military conditions to be completed within first three months after German ratification of treaty, American force will be reduced to one regiment of infantry and certain auxiliaries. Request President be informed of agreement."

As a result of a later conference with Marshal Foch, the Third Division

was released on Aug. 3 and the First Division on Aug. 15.

#### THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY

In February, 1918, the line of communications was reorganized under the name of the service of supply. At that time all staff services and departments, except the adjutant general's, the inspector general's, and the judge advocate general's departments, were grouped for supply purposes under one co-ordinating head, the commanding general, services of supply, with a general staff paralleling, so far as necessary, the general staff at general head-quarters.

The principal functions of the services of supply were the procurement, storage, and transportation of supplies. These activities were controlled in a general way by the commanding general services of supply, the maximum degree of independence being permitted to the several services. This great organization was charged with immense projects in connection with roads, docks, railroads, and buildings; the transportation of men, animals, and supplies by sea, rail, and inland waterways; the operation of telegraph and telephone systems; the control and transportation of replacements; the hospitalization necessary for an army of 2,000,000 men; the reclassification of numerous officers and men; the establishment of leave areas and of welfare and entertainment projects; the liquidation of our affairs in France; and the final embarkation of our troops for home.

The growth of the permanent port personnel, the location near the base ports of certain units for training, and other considerations led to the appointment of a territorial commander for the section around each port who, while acting as the representative of the commanding general services of supply, was given the local authority of a district commander. For similar reasons, an intermediate section commander and an advance section commander were appointed. Eventually there were nine base sections, including one in England, one in Italy, and one comprising Rotterdam and Antwerp, also one intermediate and one advance section.

The increasing participation of the American Expeditionary Forces in active operations necessitated the enlargement of the responsibilities and authority of the commanding general Services of Supply. In August, 1918, he was charged with complete responsibility for all supply matters in the services of supply, and was authorized to correspond by cable directly with the War Department on all matters of supply not involving questions of

policy.

In the following discussion of the services of supply the subjects of coordination of supply at the front, ocean tonnage, and replacements are included for convenience, though they were largely or entirely under the direct control of general staff sections at my headquarters.

### CO-ORDINATION OF SUPPLY

Our successful participation in the war required that all the different services immediately concerned with the supply of combat troops should work together as a well-regulated machine. In other words, there must be no duplication of effort, but each must perform its functions without inter-

ference with any other service. The fourth section of the general staff was created to control impartially all these services, and under broad lines of policy, to determine questions of transportation and supply in France and co-ordinate our supply services with those of the allies.

This section did not work out technical details, but was charged with having a general knowledge of existing conditions as to supply, its transportation, and of construction affecting our operations or the efficiency of our troops. It frequently happened that several of the supply departments desired the same site for the location of installations, so that all plans for such facilities had to be decided in accordance with the best interests of the whole.

In front of the advance depots, railroad lines and shipments to troops had to be carefully controlled, because mobility demanded that combat units should not be burdened with a single day's stores above the authorized standard reserve. Furthermore, accumulations at the front were exposed to the danger of destruction or capture and might indicate our intentions. Each combat division required the equivalent of twenty-five French railway car loads of supplies for its daily consumption to be delivered at a point within reach of motor or horse-drawn transportation. The regular and prompt receipt of supplies by combatant troops is of first importance in its effect upon the morale of both officers and men. The officer whose mind is pre-occupied by the question of food, clothing, or ammunition, is not free to devote his energy to training his men or to fighting the enemy. It is necessary that paper work be reduced to an absolute minimum and that the delivery of supplies to organizations be placed on an automatic basis as far as possible.

The principle of flexibility had to be borne in mind in planning our supply system in order that our forces should be supplied, no matter what their number, or where they might be called upon to enter the line. This high degree of elasticity and adaptability was assured and maintained through the medium of the regulating station. It was the connecting link between the armies and the services in the rear, and regulated the railroad transportation which tied them together. The regulating officer at each station was a member of the Fourth Section of my General Staff, acting under in-

structions from his chief of section.

Upon the regulating officer fell the responsibility that a steady flow of supply was maintained. He must meet emergency shipments of ammunition or engineering material, sudden transfers of troops by rail, the hastening forward of replacements, or the unexpected evacuation of wounded. All the supply services naturally clamored to have their shipments rushed through. The regulating officer, acting under special or secret instructions, must declare priorities in the supply of things the army needed most. ways informed of the conditions at the front, of the status of supplies, and of military plans and intentions, nothing could be shipped to the regulating station on in front of the advance depots except on his orders. The chiefs of supply services fulfilled their responsibilities when they delivered to the regulating officer the supplies called for by him, and he met his obligation when these supplies were delivered at the proper railheads at the time they were needed. The evacuation of the wounded was effected over the same railroad lines as those carrying supplies to the front, therefore, this control had also to be centralized in the regulating officer.

## LOCATION IMPORTANT

The convenient location of the regulating stations was of prime importance. They had to be close enough to all points in their zones to permit trains leaving after dusk or during the night to arrive at their destinations by dawn. They must also be far enough to the rear to be reasonably safe from capture. Only two regulating stations were actually constructed by us

in France, Is-sur-Tille and Liffol-le-Grand, as the existing French facilities were sufficient to meet our requirements beyond the reach of those stations.

As far as the regulating officer was concerned, supplies were divided into four main classes. The first class constituted food, forage and fuel, needed and consumed every day; the second, uniforms, shoes, blankets, and horse shoes, which wear out with reasonable regularity; the third, articles of equipment which require replacement at irregular intervals, such as rolling kitchens, rifles, and escort wagons; the fourth class covered articles, the flow of which depended upon tactical operations, such as ammunition and construction material. Articles in the first class were placed on an automatic basis, but formal requistion was eliminated as far as possible for all classes.

In order to meet many of the immediate needs of troops coming out of the line and to relieve to some extent the great strain on the railheads during active fighting, a system of army depots was organized. These depots were supplied by bulk shipment from the advance depots through the regulating stations during relatively quiet periods. They were under the control of the chiefs of the supply services of the armies and required practically no construction work, the supplies being stored in open places protected only by

dunnage and camouflaged tarpaulins.

The accompanying diagram illustrates graphically the supply system which supported our armies in France. The service of supply can be likened to a great resevoir divided into three main parts-the base depots, the intermediate depots, and the advance depots. The management of this reservoir is in charge of the commanding general services of supply, who administers its with a free hand, controlled only by general policies outlined to him from time to time. Each of the supply and technical services functions independently in its own respective sphere; each has its share of storage space in the base depots, in the intermediate depots, and in the advance depots. Then comes the distribution system, and here the control passes to the chief of the Fourth Section of the General Staff, who exercises his powers through the regulating stations.

### PURCHASING AGENCY

The consideration of requirements in food and material led to the adoption of an automatic supply system, but, with the exception of foodstuffs, there was an actual shortage, especially in the early part of the war, of many things, such as equipment pertaining to land transportation and equipment and material for combat. The lack of ocean tonnage to carry construction material and animals at the beginning was serious. Although an increasing amount of shipping became available as the war progressed, at no time was there sufficient for our requirements. The tonnage from the States reached about seven and one-half million tons to Dec. 31, 1918, which was a little less than one-half of the total amount obtained.

The supply situation made it imperative that we utilize European resources as far as possible for the purchase of material and supplies. our services of supply departments had entered the market of Europe as purchasers without regulation or co-ordination, they would have been thrown into competition with each other, as well as with buyers from the allied armies and the civil populations. Such a system would have created an unnatural elevation of prices, and would have actually obstructed the procurement of supplies. To meet this problem from the standpoint of economical business management, directions were given in August, 1917, for the creation of a General Purchasing Board to co-ordinate and control our purchases both among our own services and among the allies as well. The supervision and direction of this agency was placed in the hands of an experienced business man, and every supply department in the American Expeditionary

Forces was represented on the board. Agents were stationed in Switzerland, Spain, and Holland, besides the allied countries. The character of supplies included practically the entire category of necessities, although the bulk of our purchases consisted of raw materials for construction, ordnance, air equipment, and animals. A total of about 10,000,000 tons was purchased abroad by this agency to Dec. 31, 1918, most of which was obtained in France.

The functions of the purchasing agency were gradually extended until they included a wide field of activities. In addition to the co-ordination of purchases, the supply resources of our allies were reconnoitred and intimate touch was secured with foreign agencies; a statistical bureau was created which classified and analyzed our requirements; quarterly forecasts of supplies were issued; civilian manual labor was procured and organized; a technical board undertook the co-ordination, development, and utilization of the electric power facilities in France; a bureau of reciprocal supplies visced the claims of foreign governments for raw materials from the United States; and a general printing plant was established. Some of these activities were later transferred to other services as the latter became ready to undertake their control.

The principles upon which the usefulness of this agency depended were extended to our allies, and in the summer of 1918 the general purchasing agent became a member of the Inter-allied Board of Supplies. This board undertook, with signal success, to co-ordinate the supply of the allied armies in all those classes of material necessities that were in common use in all the armies. The possibility of immense savings were fully demonstrated, but the principles had not become of general application before the armistice.

#### OCEAN TONNAGE

Following a study of tonnage requirements, an officer was sent to Washington in December, 1917, with a general statement of the shipping situation in France as understood by the allied maritime council. In March, 1918, tonnage requirements for transport and maintenance of 900,000 men in France by June 30 were adopted as a basis upon which to calculate supply requisitions and the allocation of tonnage.

In April the allied maritime transport council showed that requirements for 1918 greatly exceeded the available tonnage. Further revisions of the schedule were required by the Abbeville agreement in May, under which American infantry and machine gun units were to be transported in British

shipping and by the Versailles agreement in June.

In July a serious crisis developed, as the allotment for August made the American Expeditionary Forces by the Shipping Control Committee was only 575,000 dead-weight tons, afterward increased to 700,000, whereas 803,000 tons (not including animals) were actually needed. It was strongly urged by me that more shipping be diverted from trades, and that a larger percentage of new shipping be placed in transport service.

Early in 1918 a scheme had been proposed which would provide priority for essential supplies only, based upon monthly available tonnage in sight. Although it was the understanding that calls for shipping should be based upon our actual needs, much irregularity was found in tonnage allotments.

# REPLACEMENTS OF PERSONNEL

Under the original organization project there were to be two divisions in each corps of six divisions which were to be used as reservoirs of replacements. One-half of the artillery and other auxiliaries of these two divisions were to be utilized as corps and army troops. They were to supply the first demands for replacements from their original strength, after which

a minimum of 3,000 men per month for each army corps in France was to be forwarded to them from the United States. It was estimated that this would give a sufficient reservoir of personnel to maintain the fighting strength of combat units, provided the sick and wounded were promptly returned to their own uits upon recovery.

The Thirty-second and Forty-first divisions were the first to be designated as replacement and depot divisions of the First Army Corps, but the situation soon became such that the Thirty-second Division had to be employed as a combat division. For the same reason all succeeding divisions had to be trained for combat, until June 27, when the need for replacements made it necessary to designate the Eighty-third as a depot division.

1. By the middle of August we faced a serious shortage of replacements. Divisions had arrived in France below strength, and each division diverted from replacement to combat duty increased the number of divisions to be

supplied and at the same time decreased the supply.

On Aug. 16 the War Department was cabled, as follows:

"Attention is especially invited to the very great shortage in arrivals of replacements heretofore requested. Situation with reference to replacements is now very acute. Until sufficient replacements are available in France to keep our proven divisions at full strength, replacements should by all means be sent in preference to new divisions."

At this time it became necessary to transfer 2,000 men from each of three combat divisions (the Seventh, Thirty-sixth, and Eighty-first) to the First Army in preparation for the St. Mihiel offensive.

By the time the Meuse-Argonne offensive was initiated the replacement situation had become still more acute. The infantry and machine gun units of the Eighty-fourth and Eighty-sixth divisions, then in the vicinity of Bordeaux, were utilized as replacements, leaving only a cadre of two officers and twenty-five men for each company. To provide immediate replacements during the progress of the battles new replacement organizations were formed in the zone of operations; at first, as battalions, and later, as regional replacement depots.

On Oct. 3, a cable was sent the War Department, reading as follows: "Over 50,000 of the replacements requested for the months of July, August and September have not yet arrived. Due to extreme seriousness of the replacement situation, it is necessary to utilize personnel of the Eighty-fourth and Eighty-sixth divisions for replacement purposes. Combat divisions are short over 80,000 men. Vitally important that all replacements due, including 55,000 requested for October, be shipped early in October. If necessary, some divisions in United States should be stripped of trained men and such men shipped as replacements at once."

Altogether seven divisions had to be skeletonized, leaving only one man per company and one officer per regiment to care for the records. As a further measure to meet the situation, the authorized strength of divisions was reduced in October by 4,000 men, thus lowering the strength of each infantry company to approximately 174 men. The thirty combat divisions in France at that time needed 103,513 infantry and machine gun replacements.

and only 66,490 were available.

Attention of the War Department was invited on Nov. 2 to the fact that a total of 140,000 replacements would be due by the end of November, and

the cable closed by saying:

"To send over entire divisions, which must be broken up on their arrival in France so we may obtain replacements that have not been sent as called for is a wasteful method, and one that makes for inefficiency; but as replacements are not otherwise available, there is no other course open to us. New and only partially trained divisions cannot take the place of older divisions that have had battle experience. The latter must be kept up numerically to the point of efficiency

### REMOUNTS

The shortage of animals was a serious problem throughout the war. In July, 1917, the French agreed to furnish our forces with 7,000 animals a month, and accordingly the War Department was requested to discontinue shipments. On Aug. 24, however, the French advised us that it would be impossible to furnish the number of animals originally stated, and Washington was again asked to supply animals, but none could be sent over until November, and then only a limited number.

Farly in 1918, after personal intervention and much delay, the French government made requisition on the country, and we were able to obtain 50,000 animals. After many difficulties the purchasing board was successful in obtaining permission, in the summer of 1918, to export animals from Spain, but practically no animals were received until after the armistice.

Every effort was made to reduce animal requirements—by increased motorization of artillery and by requiring mounted officers and men to walk—but in spite of all these efforts the situation as to animals grew steadily worse. The shortage by November exceeded 106,000, or almost one-half of all our needs. To relieve the crisis in this regard, during the Meuse-Argonne battle, Marshal Foch requisitioned 13,000 animals from the French armies and placed them at my disposal.

### RECLASSIFICATION

An important development in the Services of Supply was the reclassification system for officers and men. This involved not only the physical reclassification of those partially fit for duty, but also the reclassification of officers according to fitness for special duties. A number of officers were found unsuited to the duties on which employed. An effort was made to reassign these officers to the advantage of themselves and the army. A total of 1,101 officers were reclassified in addition to the disabled, and 270 were sent before efficiency boards for elimination. Nine hundred and sixty-two wounded or otherwise disabled officers were reclassified, their services being utilized to release officers on duty with the Services of Supply who were able to serve with combat units.

### CONSTRUCTION

Among the most notable achievements of the American Expeditionary Forces was the large programme of construction carried out by our Engineer troops in the Services of Supply and elsewhere. The chief projects were port facilities, including docks, railroads, warehouses, hospitals, barracks and stables. These were planned to provide ultimately for an army of 4,000,000, the construction being carried on coincident with the growth of the American Expeditionary Forces.

The port plans contemplated 160 new berths, including the necessary facilities for discharge of cargo, approximately one-half of which were completed at the time of the armistice. Construction of new standard-gauge railroad track amounted to 1,002 miles, consisting mainly of cut-offs, double tracking at congested points, and yards at ports and depots. Road construction and repair continued until our troops were withdrawn from the several areas, employing at times upward of 10,000 men, and often using 90,000 tons of stone per week.

Storage requirements necessitated large supply depots at the ports and in the intermediate and advance sections. Over 2,000,000 square feet of covered storage was secured from the French, but it was necessary to construct approximately 20,000,000 square feet additional. The base hospital centres at Mars and Mesves each with 4,000-bed convalescent camps, are

typical of the large scale upon which hospital accommodations were provided. The hospital city at Mars, of 700 buildings, covered a ground space of thirty-three acres and included the usual road, water, sewerage, and lighting facilities of a municipality.

Advantages of economy and increased mobility caused the adoption of the system of billeting troops. Billeting areas were chosen near the base ports, along the line of communications, and in the advanced zone, as strategical requirements dictated. The system was not altogether satisfactory, but with the number of troops to be accommodated no other plan was practicable. Demountable barracks were used for shelter to supplement lack of billets, 16,000 barracks of this type being erected, particularly at base ports where large camps were necessary. Stables at remount stations were built for 43,000 animals. Other construction included refrigerating plants, such as the one at Gievres with a capacity of 6,500 tons of meat and 500 tons of ice per day; and mechanical bakeries like that at Is-sur-Tille with a capacity of 800,000 pounds of bread per day. If the buildings constructed were consolidated, with the width of a standard barrack, they would reach from St. Nazaire across France to the Elbe River in Germany, a distance of 730 miles.

In connection with construction work, the Engineer Corps engaged in extensive forestry operations, producing 200,000,000 feet of lumber, 4,000,000 railroad ties, 300,000 cords of fuel wood, 35,000 pieces of piling, and large

quantities of miscellaneous products.

#### TRANSPORTATION CORPS

The Transportation Corps as a separate organization was new to our army. Its exact relation to the supply departments was conceived to be that of a system acting as a common carrier operating its own ship and rail terminals. The equipment and operation of port terminals stands out as a most remarkable achievement. The amount of tonnage handled at all French ports grew slowly, reaching about 17,000 tons daily at the end of July, 1918. An emergency then developed as a result of the critical military situation, and the capacity of our terminals was so efficiently increased that, by Nov. 11, 45,000 tons were being handled daily.

The French railroad, both in management and material, had dangerously deteriorated during the war. As our system was super-imposed upon that of the French it was necessary to provide them with additional personnel and much material. Experienced American railroad men brought into our organization, in various practical capacities, the best talent in the country, who, in addition to the management of our own transportation, materially aided the French. The relation of our transportation corps to the French railroads and to our own supply departments presented many difficulties, but these were eventually overcome and a high state of efficiency established.

It was early decided, as expedient for our purposes, to use American rolling stock on the French railroads, and approximately 20,000 cars and 1,500 standard gauge locomotives were brought from the United States and assembled by our railroad troops. We assisted the French by repairing with our own personnel 57,885 French cars and 1,947 French locomotives. The lack of rolling stock for allied use was at all times a serious handicap, so that the number of cars and locomotives built and repaired by us was no small part of our contribution to the allied cause.

## QUARTERMASTER CORPS

The Quartermaster Corps was able to provide a larger tonnage of supplies from the States than any of the great supply departments. The operations of this corps were so large and the activities so numerous that they can best be understood by a study of the report of the commanding general services of supply.

The Quartermaster Corps in France was called upon to meet conditions never before presented, and it was found advisable to give it relief. portation problems by sea transport and by rail were handled by separate corps organized for that purpose, and already described. Motor transport was also placed under an organization of its own. The usual routine supplies furnished by this department reached enormous proportions. Except for the delay early in 1918 in obtaining clothing and the inferior quality of some that was furnished, and an occasional shortage in forage, no army was ever better provided for. Special services created under the quartermaster corps included a remount service, which received, cared for, and supplied animals to troops; a veterinary service, working in conjunction with the remount organization; an effects section and baggage service; and a salvage service for the recovery and preparation for ressue of every possible article of personal equipment. Due to the activities of the salvage service, an estimated saving of \$\$5,000,000 was realized, tonnage and raw material were conserved, and what in former wars represented a distinct liability was turned into a valuable asset.

The graves registration service, also under the quartermaster corps. was charged with the acquisition and care of cemeteries, the identification and reburial of our dead, and the correspondence with relatives of the deceased. Central cemeteries were organized on the American battlefields, the largest being at Romagne-sous-Montfaucon and at Thiaucourt in the Woevre. All territory over which our troops fought was examined by this service, and, generally speaking, the remains of our dead were assembled in American cemeteries and the graves marked with a cross or six-pointed star and photographed. A few bodies were buried where they fell or in neighboring French or British cemeteries. Wherever the soldier was buried his identification tag, giving his name and army serial number, was fastened to the marker. A careful record was kept of the location of each grave.

#### SIGNAL CORPS

The Signal Corps supplied, installed, and operated the general service of telephone and telegraphic communications throughout the zone of armies, and from there to the rear areas. At the front it handled radio, press, and intercept stations; provided a radio network in the zone of advance; and also managed the meteorological, pigeon, and general photographic services. Our communication system included a cable across the English Channel, the erection of 4,000 kilometres of telephone and telegraph lines on our own poles, and the successful operation of a system with 215,500 kilometres of lines.

The quantity and importance of gasoline engine transportation in this war necessitated the creation of a new service known as the Motor Transport Corps. It was responsible for setting up motor vehicles received from America, their distribution, repair, and maintenance. Within the zone of the services of supply, the Motor Transport Corps controlled the use of motor vehicles, and it gave technical supervision to their operation in the zone of the armies. It was responsible for the training and instruction of chauffeurs and other technical personnel. Due to the shortage of shipments from America, a large number of trucks, automobiles, and spare parts had to be purchased in France.

## RENTING, BEQUISITION

A renting, requistion, and claims service was organized in March, 1918, to procure billeting areas, supervise the quartering of troops with an organization of zone and town majors, and to have charge of the renting, leasing, and requisitioning of all lands and buildings required by the American Expeditionary Forces. Under the provisions of an act of Congress, ap-

proved in April, 1918, the Claims Department was charged with the investigation, assessment, and settlement of all claims "of inhabitants of France or any other European country not an enemy or ally of an enemy" for injuries to persons or damages to property occasioned by our forces. The procedure followed was in accordance with the law and practice of the country in question. The efficient administration of this service had an excellent effect upon the people of the European countries concerned.

The various activities of the Services of Supply which, at its heighth on Nov. 11, 1918, reached a numerical strength in personnel of 668,312, including 23,772 civilian employees, can best be summed up by quoting the telegram sent by me to Major-General James G. Harbord, the commanding general, Services of Supply, upon my relinquishing personal command of the First Army.

"I want the S. O. S. to know how much the First Army appreciated the prompt response made to every demand for men, equipment, supplies, and transportation necessary to carry out the recent operations. Hearty congratulations. The S. O. S. shares the success with it."

### MUNITIONS

Our entry into the war found us with few of the auxiliaries necessary for its conduct in the modern sense. The task of the Ordnance Department in supplying artillery was especially difficult. In order to meet our requirements as rapidly as possible, we accepted the offer of the French government to supply us with the artillery equipment of 75's, 155 mm. howitzers, and 155 G. P. F. guns from their own factories for thirty divisions. The wisdom of this course was fully demonstrated by the fact that, although we soon began the manufacture of these classes of guns at home, there were no guns of American manufacture of the calibre mentioned on our front at the date of the armistice. The only guns of these types produced at home which reached France before the cessation of hostilities were 109 75 mm. guns. In addition, twenty-four 8-inch howitzers from the United States reached our front and were in use when the armistice was signed. Eight 14-inch naval guns of American manufacture were set up on railroad mounts, and most of these were successfully employed on the Meuse-Argonne front under the efficient direction of Admiral Plunkett of the navy.

### AVIATION

In aviation we were entirely dependent upon our allies, and here again the French government came to our aid until our own programme could be set under way. From time to time we obtained from the French such 'planes for training personnel as they could provide. Without going into a complete discussion of aviation material, it will be sufficient to state that it was with great difficulty that we obtained equipment even for training. As for up-to-date combat 'planes, the development at home was slow, and we had to rely upon the French who provided us with a total of 2,676 pursuit, observation, and bombing machines. The first airplanes received from home arrived in May, and altogether we received 1,379 'planes of the De Haviland type. The first American squadron completely equipped by American production, including airplanes, crossed the German lines on Aug. 7, 1918. As to our aviators, many of whom trained with our allies, it can be said that they had no superiors in daring and in fighting ability. During the battles of St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne our aviators excelled all others. They have left a record of courageous deeds that will ever remain a brilliant page in the annals of our army.

#### TANKS

In the matter of tanks, we were compelled to rely upon both the French and the English. Here, however, we were less fortunate for the reason that our allies barely had sufficient tanks to meet their own requirements. While our Tank Corps had limited opportunity, its fine personnel responded gallantly on every possible occasion and showed courage of the highest order. We had one battalion of heavy tanks engaged on the English front. On our own front we had only the light tanks, and the number available to participate in the last great assault of Nov. 1 was reduced to sixteen as a result of the previous hard fighting in the Meuse-Argonne.

#### CHEMICAL WARFARE

The Chemical Warfare Service represented another entirely new departure in this war. It included, many specialists from civil life. With personnel of a high order, it developed rapidly into one of our most efficient auxiliary services. While the early employment of gas was in the form of clouds launched from special projectors, its use later on in the war was virtually by means of gas shells fired by the light artillery. One of the most important duties of the Chemical Warfare Service was to insure the equipment of our troops with a safe and comfortable mask and the instruction of the personnel in the use of this protector. Whether or not gas will be employed in future wars is a matter of conjecture, but the effect is so deadly to the unprepared that we can never afford to neglect the question.

#### ADMINISTRATION

The general health of our armies under conditions strange and adverse in many ways to the our American experience and mode of life was marvelously good. The proportionate number of men incapacitated from other causes than battle casualties and injuries was low. Of all deaths in the American Expeditionary Forces (to Sept. 1, 1919) totaling \$1,141, there were killed in action, \$5,556; died of wounds received in battle, 15,130; other wounds and injuries, 5,669, and died of disease, 24,786. Therefore, but little over two-sevenths the total loss of life in the American Expeditionary Forces was caused by disease.

Our armies suffered from the communicable diseases that usually affect troops. Only two diseases have caused temporarily excessive sick rates, epidemic diarrhoea and influenza, and of these influenza only, due to the fatal complicating pneumonia, caused a serious rise in the death rate. Both prevailed in the armies of our allies and enemies and in the civilian population of Europe.

Venereal disease has been with us always, but the control was successful to a degree never before attained in our armies or in any other army. It has been truly remarkable when the environment in which our men lived is appreciated. The incidence of venereal disease varied between 30 and 60 per 1,000 per annum, averaging under 40. Up to September, 1919, all troops sent home were free from venereal disease. The low percentage was due largely to the fine character of men composing our armies.

Hospitalization represented one of the largest and most difficult of the medical problems in the American Expeditionary Forces. That the needs were always met and that there was always a surplus of several thousand beds, were the results of great effort and the use of all possible expedients to make the utmost of resources available. The maximum number of patients in hospital on any one day was 193,026, on Nov. 12, 1918.

Evacuation of the sick and wounded was another difficult problem, especially during the battle periods. The total number of men evacuated in the one of the armies was 214,467, of whom 11,281 were sent in hospital trains

to base ports. The number of sick and wounded sent to the United States up to Nov. 11, 1918, was 14,000. Since the armistice 103,028 patients have been sent to the United States.

The army and the Medical Department was fortunate in obtaining the services of leading physicians, surgeons, and specialists in all branches of medicine from all parts of the United States, who brought the most skilful talent of the world to the relief of our sick and wounded. The Army Nurse Corps deserves more than passing comment. These women, working tirelessly and devotedly, shared the burden of the day to the fullest extent with the men, many of them submitting to all the dangers of the battle front.

### RECORDS, PERSONNEL

New problems confronted the Adjutant General's Department in France. Our great distance from home necessitated records, data, and executive machinery to represent the War Department as well as our forces in France. Unusually close attention was paid to individual records. Never before have accuracy and completeness of reports been so strictly insisted upon. Expedients had to be adopted whereby the above requirements could be met without increasing the record and correspondence work of combat units. The organization had to be elastic to meet the demands of any force maintained in Europe.

A Statistical Division was organized to collect data regarding the special qualifications of all officers and to keep an up-to-date record of the location, duties, health, and status of every officer and soldier, nurse, field clerk, and civilian employee, as well as the location and strength of organizations. The Central Records Office at Bourges received reports from the battle front, evacuation camps, and base hospitals, convalescent leave areas, reclassification camps, and base ports, and prepared for transmission to the War Department reports of individual casualties. Each of the 209,590 casualties was considered as an individual case. A thorough investigation of the men classed as "missing in action" reduced the number from 14,000 to the signing of the armistice to twenty-two on Aug. 31, 1919.

In addition to printing and distributing all orders from general headquarters the adjutant-general's department had charge of the delivery and collection of official mail, and finally of all mail. The Motor Despatch Service operated twenty courier routes, over 2,300 miles of road, for the quick despatch and delivery of official communications. After July 1, 1918, the Military Postal Express Service was organized to handle all mail official and personal, and operated 169 fixed and mobile post offices and a railway postoffice service.

While every effort was exerted to maintain a satisfactory mail service, frequent transfers of individuals, especially during the hurried skeletonizing of certain combat divisions, numerous errors in addresses, hasty handling, and readdressing of mail by regimental and company clerks in the zone of operations, and other conditions incident to the continuous movement of troops in battle, made the distribution of mail an exceedingly difficult problem.

## INSPECTION, DISCIPLINE

The inspector-general's department, acting as an independent agency not responsible for the matters under its observation, made inspections and special investigations for the purpose of keeping commanders informed of local conditions. The inspectors worked unceasingly to determine the manner in which orders were being carried out, in an effort to perfect discipline and team play.

The earnest belief of every member of the Expeditionary Forces in the justice of our cause was productive of a form of self-imposed discipline among our soldiers, which must be regarded as an unusual development of this war, a fact which materially aided us to organize and employ in an increditably short space of time the extraordinary fighting machine developed in France.

Our troops generally were strongly imbued with an offensive spirit essential to success. The Veteran divisions had acquired not only this spirit, but the other elements of fine discipline. In highly trained divisions commanders of all grades operate according to a definite system calculated to concentrate their efforts where the enemy is weakest. Straggling is practically eliminated; the infantry, skilful in fire action and the employment of cover, gains with a minimum of casualities; the battalion, with all its accompanying weapons, works smoothly as a team in which the parts automatically assist each other; the artillery gives the infantry close and continuous support; and unforseen situations are met by prompt and energetic action.

This war has only confirmed the lessons of the past. The less experienced divisions, while aggressive, were lacking in the ready skill of habit. They were capable of powerful blows, but their blows were apt to be awkard—teamwork was often not well understood. Flexible and resourceful divisions can not be created by a few manoeuvres or by a few months' association of their elements. On the other hand, without the keen intelligence, the endurance, the willingness, and enthusiasm displayed in the training area, as well as on the battlefield, the successful results we obtained so quickly would have been utterly impossible.

## MILITARY JUSTICE

The commanders of armies, corps, divisions, separate brigades, and certain territorial districts, were empowered to appoint general court-martial. Each of the commanders had on his staff an officer of the Judge Advocate General's Department, whose duty it was to render legal advice and to assist in the prompt trial and just punishment of those guilty of serious infractions of discipline.

Prior to the signing of the armistice, serious breaches of discipline were rare, considering the number of troops. This was due to the high sense of duty of the soldiers and their appreciation of the seriousness of the situation. In the period of relaxation following the cessation of hostilities, infractions of discipline were naturally more numerous, but not even then was the number of trials as great in proportion to the strength of the force as is usual in our service.

It was early realized that many of the peace-time methods of punishment were not the best for existing conditions, In the early part of 1918, it was decided that the award of dishonorable discharge of soldiers convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, would not be contemplated, except in the most serious cases. To remove these soldiers temporary from their organizations, division commanders were authorized to form provisional temporary detachments to which such soldiers could be attached. These detachments were retained with their battalions so that offenders would not escape the dangers and hardships to which their comrades were subjected. Wherever their battalion was engaged, whether in front-line trenches or in back areas, these men were required to perform hard labor. Only in emergency were they permitted to engage in combat. Soldiers in these disciplinary battalions were made to understand that if they acquitted themselves well, they would be restored to full duty with their organizations.

All officers exercising disciplinary powers were imbued with the purpose of these instructions and carried them into effect. So that nearly all men

convicted of miltary offenses in combat divisions remained with their organizations and continued to perform their duty as soldiers. Many redeemed themselves by rendering valiant service in action and were released from the further operation of their sentences.

To have the necessary deterrent effect upon the whole unit, court-martial for serious offenses usually imposed sentences considerably heavier than would have been awarded in peace times. Except where the offender earned remission at the front, these sentences stood during hostilities. At the signing of the armistice, steps were at once taken to reduce outstanding sentences to the standards of peace time.

## PROVOST MARSHAL

On July 20, 1917, a provost marshal general was appointed with station in Paris, and later the department was organized as an administrative service with the provost marshal general functioning under the first section, general staff. The department was developed into four main sections—the military police corps which served with divisions, corps, and armies and in the sections of the service of supply; the prisoner of war escort companies; the criminal investigation department; and the circulation department. It was not until 1918 that the last-mentioned department became well trained and efficient. On Oct. 15, 1918, the strength of the corps was increased to 1 per cent. of the strength of the American Expeditionary Forces, and provost marshals for armies, corps and divisions were provided.

The military police of the American Expeditionary Forces developed into one of the most striking bodies of men in Europe. Wherever the American soldier went, there our military police were on duty. They controlled traffic in the battle zone, in all villages occupied by American troops, and in many cities through which our traffic flowed; they maintained order, so far as the American soldiers were concerned, throughout France and in portions of England, Italy, Belgium, and occupied Germany. Their smart appearance and military bearing and the intelligent manner in which they discharged their duties left an excellent impression of the typical American on all with whom

they came in contact.

### APPRECIATION

In this brief summary of the achievements of the American Expeditionary Forces it would be impossible to cite in detail the splendid ability, loyalty, and efficiency that characterized the service of both combatant and non-combatant individuals and organizations. The most striking quality of both officers and men was the resourceful energy and common sense employed, under all circumstances in handling their problems.

The highest praise is due to the commanders of armies, corps, and divisions, and their subordinate leaders, who labored loyally and ably toward the accomplishment of our task, suppressing personal opinions and ambitions in the pursuit of the common aim; and to their staffs, who developed, with battle experience, into splendid teams without superiors in any army.

To my chiefs of staff—Major-General James G. Harbord, who was later placed in command of the services of supply, and Major-General James W. McAndrews—I am deeply indebted for highly efficient services in a post of

great responsibility.

The important work of the staff at general headquarters in organization and administration was characterized by exceptional ability and a fine spirit of co-operation. No chief ever had a more loyal and efficient body of assistants.

The officers and men of the services of supply fully realized the importance of their duties, and the operations of that vast business system

were conducted in a manner which won for them the praise of all. They deserve their full share in the victory.

The American civilians in Europe, both in official and private life, were decidedly patriotic and loyal, and invariably lent encouragement and helpfulness to the armies abroad.

The various societies, especially their women, including those of the theatrical profession, and our army nurses, played a most important part in brightening the lives of our troops and in giving aid and comfort to our sick and wounded.

The navy in European waters, under command of Admiral Sims, at all times cordially aided the army. To our sister service we owe the safe arrival of our armies and their supplies. It is most gratifying to record that there has never been such perfect understanding between these two branches of the service.

Our armies were conscious of the support and co-operation of all branches of the government. Behind them stood the entire American people, whose ardent patriotism and sympathy inspired our troops with a deep sense of obligation, of loyalty, and of devotion to the country's cause never equalled in our history.

Finally the memory of the unflinching fortitude and heroism of the soldiers of the line fills me with greatest admiration. To them I again pay the supreme tribute. Their devotion, their valor, and their sacrifices will live in the hearts of their grateful countrymen.

In closing this report, Mr. Secretary, I desire to record my deep appreciation of the unqualified support accorded me throughout the war by the President and yourself. My task was simplified by your confidence and wise counsel. I am, Mr. Secretary,

Very respectfully,

JOHN J. PERSHING.

General, Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces.

## ADJUTANT GENERAL'S REPORT

## WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

## FINAL CASUALTIES TO FEBRUARY 7, 1920 Total Casualties..... 302.612 TOTAL DEATHS ..... 77.118 The list of total casualties by States, except New York, with the number of dead among the men from each State, is as follows. Casualties Dead. State Casualties 1 classifier 35,042 1 classifier 18,264 1 classifier 16,007 Massachusetts 13,505 Dead. 7,898 4,260 4,082 2,955 2,562 2,751 2,367 Massachusetts 13,505 Missouri 10,385 Michigan 10,686 New Jersey 10,166 Texas 10,138 Wisconsin 9,813 Minnesota 7,232 Lowa 7,311 2,367 2,722 2,649 2,133 2,161 Wisconsin Minnesota Lowa Lowa California Connecticut Oklahoma Tennessee Virginia Vorth Carolina Indiana Lentucky Kansas Alabama Georgia West Virginia South Carolina Maryland Montana Washington Washington Wostas Worth Dakota Maryland Mostana Washington Mostasas Arkansas Ark 1,747 1,265 1,471 1,836 1,635 6.650 6,358 6,130 5,799 5,766 5,380 1,610 1,510 1,436 1,270 1,251 1,530 1,063 New York led the list of casualties 5.160 with a total of 40,222. In detail these are. 4,018 3,919 3,812 3,443 Officers Men ,138 975 Killed in action 254 Died of disease 70 Dred of wounds 84 Died of wounds 44 Drowned 0 4,782 1,958 1,839 206 4,528 1,888 1,755 162 3,443 42 37 16 42 47 17 10 1 3 Studies Murder or homicide. Other known causes. Cause undetermined Presumed dead Malas Malas Journal South Dekota Colorado Oregon Rhode Island New Hampshire John John Florida -ermont Utah New Mexico District of Columbia Wyoming Arizona Delaware Nevada Alaska Jawaii Jouro Rico 43 193 40 188 2,000 2.160 1,867 1,759 69 Totals ..... 476 8,720 9.196 PRISONERS 409 467 300 802 228 .351 Unaccounted for ...... 1,170 26 802 839 860 773 835 877 233 150 87 71 6 4 676 WOUNDED 11,989 10,561 12,476 11,033 Hawaii Pouto Rico Philippine Islands Canal Zone 6,610 28,946 30,149

Canada's Casualty Record in the Great War


The following total is compiled by the Director of Records from official Canadian sources. It shows the casualties reported up to and including November 30, 1919. The figures were supplied by the Director of Records, December 3, 1919, and were issued by the Canadian Bureau of Information, New York:

Officers Killed in action and died	Other L. Ranks.	Total.
of wounds 2,559 Accidentally killed 5	8	51,116
Died of disease	143,510	4,905 148,859 5,102
Missing Deaths in Canada	2,633	2,633
8,392	204,293	*212,685

Total prisoners of war	236	3.493	3,729
Repatriated	204	3.086	3 290
C E F, Siberia Forces	4 ac	cidentally	killed.
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Enlistments up to Novembe	r 15.	1918+	595.441
Sailings for England			418 052
Sailings to Siberia			4 214
Total that went overse	28		422 266


<sup>\*</sup> Represents nearly 3 per cent. of Canada's total population of 8,000,000. †Over 7 per cent. of population. ‡Five per cent. of population.



























COPYRIGHT, 1919, BY THE J N MATTHEWS CO . BUFFALO, N. Y.








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
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










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






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